



**A HISTORY OF THE
PEACE CONFERENCE
OF PARIS**

First printed 1921

PRINTED IN ENGLAND
AT THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
BY FREDERICK HALL

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
EDITED BY

H. W. V. TEMPERLEY

VOL. IV



*Published under the auspices of the Institute of
International Affairs*



HENRY FROWDE AND HODDER & STOUGHTON
THE LANCET BUILDING
1 & 2 BEDFORD STREET, STRAND, W.C. 2

1921

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EDITORIAL FOREWORD

THE publication of the first three volumes of this work resulted in the production of much helpful suggestion and criticism from both sides of the water, of which advantage will be taken in this and the two remaining volumes. But, as the attempt to write contemporary history is in some sense both audacious and strange, it may be well to state briefly what experience has shown that this history can, and cannot, do.

The Peace Conference was undoubtedly in the main the work of Four, or perhaps more often of Three, men. In not a few important decisions, as for instance Reparation, Compulsory Military Service, and Poland, it is well known that the solutions adopted were directly due to the influence of one or other of these commanding personalities. But even if the records of the conversations of these men were available (and some of them certainly never will be) we should not have the whole truth. Agreements are not always in writing, stenographic reports do not invariably show the trend of a debate, and the motives of individuals are seldom entirely visible in their arguments. Much valuable information has already been published by such men as Tardieu or Lansing and House, who stood on the steps of the throne, and men like C. T. Thompson and Wilson Harris, who waited in the ante-chambers. More is certain to be forthcoming. But it is practically certain that some of the 'arcana' of the Conference will never really be revealed.

One suggestion made is that the motives of men can be understood by estimating the pressure to which they were subjected. This would involve estimating the relative pressure exercised on their plenipotentiaries, first by the American,

British, French, or Italian legislatures, and next by popular opinion as revealed in the press and in public meetings. But to estimate the exact importance at critical moments of the Conference of a great press organ or of a great public demonstration demands both more space than any history, and more judgment than any editor, can at this time provide.

On the other hand, the contributions of Keynes and of Baruch, of Haskins and of Lord, have revealed much that is of the highest importance in showing the influence (and incidentally the limitations) of expert opinion at the Conference. It is, in fact, far more possible to reveal the general spirit inspiring a Commission in its recommendations than to gauge the motives of an individual or the influence of popular opinion on him. The methods and decisions of the Commissions were relatively known and exact, more reducible to a formula, and therefore far more intelligible than were the decisions of the 'Four' or of the 'Ten'. It is really possible to give the executive acts and decisions of the Conference and to supply expert comment on them which will show a good deal, though not all, of the processes leading to these results. Where the results were altered by the 'Four' it is possible to state the fact, but the real explanation is not always known and, when known, it cannot always be revealed.

In addition to this it is possible to analyse and make fully known the published correspondence of both Allied and Enemy Powers, with respect to the various stages of the Treaty negotiations. It is likewise possible to examine and to estimate the value of that vast mass of evidence, ethnic, economic, and historic, by which the rival States justified their claims on the heritage of the old Austria-Hungary. By these public pronouncements the Great Powers in the one case, and the Small Powers in the other, will ultimately be judged, and therefore every effort has been made to give representative selections and quotations from this enormous mass of material. As no such extensive publication of correspondence or documents

has ever been made in the case of any treaties previous to those signed at Paris, the reader has excellent materials for judgment provided that the selection has been properly made.

Two further points appear to be worth mentioning. The fourth and fifth volumes deal with the reconstruction or founding of new States upon the ruins of Old Austria-Hungary. The highly interesting questions of the new status assumed by the Dominions and by Japan, as a result of the war and of the Peace Conference, are reserved for treatment in Volume VI. But it may be a question whether the result of the war was not in fact more important in that it stimulated national consciousness in the Western Hemisphere rather than in the east and centre of Europe. It will also be necessary to give some discussion of American affairs, as the attitude of the Senate produced important diplomatic results. The other subjects for Volume VI will be Poland and Russia, Shantung, the Turkish Treaty, and the League of Nations, and a general summary of the lessons of the Conference.

Much help has been received from many quarters, but it would be invidious to mention any names except those of persons whose work has been actually quoted or used in the text. Mr. A. G. Ogilvie's absence in America has prevented his directing the work of the geographical side, and his place has been very difficult to fill. Some valuable suggestions have, however, been adopted both from Mr. A. G. Ogilvie on the geographical side and from Mr. Leon Dominian on the ethnographic. The statistical details, which are of great importance in Vols. IV and V, have been revised by Mr. B. C. Wallis.

It should be mentioned that the publication of the fourth and fifth, as of the preceding, volumes was only rendered possible by the public-spirited action of Mr. T. W. Lamont.

It seems desirable, in conclusion, to emphasize once more that the Editor has sought to steer a course equally remote from official apologetics and unofficial jeremiads. Within reasonable limits he has even encouraged the contributors to

express their individual points of view. For while it is in selection of facts that the experts can perceive the views of a writer, the general reader can only discern the writer's bias if he expresses his opinions with relative freedom. The purpose of this History will be achieved if the materials and authorities quoted in these volumes enable the reader to criticize any opinions expressed by editor or contributors. •

PLAN OF THE VOLUME

THE schème follows generally the lines of the preceding volumes but with some important differences. The main problem in the case of Germany was the defeat and punishment of a great military Power. The same problem is offered in the case of a small military Power such as Bulgaria, but the case of Austria-Hungary involves the dissolution of a Dual Monarchy embracing fifty millions of subjects, and the attempt to construct on its ruins the foundations of four new States.

The volume opens with the military defeat of Bulgaria, which was the prelude to the collapse of the Dual Monarchy. The military collapse of Austria-Hungary is next treated, but treated in a very different fashion, for that military collapse came primarily not from external assault but from internal disunion. It is therefore not a purely military study but an explanation of how nationalistic tendencies reacted upon centralist traditions, and finally broke to pieces a great military machine. The political collapse of Austria-Hungary is next treated from the standpoint of history and politics and of the singular results produced by the unique political relationships of Austria and of Hungary. Its dissolution is explained by the fact that its condition was essentially static, and therefore ultimately rendered it unable to divert or to oppose the tremendous political forces which the war had released or created.

The second chapter deals in a brief general way with the Armistices and attempts to give a bird's-eye view of the problems of the peace. The third chapter relates the stages by which Disarmament was successfully imposed on the three defeated nations. With the fourth we face the problems of

the new nationalities—the Yugo-slavs, the Rumans, and the Czecho-Slovaks (Poland being reserved for the sixth volume). The story of how these nationalities developed self-consciousness during the war and realized their dreams after the Armistice is then told with relative fullness, as it forms a necessary prelude to the understanding of the Conference.

The fifth chapter brings before us the main difficulty of the Peace Conference, the Treaty of London, and the obligations it imposed on the Allies.

The sixth chapter examines the plebiscites connected with these treaties as realized in the Klagenfurt Basin, and as proposed at Teschen, Orava, Zips, and in German West Hungary.

The seventh chapter relates the details of the negotiations of the treaties with Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary respectively, and examines the important question as to how far the Wilsonian principles were actually applied in these settlements. The full legal analysis, which was indispensable in dealing with the German Treaty, is not necessary here because the obligation to apply the Wilsonian principles in the Austrian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian Treaties was in the main a moral and not a legal one. But much pains have been taken to examine the principles underlying the Treaties, and extensive quotations have been made from both the Allied and Enemy correspondence in reference to the Treaties. It was needless and would have been impossible to quote at the same length as from the German Treaty, but the materials given enable the reader to grasp the arguments for and against all the important clauses of the three Treaties, and to form his independent judgment thereon.

The volume closes with two chapters, one on the New Bulgaria, and the other dealing with the New Austria and the New Hungary. In each case an attempt has been made to look at the problem from the point of view of the State concerned and to outline its prospects for the future.

In this scheme there are certain important subjects reserved

for Volume V. The great question of Reparation for Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria is fully dealt with there. The Economic Clauses and Commercial Policy, and the whole question of Enemy Property and Debts, are treated at considerable length not only in these Treaties but in the German. The fifth volume also includes the great question of the Treaties for the Protection of Minorities, a most important instrumentality for the future.

•It should be understood both for Volumes IV and V that they do not attempt to cover events occurring after the end of March 1921, though a later date has been added in one or two cases for the sake of completeness.

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CHAPTER I

THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTRAL POWERS

PART I

THE MILITARY COLLAPSE OF BULGARIA

A. THE BALKAN CAMPAIGNS (1915-18)

1. *Introductory.* The collapse of Bulgaria had a very great influence not only on Central Europe but on the Western Front. Ludendorff described the day when he heard of the defection of Bulgaria as an even blacker day for Germany than the 8th August, when the British Army attacked him in the West. It is therefore of importance to examine the events which led up to a catastrophe so striking and important in itself. In reality it was, of course, only one of a huge series of combined movements on that vast battle-field which stretched across three continents. Success against Bulgaria would not have been possible without the Germans being held in the West, the Austrians in the centre, and the Turks in the East. Yet not only was it one of the most dramatic and successful of all these movements, but for Central Europe it was the most important, for it led directly not only to the Bulgarian but also to the Turkish armistices, and exercised an important influence on the Austro-Hungarian and the German. This was because the position of Bulgaria across the Berlin-Bagdad railway lent her an importance out of all proportion to her resources and power. As Ludendorff wrote, 'The Entente could attack Constantinople through Bulgaria.'¹

2. *The outbreak of the Great War, July 1914; Turkey's entry, October 1914, and Bulgaria's decision to join the Central Powers, September 1915.* In July 1914 war broke out between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. This conflict did not at first involve any of the other Balkan States except Montenegro, who immediately threw in her lot with Serbia. Turkey

¹ Ludendorff, *The General Staff and its Problems*, vol. ii, p. 680.

ranged herself with Germany and Austria in October 1914, strongly influenced by her fear of Russia and by German diplomacy backed by the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*.

Bulgaria bided her time. The influence of Russia had greatly diminished and that of Austria-Hungary had grown, largely owing to the personal leanings of King Ferdinand towards the latter group. In the meantime, however, she entered into active negotiations with both groups of belligerents. As the price of her neutrality she obtained from Turkey a strip of territory west of the Maritza river which secured her connexion by rail via Karagatch (Adrianople Station) with her new territories in Western Thrace. She negotiated also with the Entente, and at their suggestion Serbia was offering her territorial concessions in Macedonia when Bulgaria entered the war.¹ If the German campaign against Russia in 1915 had not been such a convincing success and if the British campaign in the Dardanelles had not been a failure, Bulgaria might have joined the side of the Entente and been rewarded with a part of the coveted Macedonia. The events of 1915 seem to have led her to the erroneous conclusion that the war was rapidly nearing its end, that Germany could not lose, and that her own best policy was to join the Central Powers. Until this conclusion was falsified by military events Bulgaria remained a staunch supporter of the Central Powers.

Bulgaria mobilized her army on the 21st September 1915, and declared war on Serbia on the 14th October. From the east and south-east she attacked with twelve strong divisions, whilst Field-Marshal von Mackensen with a German-Austrian force, crossing the Danube, simultaneously invaded Serbia from the north. By the middle of December this led to the complete occupation of Serbia and Montenegro by the Central Powers, the administration of these countries being divided between Bulgaria and Austria, Germany retaining in her own hands the administration of the railways. Henceforward the policy of Bulgaria became an entirely selfish one. The lessons of past experiences had sunk deep and she was fully convinced that the only way to secure new territory for herself was to

¹ v. the evidence in Report of Commission, Responsibility of Authors of the War, 29th March 1919, *American Journal of International Law*, January-April, 1920, vol. xiv, p. 105. The agreement with Turkey was signed 22 July 1915.

be in possession of it at the moment hostilities ceased, and that all other military objectives were for her merely a snare. She determined to concentrate all her efforts on holding Macedonia. Unlike Turkey, therefore, she steadily repulsed all German and Austrian attempts to get her to pool her resources and place her troops freely at the disposal of the German Higher Command. Bulgarian strategy also was entirely governed by this policy.

3. *General situation of the Allies at the date of Bulgaria's entry into the war ; Allies land at Salonica, October 1915.* The general situation of the Allies at the date of Bulgaria's entry into the war was as follows :

On the Western Front quiet had reigned throughout the summer. On the Eastern Front the Germans had defeated the Russian Armies and forced their front back after a successful break-through in Galicia. On the Italian Front the Italians had attacked repeatedly but without marked success. The Franco-British expedition had failed to get through the Dardanelles and everything there was at a standstill.

The end of the summer campaign in Russia enabled the Germans to transfer troops southwards for the conquest of Serbia and westwards to reinforce the Western Front in time to meet the powerful offensive of the Allies near Loos and in Champagne in September 1915.

When attacked from the north and east Serbia appealed to the Entente for assistance. After the war of 1913 Serbia and Greece had formed a defensive alliance and furthermore Serbia had obtained special rights to the port of Salonica and on the railway from Salonica to Serbia.¹ Greece should therefore have come to the help of Serbia in the autumn of 1915, and M. Venizelos, who was then Prime Minister, actually ordered the mobilization of the Greek Army and invited the Entente to land troops at Salonica to assist the Serbs. King Constantine, however, doubtless greatly influenced by his wife, the Kaiser's sister, and by the Kaiser himself, disapproved of this policy and drove Venizelos from power. He interpreted the Treaty with Serbia of the 19th May 1913 for mutual defence and reciprocal guarantee in a purely local sense, refused to help

¹ v. Convention relative to transit through Salonica concluded between Greece and Serbia 10th May 1914. *American Journal of International Law*, October 1919, supplement, pp. 441-56. The Defensive Treaty between Greece and Serbia of 19th May 1913 is given in C. Strupp, *La Situation internationale de la Grèce*, Zurich, 1920, pp. 220-1.

Serbia, and put every possible obstacle in the way of Allied troops short of actually fighting them.

Allied troops from the Dardanelles began to land at the beginning of October and were later joined by troops, both French and British, from the Western Front, too late, however, to unite with the Serbian Armies and to stem the advance of the Bulgars into Serbia. The French and British troops were driven back over the Greek frontier by the middle of December after a gallant but unsuccessful attempt to join up with the Serbs. The latter were driven westwards through Albania to the Adriatic coast.

Owing to the fatigue of their troops, the state of their communications, and probably also owing to the fact that as they were not quite sure of the attitude of the Greeks, they did not wish to break the neutrality of Greece, the German and Bulgarian Armies did not advance beyond the Greek frontier on Salonica. There more Entente troops were daily arriving, and it was rapidly being transformed into a very strongly entrenched fortress.

The entry of Bulgaria into the war and the defeat of Serbia enabled direct communication with Turkey to be established by the Central Powers. The latter were no longer obliged to smuggle their war material through Rumania, were able to give Turkey direct assistance and to tap the vast resources of the East to relieve their own economic situation.

4. *The situation in the spring of 1916; Bulgar offensive begins (May).* The early months of 1916 were spent by the Allies in the Balkans in the completion of the defences of Salonica whilst the remnants of the Serbian Army which had been collected at Corfu and Bizerta were brought to Salonica and reorganized.¹ The bulk of the Bulgarian Army was on the Greek frontier, stiffened by two German divisions and a considerable number of other German technical troops, such as Artillery, Machine Guns, and German Flying Corps. There they began to organize an elaborate defensive system and to improve communications behind it.

¹ They numbered about 150,000 men in all. Subsequently these were increased by over 10,000 Yugo-slav volunteers from America and some 10,000 Yugo-slav deserters and prisoners from the Austro-Hungarian Army. In addition one Yugo-slav volunteer division was practically annihilated in the Dobrudja, and Yugo-slav contingents fought for the Entente in Siberia and in the Archangel-Murmansk area.

In the meanwhile the German offensive at Verdun had begun, and the Austrians were preparing to attack on the Italian Front. For the offensive against Verdun most of the German divisions had been withdrawn from Serbia, whilst the Austrians had reinforced the Italian Front from the Russian. To the German offensive against Verdun the Allies responded with the fifth Isonzo battle and with a series of Russian attacks on the Eastern Front beginning at the end of March and culminating in the amazingly successful operations of Brussiloff against the Austrians in June and July. The Entente were also preparing a big counter-offensive to start in July on the Western Front. Great pressure was brought to bear on Rumania both by the Entente and the Central Powers, to induce her to join in the war; doubtless influenced by the great Russian victories in the East and the far larger promises of reward which the Entente could offer her in case of victory, Rumania declared war on Austria-Hungary on the 27th August, 1916.

The months from April to June on the Macedonian Front saw a gradual moving up of Allied troops towards the Greek frontier north and west of Salonica, and the preparations of a line to serve either as an advanced position to resist an enemy attack or as a 'jumping-off' place for an Allied offensive. This entailed much building of roads, light railways, and improvements of communications generally. The Bulgars, having prepared their communications up to the Greek frontier, decided to increase their gains in Macedonia and to take the offensive in the direction of Salonica. By May the German and Bulgarian Governments had obtained King Constantine's consent to an advance on the part of their armies into Greek territory. In consideration of a loan of £3,000,000 Constantine pledged himself, not only not to resist the advance, but even to allow their armies to occupy certain frontier forts such as Rupel Fort and the port and defences of Kavalla, whilst the Greek troops in the surrendered territory were to allow themselves to be interned by the Germans.¹

At the end of May the Bulgar Armies crossed the frontier, occupying Rupel and Demir-Hissar in the Seres Plain and the port and defences of Kavalla.

5. *Allied Operations in Macedonia, August-December 1916.*

¹ v. Official publication of Greek Government (1917). Cf. also C. Strupp, *La Situation internationale de la Grèce* (1821-1917), Zurich, 1920.

In accordance with the Allied general plan General Sarrail, who commanded the Allied Armies in Macedonia, was also preparing an offensive for the end of August, to be launched at the same time as the offensive by Rumania began.¹ The Russians renewed operations, whilst on the Western Front the battle of the Somme was entered upon in a mighty and universal effort to defeat the enemy. Sarrail's plan was to advance up the Vardar Valley with the majority of the British and French troops available whilst the Serbian Army on the west advanced to Monastir, Prilep, and Uskub. This advance started on the 15th August with some successful preliminary operations south-west of Lake Doiran.

The offensive which the Bulgarians had been preparing was ready, and was set in motion as the best means of countering the Allied attack. Their main thrust was delivered south of Monastir across the Greek frontier, east of Florina and thence eastwards. This advance, successful at first, was ultimately held up by the Serbs in the Gornichevo Pass and on the range of the Malka Nidze, after some very severe fighting. At the same time the Eastern Bulgarian Army advanced farther into eastern Macedonia up to the line of the Struma river, where it was held up by British troops. The losses of the Bulgars in the fighting on the West had been very heavy. To quote Ludendorff, 'their offensive and their spirit collapsed together. The Tsar of Bulgaria and Radoslavoff, who were in Pless at the beginning of September, were full of laments and demanded German troops.'

Sarrail, who had had to give up his movement up the Vardar Valley in order to reinforce both his flanks, decided to take advantage of the state of the Bulgars on the West and started a counter-offensive in the latter half of September, having in the meantime been further reinforced by three Russian and three Italian brigades. The British, who were now holding a very extended front from the mouth of the Struma to the Vardar (90-100 miles), undertook a series of successful subsidiary operations with a view to retaining enemy forces on their front. The operations across the river Struma were particularly successful, the Bulgars suffering very heavy

¹ Rumania, after signing a secret Treaty with the Entente, 17th August 1916 (*q. v. A.*, pp. 225-6), declared war on Austria-Hungary, and invaded Transylvania on 27th August.

casualties through making repeated counter-attacks in mass formation.

On the West, Serbian, French, and Russian troops pushed the Bulgars back to the positions they had occupied in August, where they were held up for a while; the most notable and severe fighting in these operations being that which led to the capture of the Peak of Kaimakchalan (8,300 ft.) by the Serbs under General Vassić. In consequence of these Bulgarian reverses the German Higher Command were obliged to send further German reinforcements and General Otto von Below to take command of the German and Bulgarian troops in Macedonia.

In the middle of October the Allied offensive was renewed, and after severe fighting in the Cerna Loop, Monastir fell and was reoccupied by the Serbs on the 18th November. In spite of the exhaustion of the Allied troops and of the lack of reinforcements further attacks were made on the German-Bulgarian positions north of Monastir. The German reinforcements had, however, arrived, and by putting in their last ounce of strength succeeded in beating off all Allied attacks. The effect of these operations, however, was very considerable. The recapture of Monastir produced a very great moral effect on the Serbs, whilst the fighting which preceded it proved that the new Serbian Army was a wonderful instrument of war and in every way the equal of those Serbian armies which had inflicted such severe defeats on the Austro-Hungarians earlier in the war.

The German Higher Command were compelled to send to Macedonia German troops which had really been intended for their campaign against Rumania, whilst there could be no longer any question of taking further Bulgarian troops from the Macedonian Front to assist in that campaign. The Bulgarian Army had been considerably shaken, for not only had its offensive against Salonica failed but it had been beaten back with heavy losses and had lost Monastir. It seems quite likely that, if the Allies had had a few more troops available in Macedonia or if the Greek Army had then been fighting by their side, what was accomplished with such far-reaching results in 1918 could have been achieved in 1916.

6. *Rumania's invasion of Transylvania and the enemy counter-offensive.* On the 27th August Rumania had joined in the war, on the side of the Entente, and had initiated an

invasion of Transylvania which at first met with considerable success. Whilst concentrating troops in Hungary for a counter-offensive Field-Marshal von Mackensen, with a mixed force of German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish troops, attacked the Southern Rumanian Front in the Dobrudja. The Russians had not given much help, and the Rumanians had to detach more troops to hold up this attack. The German-Austro-Hungarian offensive in Transylvania was launched in the second half of September and by the middle of October the Rumanian invasion had been definitely thrown back.

By the middle of October further concentration of German-Austrian troops having been carried out, the second phase of the campaign against Rumania was entered upon, Mackensen attacking in the Dobrudja, where he met with great success. The German Armies from the West and North-west advanced on Rumania, which they overran rapidly, Bucharest falling on the 5th December. After occupying the whole of the Dobrudja and Wallachia, they came to a halt on the line from the mouth of the Danube along that river to and including Braila and thence north-eastwards along the Lower Sereth and across to the Carpathians where the line joined up with the old Russian front. This successful campaign secured for the Central Powers vast oil and corn supplies which were to prove of such enormous importance in the war and also opened a new route (via Constanza) both to Constantinople and to Trans-Caucasia, whence Germany was able to draw upon further economic assets.

7. *The Greek Revolution and deposition of King Constantine, 1916-17.* Indignation amongst the Greek population in Macedonia at the invasion by the Bulgars and at King Constantine's studied inaction, led to the 'Salonica Revolution' of the 30th August. A Committee of National Defence was formed which called upon Venizelos to come and place himself at its head. He came and, together with Admiral Conduriotis and General Danglis, formed a Government of National Defence at Salonica. Macedonia, Crete, and the Islands of the Archipelago sided with him, and he raised a Corps of National Defence which was placed at the disposal of the Allied Commander-in-Chief and which gave a very good account of itself in the course of the next two years.

During the autumn of 1916 the situation in Greece became very serious. Pro-German propaganda and King Constantine's

belief in the invincibility of the German Army culminated in the incidents of the 1st December at Athens, in which British and French sailors and marines were treacherously attacked, whilst many of Venizelos's partisans were subjected to outrageous indignities and even imprisoned or shot. This event led to the recognition of Venizelos's Government as a *de facto* Government by the Allies, to the blockade of the Greek coast by the Allied Navies, and to an Allied ultimatum to Greece forcing King Constantine to transfer the bulk of his troops to the Morea (14th December 1916). The Allied Armies in Macedonia had to detach strong forces to watch the northern frontier of Old Greece in case of failure to transfer the troops and of the resulting possibility of attack by Greek Royalist troops. M. Venizelos's position improved in the spring of 1917 with the gradual adherence of various parts of Greece to his Government. In June M. Jonnart was sent as Allied High Commissioner to Athens, where he persuaded Constantine to leave Greece, and to 'design as his successor' his second son Alexander (11th June).¹ Venizelos and his Government were restored to power and the whole of Greece then joined in the war on the side of the Allies.

8. *The situation at the end of 1916; plans for 1917.* The end of 1916, with the arrival of the winter, brought active operations to a comparative standstill on all fronts. Both sides, though in a very exhausted condition, were making plans for the 1917 campaign and paying the greatest attention to the reorganization of their armies, man-power, and material and economic resources. Germany, in particular, took in hand the reorganization of her weaker Allies and the economic organization of their territories. In Bulgaria this took the form of a very elaborate system of requisition of foodstuffs under German supervision, a large contribution being sent to Germany every month. The Allied plan of campaign for 1917, conceived at the Chantilly Conference in November 1916, consisted of a series of offensives on all fronts. The Central Powers decided to adopt a defensive policy, to resist the Allied offensives and ultimately to launch counter-offensives. In the Balkans, Bulgaria was determined to follow her traditional policy of holding on to all she had got and had no desire to

¹ v. documents in Strupp, *La Situation internationale de la Grèce*, Zurich, 1920, p. 249.

renew an offensive which might prove as costly as her attempt in 1916. Her policy therefore became a purely defensive one.

9. *Operations in the Balkans, 1917.* Whilst on the Western Front there took place the great offensives of the French in Champagne and the British at Vimy, in Macedonia the spring of 1917 witnessed a series of attacks made by the Allies with varying success. The most important operations were an attack by the French north-west of Monastir and between Lakes Prespa and Ochrida, in which they captured a number of prisoners but failed to make substantial progress; whilst the British on the 24th April and again early in May attacked the very strong Bulgar positions south-west of Lake Doiran. These attacks were only partially successful and very heavy casualties were suffered by the attacking troops. The Bulgar showed himself to be a very good and stubborn fighter when defending strongly entrenched positions and supported by a considerably superior artillery with a large percentage of German personnel. He, however, undertook no counter-offensives, and for the remainder of the year no large operations were entered upon by either side on the Macedonian Front. The Bulgar forces, however, were kept constantly on the alert and their *moral* was considerably affected by continuous operations on a small scale and raids, in which the Allies proved themselves almost invariably superior.

Two divisions and two mounted brigades from the British Army were sent to reinforce General Allenby's army for his forthcoming campaign in Palestine; whilst in the autumn Venizelos had begun to mobilize the Royal Greek Army. The progress was slow and very gradual as much of the equipment and clothing for the army had to be provided from France and Great Britain. Its training was undertaken by a French Mission and later on completed behind the Front under French and British instructors.

10. *Operations on other Fronts. Russian and Rumanian armistices, 1917.* On other fronts, however, great events were happening. On the Western Front the Allies continued their offensive operations with considerable success, particularly at Cambrai in November. In Italy the Italians made successful attacks on the Isonzo Front in August and September, but these were followed by the great disaster of Caporetto which led to the withdrawal of the Italian Front to the line of the

Piave river. In Rumania fighting took place on the Sereth, but the reorganized Rumanian Army fought well at Mărășești (the 'Rumanian Verdun') against superior numbers and held its ground. In Palestine General Allenby's campaign started in August and resulted in the occupation of Jerusalem on the 9th December, whilst in Mesopotamia, after occupying Bagdad, the British had advanced farther up the Euphrates and the Tigris towards Mosul. In Russia, however, Bolshevism gradually got a stronger hold, the Russian Armies practically ceased fighting and armistice negotiations commenced early in December at Brest-Litovsk. As a consequence the position of Rumania became untenable and similar armistice negotiations were entered upon at Focsani in December.

11. *The situation at the end of 1917 ; early operations 1918.* The close of 1917 thus found the Central Powers in a strong position, as the end of their campaigns in the East released large numbers of troops for their Western and Southern Fronts, and at the same time provided them with new and wide fields from which they could draw extensive supplies of all kinds, and thus alleviate to a certain extent the economic pressure of the Blockade.

The German Higher Command decided therefore to employ their renewed strength in a desperate attempt to secure final victory before the arrival of the Americans could decisively affect the situation in favour of the Entente. For this purpose large numbers of troops were transferred from the East to the West, whilst the Bulgarian Third Army, which occupied the Dobrudja, was reduced to very small dimensions, the greater part (60,000 men) being sent to reinforce the Macedonian Front and to relieve further German units for the Western Front.

In December 1917 General Sarrail was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies by General Guillaumat. During the winter and spring the equipping, organizing, and training of the Greek Army were carried on with all speed. In March 1918 the first division of the Royal Greek Army appeared on the front and by June a whole Corps was in the line under the orders of General Milne, the British Commander-in-Chief. As a consequence of the German offensive on the Western Front in March, a considerable number of British and French troops had to be sent from Macedonia to France, and British

and French divisions, which hitherto comprised 12 battalions, were reorganized on the 9-battalion basis.

In May two divisions of the Greek Corps of National Defence carried out a very successful operation in the high mountains west of the Vardar, taking a very strongly organized Bulgarian salient known as the Srka di Legen and over 2,000 prisoners.

12. *The appearance of war-weariness in the Bulgarian Army, 1918.* In Bulgaria and in the army a very marked feeling of war-weariness and discontent began to manifest itself at the end of 1917 and in the spring of 1918. In the army this was partly due to bad food and lack of clothing, and partly to the fact that the Bulgar peasant was thoroughly tired of the war and thought with longing of his neglected farm; nor could he see the object of going on with the war after Bulgaria had obtained by conquest all she could hope for. To him it appeared that Germany was the only party who would derive any benefit from further fighting. Much disappointment was also caused by the failure of the collapse of Russia and the German victories in the West to bring peace.

In the country the Treaty of Bucharest further increased the discontent and irritation against Germany, already created by the wholesale requisition of supplies. By this Treaty the Bulgars saw their ambitions in the Dobrudja only partially satisfied. Bulgaria, who claimed the whole of the Dobrudja up to the Danube, had only been given that portion lying to the south of the Cernavoda-Constanza railway. The latter was kept in Bulgarian hands, whilst Northern Dobrudja was placed under the joint administration of the Central Powers (Turkey included).¹ In addition, the Turkish Government claimed as compensation from Bulgaria the return of the districts east of the Maritza and round Adrianople ceded to her in 1915.² Other grievances of Bulgaria against Germany were due to the unequal distribution of Rumanian spoils, to the failure of promised supplies from the Ukraine, to the suspicion of German intentions as regards Seres, Drama, and Kavalla in the event of Constantine's restoration to the Greek throne, and to suspicion of German support to the various Turkish claims in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace. All this, together with the failure of the Germans to break through on the

¹ Ludendorff, *War Memories*, vol. i, p. 356.

² *v. supra*, p. 2.

Western Front, brought about the fall of Radoslavoff (August) and the entry into power of Malinoff with a Cabinet, some of whose members were openly in favour of securing an early peace ; this was an unmistakable sign that the German hold on Bulgaria was rapidly weakening.

The German Higher Command were keenly alive to the fact that the Italian and Macedonian Fronts were merely a prolongation of the Western Front and formed the protection of their flanks, the Macedonian Front at the same time protecting the flank of Austria-Hungary. They endeavoured to remedy the state of affairs in the Bulgarian Army by taking closer control and arranging for better food and clothing supplies. In May and June they called upon the Bulgarian Armies to undertake offensive operations intended to synchronize with the German attacks on the Western Front and to prevent the sending of reinforcements by the Allies from Macedonia to France. The Bulgarian attacks, however, were very half-hearted and in some cases never materialized at all owing to the refusal of the troops to advance. They openly declared that they were willing to defend their positions but not to attack, several minor mutinies occurring in regiments which were ordered to take part in attacks. These facts show how consistently the *moral* of the Bulgarian Army had deteriorated and how its offensive spirit had been destroyed by war-weariness and exhaustion, and yet throughout 1918 until its final defeat the Bulgar soldier showed himself as stubborn and gallant as ever in defence and counter-attack.

When later the Bulgarian Government feared the impending Allied attack and asked for German reinforcements the German Higher Command, not fully realizing the magnitude of the attack and unable to spare troops from the sorely pressed Western Front, advised the Bulgars to form adequate reserves and, if necessary, to give up a certain amount of ground.

13. *Decision to undertake large-scale operations in the Balkans.* In June General Guillaumat was replaced by General Franchet d'Esperey, a bold and brilliant leader, who rapidly became convinced of the possibilities of an offensive on a large scale on the Macedonian Front as soon as the greater portion of the Greek Army was mobilized. He immediately started the process of thinning out the line and replacing good

14 COLLAPSE OF THE CENTRAL POWERS

but tired British, French, and Serbian troops by fresh Greek troops, and thus collecting a reserve which, when rested, was to form the striking force to be thrown into the battle at the decisive point. By July the Second Greek Corps had arrived at the Front. In the latter half of July the Supreme War Council at Versailles communicated to General Franchet d'Esperey its decision that the armies under his command were to take part in the Allied general counter-offensive which Marshal Foch had opened on the 18th July at Soissons.

The Bulgarian Army held the Front from the river Devoli in Albania to the Aegean, a distance of about 230 miles, with some 210,000 rifles, 4,000 sabres, and 1,270 guns (including 345 heavy).

To oppose these the Allies disposed of 190,000 rifles, 8,000 sabres, and 1,520 guns (including 325 heavy), i. e. they were slightly inferior to the Bulgar forces in rifles and heavy guns.

14. *Enemy dispositions.* The enemy's dispositions were very largely influenced by the physical conditions of this theatre of war and his armies were consequently grouped according to well-defined geographical sectors :

(i) The Eleventh German Army (about 98,000 rifles) held the sector from the Devoli to the Dzena Massif (about 120 miles). The Army and Corps Staffs were German, the troops mainly Bulgarian, with the bulk of the forces across the Monastir Plain and in the loop of the river Cerna.¹ It was based on the Vardar Valley railway and supplied by a light railway from Gradsko to Prilep and down the Monastir Plain, by roads from Uskub through the Tetovo-Kičevo Pass, from Veles through the Babuna Pass and from Demir-Kapu to Konopiste.

(ii) The First Bulgar Army (about 52,000 rifles) held the sector from Dzena across the Vardar to the crest of the Beles Mountains (about 35 miles) just north of Lake Doiran ; its line of communication was the Vardar Valley railway and its branch from Hudovo to Dedeli.

(iii) The Second Bulgar Army (about 40,000 rifles) held the sector along the crest of the Beles and then across the Struma river and down its valley to south of Seres (about 55 miles) ; its line of communication was the Struma Valley light Railway

¹ At the moment of the offensive only three or four battalions in this army were German.

to the northern end of the Rupeš Pass and the roads in the Strumica and Struma Valleys.

(iv) The Fourth Bulgar Army (about 20,000 rifles) held the sector from Seres to the Gulf of Orfano and thence along the coast to the mouth of the Maritza river ; its line of communication was the Drama-Dedeagach-Adrianople Railway.

Lateral communications between the Eleventh and First Armies were bad as, except by the Vardar and Cerna Valleys, they were blocked by the Dzena Massif. Between the First and Second Armies, however, the Strumica Valley with its good road afforded excellent lateral communication.

15. *Allied dispositions.* The Allies were organized into three armies and an independent Corps.

(i) On the right General Sir George Milne's Army (about 65,000 rifles) composed of (a) British troops : 1 Cavalry Brigade, 4 Divisions, 1 independent Infantry Brigade and Heavy Artillery ; (b) Greek troops : 1 Cavalry Regiment, 5 Infantry Divisions. This army held the sector from the Gulf of Orfano to west of the Vardar (about 100 miles).

(ii) The First French Corps (about 22,000 rifles) of 1 French and 2 Greek Divisions, acting as a connecting link between British and Serbian Armies, held a very mountainous sector from west of the Vardar to Nonte (about 20 miles).

(iii) The two Serbian Armies (about 37,000 rifles) of 1 Cavalry and 6 Infantry Divisions, reinforced by 2 French Divisions and French Heavy Artillery, commanded by the Prince-Regent of Serbia with Marshal Mishitch as Chief of Staff, held the sector from Nonte to the eastern arm of the Cerna river (about 30 miles).

(iv) The French Armée D'Orient (about 66,000 rifles) of 1 French Cavalry Brigade and 5 French Divisions and French Heavy Artillery, commanded by General Henrys, held the sector from the river Cerna across the Monastir Plain to the river Devoli (about 80 miles).

In Albania an Italian Corps opposed to an Austrian one carried on the line to the Adriatic. Both these Corps, however, were under the direct orders of their respective G.H.Q. at home and worked independently of the forces in Macedonia.

16. *The Allied Plan of Attack.* Hitherto only three lines of attack had been considered possible :

(i) Across the Struma Plain towards Drama and Kavalla, and north through the Rupeš Pass.

(ii) Up the Vardar Valley.

(iii) Up the Monastir Valley to Prilep and thence to the Vardar Valley.

At the suggestion of Marshal Mishitch, General Franchet d'Esperey adopted a bold plan of action, which certainly contained that very valuable aid to victory—surprise—but which would have been impossible of achievement for troops not possessing the special qualities of the Serbian soldier.

The plan aimed at the dislocation of the Bulgarian Armies. This was to be brought about in the following manner :

(i) A main operation with the object of reaching the zone Kavadar—confluent of the Cerna and Vardar rivers, this region forming the heart of the communications of the Eleventh German and First Bulgarian armies. This main operation entailed :

(a) Breaking through the hostile front on the sector Sokol-Vetrenik.

(b) Capture of Koziak mountain and the watershed between the Cerna and Boshoba rivers, thus ensuring the separation of the Bulgarian forces.

(c) The widening of the gap to east and west.

(ii) A subsidiary operation in the Vardar-Lake Doiran sector.

(iii) Exploitation on the whole front by all the Allied forces.

This plan was remarkable for the selection of the sector for the 'break-through' attack. In this sector the Bulgarian forces held the heights of the Moglena Mountains overlooking the Allied positions and communications. The Bulgar positions were strongly entrenched, the country behind was very mountainous and with bad communications. In rear of the front system only a few mountain peaks were entrenched as strong points. Owing to the extraordinary natural strength of this position it was only lightly held. Six battalions held a front of nearly 10 miles and these were to be attacked by three whole divisions. It was also the point of junction of the 2nd and 3rd Bulgar Divisions.

17. *The 'break-through', 15th September 1918.*¹ In order to obtain the full effect of surprise preliminary operations were undertaken by the British and Greek in the Vardar and Struma

¹ Allenby's offensive, which began on 18th September and destroyed the Turkish Army in Palestine, was also of great importance (v. Vol. I, p. 31).

Valleys respectively. Their object was to deceive the enemy as to the real point of attack and to prevent his reinforcing the threatened sector. On the 14th September the general bombardment of the whole line was commenced, and on the 15th September just after dawn one Serbian and two French divisions of the Second Serbian Army were launched to the attack of the positions from Sokol to Vetrenik. By the evening they had carried the whole front system on a 7-mile front after some very severe fighting. On the 16th the second system was carried including the height of Koziak, whilst the gap was widened to 15 miles; the First Serbian Army on the West, and Franco-Greek troops on the East, having extended the front of attack. That afternoon the Timok and Yugo-slav Divisions of the Second Serbian Army passed through the attacking divisions, which were very exhausted by heavy fighting and continual climbing, the two French Divisions alone, which had started with very low effectives, losing over 2,000 casualties in 36 hours in the course of this attack.

On the 17th the advance was continued with the object of definitely separating the Bulgar forces in the valley of the Cerna from those in the Vardar Valley, the Second Serbian Army swinging round north-eastwards to advance on the line Demir-Kapu-Krivolak, whilst the First Army advanced northwards on the line Gradsko-Prilep.

The 'break-through' had been successfully accomplished.

On the 18th the subsidiary operation was set in motion. General Milne's Anglo-Greek forces attacked the Bulgarian First Army north and south of Lake Doiran, where it held positions of great natural strength, improved by three years' constant work. North of the lake the attack was carried out by the Cretan Division, supported by the British 28th Division; south of the lake by the 22nd and 26th British and the Greek Seres Divisions. North of the lake the attack failed to penetrate the main Bulgarian position in spite of heavy fighting. South of the lake the attack was very successful at first, but after repeated counter-attacks by the Bulgars the Allied gains were confined to holding the whole Bulgar front system.

On the 19th the attack south of the lake was renewed with great gallantry, but only succeeded in partially taking the Bulgar second line. The fighting had been very severe, very heavy casualties being suffered by both sides. The effect of

this attack, however, was very considerable as it pinned down the First Bulgarian Army to its position and even obliged it to put in all its reserves in this fighting, thus preventing it from sending badly needed help to the Eleventh German Army and from protecting its own line of communication against the advance of the victorious Serbs.

18. *The pursuit and retreat.* In the meantime the Serbian Armies were advancing very rapidly. By the 22nd they had reached the Vardar at Demir-Kapu, Krivolak and Gradsko, thus cutting the line of communication of the First Bulgarian and Eleventh German Armies.

The position of the First Bulgarian Army had become very serious directly its line of communication up the Vardar Valley was threatened by the advance of the Serbian Second Army. For there existed only one other route by which it could be extricated, namely, the road through the Kosturino Pass from the Vardar Valley to that of the Strumica. On the 21st the troops west of the Vardar withdrew from their positions, crossed the Vardar, and began the retreat of the First Army. On the 22nd the troops between the Vardar and Lake Doiran began their retirement. Although strongly pressed by Allied troops the retirement of this army was effected in good order at first, their rear-guards offering considerable resistance in a country eminently suitable for rear-guard actions. In the retreat up the pass, however, the enemy became utterly disorganized, the road and entrance to the pass being blocked for miles with troops, guns, and transport offering wonderful targets to the British aeroplanes who bombed and machine-gunned them incessantly for two days.

On the 24th the Allied forces had reached the line Lake Doiran-Hudovo-Demir-Kapu-Krivolak and preparations were made for the attack of the mountain ranges east of the Vardar, which were carried in the course of the next two days. The British entered Bulgarian territory on the 25th and occupied Strumica on the following day. On this day also the heights of the Beles (north of Lake Doiran) were stormed by Anglo-Greek troops, whilst on the left the Serbs entered Štip (Ishtip).

The First Bulgarian Army, short-headed in its retreat northwards by the Serbs at Štip, continually pressed by the Anglo-Greek Army, was now forced to withdraw down the Strumica Valley and across the mountains to the north of it,

towards the Struma Valley, i. e. the line of communications of the Second Army. The Anglo-Greek Army swung eastwards in pursuit with the object of striking at the Struma Valley communications. On the 28th and 29th British aeroplanes found the Kresna Pass choked with the retreating enemy, whose Struma Army was now in danger, and again did great execution. It was within a day's march of the Rupel Pass when the armistice was signed on the 29th September.

The Serbian Second Army had advanced up the Bregalnitsa Valley and its cavalry had reached Tsarevoselo on the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier, only 60 miles from Sofia. Meanwhile, in the west, rapid progress had been made towards the disruption of the Eleventh Army. The front of attack had been extended by the French Armée D'Orient, whilst the wedge in the enemy's line had been increased. By the 23rd the First Serbian Army had reached the line Gradsko-Prilep, the Eleventh German Army being thus practically cut in two. The western portion of the latter was left with only one very indifferent and devious route to regain touch with the rest of the Bulgarian Army, or its base, viz. the road through the Tetovo Pass (4,500 ft.) to Uskub. Their only alternative was the unattractive one of a withdrawal through the roadless mountains of Albania. Part of the eastern portion had retired north-eastwards through the Babuna Pass on Veles, whilst the remains of the 2nd and 3rd Bulgar Divisions had been driven across the Vardar towards Štip by the Second Serbian Army. The First Serbian Army, continuing their wonderful advance northwards on Uskub, occupied Veles on the 25th and by the evening of the 29th had reached Levterce (south-east of Uskub) and Kliseli, whilst the French Cavalry Brigade entered Uskub on the 29th after an extraordinary four days' ride across the mountains (8,000 ft. high) which separate Prilep from Uskub. The Eleventh German Army of the Bulgars was thus completely cut off.

North of Monastir the Allied troops were slowly driving back the Eleventh Army out of the Monastir Plain into the mountainous regions of the west towards the mouth of the Tetovo Pass and Albania. The Eleventh Army put up a strong resistance, but by the 29th French and Italian troops were nearing Kičevo, whilst farther west they had occupied Resna and had advanced into Albania reaching the Elbassan road. At midday on the 30th September operations against Bulgaria

ceased in accordance with the terms of an armistice signed the previous evening in Salonica.

19. *The Armistice (29th September)*. On the 26th a Bulgarian *parlementaire* presented himself to the British outposts in the Strumica Valley. He was the bearer of a letter from the Commander-in-Chief of the Bulgarian Army asking for a forty-eight hours' suspension of hostilities with a view to arranging an armistice. The suspension of hostilities was refused, but the Bulgar Commander-in-Chief was informed that if accredited representatives of the Bulgarian Government were sent to negotiate an armistice, they would be received. On the 28th a Delegation consisting of M. Liaptcheff, Minister of Finance, General Lukoff commanding the Second Bulgarian Army, and M. Radeff, ex-Minister at Berne and Bucharest, crossed the British lines, arriving in Salonica on the evening of the same day. On the 29th General Franchet d'Esperey handed to them the Allied terms. The Bulgar Delegates, after consulting their Government at Sofia by wireless, signed the Armistice Convention that evening.

By the terms of this Convention :

- (i) Hostilities between the Allies and Bulgaria were to cease at 12 noon on the 30th September.
- (ii) All Bulgarian units west of Uskub became prisoners of war.
- (iii) The remainder of the Bulgarian forces were to be withdrawn into Bulgaria and demobilized immediately with the exception of 3 Divisions which Bulgaria was allowed to retain to guard her Turkish frontier and the railways.
- (iv) The Allies were to have all facilities for the transport of their troops through Bulgaria for further operations, and the right to occupy any strategic point they wished.
- (v) All German and Austrian subjects in Bulgaria were to leave the country within four weeks.
- (vi) All Allied prisoners of war were to be given up at once.¹

20. *The nature of the Defeat*. The nature of these terms indicates the extent of the Bulgarian defeat. The majority of

¹ v. text in Appendix I, pp. 511-12, and also Chap. II, pp. 120-1, for further discussion.

the Eleventh Army was completely cut off from its line of communication and bases, the First Army cut off from its line of communication, and thrown back in disorder upon the already over-burdened line of communication of the Second Army, whilst Allied troops were already on the verge of cutting this last line of communication.

During the fifteen days' fighting over 15,000 prisoners and 400 guns were taken. By the surrender of the Eleventh Army these numbers were increased to over 100,000 prisoners, 800 guns, and several thousand machine guns; supplies and stores of all kinds lost by the enemy comprised practically all the war material belonging to the Eleventh and First Armies.

Thus did the Allied troops crush the Bulgarian Army in the course of this fortnight's campaign.

Military history will no doubt acknowledge this campaign as a typical example of the two classic forms of decisive strategical operations against lines of communication: (a) the complete interception of an army; (b) the driving away of an army from its line of communication and forcing it to form front to a flank, as the consequences of a successful 'break-through'.

B. CAUSES OF THE COLLAPSE

21. *Allied Generalship and fighting qualities; Bulgar moral.* Events are still too recent to enable one to determine accurately all the causes of the Bulgarian collapse.

It was primarily the consequence of the thoroughness and severity of the reverse the Bulgar Army had suffered at the hands of the Allied Armies. This in turn was due to a bold plan, skilfully executed. Full credit must be given to the Serbian Armies, whose marvellous fighting and marching powers alone rendered the success of the 'break-through' possible, to the French who actually made the gap, to the British and Greeks who attacked repeatedly with great gallantry and devotion positions almost impregnable, held by superior numbers of the best Bulgarian Divisions, and, after suffering very severe casualties, took up the pursuit with much vigour and dash.

The Bulgar Army was ripe for defeat. It was decidedly war-weary and had suffered very heavy casualties since its entry into the war in 1915. Over 100,000 killed, died of wounds

or sickness (sickness accounted for 24,000), or missing, 150,000 wounded. These figures do not include prisoners of war or the casualties suffered during the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, which amounted to 50,000 killed, died of wounds, and missing, and about 120,000 wounded. It will be seen what a very heavy drain of the man-power of a population of little over four million, Bulgaria had suffered.

Disappointment with the Treaty of Bucharest, bad economic conditions due to the Blockade, and the consistent requisitioning of foodstuffs by the Germans had caused great discontent throughout the country. This had begun to spread to the army and, together with general distrust of the Germans and Turks, had gradually lowered Bulgarian *moral*. The Bulgars, however, were anxious to maintain their hold on the occupied territories and nothing short of a crushing military defeat would have made them give up their conquests. Ludendorff in his *War Memories*¹ has suggested that the Bulgarian Army did not fight, but simply went home. This suggestion is without foundation and does not bear examination. It appears to cast an undeserved slur upon the Bulgarian soldier's fighting qualities with which all who have fought against him are well acquainted, and at the same time to belittle the victory of the Allied troops in Macedonia. It is hardly supported by the casualty list on either side.

Although lack of *moral*, undoubtedly due to some extent to political propaganda, had helped to make the Bulgarians incapable of undertaking offensive operations, this lack of *moral* seems to have had but little effect when they themselves were attacked. The fighting at Sokol and Doiran was as hard as any that has taken place in the Balkans and the casualties on both sides were correspondingly high. After the 'break-through' and capture of the fortified system the Bulgarians felt themselves out-manceuvred, and instances then occurred in which their troops made little or no resistance.

22. *Weakness of the Bulgarian dispositions.* The great weakness of the Bulgarian Army's dispositions lay in that it held a very extensive and mountainous front with the majority of its forces in its front system. Owing to the mountainous nature of the country behind this system and the pooriness of the communications, it was unable to form a general reserve

¹ Vol. ii, p. 716.

which would have been available for a counter-stroke. The only reserves that were maintained were formed into two groups, one in the Cerna loop, the other in the Vardar Valley, where they formed army reserves for the Eleventh and First Armies and whence they could only be transported to assist each other in case of danger after a considerable lapse of time. The reserves of the Eleventh Army were so distant from the sector on which the 'break-through' occurred that they could not be brought into action till the third day. By then the Serbian advance had gained such impetus that these reserves were simply swept away. The reserves of the First Army were all used up in desperate counter-attacks on the Doiran Front in order to maintain that front. The result was that by the 22nd the road to Sofia was open and with no undefeated bodies of Bulgar troops between the Bulgarian capital and the victorious Allies.

The Bulgar Government was desperately anxious to avoid invasion of its national territory by Serbs and Greeks, and, realizing that everything was all but lost, decided to ask for an armistice, hoping that by doing this promptly it might secure better terms from the Allies and save something from the wreck. The true causes therefore of Bulgaria's collapse were her complete military defeat and her desire, in spite of everything that had happened, still to achieve some of the aims for which she had entered the war upon the side of the Central Powers.

C. THE CONSEQUENCES

23. *The situation in the Balkans after the Armistice.* The consequences of Bulgaria's collapse were both far-reaching and decisive. In the Balkans, the field being clear of the Bulgarian Army, the Allied Armies were now set free to carry out the new tasks demanded by the new situation. In Bulgaria men were streaming back to their homes, bands of deserters became bands of brigands, whilst political agitation culminated in a revolutionary movement led by Stambuliisky. This, though proclaimed by the Government as an outbreak of Bolshevism, was in fact a movement against Ferdinand and Radoslavoff. It was put down by German troops and machine guns in the suburbs of Sofia and Stambuliisky was thrown into prison, but not before succeeding in causing the flight of Radoslavoff in

disguise and the abdication of Ferdinand in favour of his son Boris, followed by his hasty retirement to his estates in Austria-Hungary. The case of Stambuliisky is a typical illustration of the waywardness of Balkan politics : the leader of the Revolution of 1918 a year later was Prime Minister and signed the Peace Treaty as Bulgaria's sole representative.

There were still considerable Austro-Hungarian forces in Albania, Mackensen's army of occupation in Rumania was still in being, whilst German and Austro-Hungarian Divisions, some from the Italian Front, the majority from South Russia, had begun to arrive in northern Serbia but too late to prevent the Bulgarian *débâcle*. Turkey now found the source of her supplies and her communications with Germany almost entirely cut off and was reeling under the blows which General Allenby was dealing it in Syria. Rumania was expectantly watching for an opportunity to recover her lost provinces and to turn the tables upon her enemies.

24. *Re-grouping of the Allied Armies.* The Allied Armies were re-grouped for the purpose of dealing with the various fronts as follows :

(a) *Turkish Front.* General Milne with an army consisting of 3 British, 1 French, 3 Greek Divisions, and Italian and Serbian contingents advanced on Turkey with the object firstly of securing the Dedeagach-Adrianople Railway, secondly of finally putting Turkey out of action by operating on Constantinople, and thirdly of opening up a new base at Constantinople and the sea route through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to Rumania, thus enabling the Allies to develop their full force against the Central Powers in the south and south-east.

(b) *Rumanian Front.* A force of 2 French Divisions and 1 British advanced under General Berthelot to the Danube through Bulgaria to ensure protection along that river and to facilitate and to support the re-entry of Rumania into the war.

(c) *Serbian Front.* For this front the Serbian Army of 1 Cavalry and 6 Infantry Divisions under Marshal Mishitch, supported by General Henrys' army of 9 Divisions, were detailed to reconquer Serbia and to form a front on the rivers Save and Danube from which a general advance northwards was to take place simultaneously with the re-entry of Rumania into the war, which occurred on the 11th November.

(d) *Albanian Front.* On this front the defeat of the Eleventh German Army had exposed the flank of the Austro-Hungarian forces in Albania, who began to withdraw northwards towards Montenegro followed by the Italian forces in Albania and some mixed detachments of General Henrys' army. Speed was one of the main factors in the carrying out of this plan. There were still at that time a certain number of German and Austro-Hungarian Divisions in South Russia which were available to reinforce either the very weak Turkish forces in Thrace or Mackensen's army in Rumania and North Serbia.

25. *The Turkish Operations and Armistice (30th October).* General Milne's army in its advance to the Maritza used the Bulgarian railways from Radomir to Mustapha Pasha close to Adrianople for the transport of 1 British Division, from Seres to Dedeagach for that of 1 French Division; another British Division was sent by sea to Dedeagach, whilst the British Cavalry Brigade and the Greek Corps were marching through Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace. By the end of October the railway line from Dedeagach to Adrianople had been secured. Three Divisions were on the line of the Maritza river, the river crossings at Ipsala had been secured and bridge-heads established, when the Turkish armistice stopped further operations (30th October).

The Turk had only weak detachments in Thrace with which to protect his capital. Of his two main armies the one in Syria had been completely destroyed by General Allenby, the other in the Caucasus could not be transferred to Thrace in sufficient time owing to lack of shipping. With his direct communications with Germany severed by the fall of Bulgaria he could hope for no help from that direction and he therefore asked for an armistice.

26. *Reconquest of Serbia.* Whilst these operations had been going on, the Serbian and French Armies had been working their way northwards very rapidly. In their victorious advance to the Danube they successively defeated such German and Austro-Hungarian troops as tried to bar their way. First, south of Vranje an Austro-Hungarian Division endeavoured to delay their advance and cover the concentration of other German and Austro-Hungarian Divisions north of Nish. It was brushed aside with the loss of 1,500 prisoners and Nish was entered on the 12th October. Then German and Austro-

Hungarian Divisions which had been hastily collected together took up a position on the heights south of Parachin across the Morava Valley, and north of the western Morava. After a resistance of four days they were outflanked and driven back across the Danube, whilst French troops moving through Bulgaria had also reached the Danube on the 17th October at Lom Palanka.

Belgrade, the capital, was delivered on the 1st November, the reconquest of Serbia being thus achieved by the glorious Serbian Army after six weeks' continuous fighting and marching in which it had swept the country clear of its enemies from end to end.

27. *The Austro-Hungarian Armistice (3rd November) and Hungarian Convention (13th November); effect on Rumania and Germany.* At the beginning of November the Serbs and French crossed the Danube and the Save, invading Southern Hungary in the north and Bosnia in the west. Everywhere the Yugo-slavs rose against the Austro-Hungarian authorities, whilst the Italian offensive had at last been launched on the Piave Front. The Rumanian Army also was beginning its advance. Austria-Hungary, attacked on all sides whilst her final disintegration was setting in, concluded an armistice with General Diaz as representative of the Allies, on the 3rd November.

This armistice, however, dealt almost solely with the Austro-Italian Front and omitted to legislate for the Serbian and Rumanian Fronts. Furthermore, the Hungarian Government refused to recognize the armistice of the 3rd November. The Allies therefore continued their advance into Hungary until the 13th November when a separate military convention, asked for by Count Karolyi, was signed at Belgrade by his representative, Béla Linder, and Marshal Mishitch and General Henrys representing the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the East.

By these armistices, conditions were imposed similar to those obtained from Bulgaria as to the occupation of strategic points and freedom of movement through Austria-Hungary. Plans had already been devised for the attack of Germany herself from the south and south-east when the Armistice of the 11th November brought the final operations of the Great War to a close.

Nowhere was the effect of Bulgaria's collapse felt more keenly than in Germany. No more eloquent testimony could be found of its effect on the master-mind which was directing the Central Powers' war machine than that contained in Ludendorff's *Memories* : ¹

August 8th was the black day of the German army in the history of this war. This was the worst experience that I had to go through, except for the events that, from September 15th onwards, took place on the Bulgarian front and sealed the fate of the Quadruple Alliance.

It was vital for Germany to do everything in her power to secure her position in the Balkan Peninsula in order to prevent the Allies moving into Hungary and making a flank attack on Germany and Austria-Hungary. The defeat of the Bulgarian Army compelled the despatch of substantial forces to the Balkans in order to attempt to establish a new front in Serbia and Rumania and to retain the Rumanian oil-fields (the loss of which alone would have brought Germany to the end of her resources in six weeks).

One German and one Austro-Hungarian Division were sent from the Ukraine to Serbia ; 3 German Divisions from the East, which had been intended to reinforce the Western Front ; 2 Austrian Divisions from the Italian Front were also sent.

Finally even from the hard-pressed Western Front G.H.Q. sent the Alpine Corps to Serbia. . . . The West thus lost 6 or 7 Divisions,' ² and yet these reinforcements, attacked and defeated before they were all concentrated, were of no avail and failed to establish a Southern Front. To quote Ludendorff again :

It made no difference whether our defeat came in Macedonia or the West. We were not strong enough to hold our line in the West and at the same time to establish in the Balkans a German front to replace the Bulgarian.³

The seriousness of the situation created by the defeat of the Bulgarian Army was fully realized by Ludendorff and, added to the heavy pressure exerted on the Western Front, convinced him of the necessity of hastening the end of the

¹ Vol. ii, p. 679.

² Ludendorff, vol. ii, p. 716. The despatch of these divisions shows that this opinion is not an afterthought invented to relieve the German Army of blame.

³ Ibid., vol. ii, p. 714-15.

war and of approaching the German Government with a view to decisive action. On the 28th September he informed Field-Marshal von Hindenburg that in his opinion Germany's 'position could only grow worse on account of the Balkan situation, even if we held our ground in the West'.¹ Their one task now was to act definitely and firmly with a view to a request for an armistice and a peace offer. On the 29th Hindenburg and Ludendorff held a discussion with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in which they submitted their views. These views were again submitted to the new German Government on the 3rd October in a statement signed by von Hindenburg in which it is stated that 'as a result of the collapse of the Macedonian front, and of the weakening of our reserves in the West, which this has necessitated, and in view of the impossibility of making good the very heavy losses of the last few days, there appears to be now no possibility, to the best of human judgment, of winning peace from our enemies by force of arms . . . in these circumstances the only right course is to bring the war to a close, in order to spare the German people and their allies useless sacrifices. Every day wasted costs the lives of thousands of brave German soldiers. Signed, von Hindenburg.'²

The collapse of Bulgaria not only meant the end of Germany's hold on the Balkans and set a definite barrier to her Eastern ambitions, but it meant also an end to all hope of winning the war or of achieving her ambitions in other theatres. With the knocking out of the Bulgarian prop the whole structure collapsed.

¹ Ludendorff, vol. ii, p. 721.

² Ibid., vol. ii, p. 729.

CHAPTER I

THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTRAL POWERS

PART II

THE MILITARY DISINTEGRATION OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY

1. *Introductory.* The war in Central Europe was ended by the successive defeats of Bulgaria, Turkey and Austria-Hungary. But while the first was almost wholly, and the second mainly, a purely military defeat, the third was due to causes more subtle and complex. Austria-Hungary possessed a great military machine, second only to that of Germany in vigorous discipline and careful organization. Much of the Austro-Hungarian policy had been dominated by purely military considerations to an extent which is not usually realized. Thus the excellent roads of Bosnia and Dalmatia, the railway of Bosnia, the important Tauernbahn route through the Tyrol, were just as directly produced by military necessity as were the hostile attitudes of the Monarchy towards Italy or Serbia. But this vast military machine had one defect; its technical perfection was great, but the sources of its power were precarious. In the last resort it was from the majority of the citizens that the army derived its support, and the majority of the citizens of Austria-Hungary were hostile, or at any rate indifferent, to the objects pursued by General Staff and Emperor. The military collapse of Austria-Hungary was therefore not entirely or even primarily due to military defeat but to the indifference and, finally, to the open disaffection of the majority of its soldiers. The problem, therefore, to be studied is the military side of that political disintegration which was taking place in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The military leaders were loyal to the dynasty, the troops were under discipline and were remote from home and often illiterate; hence the revolution in the army worked more slowly and by methods different from those which finally broke up the Monarchy.

But the tendency to disruption was no less evident, and it is therefore on the wastage of man-power and on the decline of *moral* in the army as a whole, rather than on actual military questions in the field, that the attention must be concentrated. Thus it will be seen that, while there was room for the master-hand of a strategist at Salonica and in Palestine, on the Austrian front the defeat of the army depended as much on political as on military causes.

2. *The Problem of Man-power in Austria-Hungary.* In any review of the military strength of a country, the first item to be considered must necessarily be that of man-power.

The more prosaic side of this question, in the shape of the actual figures of mobilizable males, wastage, etc., is dealt with at a later stage of the present chapter. Apart, however, from the purely mathematical aspect of the problem, its consideration must also necessarily involve an analysis of the population from which this man-power will be drawn.

The population of Austria-Hungary was assessed in 1910 at a little over 51,000,000,¹ and may be divided into six main racial groups as follows: Eastern, Western, and Southern (or Yugo-) Slavs; Latins, Teutons, and Magyars. Taking the Slav group first, the Eastern Slavs were represented by the Ruthenes or Little Russians, Greek-Catholic or Uniate in religion, totalling about 3,500,000, and inhabiting the easternmost portion of Galicia and about half the Bukovina. The Western Slavs, who by religion were mainly Roman Catholics, included the Poles and the Czecho-Slovaks. The former numbered nearly 5,000,000, and were to be found chiefly in the westernmost portions of Galicia and in the easternmost half of Silesia, while a few were scattered in Moravia and the Bukovina. The Czecho-Slovaks, to the number of about 8,250,000, occupied central and eastern Bohemia, the greater part of Moravia, the non-Polish or western districts of Silesia, and the northern confines of Hungary. The Southern (or Yugo-) Slavs formed a solid block on the southern confines of both Austria and Hungary, and comprised about 1,250,000 Slovenes, 2,000,000 Serbs and 3,000,000 Croats. This sturdy race inhabited Carinthia, most of Carniola, all except the western strip of Istria and the coast, South Styria, Dalmatia, the bulk of Croatia-

¹ The figures quoted throughout are all approximate and estimated from the 1910 Census, the accuracy of which has often, and with reason, been impugned.

Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Hungary were scattered along the northern banks of the Danube from the Banat westwards. As far as religion was concerned, the Slovenes and the greater portion of the Croats professed the Roman Catholic faith, and most of the Serbs the Greek Orthodox faith, though in Bosnia and Herzegovina some 600,000 Serbs and Croats still adhered to the Islamic faith which had survived since the days of the Turkish domination.¹ Of the Latins, two main branches were represented in the Empire, the Rumanians and the Italians. The Rumanians, to the number of nearly 3,000,000, were to be found in Transylvania and the southern half of the Bukovina. The west of Istria and the southern portion of the Tyrol and Vorarlberg were Italian. Lastly came the two ruling races, the Germans in Austria and the Magyars in Hungary, totalling respectively about 12,000,000 and 10,000,000. Such, in brief outline, were the main ethnographic divisions of the Empire; but it would give a most erroneous impression, if the conclusion were to be drawn from the above that each ethnic entity inhabited a watertight compartment of its own. So far was this from being the case, that nearly every distinct ethnic block contained islands of another nationality. There were the Magyar Szeklers in Rumanian Transylvania, the German, Yugo-slav and Rumanian islands in Magyar Hungary, German islands in Yugo-slav Croatia and in Czecho-Slovak Bohemia, Italian islands in Yugo-slav Dalmatia and in Istria, Polish islands in the Ruthene portion of Galicia, and so on.

3. *Character of the Population; the Nationalities.* The task of the Higher Command was indeed no easy one. Apart from this babel of languages and diversity of religions, there were all the mutually inconsistent political tendencies to be considered which such an ethnographic kaleidoscope entailed. A uniform language of command had to be imposed, to the lasting resentment of those whose mother tongue it did not happen to be, and the language chosen was almost invariably that of the ruling minority. The proportion of the above nationalities in the Austro-Hungarian Army was as follows:

Slav group	44 per cent.	Teuton	28 per cent.
Latin	10 „ „	Magyar	18 „ „

These 600,000 are not included in the 2,000,000 Serbs above mentioned.

The ruling elements were naturally the Teutonic and the Magyar, but they themselves were animated by clashing motives and interests, not only in local and domestic affairs, but in their general outlook on the conduct and aims of the War. Next came that group to whom certain privileges had already been granted, such as the Croats in Hungary and the Poles in Austria, but who were divided among themselves as to the best means of attaining the goal of their political ambitions, some basing their hopes on a victory of the Entente, others seeking salvation on the side of the Central Powers. Finally came that complex of oppressed nationalities in which it was the Habsburg policy to stamp out every trace of self-expression until they could be cowed and dragooned into subservience to the ruling Teuton and Magyar will. In this category can be placed the Ruthenes, Czecho-Slovaks, Yugoslavs, Italians, and Rumanians.

But this by no means exhausts the anomalies surrounding the man-power of Austria-Hungary. In addition to the difficulties involved in raising and maintaining armies in which the combatants spoke as many different languages as they professed different religions and pursued different political ideals, there was the difficulty arising from the extraordinarily divergent standards of intelligence and education presented by this heterogeneous population. In Austria, for example, while 97 per cent. of the Germans, 97 per cent. of the Czechs, 88 per cent. of the Italians, 84 per cent. of the Slovenes, and 60 per cent. of the Poles could both read and write, only 50 per cent. of the Croats, 35 per cent. of the Serbs, and 28 per cent. of the Ruthenes could lay claim to a similar accomplishment. In Hungary the situation was analogous: 78 per cent. of the Magyars, 75 per cent. of the Germans, and 75 per cent. of the Slovaks were literates, while 50 per cent. of the Croats, 55 per cent. of the Serbs, 55 per cent. of the Rumanians, and 75 per cent. of the Ruthenes were illiterate. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the figures disclose a far more lamentable state of affairs: only 25 per cent. of the Croats and 18 per cent. of the Serbs could both read and write. It is unnecessary to elaborate what difficulties this state of affairs presented to the raising of officers, training of troops in general, and recruiting of such services as the artillery, engineers, and other specialized branches. The result was obvious. The officer class, and such arms as the cavalry, artillery, engineers,

etc., were recruited largely from Germans and Magyars, while the infantry was composed in the main of Slavs. These latter, though forming but 44 per cent. of the total forces of the Empire, represented 67 per cent. of the infantry.

Thus, instead of a population animated by a single purpose and speaking a single language, there was a series of small populations animated by different political ideals and speaking different tongues. The Austrian-German was tainted with Pan-German theories regarding *Deutschtum* and *Weltpolitik*. The Magyar, proud of the traditions of his race, resented his dependence on the German and the political fetters which linked him to Vienna. There was indeed the person of the aged Emperor, which united both in their respect for the dynasty. Beyond that, the Magyar had nothing in common with the Austrian-German, except his assumption of superiority over the Slav and Latin within his borders and his consciousness of the need to suppress those races at every opportunity. The Pole, with his memories of the historic past, hated the restrictions imposed by his Austrian-German masters, politically and constitutionally, upon his development; while he chafed under a régime which prevented his incorporation with his brothers over the Russian border in a great Polish State, similar to that which had existed before the successive partitions at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. The Czecho-Slovak had long years of resentment against the Habsburg intolerance and oppression to avenge. The Rumanian looked back to the time when, under Michael 'The Brave', Transylvania formed part of the great Wallachian principality, and looked forward to the day when, having cast off the Magyar yoke, he could once more be linked up in a single State with his brothers of Rumania proper. The Italians of Istria and Zara sighed for the glories of the Venetian Republic, when the Adriatic was an Italian sea; while those of the Tyrol had, ever since 1848, been engaged in an irredentist movement aiming at incorporation in the Italian kingdom. The Yugo-slav also had his account to settle with Vienna and Budapest. There was 1848 to be wiped out, the Zagreb and Friedjung trials and long years of social and political tyranny to avenge; there was, moreover, that growing national consciousness which for the last seventy years had so slowly but surely been welding the Serbs, Croats and

Slovenes of Austria-Hungary and the Balkans into a political entity and unity. Finally came the Jews of every nationality with their detestation of those ruling castes who had for so long exposed them to social boycott. Hated and hating alike, they were still a power in the land, and their hostility could not be ignored.¹

4. *The Military System.* Such was the volcanic material which Austria-Hungary's war chiefs had to mould into an efficient and responsive war machine. Two links held together this welter of disruptive forces. One—a flimsy one—was the Habsburg idea; loyalty to the Emperor's person undoubtedly counted for something amid all these mutual hatreds, jealousies and antagonisms. The other was that mixture of force employed and fear inspired, which characterized the official attitude towards the subject races. Instead of winning their loyalty by adopting a liberal policy of concession to the legitimate aspirations of these recalcitrant elements, Germans and Magyars alike thought only to control them by a policy of oppression and suppression. All were united in their hatred and fear of the German and the Magyar, but, owing to the ever-vigilant eye of Habsburg officialdom, this unity of sentiment was never allowed to develop into unity of action.

The military system of the so-called Dual Monarchy reflected the complex nature of its political characteristics. Just as its foreign and financial affairs were conducted in the joint interests both of the Austrian *Reich* and the Hungarian Kingdom by Common (*kaiserliche und königliche*, or *k.u.k.*) Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance, so its naval and military policy was directed by a Common Ministry of War (*k.u.k. Kriegsministerium*), the financial requirements of this Ministry being debated and voted by the so-called 'Delegations'. To this Ministry fell the administration and equipment of the Common (*k.u.k.*) Army, which was recruited from a fixed proportion of the yearly levies throughout both Austria and Hungary. Similarly, just as both Austria and Hungary possessed each their separate and individual Ministries of Education, Justice, Public Works, etc., so in one country there was an Austrian (*kaiserlich-königliches*, or *k.k.*), in the other a Hungarian (*königlich-ungarisches*, or *k.u.*) Ministry

¹ Of course, large numbers of Jews had adopted Magyar or Austrian-German nationality and been assimilated.

of National Defence, each administering an army of so-called *Landwehr* and *Landsturm* troops recruited from the remainder of the yearly levies, the one solely from Austrian, the other solely from Hungarian territory.

5. *Organization and Higher Command ; Military Relations of Austria and Hungary.* There were thus at the disposal of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the outbreak of War three separate armies under three separate administrations: the Common Army, recruited from all over the Empire; the Austrian *Landwehr* and *Landsturm*, recruited only from the Austrian portion of it; and the Hungarian *Landwehr* (or *Honvéd*) and *Landsturm*, recruited solely from its Hungarian parts. The term 'Landwehr'¹ did not signify, as it did in the German Army, second-line troops, but the two *Landwehrs* and the Common Army together constituted first-line troops, and all three were under the supreme command of the Emperor. Directly under the Emperor, apart from various Inspectors-General, came the Military Chancellory and the Chief of the General Staff. The Military Chancellory acted as the channel of communication between the Emperor and the three war ministries, while the Chief of Staff, who was always attached to the Emperor's personal staff and reported direct to him, had under his jurisdiction the General Staff, the War Archives Department, and the Military Geographical Institute. The Chief of the General Staff, far more than any of the three war ministers, had, next to the supreme commander-in-chief (*Ober-Befehlshaber*), the greatest influence on the conduct of war. This became all the more evident when, at the outbreak of the war in 1914, the aged Emperor Francis Joseph handed the supreme command of the Armies in the Field to the Archduke Frederick, a genial but undistinguished prince, who was guided entirely by the then Chief of Staff, Freiherr Conrad von Hoetzendorff. The latter was a typical product of the General Staff, a brilliant strategist on paper, but wanting perhaps in that adaptability to new conditions which proved so necessary during the recent war. Moreover, he lacked that element of human intuition and sympathy which is so essential an attribute of the would-be leader of men, especially when the men in question hail, as they

¹ In April 1917 the Emperor, considering the term 'Landwehr' Regiment inappropriate to units composed of first-line troops, altered the title of *Landwehr-infanterie-regiment* to that of *Schützen-regiment*.

did in the Austro-Hungarian forces, from so many different nationalities, with correspondingly different languages, religions, ideals, and traditions. The General Staff itself was naturally composed for the most part of Germans and Magyars, by reason of their higher standard of education and their political predominance in their respective halves of the Monarchy. The exact degree of friction which existed between these two elements in the direction of the War is difficult to define with any precision at the moment, owing to the lack of contemporary records. But that friction must have existed cannot be doubted. In the first place, Hungary was always an unwilling party to the Dualism which governed her relations with Austria. There was always the lurking consciousness that she might not be an equal partner in the Empire. It was true that she had her own army of Honvéd troops, recruited from within her own borders and officered by her own countrymen, and in which the language of command was, in most instances, Magyar. But then she contributed a large contingent to that Common Army over which she had only a half control. Though the Honvéd divisions each possessed their quota of divisional artillery, the Common Army controlled the heavy artillery, most of the cavalry, the aviation troops—in fact, all the technical troops of a non-divisional character. There was thus, even before the War, a party in Hungary predisposed to agitate for the divorce of the Magyar elements from the Common Army and their incorporation in a purely Hungarian Army, provided for and supplied entirely by the Hungarian exchequer. For this reason the Hungarian Delegation were more often than not inclined to vote for a reduction of any supplies asked for by the Common Ministry of War—a show of jealousy for which, as it happened, they themselves were eventually to suffer.¹ During the later stages of the War in 1918, the political parties who advocated a Hungary unfettered and mistress of her own Foreign Affairs, Army and Finance, gained an increasing ascendancy in the country. Moreover, Hungary was a fertile country and Austria was not. She therefore resented the compulsion which her political ties with the latter

¹ The Austrian General of Infantry, Alfred Krausz, complains in his *Die Ursachen unserer Niederlage* that, owing to the opposition of the Hungarian Delegation, the divisions went into the field with only 36 field-guns instead of the German divisional allowance of 72.

imposed on her, for she was forced to supply her produce to armies over which she exercised so hampered and partial a control. Still greater grew her resentment when her products were requisitioned, not for the Austro-Hungarian Common Army, part of which certainly was recruited from Magyar soil, but for the German Army and population. These factors cannot but have been reflected in wrangling and friction between the German and Magyar elements of the General Staff and in awkward complications between the Austro-Hungarian and German Higher Commands.

6. *Changes necessitated by the War and by Nationalistic Tendencies.* Before the War, little attention had been paid to grouping the units of the Austro-Hungarian forces in such a fashion that the elements, whose national susceptibilities might lead to disaffection, should always be stiffened by trustworthy Germans or Magyars, whose loyalty to the House of Habsburg did not lay them open to such tendencies. The composition of units was, in the main, organized on a purely territorial basis,¹ but now circumstances arose in which Italians might be called upon to fight against Italians, Rumanians against Rumanians, Serbs against Serbs, Poles against Poles, and Ruthenes against Ruthenes—to say nothing of the chances of disaffection among such elements of the army as the Czecho-Slovaks, who had no interests at stake beyond the opportunities the eventual peace settlement might afford them of freeing themselves from the Austrian yoke. Such a situation opened the eyes of the General Staff to the dangers of this system. There were mutinies among the Polish and Czech elements which formed part of the Przemysl garrison. The 28th and 36th Common Army Infantry Regiments and the 36th Schützen (formerly Landwehr) Regiment, which were Czecho-Slovak by nationality, deserted wholesale. Throughout the War indeed the Slav and Latin units tended to offer a conspicuously weaker resistance in battle than the German and Magyar. The Higher Command were thus driven to work out a policy of readjustment in the distribution of nationalities among the various units. The general principle was adopted of reinforcing the Slav and Latin units with trustworthy Magyar or German elements. This was effected in a variety of ways, by changing the dépôts of regiments, by readjusting the balance of nationalities

¹ Except in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

within higher units such as corps and divisions, by replacing wastage in Slav and Latin units by Magyar or German drafts, and by regulating the disposition of troops on the different fronts in such a way that units liable to disaffection might not find themselves faced by co-nationals among the troops of the Entente. Many examples could be quoted of these different readjustments. The 41st Honvéd Division was entirely Magyar, while the 20th Honvéd Division contained a preponderance of Rumanians and Ruthenes; in order to strengthen the Magyar element in the latter, an exchange of brigades between the two divisions was effected, thus creating a Magyar majority in both divisions. A similar exchange was made between units of the 9th and 30th Common Army Infantry Divisions. The dépôts of the 35th and 11th Common Army Infantry Regiments, which were Czech by nationality, were transferred from Bohemia to Hungary. Again, when the 82nd Common Army Infantry Regiment was despatched to the Rumanian Front, the Rumanian elements had first to be withdrawn from it.

7. *Causes of Early Defeats.* However, despite all these efforts on the part of the Higher Command to minimize the chances of disaffection, the Austro-Hungarian forces met with a conspicuous lack of success during the earlier stages of the War. It was only the help of German reinforcements in the winter of 1914-15 which stemmed the tide of their defeats on the Russian Front and prevented the Russian Armies from crossing the Carpathians into Hungary. On the Balkan Front during the same campaign, three successive attempts to invade Serbia were repulsed, each time with increasingly heavy losses. The causes of these failures are to be sought partly in the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Higher Command could not rely with any certainty upon the *moral* and loyalty of the man-power at its disposal, and partly in its own mistaken tactics. Major-General von Cramon, the German liaison officer with the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command, laments these faulty tactics in his book, *Unser Oesterreichisch-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg*, and states that the Austro-Hungarian General Staff expected the line to advance or retreat together. If, for instance, any unit were forced back, its neighbours would fall back in sympathy. The possibility of utilizing such a situation to squeeze out the enemy by flank pressure was overlooked,

with the result that excellent positions were repeatedly lost. Again, the methods of reinforcement proved most unsatisfactory. Instead of distributing troops from the dépôts among their respective regiments at the front as casualties occurred, the drafts to replace wastage were all organized into battalions (known as *Marschbataillone*) and frequently thrown into engagements in that form as fighting units, instead of being drawn upon little by little to fill up the necessary gaps. Regiments and even brigades composed solely of these draft battalions were used in this manner, and naturally lacked the nerve and staying power which they would have acquired from gradual assimilation to more seasoned troops. By March 1915 the plight of the Austro-Hungarian forces was serious. The Bukovina and most of Galicia was lost, the much-vaunted 'punitive expedition' against Serbia perforce abandoned, heavy losses sustained both in men and material, and a general feeling of distrust of the *Generalität* of the Army engendered. The Hungarians were exceptionally bitter in their complaints of the incompetence of the Austrian leaders, for the Russians were on their Carpathian frontiers. A despairing cry was raised for help from the German Army. Austria-Hungary, it was argued, had saved Prussian Silesia; it was now for Germany to save Hungary. The road between Pless, the German Great General Headquarters, and Teschen, the seat of the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command, and only an hour's motor drive away, became the scene of feverish activity. Conrad visited Falkenhayn and Falkenhayn visited Conrad. Eventually a plan of campaign to pierce the Russian lines on the Tarnow-Gorlice Front was drawn up conjointly, and the great summer offensive under Mackensen was launched. The consequent collapse of the Russian left caused their whole line to retreat, and by the end of August the Russians had lost Poland and were behind the Styr and the Sereth.

8. *Austro-Hungarian Relations with Germany.* Flushed with the success gained by the help of the Germans, the Austro-Hungarians endeavoured to develop it further by an attack at Rovno. This attack, which was carried out by the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army under Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, failed, and again the German Army had to come to the rescue, although too late to avoid the retirement from the Sereth to the Strypa. After this failure, the Germans insisted on the

Fourth Army's incorporation in a German Group of Armies commanded by the German von Linsingen, who was in turn responsible to the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command.

From this time onwards the Austro-Hungarian share in the War became characterized by constant friction with German Headquarters. Austria-Hungary was the weak party in the alliance, but her leaders were proud and very susceptible where the honour of her arms was concerned. Her only hope for success lay in her acquiescence in a unified command controlled by the German General Staff, but her stubborn pride held out against the indignity which she conceived such a course to involve.

Great events had in the meantime occurred on the Serbian Front. The necessity for supplying Turkey with munitions and getting into direct touch with Bulgaria, had led the Germans to take an active interest in the Serbian campaign. Falkenhayn was not blind to the repeated failures of the Austro-Hungarian leadership, and he demanded that the control of a new Balkan campaign should be in the hands of a German general acting under German orders. He was supported by the Bulgarians, on whose assistance he could count only on these conditions. Conrad, ever jealous for prestige, eventually agreed to the appointment of von Mackensen, but made efforts to secure the despatch of the preliminary orders for the campaign from Teschen. Falkenhayn, however, would not agree, and Conrad, forced to yield on this point, suggested that Mackensen's reports should be sent simultaneously to both G.H.Q.'s. Falkenhayn remained obdurate here also, pointing out that both Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian liaison officers existed for the transmission of reports to Teschen and Sofia; Bulgaria, he said, was a new ally, unused to team work, and must be carefully handled. Conrad, though deeply wounded, gave way. Such incidents only tended to embitter relations between the two General Staffs, and to imperil the future prospects of a really unified command.

On the 6th October 1915, Mackensen's Army, comprising twelve Austro-Hungarian and German divisions, crossed the Danube, and within a fortnight the Bulgarians had invaded Serbia in the south. By the end of November, Serbia and Macedonia had been overrun, and the way to Turkey was opened. In the meanwhile Entente troops had landed at

Salonica, and Falkenhayn and Conrad had agreed that Mackensen's campaign must be carried to the Aegean Sea. Apparently, however, Falkenhayn was not thoroughly convinced of the necessity of attacking Salonica, for Mackensen had already withdrawn some of his corps to rest in Hungary. Conrad rushed to Pless for explanations.¹ There Falkenhayn still professed his adherence to pushing on the Serbian campaign, although he drew attention to the difficulties of supply in the mountains of Macedonia, the possibility of typhus epidemic, and the approach of mid-winter. Conrad was only partially satisfied with this profession of good faith, and afterwards wrote to Falkenhayn that he considered himself absolved from the agreement to support Mackensen with Austro-Hungarian troops, for whose use he claimed full and free decision. The Mackensen campaign was given up.

9. *Conrad's Attack on Italy, May 1916.* Conrad had spent much of his time before the War in perfecting plans for the undoing of the *Erbfeind*—Italy. Although Italy had been at war with Austria-Hungary since May 1915, no great battles had been fought. The Italians had advanced to the Isonzo and stood a few miles over the Austrian frontier in parts of the Trentino. The heaviest fighting had occurred round Gorizia, the Austro-Hungarians on the whole front remaining for the most part on the defensive. Conrad now contemplated a great offensive in the Trentino, and asked Falkenhayn for the assistance of German infantry and heavy artillery. The attack on Verdun was, however, in preparation, and Germany was not yet willing to declare war on Italy; Falkenhayn therefore refused to enter into the Austro-Hungarian plans. The German General had by now a poor opinion of the offensive value of the Dual Monarchy's troops. Some units were admittedly of high standard, but their average worth was much below that of the Germans, and Falkenhayn would have preferred to place the troops of his Ally everywhere on the defensive. The German requirements for Verdun necessitated some reinforcements of the Russian front, and Falkenhayn asked for Kövess' (3rd) Army from the Serbian-Montenegrin Front to replace the German troops withdrawn from Russia to France. Conrad, however, refused, and launched the successful

¹ There was probably a difficulty caused by the conflicting Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian claims on Salonica.

Montenegrin-Albanian offensive without the German General's knowledge. An open breach between the two generals occurred, and although Conrad finally apologized, it cannot be supposed that their subsequent outward show of friendship concealed anything but feelings of cordial dislike. In February 1916 the German G.H.Q. were moved to Mézières, and such unity between the Austro-Hungarian and German General Staffs as the contiguity of Pless and Teschen had facilitated, suffered a yet wider breach. The relations, too, between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria were not of the best. In Serbia, the Bulgars had occupied Prizrend, Prishtina and Elbassan, and thus encroached on what Austria-Hungary considered her sphere of interest. Open hostility occurred between the troops of both nations. On the Bulgarian admission that their occupation of the debatable territory was only temporary, the matter ended.

During the early spring of 1916, Conrad perfected his plans for an offensive in the Trentino. He observed the strictest secrecy towards Falkenhayn, and although he must have known that German liaison officers had seen and reported the large concentrations of troops behind the Italian Front, it was not until April that he made known his intentions to Falkenhayn, who evinced only a lukewarm interest, and even suggested that, as the winter was so prolonged, the offensive should be called off and several of the released divisions sent to support the Western Front.

Two Austro-Hungarian Armies—the 11th (Dankl) and the 3rd (Kövess)—had been concentrated between Bozen and the Trentino Front, and on the 15th May 1916 the attack was launched. Here, at last, the hereditary enemy of the Monarchy was to be laid low, and his armies cut off and surrounded. Whereas on other fronts the nation's forces might be divided in their opinions, against Italy the German, Serb, Croat, Slovene and Magyar were bound by a common hate. In view of the possibilities of a great victory, the heir to the throne, Archduke Charles Francis Joseph, guided by an efficient staff, had been placed in command of the leading Army Corps (XX). The attack was immediately successful, and within a week Asiago was taken. The news was joyfully received in the Empire, complimentary telegrams passed between Emperor and Emperor. At last the military prestige of Austria-Hungary

appeared—superficially, no doubt—to be vindicated. The Trentino offensive, however, in spite of this jubilation, had failed. Difficulties in the transport of heavy artillery and the impossibility therefore of maintaining sufficient pace in the attack, gave the Italians the time they needed to rearrange and reinforce their over-taxed troops.

10. *Brussiloff's Offensive and German Supreme Control in the East.* A great disaster now loomed up on the Eastern Front. On the 4th June the Russians began their great offensive under Brussiloff from the Pripet to the Rumanian frontier. The Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army under Archduke Joseph Ferdinand broke completely, Lutsk fell, and Lemberg was threatened. Farther south, too, the Austro-Hungarian Front collapsed. In twelve days the Fourth Army lost 54 per cent. and the Seventh Army 57 per cent. of their effectives. Both these armies were under Austro-Hungarian control. The Germans took prompt measures to limit, as much as possible, the results of these disasters. The Archduke was dismissed from his command and his army placed directly under German control, while German troops were drafted in to stiffen the wavering forces and initiate some sort of resistance. But although the centre was saved, the Russians continued to advance in the Bukovina and Eastern Galicia. By August the Bukovina was once again lost, and the Russians were over the Zlota Lipa and had taken Brody. The failure of the Trentino offensive and the Russian successes made Conrad's position insecure, and only the lack of a substitute sufficiently agreeable to the Emperor, the Army, and the politicians, saved him. The question of establishing a unified command on the Eastern Front under German auspices became acute. A compromise, however, was arrived at. Hindenburg took over the command north of the Pripet under German G.H.Q., while the forces south of the Pripet to Bukovina came under both German G.H.Q. and Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q., working in conjunction. A system of exchange of officers and intermixture of German and Austro-Hungarian smaller units was instituted. The insertion of these German units, known as *Korsettenstangen*, tended to strain the relationship existing between the two Armies, rather than to improve it. The Germans frankly despised their brethren in arms, and there is reason to believe that the Austro-Hungarians found the manners and behaviour

of their allies often lacking in cordiality, if not occasionally in courtesy. The feelings of both are well illustrated by the Austrian General Krausz, who relates in his book the story of an Austro-Hungarian divisional commander, who once complained to him of the 'inconsiderate, surly (*schroffe*), selfish, arrogant, and offensive attitude' of the German troops with whom he was then in contact. Krausz repeated this complaint to a German general, who replied with a frank admission of these qualities on the part of his troops. 'These complaints', he added, 'are very unpleasant and painful to me; but we have brought our men to such a pitch of energy, and we are so concerned to keep driving them on to maintain it, that there is little wonder if it sometimes takes a wrong direction.'

Two events finally obtained a unified control of the whole Eastern Front—Rumania's entry into the War on the 27th August 1916, and the replacement of Falkenhayn by Hindenburg. As soon as Hungary was again threatened with invasion, the feeling against the Austro-Hungarian command grew, and Conrad was forced to swallow his pride and submit to German control. The rapid invasion of Transylvania was soon followed by the heavy defeat of the Rumanians, who by the 19th January 1917 were out of Hungary and back in Moldavia. German troops had again saved the Dual Monarchy.

11. *The New Emperor; Fall of Conrad.* The Emperor Francis Joseph died on the 21st November 1916, and the thirty-year-old Archduke Charles succeeded him. From this moment the Habsburg tradition and blind loyalty to the Germans began to lose ground. The whole policy of the Empire was suddenly changed. War *à outrance* was to be abandoned. Peace was to be made. The mystical veneration surrounding the throne was to be replaced by frequent intercourse between Emperor and people. The severe repression of Court influence by the Army and the isolation of Teschen were to be abolished, and a new era established. There is no doubt that at this period the growing shortage of food, the rising prices and the heavy losses suffered in the field, had induced an intense feeling of war-weariness. There arose a sigh of relief among the greater part of the people when the old Emperor died and a new one, who openly desired peace, began to reign. Emperor Charles soon dismissed the Archduke Frederick, and much against Conrad's will and that of the Germans, moved the *Armee-ober-*

kommando to Baden near Vienna, where he took over in person the command of the Austro-Hungarian forces. This move was much appreciated both by the Army and the Court. But the position of Conrad became impossible, and his dismissal soon followed, together with that of nearly all his staff, who were replaced by younger and more accommodating men under General Arz von Straussenberg, a jovial person, of no great ability and not of a nature to contradict his new Emperor. General Cramon's comment on this is that General Krausz was passed over in spite of his well-known military gifts and his ability to work well in unison with the Germans. His independence and sharp manner, however, were not suited to Charles, who is said to have cared more for pleasant, easy-going men.

Conrad von HoetENDORFF was essentially a 'staff' soldier. He was stronger in the conception of plans than in their execution. He had remained wedded to certain preconceived ideas, which he was unable to adapt to new conditions. His General Staff he educated to a high level of theoretical knowledge and learning. On paper they inevitably beat the enemy; in war, their lack of actual experience led them to suffer defeat after defeat. He seldom visited the front, or interviewed his generals at their headquarters. He was no courtier, and was disliked as much at Schönbrunn as in the Ballplatz. Nor was he *persona grata* in Church circles; his marriage with a *divorcée* and his disregard of church ceremony having earned for him their intense dislike. The Archdukes suffered severely at his hands, but he was nevertheless not strong enough to rid himself of certain incompetent Army commanders whose attachment to his 'school' was known. The Court and most of the Army were glad of his dismissal, and several of the acknowledged failures found their way back to high places. General Martiny, whose Xth Corps had failed miserably at Lutsk, obtained the IIIrd Corps on the Italian Front. To Archduke Peter Ferdinand, who had mismanaged his division early in the War on the Russian Front, was conceded a corps command in the Tyrol, while Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, to whose slackness the disaster at Lutsk may be chiefly attributed, was made inspector of the Empire's Air Forces.

The economic difficulties of the Empire immediately engaged the attention of Charles. The position was peculiar. Hungary

was plentifully supplied with food-stuffs, while in Austria prices were high and food scarce. The jealousy of Hungary was shown in this matter, for whenever prices were fixed for Austria, Hungary fixed higher prices still, and so secured much that Austria required. For example, at this time the fixed price for a load of wood in Austria was 58-60 *kronen*—in Hungary, 120 *kronen*. Styrian wood, therefore, instead of being used in Austria, was exported to Hungary! Profiteering was rife and was to all intents and purposes encouraged by the Army, which preferred to deal with contractors rather than with producers. The comparatively fair and very strict rationing in force in Germany was not reflected in the neighbouring Monarchy.

Though assiduous in securing reports and becoming himself convinced of the necessity of some method by which the resources of the Empire might be made more productive, the Emperor was unable to initiate any scheme to better the situation. Charles entered upon his duties with enthusiasm. He visited all fronts, war and home, and evinced a feverish anxiety to be known and liked by his people. He tried to placate the oppressed nations by a political amnesty, he summoned the Austrian Parliament (closed since early in 1914), he abolished the harsher forms of field punishment. His generosity of purpose cannot be doubted, and it might seem an ill reward that the very peoples whose lot he tried to improve, began from that moment to voice even more openly than before their demand for entire independence from Habsburg rule.

12. *The Dwindling of Austro-Hungarian Man-power.* The enormous losses sustained by the Army were beginning to render acute the problem of Austria-Hungary's dwindling man-power. The number of mobilizable men between the ages of 17 and 50 was estimated in the middle of 1917 at just over 11,500,000. The permanent wastage had been calculated at over 4,000,000, of which 1,800,000 were accounted for as prisoners of war in the hands of the Allies, while a constant figure of 400,000 might be assumed for temporary wastage, viz. those in hospitals liable to return to the front. The forces in the field were estimated at a little under 2,000,000, while those employed on lines of communication and in training amounted to upwards of 1,000,000, the Navy and naval reserves accounting for another 50,000. A balance-sheet might thus

have been drawn up in very rough figures in June 1917 somewhat on the following lines :

Total mobilizable men	11,500,000
Permanent wastage	4,000,000
Temporary wastage	400,000
Forces in the field	2,000,000
L. of C., and in training	1,000,000
Navy and naval reserves	50,000
	<hr/>
	7,450,000
	<hr/>
	4,050,000

Of this total, nearly 3,500,000 must have been employed in industry, government services and starved professions, thus leaving only a residue of 550,000 for the further prosecution of the War. Moreover, the economic distress which reigned in the Dual Monarchy during the latter phases of the War was so crippling to its manhood, that the physical fitness of this residue must have been very seriously impaired, and the proportion of it really fit for general service a very low one. This is borne out by a study of the recruiting situation at this stage of the War. On the 1st May 1915 the age limit for liability to military service was extended to include men between the ages of 18 and 50, while on the 16th December of the same year it received a yet further extension from 50 to 55. Men who attained the age of 50 during the course of the War were not automatically released from further service, but had to await a special Imperial decree. Men previously rejected as unfit were liable to constant re-examinations. As the need for men grew, the standard of physical fitness declined. Early in 1917 grave discontent manifested itself throughout the civil population, and to a certain extent in the Army also, at the prolongation of service with the colours and at the demands of the military authorities upon the youth and middle age of the Empire. Accordingly, in the spring of 1917, von Hazai was made Director-General of Recruiting and Supplies (*Leiter des gesammten Ersatzwesens*), in order to co-ordinate the development of the resources in men and material at the disposal of the Dual Monarchy. Partly owing to the increase in reserves available, following on the subsidence of hostilities in the Eastern theatre, and partly in order to appease the public agitation just referred to, Hazai was able to evolve a policy of releasing

the older classes from service at the front, if not from service altogether. By the middle of 1917, the 1899 class (or youths attaining the age of 18 in 1917) had been called up ; the 1898 class had been called up and subjected already to one revision ; the 1897 class had been twice revised ; the 1896-4 classes three times ;^a and the 1893-73 classes four times revised ; while the 1872-67 classes of men, between the ages of 45 and 50, had been twice revised. For the following year there remained only the 1900 class, or boys attaining the age of 18 in 1918, the first, second, and third revisions of the 1899 class, second and third revisions of the 1898 class, third revision of the 1897 class, a possible fourth revision of the 1896-4 classes, and a third revision of the 1872-67 classes. The above revisions, together with the calling to the colours of the 1900 class, could not yield more than a maximum of 500,000 men all told. The outlook was indeed a gloomy one.

13. *Caporetto and its Effects.* In the summer of 1917 the Austro-Hungarians had been forced to the defensive on both the Russian and Italian Fronts. In Russia, Kerensky had let loose the last great Russian effort to push back the Central Powers, while Italian troops had taken the offensive on the Isonzo front. The Russians again moved south-west of the Dniester, but the triumph of Bolshevism and the arrival of German reinforcements almost entirely freed Galicia and Bukovina, and peace with Russia became a distinct possibility. During Korniloff's offensive the Czechs of the 19th Division went over to the Russians. On the 9th August 1916 the Italians had taken Gorizia, they mounted astride the Bainsizza Plateau (May-August 1917) ; Austro-Hungarian resistance had been overcome, and had the Italians been able to push forward, the military power of the Monarchy might perhaps have been crushed there and then. Germany was not slow to realize the danger to herself of the immediate situation on this front and hastened to lend her aid for an offensive which might shake off the Italians for good. The tactics so successfully carried out by the Central Powers at Gorlice were again adopted, and led to the disastrous defeat of the Italians at Caporetto in October 1917. But an overwhelming success by the Central Powers was prevented by the failure of Conrad to develop a push in the Trentino and their own inability to round up the Duke of Aosta's Army. The arrival of British and French

reinforcements steadied the Italians, and the German troops were by degrees withdrawn from the front.

Possibilities of peace were now bright in the East. Armistice negotiations were entered into with the Russians at Brest-Litovsk, and an armistice was signed on the 15th December 1917.

The first discussions between the German and Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q.s regarding a combined offensive on the Western Front took place shortly after the Caporetto victory. In return for German help then given, Austria-Hungary had promised to place all her available troops at Germany's disposal for the Western Front. No great offensive operations were called for on other fronts, and Germany now demanded the completion of the bargain. There were several reasons why Austria-Hungary refused to supply the troops required. The Empress Zita, whose sympathies were, for family reasons, inclined towards the Entente, wished to avoid the contact of Austrian and French troops on French soil, while the non-German elements and Social Democrats were becoming increasingly averse to any sort of help being given to Germany. The attitude of the troops themselves had also to be taken into consideration. On the Western Front the good behaviour of Slav troops could not be assumed, while Germans and Hungarians were required on the Italian and Home Fronts. Further, the necessary equipment for the highly-developed system of fighting in France was not available. In spite of these shortcomings, it is certain that a really willing Austria-Hungary could have spared at least half a dozen divisions. The dispute was eventually settled by the despatch of a number of heavy field artillery batteries, for which ammunition was to be supplied by Germany; owing to strikes and shortage of raw material, the output of munitions in Austria-Hungary had fallen far short of the demand.

14. *Signs of Army Demoralization.* In the meantime the food situation in Austrian towns—particularly Vienna—was rapidly becoming desperate. The reduction by one-half of the bread ration in January 1918 was followed by a general strike of workmen, and the danger of revolution among the civil population became imminent. The Emperor Charles left his luxurious castle at Laxenburg and withdrew with his family to the more unpretentious Imperial dwelling at Baden. The

3rd *Edelweiss* Division and certain trustworthy Hungarian units were brought from the front to the environs of Vienna. Prince Schönburg-Hartenstein, one of the most energetic of the Austrian generals, was even designated as a sort of military dictator, should the occasion for such a post arise. The strike was only settled by the promise of an early peace with Russia and the supply of grain from the Ukraine, while a portion of the Army food reserve was commandeered for the civilian population. A reduction of the Army bread ration in January 1918 was necessitated by this apportioning of part of the Army food reserve to the civil population, whom it became imperative to satisfy. This led to renewed desertions, which, in spite of all counter-measures, continued steadily on the increase. The trench rations were temporarily augmented and field punishments reintroduced, but without avail, for the Army's *moral* was now on the decline—a descent gathering momentum as the War continued. In February 1918 on the Piave a Hungarian unit whose *moral* was usually good, suddenly refused to fight, owing to hunger, and retired towards the Livenza, where they were met and overpowered by German troops, but not before casualties had been suffered on both sides. Mutiny and desertion were not confined to the Army or to the battle front. Towards the end of February a mutiny broke out in a division of the fleet at Cattaro, whence only a few months earlier a torpedo boat with its Slav crew had taken their ship into Brindisi. The Admiral (von Hansa) was made prisoner, and a sailors' revolutionary committee presented him with an ultimatum demanding (a) an immediate general peace; (b) arrangements whereby the principles of nationality might be respected; (c) the better treatment of men by their officers. Strong forces, however, arrived from Pola, and the mutiny was suppressed. A revolt of the 22nd Infantry Regiment (Serbo-Croat) occurred at Mostar, near Temesvár 8,000 Poles endeavoured to reach Rumania, and were only prevented by a Croatian regiment, which forced them to surrender after a pitched battle, in which both machine guns and artillery were used. The mutiny of Poles, due probably to their dissatisfaction at the cession of Kholm to the Ukraine, was a fatal sign for the Monarchy. For years the support of Catholic Galicia had enabled the Austrian Government not only to control its Slav irreconcilables, but also to placate its German friends.

The position of the Poles in the Army perhaps needs a word of explanation. After the collapse of the Russian revolution in 1906, the Polish revolutionary leaders and many of their followers passed over into Galicia. Here Joseph Pilsudski, at the outbreak of war, formed the Polish Legions, at the head of which he crossed the Russian frontier and occupied Kielce by a *coup de main*. This initial success secured for them their incorporation in the Austro-Hungarian Army. They were allowed to wear a special uniform and use Polish as the language of command. Pilsudski, for political reasons, was subsequently relegated to a minor command in the Legions, whose numbers grew as Poland became occupied by the Central Powers. By 1916 the Legions consisted of three infantry brigades, two cavalry and two artillery regiments, and were renamed the Polish *Hilfskorps*. With the Austro-German declaration of the independence of the Kingdom of Poland, 5th November 1916, the corps was retained in the interior to provide the nucleus of a Polish Army, the formation of which was then contemplated. But owing to their failure to obtain recruits, the corps was handed over to the German Governor-General of the German occupied territory in Russian Poland, to be used by him as the permanent cadre of the Polish Army. When, however, at the beginning of July 1917 the greater part of the Legionaries refused to take the oath of 'brotherhood in arms with Austria-Hungary and Germany', many of them, including Pilsudski, were interned, the remainder being sent to Galicia. After another ineffectual attempt at reorganization, nearly all the troops were sent to the *dépôts* of various Austrian infantry regiments, excepting one brigade, which, employed on the Galician Front, later fought its way over to the Bolsheviks, during the summer of 1918.

Another sign of the approaching demoralization was to be found in the desertion of men from regimental *dépôts* and from drafts bound for the front. During three days in March a police raid discovered 600 deserters in Budapest, and during fifteen days in April 1,000 more were arrested. The deserters were not punished, but were sent back to their regimental *dépôts*. Desertions frequently occurred *en masse*, and the defaulters, forming themselves into large armed bands, took to the wilder parts of the country. Though at first they inspired and spread terror, they were subsequently to a certain extent

protected by the natives. These bands scattered through Dalmatia, Croatia and the Banat, and the efforts of the authorities to round them up were not attended with much success. Instances of desertion from draft units became more and more frequent. In February 1918, when a march battalion of the 14th Infantry Regiment (German) left their dépôt at Linz for the front, more than 200 men deserted and hid themselves in the neighbourhood. A 'march' company of the 34th Infantry Regiment (Magyar-Slovak), hearing that they were destined for Palestine, mutinied on leaving their dépôt, and returned to their homes. The economic conditions were having a disastrous effect on the *moral* of the Army, and even the hopes of increased food supplies from the Ukraine could not allay the growing discontent.

Apart from internal conditions, political events were likewise beginning to cast the shadow of eventual doom upon Austria-Hungary. In April 1918, M. Clemenceau disclosed the peace overtures made by the Emperor through his brother-in-law, Prince Sixte de Bourbon. It was only with difficulty, and possibly by some perversion of the truth, that Germany was reassured of the Emperor's good faith with his ally. Shortly after this another incident occurred to widen the breach between the Central Powers. Early in May the food position in Vienna was serious. Bread for only a few days was available. The chief of the Common Food Ministry, General Landwehr, felt that measures must be taken quickly to avoid starvation and revolution. He therefore intercepted a large quantity of cereals and 2,000 wagons of grain—German property—on its way up the Danube to Germany from Rumania and the Ukraine. This food he commandeered for Vienna without asking permission from Germany.

15. *The Failure of the Offensive against Italy, June 1918.* On the 13th May, at Spa, the Emperor Charles obtained in a manner absolution for these unfortunate incidents by signing a convention purporting to strengthen and deepen the alliance between Germany and the Monarchy. At this meeting an offensive on the Piave was agreed to. Conrad, however, was subsequently able to convince the Emperor that a simultaneous push in the Trentino was a necessity, and finally the offensive became a series of separate operations between Pasubio and the sea. A preliminary demonstration in the Tonale Pass was

without effect, and on the 15th June the offensive was launched on the plateau of Sette Comuni, east of the Brenta and on the Piave opposite Treviso. Only where least expected was success obtained. Three divisions, after a bloody fight, crossed the Piave and established themselves astride the Montello, while towards the mouth of the river further divisions obtained a footing on the right bank. Any exploitation of this gain was prevented by heavy rains which, swelling the river to a rushing torrent, swept away the bridges and severed the communications of the advancing force. Only at the cost of heavy losses was a retreat effected, and by the 24th June—the anniversary of the Battle of Custozza—the Austro-Hungarians were again behind the Piave. During this fighting the Monarchy's Air Force was almost placed *hors de combat*, losing 107 aeroplanes. In view of the mutinies and desertions already referred to, it is surprising to find that the troops fought with comparative bravery and devotion. It was only when actually defeated that disillusionment set in amongst them. This may be accounted for perhaps by the fact that the proportion of men who could read and write in the Austro-Hungarian Army was comparatively low; the offensive spirit was thus more easily heightened by increased rations (always granted before large operations) and by the personal example of a superior officer. The defeat, with its 150,000 casualties, caused an outcry in Austria-Hungary. In the Hungarian Parliament, the Austrian generals were accused of incompetence, and a national Army again called for. In the Austrian Reichsrat during a three days' secret debate, both Charles and his Empress were openly accused by the German members of an understanding with the enemy. The downfall of Conrad was finally consummated. After forty-seven years' service, he became Colonel-in-Chief of the Guards—a position equivalent to the command of the Yeomen of the Guard in this country.

16. *Results of the Failure of the Offensive, increased Demoralization.* On the suspension of the offensive, the Germans demanded six Austro-Hungarian divisions for the Western Front, but in view of the great opposition of the politicians, only two—the 1st (German) and 35th (Magyar-Slovak-Rumanian) Divisions—were sent in the early days of July. Two further divisions—the 37th Honvéd (Magyar-Slovak) and 10th (mostly Polish-Ruthene)—followed at the end of August. On the 17th August

the last birthday dinner of a reigning Habsburg monarch took place, and the Emperor was presented with a Field-Marshal's baton by his Generals. The baton had already travelled to the Italian Front, where it was to have been presented on the morrow of a great victory. In spite of the disastrous Piave battle, the lack of food and the growth of nationalist feeling among the soldiers, discipline and counter measures were still able to prevent mutiny and desertion at the front from paralysing further operations. Nevertheless, several mutinies did occur—mostly among Czech regiments, e. g. the 3rd, 21st, 98th Infantry, and the 8th and 28th Schützen (formerly Landwehr) Regiments. The greatest chaos, however, reigned in the interior of the Monarchy. At the dépôt at Rumburg, for instance, men of the 18th (Czech), 92nd and 94th (German) Infantry Regiments broke out of barracks, and after killing their commanding officer and robbing the population, proceeded to march on Theresienstadt. The loyal garrisons of two neighbouring towns were, however, warned by telephone of their advance, and in the fight which ensued, some 300 deserters were captured. Fully 600 succeeded in effecting their escape, and although the greater number were subsequently caught, some of them crossed the German border into Saxony. Again, a draft battalion of the 81st Regiment was paraded at Lienz in the Pusterthal, bound for Trent, on the way to the front; but when the order to advance was given, not a man in the battalion moved. The officers drew their revolvers, but the men, mainly Croats and Dalmatians, attacked them. A major of German nationality was killed by blows with the butt of a rifle, many other officers were wounded, and the battalion was only subdued by the machine-guns of another unit. Some 200 men, however, succeeded in escaping; they took with them a quantity of rifles, ammunition and machine-guns, and made off into the mountains, where they were joined by other deserters. A fugitive Rumanian officer appeared and played the part of brigand chief; and the efforts of the gendarmerie, a strong detachment of which was sent from Franzensfeste, assisted by several machine-gun units, resulted merely in the capture of a few of the deserters, who were promptly shot. Examples of the revolutionary spirit introduced by prisoners of war returned from Russia were numerous. Great care was taken to segregate them, in order to prevent the spread of

subversive ideas, but without any conspicuous success. The number of deserters at large in the interior of the country assumed enormous dimensions in May and June. In Slavonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina it was estimated that over 17,000 of these deserters were roving about the country in armed bands. They were to be found in Hungary (especially between the Danube and Theiss), Bohemia, Moravia, Carniola, Carinthia and the Banat. The total number of deserters in the interior at this time cannot have been far short of 100,000.

17. *The Last Stages.* On the 15th September, Charles's Peace Note was sent out to neutrals and the Entente Powers, in spite of great opposition from the German Great G.H.Q. On the same day the Entente offensive began on the Balkan Front, and by the 29th September the Bulgarian Armistice was in force. As the Entente troops advanced into Serbia a frantic attempt was made by the Central Powers to form a new Southern Front. Under the Austrian Field-Marshal Kövess, Austro-Hungarian troops were rushed from Italy and the Ukraine; but little offensive spirit was shown, and one division left its fighting position at Vranje without firing a shot. On the 1st October, Hussarek, the Austrian Prime Minister, hinted in the Reichsrat at federating the 'nations' (v. pp. 90-1). In view of the political and economic conditions prevailing in Austria-Hungary at this moment, it seems curious that an immediate revolution did not occur at the front. It can only be attributed to the strictness of discipline, to the jealousies of the different nationalities, and to the fact that all Austro-Hungarian high commanders—whatever their nationality—remained loyal to the old order. On the 20th October, however, following several mutinies among the Magyars in the Val Sugana and on the Piave, the Hungarian Parliament demanded the return of the Hungarian Army, and the Archduke Joseph, then in command of the Trentino Front, was nominated Field-Marshal and Commander of the National Hungarian Army. On the 24th October the Entente began their last attack on the Italian Front. The Austro-Hungarians made stubborn resistance at several points, notably in the Asolone-Grappa area. On the 27th October, British troops crossed the Piave and broke through the enemy front. Retreat now became general. On the 3rd November the Armistice was signed, just in time to anticipate the disruption of the two halves of the

Monarchy. A wild rush to return set in on the part of all those who could avoid being taken prisoner. Several thousands 'looted' their way homewards. Staffs broke up, and the G.H.Q. at Baden became the scene of the greatest disorder, the troops and guards attached disappearing in haste. The military power of Austria-Hungary was finally broken, and the Dual Monarchy ceased to exist.

18. *General Considerations.* Brief and general though the above summary is, it suffices perhaps to indicate how ripe for disintegration were the various elements of the Austro-Hungarian population, even before the War, and how the long tale of military failures from 1914 onwards culminated in the only possible result, namely, the defeat of the Habsburg arms and the overthrow of the Habsburg Empire. It would be difficult to point to any one factor which, more than another, contributed to this outcome. All the elements of eventual disaster were present. The pre-existing discontent of the various nationalities and their hatred of the German and Magyar could but increase in intensity, as the War, with all its concomitant horrors of death, disease, famine and want, proceeded—a War, too, in which they were engaged, many of them, against their will, and were called upon, more often than not, to fight against their brothers in race and religion. Add to this bad leadership, faulty tactics and dwindling reserves in men and material; lack of unity of purpose, and want of collaboration, with their German allies; the conflict of pride with the growing consciousness of inherent inadequacy and inefficiency; perpetual friction not only between the dominant and subordinate nationalities, but between the two ruling ones themselves; constant political crises and changes of Ministry, with the resulting instability of policy in general; the growth of revolutionary ideas synchronizing with the peace with Russia and the return of prisoners of war infected with the germs of Bolshevism; the successfully subversive propaganda of the Entente; above all, a war-weariness produced by such economic distress as can hardly be paralleled in the history of mankind—these are but a few of the contributory factors. History alone and the gradual emergence of contemporary records can fill in the details in all their lurid colours. The wonder is, perhaps, that the final *dénouement* did not come sooner. If the decline and fall of the Holy Roman Empire's successor

prove melancholy reading to the future student of European history, the story of the rise from its débris of a number of national entities, strong and vigorous in the consciousness of their newly and, be it added, hardly won freedom, should afford him some compensating consolation. It remained for the Peace Conference to build out of the ruins the foundations of new, free, self-contained and self-supporting states upon a firm and equitable basis.

CHAPTER I

THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTRAL POWERS

PART III

THE DOWNFALL OF THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

A. THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY BEFORE THE WAR

1. *The Austrian 'Staatsidee'*. 'The idea of the Austrian State' (*die österreichische Staatsidee*) was in recent years habitually in the mouth of those who defended Austria-Hungary's existence. The concrete meaning of the term was never explained; in fact, it had none which its votaries would have cared to explain, and the Austrian State, to which it primarily referred as being conterminous with the Habsburg dominions, did not exist except in reminiscences of the past and pious wishes for the future. The Habsburg Monarchy consisted of two separate, sovereign States, Austria and Hungary, with Bosnia-Herzegovina held by them in common. Since 1867, Austria was that which remained of the amorphous mass of the Habsburg possessions, the 'home-farm' of the dynasty, after national States had arisen in Germany, Italy and, in certain aspects, also in Hungary; for nearly fifty years (until 1916) this residuum, which in proportion to its size displayed more frontier and less coherence than any other State in Europe, went officially by the colourless designation of 'the Kingdoms and Provinces represented in the Reichsrat'. The name of Austria, currently given to them, was kept in reserve in the hope that some day it might once more cover all the dominions of the Habsburgs, *des Hauses Oesterreich*.¹ The Austria of 1867 was regarded by the Habsburgs as but a phase in the history of their dynastic power, their *Hausmacht*; for them there was nothing final about it, indeed they shunned finality—principles

¹ For a discussion of the legal and constitutional relations of Austria and Hungary to one another and to the Common Monarchy see Chap. VII, p. 395, n. 2.

when arranged suggest or imply limitation. Every piece of drift-wood carried to their shore was to them a promising sprig which might yet grow into a crown. Their outlying western possessions were gone, their age-long dreams of dominion over Germany and Italy were dead ; their face was now to the east. Through Galicia and Dalmatia, Austria's fantastically shaped body, enveloping the massive block of Hungary, stretched out its arms towards Poland, the Ukraine, Rumania, and Serbia, which all found their place in the war-dreams and schemings of the Habsburg dynasty. The Habsburgs were the one dynasty which had never linked up its fate with that of any single nation ; they had a capital and a territorial base, but no nationality ; they developed schemes territorially coherent, though devoid of all national idea. Their instincts were purely proprietary, the one meaning of an Austrian State to them was that they possessed it ; to the outside world, that it existed. For the few, and mostly interested, exponents of an Austrian State, its existence was an aim in itself ; and this was the pivot of all that there was in the alleged Austrian *Staatsidee*. But it was by no means this exceedingly frail basis which sustained Austria-Hungary's continued existence.

2. *The Partnership of Magyars on one side and Germans and Poles on the other.* There was more shape and sense in the remaining Habsburg dominions than appeared on the surface and more than the Habsburg Idea recognized or admitted ; there was less justice to nationalities than the dynasty could theoretically have put up with. Although inhabited by eight, and, counting sub-divisions, even by eleven peoples, the territory of the Habsburg Monarchy was completely covered by the historic, 'imperialist' claims of three nationalities—the claim of the Magyars to the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen, of the Germans to 'Western' Austria,¹ and of the Poles to Galicia ; each claim was tenaciously asserted, though, unless statistical forgeries were committed and unless the Jews were excluded,

¹ 'Western Austria' is here meant to denote the western hereditary provinces which had been under the Habsburgs since 1526, had been included in the Holy Roman Empire and then in the Germanic Confederation of 1815, and lay within the orbit of German settlement, influence, and ambitions. It excludes the outlying provinces in the east and south-east Galicia, the Bukovina and Dalmatia, acquisitions of the late eighteenth century, unconnected with the original block of the Habsburg possessions in geography and history, in nationality (except for the newly-planted German settlers in the Bukovina) and also in their economic structure.

none of the three nationalities formed a majority in the territory it claimed. If conceded dominion, the master-nations were ready to defend every inch of the Monarchy against the national claims of its neighbours, the co-racials of the subject nationalities—the Southern Tyrol and Trierte against Italy, the Illyrian provinces against Serbia, East Galicia against Russia, Transylvania against Rumania; whereas the subject nationalities, if conceded national self-government, would naturally have bethought themselves next of national reunion. The Germans and Poles in Austria, and the Magyars in Hungary, in their own interest, not from any attachment to the dynasty, had to become the ‘State-preserving elements’ (*die staatterhaltenden Elemente*).

In turn the Habsburgs, for reasons of internal as well as of international policy, had no choice but to base their rule on the supremacy of the Magyars in Hungary, and of the Germans and Poles in Austria. It had its roots in history and was opposed to the national principle, like the Habsburg Monarchy. It rested on past empire and on consequent social superiority, and was therefore conservative, a feature essential to a Monarchy which lived by survival alone. The upper classes were Magyar throughout Hungary, Polish throughout Galicia; in ‘Western’ Austria even in 1914 they still remained predominantly German. The choice between nationalities implied therefore a choice between classes—a mediaeval, clerical dynasty does not lead social revolutions, nor impose the rule of peasants on their landlords. Lastly, the German-Magyar combination alone could supply the Habsburgs with a suitable foreign alliance to safeguard their possessions against a coalition of the neighbouring States, each of which saw national territory of its own included in their Monarchy. The Germans within Austria were sufficiently strong to permeate the State and thus to accept dominion in lieu of complete national reunion; Germany alone seemed sufficiently powerful to preserve Austria-Hungary’s existence and sufficiently concerned in it to attempt doing so; and moreover Germany had no interests conflicting with those of Austria-Hungary in the Adriatic and the Balkans, which now became the main sphere of Habsburg ambitions. Hence the German alliance. The logical result of that alliance upon the internal affairs of the Habsburg Monarchy was once more

the predominance of the Magyars in Hungary and of the Germans (with their indispensable associates, the Poles) in Austria. No one had chosen his partners, no special sympathy bound either the Poles or the Magyars to the Germans—in fact, when necessary, they could show strong dislike of one another—and few statesmen except Bismarck, Julius Andrassy the elder, and, more recently, Stephen Tisza, seem to have understood and accepted all the implications of the system. It had been imposed on the contracting parties by the inherent necessities of their political situation and by the logic of events. Its intricacies were such that no human mind could have thought out, nor any human skill readjusted them. Its inherent force was so great that it survived to the very end, till October 1918.

In 1848, when the national and constitutional movement among the gentry and bourgeoisie found expression in revolt against the non-national, proprietary character of the Monarchy, the dynasty appealed to the subject peasant-races, the Czecho-Slovaks, the Yugo-slavs, Ruthenes,¹ and Rumans, for help against their masters, the Germans, Magyars, and Poles. In 1867 the Habsburgs surrendered their late supporters to their late opponents. Reconciled to the most powerful and most articulate of their subjects, they proposed to resume the struggle against their hereditary enemy, Prussia. A German-Magyar veto prevented them from doing so in 1870. In 1879 the alliance with Prussia-Germany was concluded. The ideas of separation from Germany and of reform within the Habsburg Monarchy, which arose once more in the course of the War and in the hour of defeat, were froth and bubble, and the last desperate attempts of October 1918 bore no more resemblance to action based on a political system than the mad antics of a drowning man do to the movement of swimming. The political developments of Austria-Hungary obeyed the necessities of its internal structure; illusions there were of dynastic power to shape—in reality these developments were pre-determined as the movements of the stars, and subject to iron laws.

¹ The Little Russians in the late Austro-Hungarian territories are usually known by the name of 'Ruthenes', although in language and race they are absolutely identical with the Little Russians of Southern Russia. A group of Little Russians, which claimed to form a nation distinct from that of the Great Russians and not merely a branch of the Russian nation, to avoid all resemblance, adopted the fanciful name of 'Ukrainians'. Thus they have come to be known by three interchangeable names.

It had not been within the power of the Habsburgs and their centralist followers to refuse the claims of the Germans, Magyars, and Poles ; as far as Austria was concerned, it had been within their power, and to their interest, to prevent the complete establishment of the system. Its full logical development would have left the Habsburgs stripped of all authority, without a 'home-farm', with an exceedingly limited base for dynastic schemings, with very little scope for an independent foreign policy, bound hand and foot to the three dominant nationalities. They would have changed into shadowy suzerains of excessively powerful subjects, the real masters of their possessions ; in short, the Habsburgs would have been reduced to the position of constitutional monarchs in three 'imperialist' States, each based on the artificially secured rule of a dominant minority. It was in opposition to the complete establishment of a system, of which the principle had to be admitted if the Habsburg Monarchy was to be held together, that the interest of the dynasty coincided with that of the submerged nationalities. Cautiously, and as far as Hungary was concerned, in a purely Platonic fashion, the Habsburgs sympathized with the outraged national rights of races whom they themselves, in their own dynastic interest, had surrendered to the master-nations. This was the outstanding peculiarity of the Habsburg system, the only concrete meaning of the so-called Austrian *Staatsidee*.

3. *The Magyar System.* In 1867 Hungary had crystallized once more into the 'imperialist' domain of the Magyars and was, in its constitution, completely separated from the remaining Habsburg heritage, the Austrian Hereditary Provinces. The frontier drawn between Austria and Hungary cut across the lands *minorum gentium*, of 'the minor nations', the Czecho-Slovaks, the Yugo-slavs, the Ruthenes, and the Rumans, whose national territories were thus partitioned even within the borders of the Habsburg possessions, an obvious fact which, during the War, was only too often overlooked or deliberately left out of count when internal reform and national autonomy within the Habsburg Monarchy were discussed. By forming Croatia into a separate, though absolutely dependent, State, the Magyars had secured for themselves a majority in Hungary proper, and by means of a narrow class franchise in a country where the upper classes were Magyar or Magyarized, they had

given an almost exclusively Magyar character to their Parliament. This was an artificially constructed and delicately balanced system which did not admit of any radical changes within Hungary nor of a material extension of its borders; strongly conscious of this fact, Stephen Tisza was a bitter opponent of democratic reform at home and of any considerable increase of territory at the expense of Serbia or Rumania. Hungary was not to be used or manipulated in the Habsburg interest; it was neither to be enlarged nor reduced. There were no Magyars outside Hungary's frontiers, and within they were to be dominant. They held the most convenient strategic frontiers, the Carpathian arc and the Transylvanian mountain-bastion, and had access to the sea. Hungary was complete.

The Magyars would have gladly seen the Germans and Poles attain the same position in 'Western' Austria and in Galicia, respectively, which they themselves held in Hungary. It was not to their interest that in Austria the subject races should remain in immediate touch with the dynasty, and enjoy more favourable treatment than in Hungary, nor that the dynastic power of the Habsburgs should survive anywhere, and threaten with the help of the subject races once more to include or engulf the Magyar domain in the amorphous mass of the Habsburg possessions. In September 1866 Count Julius Andrassy the elder emphatically declared to the Austrian Minister Hübner that the Magyars 'could not suffer a federalist system to be established in Austria, a probable centre for future attacks against Hungary'. Had full self-government been conceded within Austria such a system would have affected the nationalities oppressed in Hungary; the Magyars would have had to break off all connexion with Austria and the Habsburgs—every extant link and all reminiscences of a common past would then have kept suggesting to the subject races of Hungary that through a reunion in a dynastic Habsburg State lay the road to national self-government. But as changes in the Austrian constitution required a two-thirds majority, and such a majority could not have been obtained in the Reichsrat against the German vote, federalist devolution could have been introduced by means of a dynastic *coup d'état* alone. In the Agreement of 1867 the Magyars therefore explicitly stipulated that the connexion between the two States was to continue only so long as both were governed in a constitutional manner. They thus reserved for themselves

the power of vetoing any unconstitutional act even with regard to exclusively Austrian affairs—but they naturally never protested when the Austrian constitution was infringed to the disadvantage of the Slavs.

The Magyars desired Austria to be centralized, and its centralism to bear a distinct German character. But with Galicia as an integral part of Austria, the Austrian State was ill poised. It would therefore have been to the interest of the Austrian Germans, as well as of the Polish and the Magyar oligarchs, had a separate constitutional status been conceded to Galicia. The exclusion of the Galician members from the Austrian Reichsrat would have given a decisive majority to the Germans over the Czechs, Yugo-slavs, and Italians, whilst the Poles would have been left to deal with the Ruthenes in the Galician Diet, where, by means of electoral devices, they had secured for themselves a majority almost as good as that of the Magyars in the Hungarian Parliament. As long as within Austria no single nationality had a decisive, permanent superiority over its opponents, the Habsburgs were able to preserve their dynastic power, without reproducing the strictly 'constitutional' Magyar system of government. Although they never seriously questioned the predominance of the Germans and Poles over the subject races, they used the contending nationalities as checks on each other. They could do so the more easily as they invariably had the support of the German clericals and of the Poles. Nationality was not the dominant, or at least not the exclusive, political instinct and interest of the German clericals, whilst the Poles had to think of the wider, international aspects of the Polish question and could not consider a settlement within the narrow frontiers of Galicia, which formed one province only of Poland, as anything but temporary. Neither for the German clericals nor for the Poles was there finality in the frontiers of Austria, as there was for the Magyars in those of Hungary, and neither therefore felt the same overwhelming interest in the complete and definite establishment of the triple Magyar-German-Polish scheme.

4. *Austrian Centralism and German Nationalism.* In the central, purely German districts of Austria national feeling had never completely divested itself of an Austrian imprint; it oscillated between the German national idea on the one hand

and a peculiar Austrian sentiment on the other. In the Czech provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, bordering on Saxony and Prussia, the German minority developed an uncompromising nationalism, neither softened nor clouded by religious sentiment; so also, to some extent, in the southern Slovene borderlands. But in the centre, especially in Vienna, the population felt too closely associated with the Habsburgs in their power, and its profits and glory, to adopt the purely German point of view. The phantoms of the mediaeval Roman Empire, of the non-national world-idea centring in Imperial Vienna, surrounded the throne of the Habsburgs—*ils vivaient de l'ombre d'une ombre* . . . For the devout peasantry of the Alpine provinces and for the Vienna petty middle classes, Roman Catholicism was a further link with the dynasty, and even with the clericals of other nations, Czech, Slovene, or Italian. The *intransigent* German nationalists turned their backs upon Hungary and Galicia in order to concentrate on the Czech and Slovene provinces, in which they were directly concerned through their German minorities. The 'Austrians' could not become indifferent to any part of the Habsburg dominions, their old inheritance, and upheld the conception of the *Gesamtmonarchie* (a State embracing them all) with even more fervour than the dynasty itself. But whilst German nationalism and Austrian 'imperialism' were clearly distinct in theory and in the minds of their most extreme exponents, they blended in the middle ranges, and most Austrian Germans were something of the one and something of the other. Austrian imperialism with Vienna for centre was German in its essence, and the Germans were in Austria the most important centripetal force.¹

The idea of the *Gesamtmonarchie* was a direct negation of the Magyar scheme. 'As long as a Magyar is left alive he will not allow his nation to be forced under such a superior State organization,' declared Count Tisza on the 1st January 1916. The centralist Austrian 'patriotism' was by all means agreeable to the Magyars, but only if enclosed within the frontiers of the western half of the Monarchy, i. e. whilst directed against Czech and Yugo-slav national ambitions. 'I consider this feeling equally sacred as our own patriotism,' Count Tisza went on to say in his exposition of the Magyar

¹ On this subject cf. L. B. Namier in the *Nineteenth Century and After* of July 1916, 'The Old House and the German Future.'

creed. 'I sympathize with it and value it, provided it does not turn against the independence of the Hungarian nation. . . . It is in our own interest to strengthen over there the centripetal as against the centrifugal forces. . . . Before now the Magyar nation tried to fulfil its mission, to promote and strengthen the centripetal forces in Austria. . . . And if in the past it has not achieved full success, this was because Austrian patriotism has not been able to divest itself of the old tendencies in favour of a Monarchy including all the Habsburg dominions. . . .' Tisza spoke of an 'Austrian patriotism'; he meant it. The Magyars wanted Austria, but not too much of it. They wanted it to be German, but not too German. It was to be sufficiently German to prevent the nationalities which were subdued in Hungary from forming national States across Hungary's border, but not so German as to lead to a fusion of Austria with Germany. The weaker Austrian partner would then have been replaced by an overwhelmingly, indeed dangerously superior German neighbour, and the Magyar system in international politics, a marvellous machine which through a multitude of wheels and levers made one of the smallest nations in Europe into a Great Power, would have broken down. 'A proper centralization of Austria will secure the State against excessive Germanism (*Deutschtümelei*) on the part of the Germans by their being mixed up with the Slavs, whilst the Slavs will be prevented by the Germans from following out a centrifugal policy,' explained the elder Andrassy to the Emperor Francis Joseph I in July 1866. The aim of German nationalism was Great-Germany—comprising all territories of the former Germanic Confederation—even *Mittel-Europa*; the logical expression of 'Austrian' patriotism was Great-Austria—*die Gesamtmonarchie*. The Magyars wanted neither. For them, and them alone, the Dual Monarchy, as they had reconstructed it in 1867, was final.

The Austrian federalist schemes of 1860-73 were based on the historic provinces into which Austria was divided. There were seventeen of these, differing widely in size and population—e.g. Galicia had 22,000 square miles and, in 1910, 8,000,000 inhabitants, Salzburg 2,000 square miles and 200,000 inhabitants. Only some of the small German mountain provinces were nationally homogeneous. All the rest had their national minorities and their national problems. Whereas in

the Austrian Reichsrat and government the Germans were practically dominant, there were Slav majorities and German minorities in Bohemia, Moravia, and Carniola ; on the Adriatic coast there were practically no Germans. Complete centralization in the Austrian Reichsrat alone could save the Germans in the Slav provinces from becoming minorities subject to non-German rule, and to achieve this was for the German Nationalists the purpose of Austria's existence. But again the particular interests of the German clericals produced divergences within the German camp. To the clericals, who were strongly entrenched in several of the Alpine Diets, provincial autonomy safeguarded certain interests against a possible or actual anti-clerical majority in the Vienna Parliament. This was a further obstacle to German centralism in Austria.

5. *The Poles and the Habsburgs.* The Austrian Poles were neither federalists nor centralists, merely Habsburgites. They had been federalists at times, but half-heartedly ; they did not really wish for an increase in the power and independence of the pro-Russian Czechs and Yugo-slavs. They could not be centralists as long as Galicia remained an Austrian province. For themselves they demanded from Austria national liberty and dominion over the Ruthenes of East Galicia ; on every other point they were prepared for compromise. They were willing to co-operate with the dynasty because they counted on Habsburg support in the reconstruction of Poland. Whilst Russia in partitioning Poland had aimed at re-establishing her own national unity (White Russia and the Western Ukraine) and Prussia at consolidating her eastern frontier (West Prussia and Posnania), Austria had merely demanded her pound of flesh as counterpoise to the acquisitions of her neighbours. The same reasons which had moved the other two Powers to partition Poland maintained their opposition to its reconstruction ; the Habsburgs were prepared to give up their pound of flesh provided they could get the entire man. Hostility to Prussia and Russia, and the common Roman Catholic religion were bonds between the Poles and the Habsburgs, even before the agreement on the basis of Galician autonomy was reached ; that agreement was the logical outcome of a community of interests. The idea of an ' Austro-Polish solution ' can be traced as early as 1794, 1809, and 1830 ; after 1848, and still more after 1867, the belief in ' Austria's

historic mission' with regard to Poland became a fundamental article of the Polish creed in Galicia. Reluctantly the Poles accepted even the German Alliance as necessary for safeguarding Austria and of course also their dominion over the Little Russian territory of East Galicia against Russia. The anti-Russian and generally anti-Slav policy continued to bind them to the Habsburgs and Magyars. It was not an accident that M. de Bilinski, one of the chief leaders of the Galician Poles and Minister for Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1914, was one of the main authors of the Ultimatum to Serbia—which fact did not prevent him in 1919 from attaining Cabinet rank in the reconstituted Poland.

6. *The Yugo-slav Problem.*¹ One stone in the structure of the Habsburg Monarchy was very loose—Bosnia-Herzegovina, acquired in 1878 for dynastic reasons, not coveted then either by the Austrian Germans or the Magyars. Yugo-slav throughout in nationality, though partly Mussulman in religion, and surrounded by Yugo-slav territory—by Croatia, a nominally self-governing kingdom under the Hungarian Crown, by Dalmatia, an Austrian province nowhere bordering on Austria, and by the independent Yugo-slav kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro—Bosnia-Herzegovina had no political connexion with any of them but remained under the joint Austro-Hungarian government, which itself was not a government but a contractual formation based on the Agreement of 1867. The Austrian Prime Minister, Baron Hussarek, in his speech of the 1st October 1918, described Bosnia-Herzegovina as *ein staatsrechtlich undefinierbares Neutrum*.² The dynasty would have willingly accepted a union of all Yugo-slav territory provided it was effected under their sceptre. The Austrian Germans would not allow the Slovene territories, their sea-coast, to be detached from 'Western' Austria, but would probably have agreed to a Serbo-Croat State or at least to a Great Croatia—consisting of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.² But as such a union of Yugo-slav territories would have changed the balance within Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy to the disadvantage of the Magyars, these naturally objected, and there was no way of fitting the Yugo-slav stones into

¹ v. further discussion, Chap. IV, part I, *passim*.

² 'A nondescript creation, which cannot be defined in terms of political science.'

the structure of the Habsburg Monarchy. For different reasons the other national problems of the Habsburg Monarchy were internationally more or less dormant during the year preceding the outbreak of the War. The unsolved Yugo-slav question opened up the problem of Austria-Hungary's existence and brought about the War.

The War, in which Russia and Germany opposed each other, unrolled the Polish Question which could not have been reopened in any other way, and the Polish Question raised all the other problems of Austria-Hungary's inner structure. Austria-Hungary, as it existed from 1867 till 1914, the creation of Magyar statesmanship, fully and finally satisfied none but the Magyars; on everybody else, not excluding even the dynasty, the Austrian centralists and the German Nationalists, it imposed sacrifices and renunciations, offering them merely half-solutions and a *modus vivendi*. The War and the possibility, nay the certainty, of change unhinged at one blow the delicate system of compromise and balances, and liberated wildly divergent desires and forces. 'Great' Austria, 'Great' Germany, a reunited Poland threatened to destroy the balance and nature of the Dual System, the national ambitions of the subject races threatened to destroy the very existence of the Habsburg Monarchy and the 'integrity of Hungary'. Which-ever side was to prove victorious, the Austria-Hungary of pre-War days was dead, and everything was once more unsettled. Long-forgotten visions stirred up somnolent forces, leading them towards an unknown future.

B. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY IN THE WAR

7. *The Austrian Solution of the Polish Question.* On the outbreak of war the Galician Poles declared for a union of Galicia and Russian Poland under the Habsburgs as a third component part of the Monarchy; this, the so-called 'Austrian Solution of the Polish Question', was the first suggestion for a recasting of the Habsburg Monarchy. The Habsburgs would have welcomed it as implying new acquisitions, the German Nationalists as crystallizing their domain in 'Western' Austria, most of the Magyars as a consummation of the triple German-Magyar-Polish scheme. Tisza resisted. Alone in his generation he had a perfect understanding of Austria-Hungary's

political mechanism. Under the Dual System the virile Magyar oligarchs had realized independence, i.e. predominance over their internally distracted Austrian partner (dominion being the only form of independence in marriage). Could they be certain of maintaining it in a 'triangle'? A political structure of the Monarchy which would make it possible for Hungary to be out-voted on essential problems of State, and therefore subject to an alien will, would nullify our achievements,' wrote Count Tisza to Count Czernin on the 22nd February 1917. Similarly, Germany was loath to accept a union of Austrian and Russian Poland, which, leaving Prussian Poland the only unredeemed Polish territory, would have given an exclusively anti-German front to the Polish State, the new partner in the Habsburg Monarchy. Tisza's scheme was to join Russian Poland to Austria externally as a self-governing kingdom, whilst Galicia remained an integral part of the Austrian Empire; the German scheme was to form it into a nominally independent kingdom under Germany. Both were clearly unacceptable to Austria; among the Austrian Poles either solution would have produced a desire for union with the new Poland, which, if unsatisfied, would have made them join forces with the Slav opposition in the Reichsrat, creating there a permanent majority in opposition to the Austrian State. A complete deadlock was thus reached in the Polish Question.

8. *The Habsburg Monarchy and Mittel-Europa.* This deadlock delayed Austria's internal reconstruction; building operations could not begin on undefined ground, although the plans were complete. A political consolidation had been effected among the Austrian Germans between those who were primarily Austrians and those who were primarily Germans. Axiomatic truths about Austria-Hungary, hitherto obscured by surface contradictions, were revealed in practice. Germany in her own interest safeguarded the existence of the Habsburg Monarchy, the fight for it was a German national war. But the races opposed to German-Magyar rule became the enemies of the Habsburg Monarchy. Experience had taught them that cultural liberties without national independence meant the right to develop nationality coupled with the duty to ignore it in wars brought about by the dominant races. The logic of events forced a programme of complete independence, tanta-

mount to the break-up of the Habsburg Monarchy, on the subject races. The Austrian 'imperialists' who, non-national as they were in their ideas, would have preferred to build on a wider rather than an exclusively German basis, were in their turn forced into an attitude and policy towards the subject races hardly differing from that of the German Nationalists.

On the other hand, the War proved Austria-Hungary's value to Germany. The Habsburg Monarchy, which to short-sighted Pan-Germans (not to Bismarck) had seemed a cumbersome survival impeding the road to a reunion of the entire German nation, proved the most valuable asset for *Mittel-Europa*, the German World-Empire. Even the extremest Pan-Germans in Austria became converted to the Habsburg Monarchy. There was now a platform common to all the Austrian Germans—Austria was to be maintained, reconstructed on a German basis, and firmly fitted into the Germanic system; her policy was to be subordinated to that of Central Europe, and the entire Habsburg inheritance was to be taken over and secured by the joint strength of the German nation. Through *Mittel-Europa* the Austrian Germans returned both to the Pan-German and to the Great-Austrian idea, now reconciled with each other. They beheld themselves once more an integral part of the German nation, and as part of it resumed an 'imperialism' too wide for them in their previous isolation.

The Polish programme of a union of Austrian and Russian Poland threatened to change the balance within the Habsburg Monarchy; the German programme of Central European Union—to destroy its independence. Either would have marked the end of Austria-Hungary, the Dual Monarchy within the frontiers of 1867. The structural conception of Austria-Hungary was broken down by the races dominant in Austria three years before defeat, and the action of the subject races razed the building and obliterated its foundations.

Naturally the Habsburgs did not relish the idea of being permanently reduced to a dependent position within the Central European Union. Nor was Tisza prepared to admit a union infringing Hungary's sovereignty and independence. The domain of the Magyars in Hungary was to remain intact, Austria was to remain common yet neutral ground between Germany and the Magyars. If a Central European *bloc* was to be formed this too was to rest on a dual basis. The European

and trans-European West might pass under German leadership, but the 'Turanian' East—Bulgaria, Turkey, etc.—was to pass under that of the Magyars. *Mittel-Europa*, like Austria, was to stop at the western frontier of Hungary; this was the Magyar conception of it. The 9,000,000 Magyars were to stand back to back with the 80,000,000 Germans, not to obey them. Tisza was a bold, silent man. He worked for aims which possibly a sense of humour and proportion did not allow him to avow.

9. *Schemes for Reconstruction in 1915.* In the summer of 1915 the armies of the Central Powers had occupied Russian Poland. A declaration of policy seemed urgently needed. Count Julius Andrassy, a bitter personal and political enemy of Tisza, opened a campaign in favour of the 'Austrian solution'. Towards the end of the year, when the tide of *Mittel-Europa* propaganda rose rapidly, Andrassy linked up the two ideas in one scheme of compromise all round. The Habsburgs were to waive their dynastic pride by accepting a subordinate place in *Mittel-Europa*, and in exchange receive the Polish Crown. The Poles were to be conceded this, the widest measure of national reunion compatible with the German Alliance. The Austrian Germans were to attain dominion in Austria and German reunion in *Mittel-Europa*. In the complete discomfiture of the subject races of 'Western' Austria and Galicia and in the establishment of the Central European *bloc* as the dominant Power in Europe, the Magyars were to find full safeguards for the integrity of Hungary and against any effective revival of Slav schemes from within or without the Monarchy. Tisza maintained a cold refusal. When on Easter Sunday, the 23rd April 1916, Andrassy once more developed his pet scheme simultaneously in the *Vienna Neue Freie Presse* and in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Tisza's organ, the *Budapesti Hirlap*, published two articles, one declaring Magyar *désintéressement* in the Polish Question ('If we started discussing the Polish Question we should only be talking about other people's possessions and interfering with other people's business'), the other bitterly protesting against German economic activities in Hungary, though the closest economic union was to have been the essence of the Central European scheme.

10. *Rifts in the Monarchy.* Serbia was not to be annexed, because the Magyars did not want any more Yugo-slav terri-

tory ;¹ Rumania could not be placated, because the Magyars would not cede an inch of Transylvanian territory ; the Austrian-Polish scheme was to be dropped, because the Magyars—through Tisza—insisted on preserving the Dual System ; Central European Union in the integral sense was not to be, because the Magyars refused to submit to any superior political organization. The Habsburg Monarchy was not to be remodelled, enlarged or even saved if a sacrifice were required of Hungary's integrity or sovereignty. And this list of prohibitions was enforced by a Premier who had neither his country's foreign policy nor its army under his direct control,² as the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and War and the Supreme Army Command were common to both States of the Monarchy and had their offices and headquarters in Austria, not in Hungary. The Austrian patriots at the Vienna Court and in the army bitterly resented the 'Magyar egoism' and fretted at its dictation. The Magyars, on the other hand, now fully realized the dangers which, in case of victory, would arise from their troops being mixed up with those of Austria under a command constitutionally hostile to the separatist Magyar doctrines about Hungary's sovereignty and independence. But if, owing to the wretched ineptitude of her rulers, Austria were to break up or be permanently subordinated to Germany, the Magyars did not want Hungary to be involved in her fate. Lifelong champions of the Agreement of 1867, such as Tisza and Wekerle, became converted to the demand for a separate Hungarian army. 'The great task of completing the structure of the Hungarian National State' mentioned in the Royal Rescript of the 6th May 1918, covered among others a promise of a Hungarian national army to be established after the War.³ Even on the Magyar side rifts appeared in the structure of 1867.

The Polish understanding with Austria was with the dynasty and the German Nationalists rather than with the 'Austrian' centralists, the high Vienna bureaucracy, and Supreme Army Command. The *ex-officio* partners of the Habsburgs were

¹ v. further discussion Chap. IV, part I, pp. 176-80.

² During the war, however, Tisza established a certain control over Austria-Hungary's foreign policy ; all wires and despatches received had to be communicated to him immediately, and he demanded that no important notes should be despatched until he had had time to give his opinion on them (cf. Czernin's *In the World War*, pp. 128-9 and 134). For arrangements *re* Austro-Hungarian Army and Honvéd Army, v. *supra*, Chap. II, part II. *passim*.

³ v. Chap. I, part I, pp. 36-7, *supra*.

jealous of any Habsburg territories not subject also to their authority. When in the War the Supreme Army Command obtained exceptionally wide powers the Austrian Poles suddenly beheld the face of the centralists which they had not seen since 1867. The dynasty solicited Polish support for the Austrian Solution, but Polish volunteers from Russia, invalided whilst fighting in the Austrian Polish Legions, were interned as alien enemies by the Austro-Hungarian Higher Command. Austrian-German governors were appointed to Galicia, the Galician railways were militarized and Germanized, and, to the joy of the subject Ruthenes, who are nearly as numerous in Galicia as the Poles, the established Polish character of the Galician administration was ignored. Everything was done to teach the Poles that Austrian generals and bureaucrats had no use for unwritten conventions. Sometimes it almost looked as if they took their revenge for having been so long excluded from Galicia. On the high level of international politics the Austro-Polish leaders continued to spin their intrigues with the Vienna Court, but the feeling which all the Polish parties of Galicia had evinced for the Austrian cause at their meeting at Cracow of the 16th August 1914 was vanishing fast. This was true even of the unpolitical popular masses. In 1914 a stream of refugees poured into Vienna from the Galician theatre of war; they were treated like burdensome, undesirable aliens. In 1915 most of Galicia was recovered by Austria-Hungary, but the Vienna Government refused to spend money on its reconstruction. There naturally was none of the warm sentiment which the Germans displayed towards the war-stricken districts of East Prussia. Austria and Galicia were strangers to each other, and this was brought home to every one by the War. Yet another rift was opening in the structure of Austria-Hungary.

Before the War a very large part of Austria's food supply was derived from Hungary; for years the industrial population of 'Western' Austria had paid exaggerated prices because of the high protective duties on food established in favour of the Magyar landowners. When the food shortage arose during the War, Hungary closed the frontier against Austria, supplying but ridiculously small quantities of food to her starving population. 'We can forgive the hunger blockade instituted by our enemies, never that by the Magyars,' declared a leader of the Austrian-German Socialists at the conclusion of the War.

It taught the German-Austrian enthusiasts of the Habsburg Monarchy to appreciate its profits and glory, and made them ponder over the hyphen in Austria-Hungary. 'Economic partnership proved in practice to mean the starvation of Austria,' wrote the Vienna *Arbeiter-Zeitung* on the 17th October 1918, the day after the Magyars had declared Hungary's separation from Austria. '. . . We part from them with a light heart.'

The three dominant races of the Habsburg Monarchy, the Magyars in Hungary, the Germans and Poles in Austria, whilst unable to develop a common programme for the future, were losing the instincts of a common political existence within the Habsburg Monarchy. Even in their unpolitical masses everyday experience sapped the sense of community in the Monarchy, whilst whatever had remained of a feeling of citizenship in the subject races, the Czecho-Slovaks, Yugo-slavs, Ruthenes, Italians, and Rumans, was completely eradicated by mass executions, imprisonments, internments, petty persecutions, constant chicanery—in short, by a régime which made them look upon the Habsburg rule as a hostile military occupation.¹

11. 1916. A year of political exuberance had followed in Austria on the collapse of Russia and Serbia in 1915. It closed in the Lutsk disaster, a repetition of the initial Galician and Serbian defeats which Austria-Hungary's rulers had too easily forgotten in the noise of victories gained for them by the Germans. No positive results had been reached in the discussions concerning Poland, Austria's internal reconstruction, and Central European Union when they were cut short by General Brussiloff's offensive. Merely the difficulties of remodelling the Habsburg Monarchy in case of victory had been revealed. The Russian successes in 1916 having once more rendered Austria-Hungary absolutely dependent on Germany, the German scheme with regard to Poland was enacted on the 5th November 1916 in the declaration of the two Emperors, setting up Russian Poland as a State separate from Germany and Austria alike. Austria-Hungary's rulers, humiliated in the field, war-weary to the last degree, with their ambitions disappointed even in the days of victory, with the economic resources of their countries exhausted, their military reserves utterly depleted, would have gladly

¹ For details in Czecho-Slovakia v. Chap. IV, part III, pp. 248-52, and in Yugo-slavia Chap. IV, part I, pp. 180-2.

accepted the *status quo ante bellum*. The Magyars had always deprecated any change in Austria-Hungary's frontiers, the Habsburgs and their followers wished for it no longer. Their Monarchy, saved by German arms, was to be preserved by disarmament and a new Holy Alliance. Once more they were converts to pacifism.

Still, a complete return to pre-War conditions was impossible, and at least a partial realization of the ideas of 1915 seemed necessary. Simultaneously with the proclamation of a Polish State in Russian Poland (5th November 1916), very wide autonomy was promised to the Galician Poles, although it was obvious that an autonomous Galicia could not have existed alongside of the Polish kingdom, and that sooner or later the two would have been united either within or without the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy. But unless Galicia was excluded, Austria could not be effectively Germanized. As, however, in the Austrian Reichsrat the Germans and Poles united had not the necessary two-thirds majority over the subject races, it was proposed to carry out the changes by means of unconstitutional Imperial edicts (*Oktroi*)—the Magyars would not have vetoed changes completing the triple German-Magyar-Polish scheme. But once more the discussions were cut short before any results had been attained. The Russian Revolution supervened in March 1917, with hopes for peace and fear of social upheaval. The Austrian Reichsrat, which had not been summoned since the outbreak of the War, had to be convened, the appearance at least of constitutional government had to be restored. The dominant races were promised that their wishes should be realized at some more convenient time, in some more convenient form.

12. *The Russian Revolution.* The Russian Revolution came like a current of fresh air through a stifling heavy atmosphere. It came like the promise of a new, better world. Europe was turning in a vicious circle, and a struggle was dragging on which by then every one wished had never broken out. But peace without victory could not be concluded by those who thought in categories of nationality; genuine controversies are settled, not solved in their own terms. Decisions are imposed, but the real solution comes with change in modes of thinking and indifference to previous issues. The non-national Habsburgs became pacifists in a war of nationality,

which they themselves had provoked in order to defeat nationality. The popular revolt against war assumed the form of social upheaval, cutting across the lines of purely nationalist ideology. Social revolution, as a distant background to the European situation, and a Peace Conference dominated by the fear of it, might have saved the Habsburg Monarchy by diverting attention to new lines of cleavage. But further war under revolutionary conditions was bound to destroy it. 'The responsibility for continuing the War is much greater for a sovereign whose country is united by the ties of dynasty alone, than for the ruler of a country where the people itself fights for a national cause,' wrote Count Czernin in his memorandum of the 12th April 1917. With the dynasty its inheritance was bound to disappear. *Ils vivaient de l'ombre d'une ombre, de quoi vivrait-on après eux?*

The fear of social revolution in Europe in 1917 sprang from an intellectual illusion. The book-reading world knew the Socialist doctrine to be non-national, and forgot that this was not true of those who professed it, least of all of the Socialist *intelligentsia*. Whatever divergences there were in social interests, all alike had been educated in the nationalist ideologies of their bourgeoisies. Therefore the danger or chance of proletarian revolution stood, *ceteris paribus*, in an inverted ratio to the diffusion of education. Revolutions after defeats were proletarian despair let loose by nationalist exasperation. But whilst the War lasted nationalist zeal neutralized social antagonisms, and it is immaterial whether this was because of national sentiment even in the lower classes or because of their inability to act without a strong lead from members of the *intelligentsia*. In oppressed or endangered nations the Socialist intellectuals proved the most uncompromising of nationalists. They cultivated nationality with a radicalism peculiar to their nature and ideas. Their nationalism was based on the living popular masses, not on history; this did not render it less deadly in nationally mixed territories or where nationality hopelessly conflicted with geography. In Austria-Hungary the rise of socialism, stimulated by the Russian Revolution, produced in all races a movement which in a more than ever absolute manner insisted on complete national reunion and independence, irrespective of historic tradition, established States, existing frontiers, and

most of all, independent of inherited dynasties or dynastic inheritances.

The less a nation shared the interests of the dynasty, the stronger was the repercussion produced on it by the Russian example. 'Your Majesty is acquainted with the secret reports of the Governors,' wrote Count Czernin in his memorandum of the 12th April 1917. '... the Russian Revolution works more strongly on our Slavs than on the Germans in Germany. ...' When, after more than three years, the Austrian Reichsrat reassembled on the 30th May 1917, the representatives of the subject races came forward with programmes revolutionary in substance, although in form they still acknowledged the dynasty. The Czechs greeted the Russian Revolution 'with boundless admiration and enthusiasm', declared 'solemnly before the whole world the Czech people's will to freedom and independence', demanded the reshaping of the Monarchy into 'a federal State of free national States with equal rights', and, as a logical sequence, the joining up of the Czechs and Slovaks in a single unit. The leader of the Yugo-slavs similarly demanded 'the union of all territories of the Monarchy inhabited by Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs in an independent State organism, free from the rule of any foreign nation. ...' The Ruthenes passionately protested against East Galicia being kept in constitutional union with Polish territories or forced into it still further, demanded self-government for the Little Russian territories of the Monarchy and hinted at their fundamental unity with the Russian Ukraine. The foundations of Austria-Hungary's structure, which 'created ruling and oppressed peoples', were openly assailed.

13. *The Attitude of the Poles.* By May 1917 the attitude of the Poles towards Austria had lost its precision. Their dominant position in Galicia had suffered diminution in the war, the Habsburgs had proved unable in face of the German opposition to realize their Polish schemes, and the fear of Russia among the Poles disappeared to a very large extent when, on the 30th March 1917, revolutionary Russia acknowledged Poland's independence and renounced all claims to ethnically Polish territory. It was now from the Central Powers in occupation of Polish territory that Poland's independence and reunion had to be extracted. Still the consequent change of front among the Poles was by no means complete. The

'conciliatories', those who always favoured compromise with whatever Power was dominant in Poland, could not disregard the possibility of the Central Powers remaining supreme; the fear of revolution spreading from the east replaced with many the previous fear of Russia—against social revolution the Central Powers were the bulwark in Eastern Europe; lastly, few Poles would have been satisfied with national independence within ethnically just frontiers—they aspired to conquests in White Russian and Little Russian land, in the vast territories beyond Poland's eastern ethnic border, where the Polish land-owning nobility ruled over many millions of Russian peasants. Polish designs on such a socially reactionary basis, could best have been realized in conjunction with the Central Powers. The weakening of Russia, which had collapsed whilst fighting on the Allied side, seemed to offer an incomparable opportunity for Polish Imperialist expansion.

Under the influence of the Russian Revolution the more radical elements among the Galician Poles adopted a sharper attitude towards Austria. A resolution was voted at the Cracow conference of the representatives of Austrian Poland on the 28th May 1917, demanding a reunited and independent Poland with free access to the sea. The Polish Socialists were steering towards opposition to the Austrian Government. But in Parliament practically all the Polish members belonged to one single club organization. The cautious and conservative in it insisted on continuing to negotiate with the Austrian Government, and tried by means of compromise and agreement to regain for the Poles their previous position in the Galician administration, to secure their dominion over the Little Russians of East Galicia, to obtain concessions in late Russian Poland, and to gain an extension of frontiers at Russia's expense. It was not the fault of these Poles if the Central Powers did not respond sufficiently to their advances. The Polish Club in the Austrian Reichsrat, embarrassed by continuous rebuffs and under pressure from the Left, occasionally passed into opposition to the government, only to return to its side when able to point to any concessions, however problematical. 'If at present our representatives have passed into opposition, this is chiefly because the administration of Galicia has been entrusted to alien hands . . .' wrote the correspondent of the *Kurjer Poznanski*, the chief organ of the

National Democrats in Posnania, on the 24th July 1917. 'But it is said that a return to the previous condition is imminent. Then willy-nilly the Polish Club will have to resume its previous attitude towards the Austrian Government; for power at home it will have to pay by supplying the government with the necessary number of votes in Parliament.' 'Exactly as half a century ago', wrote the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse* on the 8th March 1918, after the most serious conflict between the Poles and the Government,¹ 'the Poles have refused to make common cause with the Czechs and to share in political wickedness.' The balance within the Polish Club itself and its leadership had lost steadiness; but every change in its attitude meant on a division a turn-over of about 150 in a House of 500 members. Neither satisfied nor irreconcilable, the Poles became the uncertain quantity in Austrian politics.

14. *Bolshevism and Austria-Hungary.* Russia under Kerensky still always moved within accepted State traditions and categories. It tried to preserve the strength of the old weapons and accepted their limitations. Bolshevism broke through the framework of the past, established the victory of a mass movement over an inherited organization, and in international relations proclaimed the unlimited right of every nation to determine its own fate. The Austro-Hungarian Government in sublime naïveté allowed, nay, encouraged, the press to describe the break-up of the Russian Empire, the dissolution of its armies, and the disappearance of authority. Finally at Brest-Litovsk it appeared wise in its own eyes, and in these alone, when it argued with the Bolsheviks on their own principle of self-determination, but forgot that force alone could not permanently exclude it from the territories of the Habsburg Monarchy. In Austria the subject races and the starving, suffering masses eagerly watched how a great and strong empire was trodden to dust by 'the feet of the poor and the steps of the needy', the picture of an army in dissolution became vivid to the rank and file of the Austrian troops, the idea that a new era had opened up irresistibly imposed itself on the minds of discerning men. 'The Peace' (of Brest-Litovsk), wrote the Vienna Socialist *Arbeiter-Zeitung* on the 2nd March 1918, 'promises independent statehood to the Finns, Esths, Letts, Lithuanians, Poles, and Ukrainians.

¹ On the subject of Kholm see *infra*, § 17, and Vol. I, pp. 227-9.

Even the German Nationalists in their mental blindness cannot seriously believe that it will be possible to refuse statehood to the Czechs, when it is conceded to nations far inferior to them in wealth, culture, and power.' Hitherto the German Socialists in Austria had stood by the programme of cultural autonomy for the different nationalities; educational matters were to have been handed over to voluntary organizations resembling churches, yet endowed with considerable governing powers. Under the influence of the Bolshevik Revolution they progressed beyond their previous programme. 'In the great world-league of free nations . . . ' wrote the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* in the article quoted above, 'there is no room for the old Austria; if Austria is to exist at all, it must change into a union of free nations.' 'No fully developed, self-conscious nation can renounce its right to a State of its own.' 'To every nation its State with its own government and its own Parliament; all nations united in the Empire for the common administration of the joint economic body—on this basis alone a constitution is possible which the nations would voluntarily accept and which would put an end to conflicts of nationality.'

15. *The Impossibility of reconstructing Austria-Hungary.* Two difficulties were silently passed over in the programme. One was the problem of Dualism, the other the problem of territorial delimitation in the Czech provinces. 'All nations united in the Empire . . . '—did 'Empire' stand for Austria plus Hungary? If so, the Magyar State in Hungary had first to be destroyed, and to effect this was not within the power of Austria, but of the hostile Allied and Associated Powers alone. Meantime the Czechs and Slovenes refused to enter into any negotiations on constitutional reform if this was to be circumscribed within the Austrian half of the Monarchy. The German Socialist leader, Dr. Renner, subsequently first Chancellor of the German-Austrian Republic, preached nationalism to the Germans in the Vienna Parliament. They should not remain satisfied with the nondescript Austrian State, he declared in a speech on the 25th February 1918, but should 'as a nation demand national unity and national self-determination within the framework of a federal State based on nationality. . . .' And he added: 'It is unthinkable that the Czechs should enclose German territory or the Germans Czech territory within

their respective States.' But the German mountain fringe cannot be separated from the Czech plain. Statehood attained by such a carving-out of territory as could never form an independent State would indeed have been a Danaan gift for the Czechs. It would have been preferable for them to remain amorphous in the autonomous Austrian State than to have the German Borderlands of Eger and Reichenberg and Trautenau and of the 'Sudetenland' formed into a German State. Yet obviously, whatever the hitherto dominant Austrian Germans could do, they could not voluntarily allow three million Germans inhabiting the Czech provinces to be reduced to the position of a national minority within a Czech State. The hostile Allied and Associated Powers alone could do so. On the two rocks of the Dualist system and of German Bohemia every attempt at reforming Austria-Hungary from within was bound to founder, however sincerely undertaken.

But, in fact, no such attempt was honestly made. The constitutional reform, which the Austrian Prime Minister, Dr. von Seidler, outlined on the 7th March 1918, aimed at destroying the possible foundations of national States within Austrian territory. He professed the doctrine of cultural autonomy which the Socialists had put up in 1899 and abandoned as insufficient in 1918. 'We, in our time,' he declared, 'must see to it that the conflicts of nationality should find their solution within the framework of the State', i. e. of the one, undivided Austrian State. He acted in an understanding with the German parties and consequently in their interests. 'He wants a settlement in Bohemia and an understanding with the Yugo-slavs in the Alps, in every province apart . . . ' was the comment of the *Neue Freie Presse* on the 8th March. 'That which is a policy of peace between the nationalities in Bohemia, would be a policy of war between the nationalities in Styria. . . ' Put into plainer language, this meant that the measures which suited Austria and the Germans in Bohemia, where the Germans were in a minority, did not suit them in Styria, where they were in a majority; that the separation of the German from the Czech parts of Bohemia would have destroyed the foundations of the Czech State, but the separation of the Slovene from the German districts of Styria and Carinthia would have led to the formation of a Slovene State and its ultimate inclusion in Yugo-slavia. A significant passage in the speech acknow-

ledged the existence of a Yugo-slav problem. The idea which was at the back of Seidler's mind was more clearly explained in his speech of the 3rd May 1918. Bosnia and Dalmatia were to be joined up with Croatia into a 'Great-Croatian' State. But 'the Austrian provinces which lie on the road to the Adriatic and are closely connected with the German-speaking provinces could not be included in this State'. The Austrian Government seems still always to have counted on the old Croat sentiment which they hoped to revive by creating a State in which the Roman Catholic Croats would have had a very marked preponderance over the Greek Orthodox Serbs. But even if the setting up of such a State might have scuttled the idea of a united Yugo-slavia, which by 1918 seemed more than doubtful, the Magyars naturally failed to see why they were to hand over to it provinces which lay on their road to the Adriatic, and why they were to agree to the setting-up of a State which, if it had successfully grown into a Habsburg dependency, would have changed the balance within the Monarchy to the disadvantage of the Magyars. That is why the scheme could never be realized.

On the 2nd April 1918, Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a public speech bitterly attacked the Czechs for demanding Czecho-Slovak union and independence and for sympathizing with the Czecho-Slovak Legions which fought on the Allied side. 'The wretched and miserable Masaryk is not the only one of his kind. There are also Masaryks within the borders of the Monarchy.' Czernin's speech marked a return to the anti-Slav militancy of 1915 and 1916. In April 1917 Czernin himself had called for a suspension of anti-Slav action in view of the efforts which were then to be made to obtain peace with Russia. A year later, after Brest-Litovsk, he gave the signal for resuming the old course.

16. *The Clemenceau Disclosures and the Austrian Germans.* Czernin's speech led to unexpected results. It provoked M. Clemenceau's revelations concerning the secret peace negotiations which in 1917 the Emperor Charles had conducted behind the backs both of his own Foreign Minister and of Germany.¹ The speech produced Czernin's own resignation

¹ For Count Czernin's speech of the 2nd April 1918 v. G. L. Dickinson, *Peace Proposals and War Aims* (1919), pp. 174-5; and for the Emperor's letters, etc., v. pp. 30-41. For details of a proposed negotiation with Austria v.

(15th April) and the publication of the Emperor's letters exasperated the German Nationalists and turned them against the Habsburgs, a fact which was to weigh heavily in the decisive days of October 1918. They had gone far to renounce their own distinct German nationalism and had forgone German national re-union in favour of the autonomous Austrian State, trusting that in reality they remained in exclusive control of the State. Here, in the middle of a war which was to have led to a consolidation of the German *Mittel-Europa*, they found the Habsburgs, who had so often done lip-service to the German idea and the German Alliance, conducting a purely dynastic policy of their own. The attempt had been childish, it had disregarded the most elementary facts of the situation, it had consequently been utterly futile, yet it was made. It was a prelude to an equally absurd attempt to come in the last days of October 1918, and supplied the background to the latter. It was with the cold eyes of estrangement that the German Nationalists watched henceforth the fate of the Habsburg dynasty.

Meantime the incident supplied the Austrian Germans with matter for blackmail. They could force the Government to hasten the 'German course' in Austria. At this price they refrained from raising the question of the Emperor's letters in the Vienna Parliament. On the 3rd May, in a speech delivered in a conference of the Parliamentary leaders, Dr. von Seidler attacked the Czechs and Yugo-slavs, more fully developing the programme outlined on the 7th March. On the 6th May Dr. Žolger, a Slovene, who had a seat in his Cabinet, had to resign. On the 19th May an Imperial Rescript was published separating the predominantly German from the predominantly Czech districts in Bohemia. The Czechs were thus brought up against the alternative of winning independence or of seeing the natural boundaries of their State obliterated. The Austrian Government by its continuous tergiversations and its short-sighted palliatives estranged even the dominant nationalities, and utterly exasperated those which were anyhow in permanent opposition to it.

17. *Kholm and East Galicia*.¹ In the peace treaty concluded

documents in *L'Opinion*, 10th, 24th, 31st July 1920, which also published Prince Sixte's account. The accuracy of the latter was formally denied by President Poincaré, cf. *The Austrian Peace Offer*, G. Manteyer.

¹ See also Vol. I, pp. 226-30.

with the fictitious Ukrainian Government at Brest-Litovsk on the 9th February 1918, the entire district of Kholm, not merely its Little Russian eastern parts, but even the purely Polish territory in the west, was ceded to the Ukraine. Such a violation of Polish territory in the east, where the Poles counted on annexing tens of thousands of square miles of non-Polish territory, drove the Poles to sheer frenzy. The Polish outcry made the Austro-Hungarian Government re-open negotiations with the Ukrainians, who, on the 3rd March, agreed to a rectification of the frontier. In compensation, however, a secret promise seems to have been given to them that the Little Russian part of Galicia would be withdrawn from Polish dominion and, together with the Little Russian parts of the Bukovina, formed into an autonomous province. This the Poles discovered in the first days of June, and again threatened to pass into an *intransigent* opposition. Consequently the notorious Magyar diplomat, Count Forgách, the author of the Friedjung forgeries, and one of the men who had drafted the Ultimatum to Serbia in July 1914, was sent to Kieff to explain to the Ukrainian Government that in view of their having failed to carry out the food clauses of the Treaty, the promises made to them had lapsed automatically. Nevertheless the Poles remained at heart bitter against Vienna, whilst the Ukrainians in turn got exasperated. One by one the different nationalities in Austria saw themselves menaced by the activities of the Habsburgs and their governmental clique, and saw promises given and broken with equal recklessness.

18. *Poland and Central Europe.* Peace having been concluded with Russia, the time seemed to have come to settle the future of the territories ceded by her to the Central Powers. The problem of Poland and Lithuania, and indirectly of Central European Union, came up once more. Germany, no less than the Austrian Germans, hoped to blackmail the Habsburgs over the letters of the Emperor Charles. They forgot to reckon with the Magyars, who certainly could not be moved to concessions by any embarrassments of the dynasty. On the 12th May, to expiate his indiscretions, the Emperor Charles went on a pilgrimage to German Headquarters, accepted in principle a union of his States with Germany, and received full absolution. The concrete application of the principle was to be worked out by the competent statesmen. But disagreements immediately

arose as to what had exactly been agreed upon. Count Burian, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, maintained that the conclusion of closer union between the Central Powers was not possible whilst Austria-Hungary's future frontiers and internal structure were uncertain, i. e. as long as the Polish question remained unsettled. The Germans replied that they were uncertain what concessions to make in that matter whilst ignorant of what Austria-Hungary's future relations to Germany would be. Burian asserted the essential and close connexion between the problems of the Austro-Polish Solution and of Central European Union, Germany insisted on Central European Union being a distinct problem and the Polish Question part of the general East European settlement. A complete *impasse* was reached.

By 1918 the Magyars had acquired an interest of their own in the Polish Question. They had accepted the Andrassy plan of connecting the Austro-Polish scheme with *Mittel-Europa*, but on one condition. The new Poland was to be joined to Austria, but in turn Austria was to hand over Dalmatia and Bosnia to Hungary; not to Croatia, but unconditionally to the Magyars, who would thus acquire undivided control of the Serbo-Croat problem. The *impasse* in the Polish negotiations with Germany implied an *impasse* within Austria-Hungary.

19. *The Decay of Austria.* Meantime the Austrian State was visibly dying away. The financial position was becoming untenable. The Austrian National Debt had risen to 70 milliard crowns; Austria lived by printing money. The circulation of paper money had risen from 2 milliards before the War to 11 milliards by the end of 1916 and to 27 milliards by the 1st October 1918. The population was literally starving. All stores and resources were completely exhausted. The army was far gone in decomposition. The towns were full of deserters, in country districts they conducted systematic brigandage. If Austria still held together it was because there was no enemy near to give the shattering touch to the corpse.

20. *Last Attempts at Settlement and Reconstruction.* When on the Western Front the turn of the tide came in July 1918, and from day to day the situation was becoming more threatening to the Central Powers, another effort was made to settle the outstanding problems. Ludendorff's plan to create

a Lithuanian and a Ukrainian State under German tutelage had broken down over the conflict between the socially conservative principles of Germany and the socially revolutionary interests of the Lithuanian and Ukrainian peasantries. A Polish settlement on the socially congenial, conservative basis of Imperialism was attempted. Prince Radziwill, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, was summoned to German Headquarters on the 10th August, and an extension of Polish frontiers in Lithuania and White Russia was offered in lieu of the Austrian Solution. The Polish delegates left German Headquarters on the 13th, and on the 14th the Austrian Emperor arrived, accompanied by Count Burian. The proposal of making Archduke Charles Stephen King of a Polish State built on the German plan seems to have been offered as a compensation to the Habsburgs. They refused, and it was agreed to let the Poles themselves decide between the rival schemes. 'A plan has been agreed upon', declared Burian in an interview on the 19th August, 'which will considerably expedite matters. . . . The Poles are to be invited to participate in the Austrian-German negotiations. . . . They have the right freely to choose their own King. . . .'

In September Count Tisza, apparently as *homo regius*, started out on a journey through Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was to ascertain how a settlement suiting the Magyars could be reached in the Yugo-slav provinces. The Magyars seem to have wished to bind up Bosnia and Dalmatia directly with Hungary, as Croatia was joined up with her, but not to admit any direct connexion between the two Yugo-slav units. The scheme was as absurd as it was complicated, and even humorous in the setting of September 1918. Every Yugo-slav deputation received by Count Tisza, even that of the very moderate Bosnian Mohammedans, told him that Yugo-slav unity was their aim. Tisza, to one of them, called the principle of self-determination 'an empty phrase', their memorandum 'silly nonsense', and in a fit of rage exclaimed, 'We may perish, still before we perish we shall have sufficient strength to crush all those who cherish such ambitions'. But there was no agreement, not even between Austria and Hungary, as to the settlement of the Bosnian problem. The outstanding feature of Austria-Hungary's history in the War was the inability to remodel the system of 1867. It could be destroyed, and

the Habsburg Monarchy with it, but it did not admit of development.

About the middle of August reports appeared in the clerical Austrian press alleging that a scheme of reform was prepared for constructing four national States, a German, a Czech, a Yugo-slav, and a Polish State, within Austria's framework. It was ascribed to Professor Lammasch and Dr. Redlich. On the 28th August, an ambiguous official *communiqué*, whilst denying the current reports, declared that the Government considered 'a revision of the constitution, preserving all the interests implied in the integrity of the State, one of its most important tasks'. But no one seemed worried by the rumours. The German-Austrian press was ironical, the Magyar papers plainly intimated that any such change in Austria's constitution would lead to a break with Hungary. The Czech leaders, however moderate, publicly denied having anything to do with the schemes. 'Negotiations are of no use, because our final aim cannot be reached by negotiations,' stated M. Stanek, the President of the Czech Parliamentary Union, on the 3rd September. 'The time for negotiations is long past, and the times are much too serious for any one to conduct valid negotiations with the Government . . . unless authorized by the Czech Parliamentary Union or the Czech National Committee.' 'In evil days we have not lost our heads', declared M. Klofač, another of the Czech leaders, 'and threats could not break us. Nor shall we lose our heads now, and promises will not influence us. . . . The Czech question cannot be discussed with the Vienna Government, which stands by the Dual System, whilst the Czech question cannot be solved under that system any more than that of the Yugo-slavs. The different proposals of the Vienna Government are therefore of no interest to us.' As if to prove finally the futility of such discussions, Baron von Hussarek declared on the 11th September that there were two limits to constitutional reform in Austria—'respect for the rights and constitution of Hungary, and the determination to preserve a united Austrian State'.

The old difficulties and the *impasse* reasserted themselves. True reform within Austria-Hungary was impossible.

C. THE COLLAPSE

21. *The Twilight of the Gods.* In the summer of 1918, by acknowledging Czecho-Slovakia as an independent, co-belligerent nation, the Allied and Associated Powers completed the programme of the root and branch destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy, previous treaties or engagements having assigned the Italian, Yugo-slav, and Ruman parts of Austria-Hungary to the three neighbouring States and recognized the principle of Polish reunion and independence. Peace negotiations with Austria-Hungary would have been illogical when the destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy and of its two component States was the purpose in view. Hence, in the autumn of 1918, the ardent desire of their Governments to enter into immediate negotiations, and so to obtain an implicit recognition of their right to speak for the populations of the Habsburg Monarchy and to continue a super-national existence. The growing panic in military circles supplied the background to these attempts. In a speech delivered on the 9th September, Count Burian complained of the intention of the Allies to destroy the Habsburg Monarchy; in the Note of the 15th September, which proposed informal peace conversations, he quoted from old speeches of Allied statesmen to show that it was not their intention to destroy it; he shut his eyes to a threat which he could not face any longer. President Wilson referred the Austro-Hungarian Government to the principles which he had previously laid down as basis for negotiations. Burian replied on the 20th that Austria-Hungary's offer remained open. Then followed Bulgaria's military collapse. On the 26th September she sued for an armistice, and on the 29th accepted terms practically equivalent to unconditional surrender. Every one felt that this was the beginning of a general *déroute*, and that the end was near at hand. No enemy army had as yet reached the frontiers of the Habsburg Monarchy, and extensive territories beyond its borders still remained under its military occupation. Still, within a month the Habsburg Monarchy and its political framework were to disappear, destroyed not by an extraneous force, but by the logic of hitherto repressed ideas. And the men who at the beginning of October were rulers, or were deemed rulers, of a great and ancient Empire, at its close were but a group of

individuals with no definable political standing or connexions. They left the empty stage 'escorted by the echoes of desertion'.

The October days of 1918 in Austria will for ever remain remarkable as a study in mass psychology and an example of how ideas, talked about yet unthinkable on one day, acquire life on the next, whilst other ideas, which had seemed solid fact, pass out of reality. Austria-Hungary disappeared when it vanished from the consciousness of those concerned. The War had broken the habits, the approach of defeat disembodied the ideas, which made up its political and social structure. The language of men changed; for the first time they drew conclusions from old familiar facts; the pace at which they did so, quickened daily; it became catastrophical. Diplomatic notes, speeches in the Vienna and Budapest Parliaments, declarations and manifestoes published at Prague, Zagreb, Cracow, or Lemberg, were no longer mere moves in a political game. The masses listened to the march of events, the leaders watched the movements of the inarticulate masses. Elemental forces seemed to work through men and to control them, uncontrolled by them. The solid political foundations of inherited everyday existence vanished, and in the enormous void ideas seemed to move, free from hindrance, obeying their own laws.

22. Hussarek's Speech of the 1st October 1918. The Austrian Parliament reassembled on the 1st October 1918. The Prime Minister, Baron von Hussarek, opened up with an elaborate speech, the phrasing of which would have won him a prize in a school competition—the last 'Noodle's Oration' of the Austrian bureaucracy. 'At the [Balkan] front our troops stand shoulder to shoulder with the German troops, and there, too, preserve magnificently and faithfully the firmly cemented alliance which in future also shall unshakeably resist all the tests of Fate. . . . The hour [for peace negotiations] must come. I look forward to it with calm and determination.'

(a) *Poland.* The problems discussed during July and August were dealt with as if it had been within the power of Austria's rulers to shape their development. 'Poland is to become an independent factor in the political world of Europe. . . . The form of the Polish State must be freely determined by the Poles themselves. In Poland a strong current of opinion

is known to favour establishing her independence in closer union with the Habsburg Monarchy, and no one can take it amiss if we, for our part, sympathise with the movement and try to meet it halfway. . . . We absolutely respect Poland's right to self-determination, and merely demand that others should respect it, even if it works out to our advantage.' Did he hope that the Poles would enter a sinking ship, or was it a cheerful tune played to avert a panic ?

(b) *The Yugo-slav Problem.* With regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina Austria 'does not intend to renounce her good rights or barter them away against hopes of territorial increase elsewhere. . . . The interests of its population and of the Monarchy are to be safeguarded. And here the idea impresses itself that the historical separation of Bosnia from Croatia and Dalmatia no longer answers the just desires of their inhabitants.' The old dynastic Croat idea, with its anti-Magyar point, was brought up once more, the Habsburg and the Magyar conceptions continued to oppose each other at a moment when the material foundations of both were crumbling fast. Nor had even the Austrian-German Nationalists freed themselves altogether of inherited 'Great-Austrian' instincts. They, who implicitly acknowledged the Magyars as their closest associates and on the 30th September decided to approach the Magyar leaders with a view to discussing 'the problems which concerned both States alike', on the very same day voted a resolution against ceding Dalmatia to Hungary; it could be ceded 'to Croatia alone, under very clearly defined conditions'.

(c) *National Autonomy in Austria.* 'Gentlemen, the iron march of the days in which Fate has placed us', continued the imperturbable Hussarek, 'compels us not to overlook the tasks of the future for the sorrows of the present day; having gained peace abroad, we shall have to go to work and set our house in order. Its structure has permanently valuable foundations, but it imperatively demands to be completed and renovated. We can no longer shut ourselves off from considering and solving the problem of autonomy for the different nationalities. . . . The fruitful principle of national autonomy can be applied still further, and this having been done systematically, a considerable improvement—nay, a complete *dénouement*—may be expected. The difficulty lies in its application. . . . The task will arise for the Government carefully to prepare and inaugurate

this difficult but hopeful work.’¹ What a sense of time ! In October 1918 the Austrian Government proposed to prepare to face the task of careful preliminary work on initiating the difficult application of a ‘ fruitful principle ’ of internal reconstruction.

23. *The Attitude of the Parties.* (a) *The Austrian Germans.* ‘ How well this speech would have sounded ten years ago, and how useful it would have been ! ’ answered the leader of the German-Austrian Socialists. ‘ Perhaps even four years, perhaps even a year ago. That it no longer appears the product of insight but of fear makes it now less, or otherwise, effective than was intended.’ On the day on which Parliament met, the German-Austrian Socialists put forward their own proposals. All Italian territory was to be ceded to Italy, and the Poles and Ukrainians were to be left free to determine their own fate, but ‘ Western ’ Austria, the old German domain, was to be saved and preserved on a pseudo-national and pseudo-territorial basis. The members representing the different nationalities in the Austrian Reichsrat were to form themselves into National Assemblies, draw up constitutions for their territories, and jointly consider what matters should remain common to them all ; the nationalities which the German-Austrian Socialists had in mind were the German Austrians themselves, the Czechs, and the Yugo-slavs, though as yet the scheme was not explicitly limited to them. The Czechs and Austrian Yugo-slavs were thus asked to accept the frontiers of ‘ Western ’ Austria, to discuss their future apart from the Slovaks and the Yugo-slavs of Hungary, of Croatia, of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and of Serbia, whilst the deputies from the German fringes of the Czech provinces and even from their German enclaves, were to enter the German-Austrian Assembly. This was chastened German nationalism, but still naïvely egoistic nationalism. The form changed, the substance remained the same.

On the 2nd October, rumours that the Austro-Hungarian Government would in a new Peace Note accept President Wilson’s ‘ Fourteen Points ’, made the Pan-German deputies propose that, in that case, the German members should immediately withdraw from the Austrian Parliament and form themselves into a German-Austrian National Assembly. The Czechs

¹ ‘ Der Regierung wird die Aufgabe erwachsen diese grosse aber aussichtsreiche Arbeit *sorgfältig vorzubereiten und einzuleiten.* ’ Italics not in original.

were to be forestalled with regard to German Bohemia ; as for the Austrian State, it was no concern of the German Nationalists once it became incapable of serving their aims. On the 4th October, at a Conference of the three big German groups, the National Union, the Christian Socialists, and the Socialists, the scheme implied in the Socialist resolutions of the 1st October was fully developed, and on the 5th October the Socialist programme was accepted by the other parties as basis for negotiations. They decided to recognize the right of the Latin and Slav nations to determine their fate and to form States of their own, but these were not to include ethnically German territory. All German territories of Austria were to form a German-Austrian State which would freely settle its relations to the other nationalities and to Germany. The Austrian Germans would enter into negotiations with the Czechs and Yugo-slavs for transforming Austria into a league of free national commonwealths, but, were this refused, they would with all their strength oppose any attempt of the Austrian authorities or of foreign Powers to settle their fate, or that of any part of their territory, without their consent. Under the influence of the debate which followed on Hussarek's speech, the Austrian Germans had advanced a considerable distance in five days. The ballast of by now irrelevant inherited conceptions was thrown overboard. The Habsburg Monarchy, Austria-Hungary, the Austrian State itself, had disappeared from their consciousness, 'Western' Austria remained the only reality to their minds. They would talk to the Czechs because of the German minorities comprised in their provinces, and to the Slovenes whose territory intervened between them and the sea. They would talk to their kinsmen in Germany. They passed over the Habsburgs in silence. Bosnia-Herzegovina and, it seems, even Dalmatia were forgotten; Galicia and the Bukovina were written off, Hungary was not mentioned, the Austrian authorities were treated as something external, almost alien to the Austrian Germans. The final break had come in the consciousness of the old champions of the Habsburg Monarchy, even the Christian Socialists could hardly resist it any longer. *Sauve qui peut* became the watchword, and from that moment the Austrian Germans were just Austrian Germans, and nothing more.

(b) *The Czechs and Yugo-slavs.* The Austro-Hungarian

Government tried to inaugurate a Peace Conference in order to reassert the existence of the Monarchy and of the Dualist Constitution, and thereby implicitly to deny that of a Czecho-Slovak and of a Yugo-slav nation. The Czechs and Yugo-slavs in the Austrian Parliament answered Hussarek's speech of the 1st October by demanding that in the Peace negotiations they should be directly represented and heard, declared that they would not allow the Austro-Hungarian Government to speak for them, nor would they discuss their future with the Austrian Government, but would settle it in conjunction with the Allied and Associated Powers. They could not consider any programme circumscribed within the frontiers of Austria alone. 'Should the Austrian Government under duress make up its mind to form Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia into a Czech State to the exclusion of the Hungarian Slovaks', stated the leader of the Czechs, 'they would see therein but an attempt to break up their national unity. . . .' They flaunted before the Government a defiant disloyalty. 'Not a drop of blood had been voluntarily shed by the Czechs on the side of the Central Powers.' The Czecho-Slovak Legions fighting in conjunction with the Allies had been called a rabble, but it is just with them that the Austrian Government will have to discuss the future of the Czecho-Slovak nation, 'and that is why we will not discuss it with you here.' 'The Yugo-slavs present their humble thanks for any schemes of autonomy', declared their spokesman in the Austrian Reichsrat. 'Baron von Hussarek comes too late for them. Through all Yugo-slav land the cry goes now: complete freedom or death! No artifice can any longer separate the Slovenes from the Croats and Serbs. . . .'

The Czechs and Yugo-slavs in the first days of October considered whether they should not withdraw from the Austrian Reichsrat, and thus definitely break with the Austrian State. But as yet they felt uncertain what line and what procedure the Allies would adopt with regard to Austria-Hungary, and hesitated to pronounce words *sur lesquels on ne revient pas*. They remained in the Austrian Reichsrat, which offered them the only public tribune within the Habsburg Monarchy, but at the same time went on consolidating their national organizations in their own as yet provincial centres. On the 5th and 6th October a conference was held at Agram (Zagreb) of all the Yugo-slav parties from the Austrian, Hungarian, Croatian, and

Bosnian legislatures, and a National Council was elected to conduct Yugo-slav policy.

(c) *The Poles.* In the debate following on Hussarek's speech, the President of the Polish Club spoke in much softer tones than other Slav leaders, partly from habit and partly with the wish to coax the Austrian Government into not spoiling the Polish game in East Galicia. He was appreciative of the way in which the Prime Minister acknowledged the right of the Poles to determine their own fate, admitted that there was a movement in favour of establishing Polish independence in conjunction with the Habsburg Monarchy, explained that it was based on the past relations of the Poles to Austria, on the part played by the Polish Club in the Austrian Reichsrat, and on the battles fought in common with Austria by the Polish Legions, but at the same time claimed for the Poles a place among the suffering nationalities of Austria. He finished by demanding the complete reunion of Poland, including Silesia, with access to the sea, and direct representation at the Peace Conference for all the Poles alike. The whole of Galicia was assumed to be Poland's due, although in the whole province the Poles are a minority, and in East Galicia form only about one-fifth of the population.

(d) *The Ruthenes.* The Ruthene members entered a passionate protest against being subjected to Polish rule. 'We shall rather fight and die than let ourselves be annexed to Poland.'

Little comfort could the Austrian Government derive from these debates.

24. *Austria-Hungary accepts President Wilson's Fourteen Points and awaits a Reply.* On the 4th October¹ the Austro-Hungarian Government, in conjunction with Germany and Turkey, offered to enter into peace negotiations on the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen Points of the 8th January 1918, of the four principles laid down in his speech of the 11th February, and of his speech of the 27th September.² Point 10 had stipulated that 'the peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development'. Austria-Hungary accepted it without inquiring as to its precise

¹ The Note was actually sent by the Swedish Minister at Washington on 7th October (see Vol. I, Appendix IV).

² For Wilson's speeches in 1918 see Vol. I, Appendix III.

meaning. Henceforth nothing could be done in Austria until Washington had spoken. 'Austria has a Prime Minister who resides at Washington,' wrote the *Neue Freie Presse* on the 9th October. 'His name is Woodrow Wilson, and his executive officer in Vienna is Baron von Hussarek.' Changes in the Austrian Government, new declarations or offers, schemes for the future, might all prove equally futile. 'We might do too much or we might do too little. . . . The Prime Minister is Woodrow Wilson at Washington,' it repeated on the 12th. 'He knows what policy he proposes to prescribe for Austria. . . .' And day after day the Vienna press impatiently complained: 'Still no answer from America.' In the weeks of supreme crisis the Austrian Government became completely paralysed, and ceased to count. It waited for an answer, or rather for a verdict. It had to wait for a long time. In the process of waiting it ceased to be a government.

On the 8th October Baron von Hussarek read out the Peace Note of the 4th October in the Austrian Reichsrat, admitting that it marked 'a modification of the political conceptions on which Austrian official policy had hitherto been based', and that the time had come for 'full-grown nations (*mündige Völker*) to determine their own future'. Austria abandoned all pretence of dominion or claim to it, she capitulated before an unknown future. 'She is going to play "King Lear"', was the over-complimentary and much too poetical comment of one of her votaries.

On the 9th October President Wilson's answer to Germany of the 8th was received; it declared that an evacuation of Allied territory must precede the conclusion of an armistice, and asked whether the Imperial Chancellor was 'speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war'. A Reuter wire of the 8th October from Washington added: 'It is officially announced that no answer to the Austrian peace proposals is contemplated at present.' Dismay spread among the ruling circles of the Habsburg Monarchy. On the 4th October Germany and Austria-Hungary had addressed the same offer to America. Germany alone received a reply. What was the meaning of the omission? Austro-Hungarian troops not less than those of Germany were in occupation of Allied territory. Was Austria-Hungary to heed an answer which ignored its existence? But how could

she afford to ignore the Note? And what could the Austro-Hungarian Government have replied were it asked in turn whom it represented?

On the 12th October the German Government in its reply to President Wilson's Note of the 8th October specially mentioned Austria-Hungary as agreeing to the demanded evacuation of Allied territory. President Wilson, in conclusion to his Note of the 14th October, wherein he laid down that the military advisers of the Allied and Associated Powers would settle the terms of armistice, announced that a separate Note would be sent to the Austro-Hungarian Government. It had to wait.

25. *The Last Habsburg Bid.* In the meantime an attempt was to be made to form a government which could give an answer if asked whom it represented. Lammasch, the old pacifist professor who, in August 1918, in the congenial company of ossified Clericals had talked about an internal 'rejuvenation' of Austria, was to succeed Hussarek, although the Austrian Germans were averse to him because they did not trust him to stand faithfully by Germany in the decisive crisis. On the 10th October representatives of all the Austrian nationalities were summoned for audiences with the Emperor to be held on the 12th and 13th; the scheme to be discussed was approximately known. The nationalities were to be given the right to constitute States of their own within the framework of Austria. The change was to be carried out by a Cabinet representing all the nationalities. The Poles alone were to be let out of the Ark (*en route* for Warsaw) in accordance with Point 13 of President Wilson,¹ and also in the hope that the Habsburg bird, presumed to be a dove, might return with a laurel branch and 'increase of territory'. The Czechs were the first to see the Emperor and flatly refused to enter the proposed new Cabinet. They demanded that a Czech Government should immediately be set up at Prague, that it should take part in the Peace Conference, and that all Czech regiments should return to the Czech territories, with the natural corollary that the non-Czech troops should be withdrawn from them. They warned the Emperor that the Czech popular movement could

¹ *Point 13*: 'An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.'

no longer be repressed, and that, unless something decisive were done, the nationalities would act on their own. Tusar, one of the Czech delegation to the Emperor (and subsequently Prime Minister of the Czecho-Slovak Republic), published after the interview an article pointing out that the purpose of trying to form a Cabinet representing all the Austrian nationalities was to say to the world: 'In Austria everything is in perfect order. You need not trouble your heads about us!' 'We ourselves, and we alone, shall settle our future,' was Tusar's answer. 'We shall give ourselves the constitution we need. We shall determine our relations with neighbouring States, and we refuse to admit any interference from Vienna or Budapest. . . . A Czech State must arise with a Czech government at its head. Its representatives will appear at the Peace Conference. There the future organization of the world will be decided upon.' Before the Czechs negotiate with Vienna, the Austrian officials must cease to rule in Bohemia.

The refusal of the Czechs, followed by that of other nationalities, killed the idea of the Coalition Cabinet. 'No *coup d'état* from above and no revolution from below', wrote the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* on the 12th October, 'can produce a government which would be trusted by all the nationalities to negotiate peace in their name, because many nationalities do not want Austria any longer, do not feel citizens of Austria any more, and deny the right of any Austrian Government, whatever it might be, to conduct their affairs. This is the naked, brutal fact, which no clear-sighted person can deny, whether he likes or regrets it. . . . We must therefore reckon with the fact that Wilson will not invite the Austro-Hungarian Government to the peace negotiations, but only the representatives of the particular nationalities of Austria-Hungary.' 'There can be no doubt', wrote the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* again on the 15th October, 'but that the dissolution of the old State of mixed nationality into separate and independent nations is in progress; if not in law and fact, it has already occurred in idea. . . . The nations exist, have long ago constituted themselves, their will to be free and independent is unshakeable. . . .'

What, in that case, was to become of German Austria? On the 13th and 15th October, Otto Bauer, subsequently Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German-Austrian Republic, pointed out in the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* that there could not be one German

Austria, but there would have to be three geographically disconnected fragments—Inner Austria (Vienna and the Alpine Provinces), Northern Bohemia (the German fringe from Eger to Trautenau), and the Sudetenland (a few frontier districts in Eastern Bohemia, Northern Moravia, and the western part of Austrian Silesia down to Troppau), which, unless united by remaining within an Austrian super-State, could retain their connexion by union with the German Empire alone, not otherwise. An Austrian Federal State would necessarily have to retain very wide powers over economic matters, but it seemed highly doubtful whether any of the other nationalities would agree to such a surrender of governmental powers. ‘Because the German Austrians as an industrial nation have a strong interest in maintaining the united economic territory, they suppose the same feelings in the others,’ but in reality the non-German nationalities, being mostly agricultural, do not feel the same need. Then, even for economic reasons, German Austria would have to join Germany. The Austrian Germans were rapidly losing hope of being able to keep together ‘Western’ Austria.

26. *Hungary and the Sinking Ship.* The Magyars carefully watched the progressive disruption of Austria. They all felt that the moment was fast approaching when Hungary would have to break off her connexion with Austria in order to escape being pooled with her in the bankrupt mass against which the different creditor nations would enter claims. In separating, the Magyar Kingdom of Hungary was to camouflage itself into a persecuted nationality which now at last attained the freedom it had yearned for; why was it not to retain its direct hold on Slovakia, Transylvania, and the Banat just as the Poles proposed to retain their hold on East Galicia? The Magyar Socialists, in a manifesto published on the 7th October, offered a kind of cultural autonomy to the subject races in a Hungary ‘which claims the right to determine her own fate!’ ‘Self-determination’—such as Count Czernin claimed for Austria-Hungary in the farcical argument which he addressed to the Bolsheviks in the days of Brest-Litovsk. Vienna was to be the one and only scapegoat. And Germany, whom Apponyi and Andrassy, no less than Tisza and Wekerle, had only recently described as the natural, indispensable ally of Hungary,¹ was to

¹ Cf., e.g., Andrassy’s speech in the Hungarian Parliament, on 20th June

be abandoned. On the 10th October Tisza delivered a significant speech. Recent developments in Austria, he declared, had shaken the foundations of the Dual Monarchy, and should the expected changes occur, Hungary would have to reassert her complete independence. As to the German Alliance, it had been necessary only as long as Hungary was threatened by Tsarist Russia. Even more explicit was the Prime Minister, Dr. Wekerle, when on the next day, the 11th October, he addressed the Executive Committee of his party. 'A fundamental change has occurred in our relations with Austria. We are confronted by an accomplished fact. . . . It is a serious matter that Austria should have turned entirely towards federalism. Bohemia proposes to break off completely on a federalist basis and to form a separate State. . . . Austria has not got the strength to withstand such attempts. . . . We are no longer face to face with the Austria with which we concluded our agreements in the past.' She cannot fulfil her obligations with regard to common defence or to economic matters. Hungary must strike out her own line and guard her own interests. Her territorial integrity is her first concern. Little was said about the dynasty, but both speeches implied that no immediate change was contemplated. The Magyars seemed to have feared that by prematurely breaking with the dynasty they might give it a chance of securing more favourable conditions for Austria at the expense of Hungary, i. e. by an attempt at a genuine federalization of the entire Habsburg Monarchy, the Magyar domain included.

Negotiations were carried on for the formation of a new Magyar Coalition Cabinet. One after another different leaders were offered the Premiership, but declined. Count Michael Karolyi advised the Emperor to summon a Cabinet consisting of Radicals and Socialists, but refused to co-operate with the representatives of the old system. On the 14th October Wekerle formally resigned, but the next day withdrew his resignation on condition that a special clause to guarantee Hungary's territorial integrity should be inserted in the coming Imperial Proclamation federalizing Austria. In the Hungarian Delegations, Michael Karolyi demanded the immediate declaration

1918 : 'The German Alliance I consider necessary, natural, and in accordance with the only sound policy. I am convinced that without it it is impossible to conduct a proper Hungarian policy, for the Germans are the only great race in whose interest it is that there should be a strong Hungary. It cannot be to the interest of Hungary to estrange this faithful ally. . . .'

of Hungary's complete independence and of the abolition of all institutions common to Hungary and Austria. On Tisza's motion, however, the Delegations adjourned until an answer was received from President Wilson. They too had to wait.

27. *The Federalizing Manifesto of the 16th October.* In spite of the refusal of the different Austrian nationalities to join the Reconstruction Cabinet, an attempt was made to do something which might look like realizing Point 10 of President Wilson, and might perhaps have preserved Austria's existence.¹ An Imperial Manifesto, dated the 16th October, proclaimed the federalization of Austria; it was countersigned by the same Hussarek who on the 11th September had declared the Government's 'determination to preserve a united Austrian State', on the 1st October had talked in very vague terms about national autonomy, and even on the 8th October had refrained from explaining the nature and extent of the autonomy to be conceded. 'Now the reconstruction of the Fatherland on its natural and therefore most reliable foundations must be undertaken without delay,' reads the Manifesto. 'The wishes of the Austrian nationalities are to be carefully harmonized and a beginning must be made to realize them. . . . Austria, in accordance with the will of her nationalities, is to become a federal State in which every nationality within its own territory forms its own commonwealth. This is not to prejudice in any way the union of the Polish territories of Austria with the independent Polish State. The town of Trieste and its territory, in accordance with the wishes of its inhabitants, receives a special position. The reconstruction, which in no way infringes the integrity of the countries belonging to the Holy Crown of Hungary, is to secure independence to every single State, but also effectively to protect the common interests. . . . I call upon the nations . . . to co-operate in the great task through National Councils consisting of the members who represent each nationality in the Reichsrat, and to secure the interests of the nations as against each other and in relation to my government. . . .' The Emperor and his Government thus acknowledged themselves something extraneous to the basic national States, but still tried to maintain themselves through the administrative machinery; not

¹ Point 10: 'The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.'

a word was said in the Manifesto of national governments, the indispensable, logical corollary to the new national States.

On the day before the Manifesto was published it was to have been read by the Prime Minister to the leaders of the different nationalities in Parliament. The Czechs refused to appear at the meeting, the Polish leaders were away at Warsaw, the Ukrainians, expecting a Polish attempt to declare East Galicia 'Polish territory', protested against the vagueness of the Manifesto, the Yugo-slavs, who put in an appearance, declared their solidarity with the Czechs. On the 16th October the Czechs and Yugo-slavs made a common statement in the Delegations for Foreign Affairs. They 'irrevocably insisted that the Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-slav questions as international problems could be satisfactorily solved at the general Peace Conference alone', and that 'previous to the publication of President Wilson's answer to the Austro-Hungarian peace offer all discussion of the proposals contained in the Imperial Manifesto was devoid of practical value . . .'. On the 19th October the Czech National Committee in Prague and the Yugo-slav National Council at Zagreb confirmed the declaration, once for all refusing any further discussions with Vienna or Budapest.

On the same day on which the Manifesto was signed (16th October), Dr. Wekerle declared in the Hungarian Parliament that, in view of the federalization of Austria, the connexion between the two States would in future be reduced to a personal union, and Hungary would have to settle all her political and economic problems on a completely independent basis. Within Hungary the nationalities were offered nothing beyond language rights; the unity and integrity of the Magyar State were to be preserved. Dr. A. Vaida-Voevod, subsequently Rumanian Prime Minister, replied by demanding complete and free self-determination for the Hungarian Rumanians, and denied the claim of the Hungarian Parliament and Government to represent them. A similar declaration was made in the name of the Slovaks by their representative, Father Juriga.

28. *Developments in Poland.* It had been necessary to leave out the Poles from the Imperial Manifesto of the 16th October—as the thirteenth of President Wilson's Points, accepted on the 4th October both by Germany and Austria-Hungary, stipulated that 'an independent Polish state should be erected

which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations. . . .

On the 7th October the Polish Regency Council at Warsaw, formed in the autumn of 1917 from among the most 'conciliatory' elements, drew the obvious conclusions from the Note of the Central Powers (and also from the speech of the new German Chancellor Prince Max of Baden, who on the 5th October had declared in favour of freely elected Diets in the occupied territories in the East), and published a Manifesto to the Polish nation foreshadowing the formation of a representative National Government and the summoning of a Polish Diet. The Manifesto finished with the watchword of 'a free and re-united Poland'. On the 15th October the Polish representatives in the Austrian Delegations declared in the name of all the Polish members of the Austrian Reichsrat that they henceforth considered themselves 'subjects and citizens of a free and re-united Polish State'. They called on the Austro-Hungarian Government to undertake the necessary steps for realizing the principles of President Wilson and for clearly defining the right of the Polish nation to participate in the general Peace Conference. On the same day the leaders of the Galician Poles were summoned by the Regency Council to Warsaw to take part in forming the new Polish Government.

Its formation met with peculiar difficulties. The National Democrats, who had the full support of the French Government, tried to proscribe their political opponents among the Conservatives and moderates, and to reduce the radical Left to a decorative place in a predominantly National Democrat Government. After long-drawn negotiations the Regency Council surrendered to the National Democrats, and on the 19th October one of their leaders was entrusted with the formation of a new Cabinet, of which the list was accepted by the Regency Council on the 23rd October. The Left refused any share in that Government, which thus came to consist exclusively of members and friends of the National Democrat party. M. Stanislas Glombinski, their leader in Galicia, became Minister for Foreign Affairs, and on the 24th October despatched the following wire to the German Secretary of State, Dr. Solf, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Burian: 'Assuming the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, I desire to assure Your Excellency of my best intentions to maintain friendly

relations between our neighbouring States'—a peculiar performance on the part of a man and group which at that time claimed a monopoly in relations with the Entente. Many an ostracized adherent of the Regency Council, which had tried to work with the Central Powers, might have repeated the words of the feeble-minded ex-Emperor Ferdinand of Austria, who, seeing his nephew and successor, the Emperor Francis Joseph I, lose one province after another, remarked in 1866 that indeed there had been no need for him to resign, for so much he could have achieved himself.

29. *East Galicia.* On the 28th October a conference of the Austrian-Polish representatives met at Cracow and elected a commission to wind up relations with Austria—for Western Galicia in accordance with President Wilson's Thirteenth Point that all 'territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations' should be included in Poland, for East Galicia in disregard of it. The representatives of the 3,200,000 Ruthenes do not seem to have been invited at all, nor were the National Jews who represented the overwhelming majority of the 900,000 Galician Jews. Nevertheless the Polish Liquidation Committee set out to act for the entire country and, under the leadership of the National Democrats, resolved within five days to transfer its seat from Cracow to Lemberg—a gratuitous provocation to the Ruthenes.

The Ruthene members of the Austrian Reichsrat, at a meeting held in Vienna on the 10th October, had decided to summon a conference of representatives from all Ruthene territories of Austria-Hungary to Lemberg for the 18th October. Meantime the Imperial Manifesto was published on the 16th. Having met, the conference elected a Ukrainian National Council, to act as 'the Constituent Assembly of the part of the Ukrainian nation inhabiting territories of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. . . .' The Ukrainian Socialists pressed for immediate reunion with the Russian Ukraine and, when out-voted, left the Assembly; the moderate parties, obviously afraid of plunging into the chaos of the Russian Ukraine, preferred first to organize the government and administration of their own territories. 'The Ukrainian National Council has the right and duty at the time which it will consider proper, to exercise the right of self-determination for the Ukrainian people and to decide with which State to unite the territories inhabited by the Ukrainians.' Next day the National Council decided

to form the Ukrainian territories of Austria-Hungary into a separate State, to invite the Polish and Jewish national minorities inhabiting these territories to send representatives to the Council, to prepare for summoning a Diet elected by universal suffrage on the proportional system and to grant cultural autonomy and a share in the government to national minorities; lastly, to demand direct representation at the Peace Conference, denying to Count Burian the right to represent them.

By the 2nd November the Polish Liquidation Commission was to have met at Lemberg, the capital of East Galicia. The Ukrainian National Council forestalled them. In the early morning of the 1st November Ukrainian troops, acting under orders from the Council, occupied the government buildings at Lemberg, and the Council assumed the government of East Galicia. The Polish minority refused to accept the conciliatory offers of the Ukrainians, and on the same day fighting commenced between them.

30. *President Wilson's Reply to Austria-Hungary.* President Wilson's answer to the Austro-Hungarian Note of the 7th October was published on the 21st.¹ The Note, dated the 18th October, explained that the President could not entertain the suggestion of the Austro-Hungarian government 'because of certain events of the utmost importance which, occurring since the delivery of his Address of January 8th last, have necessarily altered the attitude and responsibility of the Government of the United States. . . .' Having recognized the Czecho-Slovaks as a belligerent nation and their National Council as 'a *de facto* belligerent government', and having 'also recognized in the fullest manner the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs for freedom', the President is 'no longer at liberty to accept a mere "autonomy" of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they, and not he, shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and their conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations.'

The verdict broke the last links in Austria-Hungary's logical structure. The Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-slavs were acknowledged as independent nations, the frontier between Austria and Hungary was obliterated, the two States on which

¹ v. Text in Vol. I, pp. 452-3.

the Austro-Hungarian government based its existence were no more. Austria was reduced to its German, Hungary to its Magyar, territory. The complex structure raised on the historic 'imperialisms' of the dominant races and on the Imperial traditions of the Habsburgs was shattered. The Austro-Hungarian Common Ministries, the nondescript, nationally autonomous Austrian Government, nay, even the national Magyar government of Hungary, were of a world which had vanished overnight.

On the 21st October, in a Manifesto dated the 18th, and signed by Professor Masaryk, Dr. Stefanik and Dr. Beneš, the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris published a Declaration of Independence and constituted itself the Czecho-Slovak Provisional Government. It declared that any 'federalization, and still more "autonomy" would mean nothing under a Habsburg', that the Czecho-Slovak nation refuses 'any longer to remain a part of Austria-Hungary in any form', and denied all Habsburg claims 'to rule in Czecho-Slovak land, which we here and now declare shall henceforth be a free and independent people and nation'.

The Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-slav Councils in Prague and Zagreb, which had already refused to negotiate with Vienna and Budapest previous to the general Peace Conference, could now gain nothing by discussing either the constitution or the exact frontiers of their States with the enemy Powers in the absence of the Allies. They now merely demanded once more that the alien troops should be withdrawn from their provinces, their own regiments allowed to return to their homelands; and the administration of Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-slav territories handed over to their National Councils. In fact, the Czechs did not wait for permission. Many civil servants henceforth looked to the National Council as their government; e.g. most of the railway employees in the Czech districts were Czechs, and these, ordered by their leaders, began to control food transports to Vienna. They instituted what the Germans described as a Czech blockade, a formidable weapon against a half-starved city. The central authorities were daily losing power over the non-German provinces.

31. *German Austria.* On the 21st October, the day on which President Wilson's Note was published, the German members of the Austrian Reichsrat, following up the Imperial Manifesto

of the 16th October, met in the building of the Lower Austrian Diet. Now they could no longer shirk the question, what their own relations should be to the old, non-national Austrian authorities, the legacy of a vanishing Empire. The resolutions as passed, and still more some of the speeches delivered in the German National Assembly, clearly went beyond the terms of reference drawn by the Manifesto. 'The German people in Austria', began the unanimously adopted resolutions, 'will itself determine its future State organization, form an independent German-Austrian State, and by free agreement, settle its relations to the other nationalities.' The Imperial Austrian Government, which had offered its guidance to the nationalities, was passed over in silence. Then the claim to all territory inhabited by Germans was reasserted, the German districts in the Czech provinces being specially mentioned. The summoning of a German-Austrian Constituent Assembly was foreshadowed, but not a word was said safeguarding the monarchical principle; in fact the Habsburgs were not once mentioned—more serious preoccupations filled the minds of the Austrian Germans. 'Until a National Constituent Assembly meets, the Provisional National Assembly claims the right to represent the German people of Austria at the peace negotiations, to carry on negotiations with the other nationalities for the transfer of the administration to the new national States and concerning the mutual relations to be established between them . . .' Again the Austro-Hungarian and the Austrian Governments were passed over in silence. They appeared at last in the resolution setting up an Executive Committee which, 'until the German-Austrian Government is formed, is to represent the Austrian Germans in relations with the Austro-Hungarian and the Austrian Governments, and with the other nationalities. . . .' All alike were treated as extraneous.

The Socialists, although they held only about one-fifth of the seats in the National Assembly, were clearly the driving force. They represented the organized labour masses outside, and had a moral ascendancy over the German Nationalists and the Habsburgite Clericals whose past policy had resulted in national collapse and humiliation. Victor Adler, the Socialist leader, in a speech delivered at the first meeting of the National Assembly, voiced the new spirit rising among the Austrian Germans. 'The German people in Austria will form its own

democratic State . . . which is freely to decide how to settle its relations with the neighbouring nationalities and with the German Empire. It will form a free confederation with the neighbouring nationalities, if they wish it. Should they refuse or make conditions incompatible with the economic and national interests of the German people, the German-Austrian State, which by itself is an economically impossible formation, will be compelled as a separate State to enter the German Empire. We demand for the German-Austrian State full freedom to choose between these two possible connexions.' He went on to state that the Socialists in the Constituent Assembly would declare for a republic. Meantime the Assembly, disregarding the bankrupt Habsburg institutions, should form a German-Austrian Government. 'The other nationalities will be represented at the Peace Conference; nor can the German people leave its interests in the hands of a diplomacy alien to the people. The German-Austrian Government is immediately to get into touch with the Slav nations of Austria and into direct negotiations with President Wilson for an armistice and peace. Lastly, it is to take over the administration of German Austria.'

Adler's speech declared for German-Austrian independence and renounced the Habsburg connexion. The Christian Socialists and most of the German Nationalists did not as yet go the whole way, still it was half-heartedly that they demurred. The idea was thrown out, and in these days of quick maturing was to be realized sooner than the Socialists themselves expected.

32. *The Austrian Reichsrat.* Quaint interludes were supplied in the second half of October by occasional sittings of the Austrian Reichsrat, where men seemed to meet to register the degree reached in the decline of the State. The meetings were badly attended and the discussions were invariably perfunctory and futile. The great process of Austria's recasting was carried on in the provincial national capitals, the centre was dead. On the 22nd October the Reichsrat was asked by Count Burian to appoint a Committee for Foreign Affairs which would assist the Austro-Hungarian representatives at the Peace Conference. The request was refused by all nationalities alike. Oppositions in parliaments are used to moving obviously futile resolutions without hoping to see them accepted

or realized—*c'est leur métier*. In October 1918 the governing circles in Vienna found themselves in opposition to reality.

33. *The Crisis in Hungary*. It was in a very different spirit that the Hungarian Parliament, the representative assembly of Magyar nationalists, watched the growing danger to their 'imperialist' domain. It was sitting when on the 23rd October the news arrived of the 79th Croat Regiment having mutinied at Fiume. This followed on serious Yugo-slav national demonstrations at Zagreb. A storm broke out in the House; the sitting was suspended; a Cabinet Council was called; meantime the opposition members met in the reception hall of Parliament. It was generally felt that a new line had to be struck both in foreign and internal policy and this could not possibly be done by the exponents of the old, now discredited, system. Wekerle himself felt it, and although sure of a majority in the House—only the day before Tisza's party had fused with his followers—he did not feel equal to shouldering the responsibility any longer. When the House reassembled in the evening, he announced the resignation of his Cabinet. 'I shall submit to His Majesty a proposal for summoning a new government which would include representatives of all the parties in this House and possibly of national forces outside it' (under the narrow Hungarian class franchise the Socialists had obtained no seats in the Parliament). The Cabinet crisis which followed had necessarily a revolutionary tendency. Out of the class Parliament there could come no government very different from the one which had just resigned, no government answering the supposed need of the moment and the popular demands of the capital (as a rule a disproportionately prominent element in revolutions) could have maintained itself in Parliament. The parties of the Left, under the leadership of Count Michael Karolyi, decided to form a National Council, a 'popular' quasi-Parliament as a base for a Revolutionary Government, should the oligarchs refuse to surrender. In international affairs the Left demanded that the complete independence of Hungary should be immediately proclaimed, a Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs appointed, the alliance with Germany denounced, and a separate peace concluded.

Immediately on the fall of Wekerle, Count Burian, another nominee of the Magyar oligarchy, resigned office. Count Julius Andrassy, who, though himself in every way one of the

oligarchical group, had for personal reasons always been opposed to Tisza, was appointed Burian's successor. All his life he had dreamt of filling the place which his father had held (1871-9), and he had striven for it by hard work and intrigue. He got hold of the wheel when there was nothing to steer any longer. 'From many quarters I am asked', he said in an interview to the *Neue Freie Presse* on the 25th October, 'how it can be that a Common Minister for Foreign Affairs is appointed though work on the separation of Austria and Hungary has begun. There is no contradiction in that. Until the Act of 1867 is changed, nothing but a Common Minister for Foreign Affairs is conceivable or possible.'

34. '*Das Liquidierungskabinett.*' On the 23rd October the Emperor had gone to Budapest. The 25th was spent in negotiations with Counts Andrassy and Michael Karolyi. On the same day it was given out that Professor Lammasch was at last to become Austrian Prime Minister. The pacifists were to be given office in both States in the faint hope that they might succeed in administering artificial respiration to the corpse. During the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 a man was hawking anti-earthquake pills in the streets, in October 1918 the Emperor Charles changed ministers. On the 26th the Emperor returned to Vienna and with him Karolyi, and negotiations were continued with Count Andrassy and Professor Lammasch. On the 27th October Baron von Hussarek's resignation was officially accepted and Professor Lammasch took over most of the Cabinet of his predecessor; the only new man of mark was the Minister of Finance, Dr. J. Redlich—another old, deserving ambition realized in a Cabinet posthumous to the State. From the outset the new government was described as *ein Liquidierungskabinett*, the liquidators of a bankrupt concern. They were to assist in the transfer of the administration to the national governments and try to save somewhere a place for the Habsburgs and a central government. But even for liquidation they were not wanted any more. The State was breaking up without guidance.

On the 24th October the Executive Committee of the German-Austrian National Assembly had notified the central authorities that they considered themselves the provisional government of the German-Austrian State, they had proposed that a joint Committee be formed by the different National Councils to

carry on common affairs, and that the armistice should be concluded by the different nationalities in common, but the peace negotiations conducted by each nationality separately. The Austrian Government was no longer considered competent to deal with the problems which from their nature were common to its successors. It had no mandate from any one of them and was to them but the remnant of a power which they no longer recognized.

The expected appointment of Michael Karolyi to the Hungarian Premiership did not materialize because of disagreements between him and Andrassy. Archduke Joseph was appointed *homo regius* to conduct at Budapest further negotiations for the appointment of a new Premier and Cabinet.

35. *The Military Collapse.* New frontiers were arising between the successor States of Austria-Hungary and every frontier threatened to become a battle-front. In each State the nation demanded a concentration of its troops to enforce its will and claims, and no thought was given to the military fronts of the late Habsburg Monarchy. The war-weary troops listened to the news from home, and felt that this something (force or idea), which had sent them to the fronts, was irrevocably gone.

When during the night of the 23rd-24th October operations were started by the Tenth British-Italian Army under Lord Cavan, a number of Austro-Hungarian regiments refused to fight. On the 27th the Allies crossed the Piave. The Austro-Hungarian Army in full dissolution was leaving the front, there was nothing for them to defend, no purpose which would have made their officers keep them together; a general stampede began. The front broke because the utter hopelessness and absurdity of Austria-Hungary's existence had become patent at last even to those who hitherto had acted as the cement in the Monarchy and its army.

36. *Andrassy's Peace Offer.* On the 27th October Count Andrassy despatched via Stockholm his answer to President Wilson's Note of the 18th October. The Austro-Hungarian Government declared that 'as in the case of the preceding statements of the President it also adheres to his point of view, as laid down in his last note, regarding the rights of the peoples of Austria-Hungary, particularly those of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugo-slavs'. It further declared its readiness 'without

awaiting the result of other negotiations, to enter into pour-parlers in regard to peace between Austria-Hungary and the States of the opposing party’ Thus she acknowledged the independence of the Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-slavs and offered to enter into negotiations independently of Germany, which had been given about twenty-four hours’ notice of the impending *démarche*.

On the 28th October, the day after the Note had been sent to Washington by the usual intermediary of a neutral State, but also the day after the Allies had crossed the Piave, Count Andrassy despatched a wire direct to Mr. Lansing endorsing all the points of President Wilson, declaring that preparations had already been made to give the fullest scope to the self-determination of the peoples of Austria and of Hungary, and asking the American Government to bring about ‘an immediate armistice on all the Austro-Hungarian fronts and to initiate peace negotiations’. The same Note was sent to the British, French, Italian, and Japanese Governments.

However tenaciously the Notes in their form tried to assert the continued existence of the Habsburg Monarchy, by their contents they admitted the end of Austria-Hungary to have come. To agree with President Wilson’s description of the Czecho-Slovaks, as an independent nation at war with the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, was not devoid of involuntary humour. To offer negotiations apart from Germany was as undignified as it was futile. It was believed at the time, perhaps with reason, that this was done under pressure from Count Michael Karolyi, who had always been an opponent of the alliance with Germany; but Count Julius Andrassy signed the Note, he who throughout the War had been one of the strongest advocates of *Mittel-Europa*—the son of the man who in 1879, with Bismarck, had concluded the alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany.

37. *Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-slav Independence* (28th–29th October 1918). In Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-slavia the reply of the Austro-Hungarian Government to President Wilson’s Note of the 18th October gave the sign for the final break with the Habsburg Monarchy. Not even German or Magyar troops, or whoever else might have previously been inclined to defend its existence, could any longer oppose themselves to the revolutionary action of the Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-

slavs after the Emperor and his Government had officially and before the entire world acknowledged the existence and independence of these States. In Prague the Executive Committee of the National Council met on the 28th October and after a short sitting went to the Governor's office to declare that they took over the administration of the country. The officials promised to obey their orders and put themselves completely at the service of the National Council. The same was done by the police, and at 8.30 p.m. the General commanding the troops surrendered the military command to the National Council. At 9.30 p.m. the town was entered by the Prague Regiment No. 28, which in 1915 had been dissolved because some of its companies voluntarily and by previous arrangement had crossed over to the Russians. Everywhere the crowds which gathered in the streets removed the Imperial Eagles and other emblems of the Habsburg Monarchy and of the Austrian State, and replaced them by national colours and signs. Similar scenes simultaneously occurred throughout all the Czech and Yugo-slav provinces. The movement was in no way concerted, it was entirely spontaneous; none the less it was general. The meaning of the Austro-Hungarian answer to President Wilson's Note of the 18th October was obvious, and so were the conclusions to be drawn from it. Men need not necessarily have thought out all the logical absurdities of the Austro-Hungarian Government acknowledging Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-slav independence and yet they instinctively felt them. On the 28th October the psychological break became complete. The day had all the characteristics of the consummating moments in great revolutions. Henceforth no one thought of himself as an 'Austrian' any longer.

On the 29th October the Croat Diet met and a resolution was moved and carried that 'Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia with Fiume are . . . a State completely independent of Hungary and Austria and . . . join the common national and sovereign State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs . . .' The Generals commanding the military forces in Croatia accepted the change, the Serb prisoners of war were released and enrolled in the National Guards, and the same day a new government for Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia was formed. In the course of the 30th October the arrangements for the taking over of all the civil and military power in the Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-

slav territories by their national governments were completed, and the Czecho-Slovak Government notified the Austrian Prime Minister of Dr. Tusar having been appointed Czecho-Slovak diplomatic representative in Vienna. Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-slavia, in name as in fact, became independent States. The word of the Czech leaders that the popular movement could not be repressed and that the nationalities would act on their own, came true. Everywhere the National Committees and leaders had to restrain rather than encourage the masses. These were revolutions in the truest sense, generally bloodless as no resistance was offered.

38. *Revolution in Budapest* (28th-31st October 1918.) On the 28th October a National Council was formed in Budapest by the parties of the Left, and the idea was canvassed of this Council proclaiming Count Michael Karolyi Prime Minister of Hungary. Fighting occurred in the streets. The excitement of the masses was growing daily. Many soldiers and officers joined the mob. The police declared that they would no longer do political service. On the 29th October Count Hadik, a mild oligarch of the Andrassy type, was appointed Premier and assumed office on the 30th October. In answer to his invitation to the Socialist Executive to negotiate with him he was told that he should apply to the National Council because they would not act independently. Soldiers' Councils were meantime formed at Budapest. In the night of the 30th October the rumour spread from barrack to barrack that the General commanding Budapest had ordered the dissolution of the Councils and the arrest of their members. The troops decided to offer resistance. A crowd of officers and soldiers put itself under the command of the National Council and occupied a number of important government buildings. On the 31st October at 8 a.m. Archduke Joseph, the *homo regius*, received Count Michael Karolyi. The Archduke claimed to have asked a few hours earlier that Karolyi should be made Premier. In the course of the next hour Karolyi received by telephone his appointment from the Emperor. Once more an attempt was made by the vanishing Empire to reassert its existence if merely by formally acknowledging accomplished facts. Still Count Karolyi's Government, arising from the self-appointed National Council of the Left and composed of none but its members, was clearly revolutionary in

character and the fact that Karolyi had taken the oath to the King (Charles was King in Hungary) roused dissatisfaction among the republicans, who were gaining in strength. On the 2nd November Karolyi announced in the National Council that, seeing the people's wish freely to settle the future constitution of Hungary, the Government had addressed a request to the King to absolve them from their oath of loyalty. 'We received the answer that the King absolved the Government of their oath.' Karolyi was a Magyar aristocrat, punctilious in matters of constitutional law even whilst leading a revolution, like the Whig lords of 1688. Archduke Joseph, on the other hand, preferred the part of Philippe-Égalité. 'Absolved from his oath' to his Monarch and cousin, he enthusiastically swore in his own name (from now onward plain Joseph Habsburg) and in that of his son a new oath to the Hungarian nation. Anything to keep afloat.

Count Stephen Tisza, the grim Calvinist who had ruled Hungary in the days of her strength and greatness—an iron ruler and devoted servant, a Fallen Angel in the absurd realms of Hungary's impossible politics, the statesman who alone in the decisive Councils of July 1914 had opposed the War but then had fought it as no other man in the Habsburg Monarchy—lived long enough to see the coming end, but was spared the pain of watching at their ill-fated work the small, weak, muddle-headed men, whom he had despised, insulted, and bullied all his life. On the 31st October, at 6 p.m., a few soldiers forced their way into Count Tisza's house and entered the drawing-room where he was with his wife and his sister-in-law Countess Almassy. Tisza stepped forward to meet them, unflinching to the last. After a few words had been exchanged he was shot dead by the soldiers. His last words were: 'I die. It had to be.'

39. *The End of the Austrian Reichsrat* (30th October 1918). The Lammasch Cabinet was to have met the Austrian Reichsrat on the 30th October. The conference of party leaders which assembled previously to the sitting did not press for a regular meeting of the House. Austria was dead, but the time had not yet come for the formal and circumstantial registration of the fact. The House met formally at 11 a.m. and, 'because of the existing conditions,' adjourned at 11.10 a.m., the date for its re-assembly being fixed for the 12th November. When its German

members and some ten members of other nationality, mostly stray black sheep, met on that day, in view of 'the fact that Austria had ceased to exist' and 'the House had no further functions to perform', it adjourned 'without fixing a day for its next sitting'.

40. *Revolution in Vienna* (30th–31st October). When the German-Austrian National Assembly met again on the 30th October the German-Austrian State had been practically formed by the action of its neighbours. Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-slavia, and Hungary were independent. But there remained an Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister in Vienna who offered, in whose name no one knew, to negotiate peace with the Allies apart from Germany. Even the Christian Socialists, previously ardent Habsburgites, had not the courage to defend the Note of the 27th October. 'The nation to which the Minister for Foreign Affairs belongs', declared one of their leaders, 'has refused all further connexion with Austria, and it is therefore extraordinarily difficult for the Germans to accept any one of that nation for a representative of German interests.' The spokesman of the Socialists openly attacked 'the dynasty and the Hungarian feudal magnates' who 'choose the present moment for deserting Germany and stabbing German democracy in the back'. 'These gentlemen come too late to acquire merit in bringing about peace. All they achieve is cold, shameful betrayal, the proverbial gratitude of the House of Austria. The Magyar feudal lords pose as lovers of freedom and decide in favour of personal union. No one sheds a tear for the Dualist system which long ago has outlived itself. But as to personal union we do not care either for the union or for the personnel. . . . The dynasty plans to gain the Czechs and Yugo-slavs at the expense of the Germans. We shall never admit that even a shadow of a German national interest should be sacrificed to the interest of the dynasty. . . . The German Socialists consider that the nation cannot be safeguarded against such dynastic schemings except by German Austria constituting itself a republic. From this point of view we ask once more : in whose name has Count Andrassy sent his Note? He has nothing to declare or offer in the name of the German people.'

A provisional constitution was voted for German Austria, and the German-Austrian National Assembly declared that it

alone and its organs were authorized to speak for the German-Austrian people in matters of foreign policy and to represent them at the peace negotiations. A proclamation was issued to the German people of Austria. 'The German-Austrian National Assembly has voted to-day the fundamental law of the new German-Austrian State. A Council of State was chosen to take over the administration and executive power in German Austria. The Council of State will immediately appoint the first German-Austrian Government, which is to conduct peace negotiations and assume the administration of the German districts of Austria and the command of the German troops. . . .'

On the same day enormous crowds marched through the streets of Vienna raising cries for a German-Austrian Republic and singing socialist revolutionary songs and, here and there, also the *Wacht am Rhein*. The revolutionary excitement was growing throughout the country. The Socialist party was leading the way, the other parties, especially the German Nationalists, in view of the Emperor's offer to abandon Germany, had no longer heart to resist.

The first Government of German Austria was appointed by the Council of State on the 31st October, without any reference to the Emperor.

41. *The Austrian 'Staatsidee' once more.* On the 1st November the Hungarian Government ordered the Hungarian troops at all the fronts to lay down arms, on the 3rd the Austro-Hungarian Military Command signed an armistice which practically amounted to absolute and unconditional surrender. The Austro-Hungarian Army, the oldest and last bulwark of the Habsburg Monarchy, ceased to exist. 'The End of the Military Monarchy' was the heading of a remarkable leading article in the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* of the 3rd November.

The armies melt away, all territory is given over to the enemy, they need not conquer any more, for there is no one for them to fight. The Hungarian Minister for War has ordered all Hungarian troops to lay down arms. The most important harbours have called in the enemy fleets. . . . The Italians will not conclude an armistice except on terms such as have seldom marked the end of a war. This is the end of the war which Austria-Hungary has arrogantly provoked, and this is the end of the military Monarchy. A shameful end, this War and its conclusion, but truly worthy of her existence, the end she deserved. For all the wars which Austria-Hungary has conducted—

and an infinite amount of blood has been shed by her rulers—were made only to maintain the dynastic power, to preserve its glory, to assert its importance. What business had Austria in Germany, or, still more, in Italy? . . . How did we get to Bosnia-Herzegovina? German Austria protested against its occupation, the Magyars did not want it, but it answered the needs of the dynastic power. . . . The dynasty needed compensation, a substitute, for the 'subjects' whom it had lost in Germany and Italy. . . . For centuries it had impeded German unity; it had been an obstacle to the union of Italy; it had to obstruct the Serb national cause, for such was its vocation. . . . The end of the military Monarchy, be it shameful beyond expression, does not move our hearts. . . . An edifice of lies collapses, a system of dynastic power, which has been a plague to the world ever since it started on its infamous course, has reached its term in the world's history. All wrappings fall from the State Idea and here it stands in its nakedness. See how it looks. With what insolence has the legend about the loyalty of all the nationalities been drummed into the world, throughout history, and especially during the War, and with what insolence was the world told that the nationalities were glad to belong to the Habsburgs. And now that the force is broken which had bound them all—and it was nothing but force which bound them together—now that they can speak and act just as they think and feel, their true feelings for Austria break forth like a flood: hatred against that Austria, joy to be rid of her. In the Czechs, Poles, Slovenes, Croats, Italians, not a shadow of grief can be found, not a trace of the feeling that a bond has broken which had existed for centuries, no emotion, no sadness, no woe, none of the sentiments which even prisoners feel on leaving gaol. And this state of things, which cannot be the growth of a day, but in its origins must reach back for years and tens of years, had been painted to the world as the happy and united Austria, where all the nations prayed to God to bless whatever Emperor there was, finding their ecstatic happiness in all having him for ruler. And for this lie of a State Idea, for a Monarchy which the nations fly like an evil, we have made the War, millions and millions have shed their blood, our present and our future have been sacrificed.

42. *The End of the Monarchy* (9th–16th November). On the 9th November the German Emperor and the Crown Prince resigned the Thrones of Germany and Prussia. On the 11th November the Emperor Charles renounced all share in the government of German-Austria without, however, explicitly renouncing the Crown; he merely promised to submit to the verdict of the people whatever it might be. ' . . . I do not want to be an obstacle to the free development of my peoples. I recognize beforehand the decision which German Austria makes as regards her future constitution. . . . I renounce all share in the business of the State. Simultaneously I relieve my Austrian Government of office.' So too, on the 13th November, he

renounced all share in the government of Hungary, recognizing beforehand any decision she might take as regards her constitution, though declining to abdicate.

On the 12th November the Council of State decreed German Austria 'a democratic Republic' and 'a component part of the German Republic'. On the 16th November a Republic was proclaimed in Hungary. The last successor-States of the Habsburg Monarchy renounced their Habsburg allegiance.

CHAPTER II

THE ARMISTICES AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE

PART I

THE ARMISTICES AND THEIR MEANING¹

1. *Introductory.* The Armistices with Bulgaria, Turkey, and with Austria-Hungary, and the military convention with Hungary were concluded on a basis quite different from that of the Armistice with Germany. All these Armistices were primarily military in character, in each case, by contrast with the German Army, the defeated party definitely agreed to demobilize its forces without any reciprocal engagement on the part of the Allies. They bear then a general resemblance in that they all embodied conditions practically equivalent to unconditional surrender. There were, however, some necessary differences in detail.

2. *The Armistice with Bulgaria, 29th September, and with Turkey, 30th October 1918.* Bulgaria had simply applied for a suspension of hostilities because of her defeat in the field, and no political negotiations had preceded her military collapse. It has been suggested that political considerations entered into the drawing up of this Armistice; it must be remembered, however, that this was the first Armistice of the war imposed by the victorious Allies on one of the enemy countries, and that none of the complications, which later entered into the Armistice with Germany and its revisions, was even thought of at that time.

It is quite evident from its terms that military considerations only were entertained, their whole aim and object being: firstly, to secure the freedom of the Allied territories and subjects still in the hands of the Bulgars; secondly, to eliminate the Bulgarian Army as a source of danger, but at the same time

¹ See Texts of Armistices with Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey and military convention with Hungary, this volume, App. I.

to retain sufficient numbers under arms to guard the eastern and northern frontiers of Bulgaria and her railways, and to keep the country quiet, whilst all available means of communications, both eastwards and northwards, were used by the Allies for further operations.

Articles 2 and 3 laid down that those portions of the Bulgarian Army, which remained in being, should, with the exception of three divisions, be demobilized (i. e. reduced to peace strength) forthwith, after handing in at dépôts, designated by the Allies and under their control, all mobilization equipment, thus only retaining their peace equipment. The deduction is evident. This was not an Armistice at all in the sense that it was a suspension of hostilities which might subsequently be resumed. Bulgaria signed what was, in effect, a non-reciprocal agreement to demobilize her forces. The Armistice with Turkey was similar, an acknowledgement of inability to fight any longer. It would have been well if both had been in name, what they were really in fact, an unconditional surrender.

3. *The Armistice with Austria-Hungary, 3rd November 1918.* The case of Austria-Hungary was on a different basis, because her Government had negotiated with President Wilson in the middle of September and again in October. But no governing document, agreed upon by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, such as the President's 5th November Memorandum to Germany, had passed between the two negotiating parties. Austria-Hungary had indeed first asked the United States on the 15th September to discuss the basis of peace; and finally, on the 7th October for negotiations 'for which the Fourteen Points . . . (8th January 1918) and the Four Points . . . (11th February 1918) should serve as a foundation, and in which the view-points declared by President Wilson in his address of the 27th September 1918, will also be taken into account'. Wilson had replied, on the 18th October, mentioning a reservation as to the autonomy of the peoples of Austria-Hungary. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, and specifically the Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-slavs, were not merely to have an 'opportunity of autonomous development', but themselves to decide their own fate on the principle of self-determination.¹ All this is related elsewhere, but there seems to have been agreement on the 'Fourteen Points' (except Point Ten), on the Four

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 370-3, 417-20.

Principles of the 11th February 1918, as being the foundation of peace, and that 'the view-points' of the 'Five Particulars', 27th September 1918, would be taken into account. It might be held that the reply of the President did not necessarily bind the other Powers, but this argument is weakened by the importance which they subsequently attached to those speeches as the basis of the negotiations with Germany. There is, at any rate, no doubt about the attitude of the President himself. In his memorandum to Italy of the 14th April 1919 he wrote that he did not consider himself 'free to suggest one basis for peace with Germany and another basis for peace with Austria'.¹

Wilson's reply of the 18th October dissolved the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and brought the Habsburg dynasty to the ground. Both Austria and Hungary separately tossed the Common Monarchy on to the rubbish-heap, and declared themselves Republics. Czecho-Slovaks, Italians, Yugo-slavs and Rumanians rapidly occupied the lands inhabited by their compatriots. The great Austro-Hungarian Army melted helplessly away, and the hapless young Emperor sought refuge in Switzerland, after consenting to an Armistice on the 3rd November.

The Armistice with Austria-Hungary was not only a purely military document, it was really a document drawn with almost exclusive reference to the needs, demands, and claims of Italy. The points to be occupied went beyond even the line of the Treaty of London, and enabled Italy to occupy, though not legally to claim, points beyond this line: e.g. the Sexten Valley, the town of Tarvis, Mount Blegos, and the whole of Schneeberg (Monte Nevoso); the Armistice line hitting the sea at a point just west of Fiume. Fiume was not included in the Armistice, but was occupied on the 19th November by a small Serb force under Colonel Maximović. As a result of somewhat dubious negotiations by an Italian Admiral, the Serbs were induced to evacuate the town and retire to Bakar (Buccari). The Italians under General Grazioli occupied the town, but the arrival of two French, one American, and one British battalion gave an international character to the occupation. The Armistice had provided that part of Northern Dalmatia from Zara to Sebenico, together with a number of islands, which the Treaty of London

¹ v. Memo., 14th April 1919. Vol. V, App. III. Above-quoted sentence is translated from the French.

recognized as Italian in the future, were to be surrendered to, and occupied by, Inter-Allied troops. Of course, these occupied territories should theoretically have been in the hands of the Allies as a whole ; but in practice the troops were necessarily Italian except those at Fiume. This fact tended to obscure the difference between the line of the Treaty of London which bound England, Italy, and France, and the Armistice line, which had no value except for military purposes. The action of Admiral Millo, the Italian administrator of North Dalmatia, who described himself in his public proclamations as ' Governor of Dalmatia ', did something to maintain this illusion. The Naval clauses of the Armistice were of considerable importance, as they divided the Adriatic Coast into three spheres, respectively Italian, American, and French, and thereby prevented a complete Italian control of the coast. Under this agreement, the Italians controlled the Austro-Hungarian coast from east of Fiume to Cape Planka, the Americans from Cape Planka to east of Slano, and the remainder, including the all-important harbour of Cattaro, was and remained under French control until October 1920. The Armistice did not recognize the arrangement by which the Austro-Hungarian Fleet had, on the 31st October, surrendered to a representative of the then unrecognized Yugo-slav Government.¹ This Armistice handed over the fleet to the Allied and Associated Powers, as a whole, to await their decision.

4. *Military Defects of the Armistice.* (a) *The Military Convention with Hungary, 13th November 1918.* Even regarded as an instrument for enforcing the disarmament of Austria-Hungary, the Armistice had grave defects. The first of them was that there was no demarcation line of any sort in Hungary, and that Hungary was now practically a separate State and became a Republic (16th November). Rumania had renewed the war (8th November) and invaded Transylvania, while the Serbs and French were pressing on up the Danube. To establish a stabilized line the French and Serb military commanders signed a Military Convention with Hungarian representatives on the 13th November. This regulated the situation in Hungary for the time being, but the line had to be advanced more than once later on the Rumanian side, and in each case of alteration, the question arose as to whether the alteration was intended to

¹ See also account in the *New Europe*, 19th December 1918.

be of the nature of a permanent occupation. Even thus, however, the demarcation lines were not properly established between belligerent forces in Austria-Hungary. It was indeed definite that Hungary was delimited, but disputes at once arose between the Allied troops and the Magyars.¹ Article 3 provided for further extension of the zone of occupation if necessary, and this occupation did, in fact, prove necessary. The line of demarcation was first advanced from the Maros Valley to a line running north and south from Szatmar to Arad, and thence advanced again to a line just outside Debreczen and Szegedin. In each case this advance provoked the assertion that it was an establishment of a permanent frontier. There was a partial basis for this view, and, as is shown elsewhere,² it certainly had an important influence in producing Béla Kun's revolution. It would certainly have been better if the demarcation lines had nowhere coincided with possibly permanent frontiers.

(b) *The Yugo-slavs in Carinthia and Styria.* While difficulties followed in Hungary because a line had been defined and was then continually altered, difficulties followed in one part of Austria because a line was not defined and yet was continually altered. The line of occupation defined in the Armistice which Inter-Allied troops were to occupy, applied only to Italian troops and to Inter-Allied troops acting with them. There was no such line defined which Serb or Yugo-slav troops were to occupy. Serb regulars and Slovene irregulars advanced and occupied such places as Laibach (Ljubljana) and Marburg. The Yugo-slavs thus held one part and the Austrians another part of Styria and Carinthia. How much further were the Yugo-slavs to go or were they right in holding the places they occupied? It would seem that the point was never settled. In Styria, after some sporadic fighting, the French military command succeeded in imposing a line on both belligerents, which corresponded roughly to the ultimate frontier. But in Carinthia, several attempts made by Allied officers to draw such a line failed, owing to faults both on the Yugo-slav and Austrian sides, and also to interference from Paris. The result was

¹ *Documents concernant l'exécution de l'armistice en Hongrie* (November 1918-March 1919). Published officially Budapest, 1919. See also Chap. III, and map on p. 122, this volume, App. I, for text of armistices, etc.

² Vol. I, pp. 352-3.

unfortunate, for hostilities continued. They began in December with a defeat of the Yugo-slavs and their retirement to the line of the Karavanken. At the end of April hostilities were resumed, the Austrians fell back, and in the middle of May the Yugo-slavs entered Klagenfurt and captured much war material. This action at length compelled the Supreme Council to interfere and establish a demarcation line, dividing the Klagenfurt basin between the two belligerents. The history of these transactions is related elsewhere,¹ but they are of considerable interest as showing the difficulties that inevitably arise when an armistice line is framed upon the wrong lines, and does not provide for all contingencies. If the Armistice had been properly framed in November 1918, Yugo-slavs and Austrians would not have been openly fighting one another in May 1919, and the Supreme Council would not have been called from more important business to restore peace to the valleys of Carinthia.

(c) *Albania*. No provisions were made in any armistice for occupation of any front here by Inter-Allied forces. The Austro-Hungarian troops rapidly melted away. Albania was ultimately partially occupied by Serb troops in the north and by Italians in the south and centre. Scutari was taken, but ultimately evacuated by the Serbs, and placed under an Inter-Allied military régime under control of a French general.²

The foregoing summary has shown not only the actual defects in the Armistices, but also that their interpretation proceeded on purely military lines, and that disputes only arose when it was thought that military pretexts were being used to subserve political ends. Their aim was to disable Austria and Hungary militarily, and to place parts of their territory in Allied hands, and the rest under strategic control by the Allies, if necessary. But the non-military clauses had no special political or legal importance. There was nothing corresponding to the famous reservation of Article 19 in the German Armistice, which had so profound an effect on the Peace Treaty,³ and, in some sense at any rate, affected the meaning of the pre-Armistice agreement as regards 'damage to civilians'. Speaking generally, the terms were those of unconditional surrender, because neither President Wilson nor the Allies made any offer similar to that made in the

¹ v. Chap. VI, Part 2.

² v. also Chap. V, Part 2.

³ See on this point Vol. I, pp. 424-6, and Vol. V, App. II.

negotiations previous to the German Armistice. Nor did they ever admit, as they explicitly admitted in the German case, that any such pre-Armistice agreement was binding upon them.

But, if from the legal point of view the Allied and Associated Powers were not bound when they began negotiating peace with Austria and with Hungary, their moral obligations were compelling. Many of the 'Fourteen Points' and the other addresses of the President, which formed the legal basis of the German Peace, had specific reference to Austria and to Hungary. A guaranteed peace in the Balkans, Serbian access to the sea, Polish, Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-slav independence, the redemption of Rumanians and Italians by their brethren, the restoration of Serbia, Rumania, and Montenegro, these were specific demands, and could hardly be repudiated as the basis of Treaties affecting the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Other points, though of a more general character, were not confined to Germany alone, such as the reduction of arbitrary power to virtual impotency, the prohibition of barter of peoples like chattels from sovereignty to sovereignty, and the destruction of militarism. Wider propositions still, e.g. such as the price of peace being impartial justice to every nation, the settlement being a 'final one', self-determination being 'an imperative principle of action', that 'It (the world) wishes the final triumph of justice and fair dealing', had no meaning whatever unless they applied to the other defeated Powers as well as to Germany.

5. *Evidence that the Powers accepted the morally binding character of the Wilsonian Principles as a basis for Austrian and Hungarian Treaties.* From the moral, as distinct from the strictly legal, point of view, it would seem therefore that the Wilsonian principles were the basis of negotiations between the Allies and Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. The fact seems to have been recognized by both parties to the negotiation in each case. There was no discussion as to whether pre-armistice agreements or contractual undertakings were being carried out. The defeated Powers made continual appeals to the 'Fourteen Points' and other addresses of President Wilson as being the *basis* of settlement. The Allied replies do not appear to have explicitly affirmed this proposition, but their references to 'justice' and their insistence on the final and irrevocable nature of the principles of settlement would seem to show that they

were not prepared to deny it. Moreover, there is one case in which it would seem that the Allied and Associated Powers were agreed with Austria, at any rate, as early as June 1919, and subsequently with Hungary. That was that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had ceased to exist. This conclusion cannot be questioned after a study of the documents connected with these Treaties and particularly of their preambles. This obviously makes it more difficult to hold that the obligations of the Armistice, which was signed with the Dual Monarchy, continued to have legal validity when applied to the two constituent elements, into which it dissolved, viz. the independent States of Austria and Hungary. But, as has already been pointed out elsewhere,¹ moral obligations at least resulted from this agreement, and subsequent events could not have made these less binding. One document exists which would seem to prove that the Allies in substance admit that the Wilsonian principles are binding. In her Reply of the 12th February 1920, Hungary protested that the inclusion of pensions and separation allowances, etc., as part of reparation in the Hungarian Treaty was 'contrary to the fundamental principles proclaimed by President Wilson'. The Allied and Associated Powers replied that the 'terms of Annex I are identical with those which have been inserted in the Treaties of Versailles, of St. Germain, of Neuilly', and could not, therefore, be altered. Now the Powers had previously declared in their Reply to Germany that they had drawn up 'the Reparation clauses . . . with scrupulous regard for the correspondence leading up to the Armistice of November 11th, 1918'.² They also definitively accepted the Wilsonian principles as the agreed basis of that peace.³ It would seem, therefore, to follow that, on so crucial a point as this, the Powers claimed to have followed the practice of the German Treaty which they themselves declared to be based on the Wilsonian principles.³ It is not easy to escape from the logic of this position. The Allies seem to have been under the strongest moral obligations to apply the principles of President Wilson, and especially the specific points dealing with

¹ Vol. I, p. 373.

² v. Vol. II, pp. 311, 402.

³ e.g. Reply to German Observations by Allied and Associated Powers, 16th June 1919, Vol. II, p. 311; in another passage the Allies refer to the President's speech of 8th January 1918 and 'the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses' as 'the agreed basis of the peace'. See Vol. I, p. 204, Vol. II, p. 7, etc.

Austria-Hungary and the Balkans, to the States and Treaties with which they were concerned. Bulgaria appears to be included under the settlement of the Balkans, so that the Allies were morally bound in dealing with Bulgaria as well as with Austria and Hungary. The Allied and Associated Powers seem to have taken up the position of neither denying nor affirming anything in the way of legal obligation as regards these Treaties. President Wilson explicitly affirmed that he was bound by his own principles in negotiating the Austrian Treaty, though he did not state whether this obligation was legal or moral. While, however, the other Great Powers did not explicitly affirm it, they seem in practice to have accepted the moral obligations implied in the Wilsonian principles. For, in the last resort, peace was universal and intended to be final and based upon 'broad-visioned justice and mercy'. It is obvious that the vision of justice could not be more limited in Sofia, Budapest, or in Vienna than in Berlin.

CHAPTER II

THE ARMISTICES AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE

PART II

BRIEF SKETCH OF THE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THE AUSTRIAN AND HUNGARIAN TREATIES

1. *The four main Problems ; Organization.* A full account of the actual negotiations and principles connected with the Austrian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian Treaties is given elsewhere.¹ But a brief sketch must here be attempted of the problems raised by the Austrian Treaty, as distinct from the German, to which it was only secondary in importance. The actual difficulties of the Conference in producing the Austrian Treaty must be indicated here, for they are connected, not only with Disarmament² and with the attitude of Enemy States, but also with that of Allied ones. Opposition came from the most unexpected quarters and the complexity of the issues even increased as time went on. The problems with regard to the questions of territorial and food distribution, and of reconciliation between wrangling nationalities, were all different from those in the German Treaty. The main problems were :

(a) to provide for the recognition and status of the new ' successor-states ' of Austria-Hungary (§§ 2-4) ;

(b) to provide for the transition between a temporary military occupation, set up under the Armistices, and permanent territorial arrangements under the Treaties (§§ 5-6) ;

(c) to regulate and protect racial minorities under alien domination (§ 7) ;

(d) to feed the starving populations of Central Europe and to repel Bolshevism (§ 8).

The organization of the Conference was, of course, that for

¹ v. Chap. VII.

² v. Chap. III.

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the German Treaty. But it is important to note that the Council of Four did not disperse until it had exercised influence on the Austrian Treaty. On the 25th March the 'Four' formally superseded the 'Ten' as the supreme organ of the Conference. By the middle of April they had decided most of the problems of the German Treaty from the point of view of principle and consequently had a certain amount of time to devote to Austrian problems. The Austrian Draft Treaty was not ready until the 29th May, or handed to the Austrians till the 2nd June. Some of its more important problems had therefore been discussed and pronounced upon by the 'Four', or rather, between the 24th April and the 9th May, by the 'Three'. After the departure of President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George on the 28th June, the Council of Five¹ were entrusted with revising the as yet imperfect draft of the Austrian Treaty. A revised draft was presented on the 20th July and the final Treaty signed on the 10th September. The Bulgarian Treaty was signed on the 27th November 1919. Owing to local disturbances the Hungarian Treaty was not presented till the 15th January 1920 or signed till the 4th June 1920. But the Hungarian frontiers were in fact settled by the 'Four' on the 13th June 1919, and the rest of the Hungarian Treaty was mostly a replica of the Austrian Treaty. Both it and the Bulgarian Treaty were in the main the work of the 'Five'. It is of importance to realize this because the Small Powers were never allowed to take part in the decisions either of the 'Five' or the 'Four'. The organization of the Conference has been described at length elsewhere.² The Reparations Commission was by no means so important for Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, but, in some ways, the Commissions dealing with the Economic Clauses, Commercial Policy, and International Communications were even more important for these three related Treaties than they were for Germany. One conclusion, however, can be suggested without hazard. The Territorial Commissions of the Austrian and related Treaties are of transcendent importance, for they had to deal with questions, not

¹ Mr. Lansing (afterwards Mr. F. L. Polk) (U.S.A.); Mr. Balfour (September Sir Eyre Crowe) (Great Britain); M. Pichon (France); M. Tittoni (November M. Scialoja) (Italy); with M. Clemenceau (France) as President. v. Vol. I, p. 499. The Conference of Ambassadors at Paris ultimately became responsible for the execution not only of the German, but of all other Treaties.

² v. Vol. I, Chap. VII, *passim*.

of paring off provinces, but of creating and constructing new states. They decided on the amount of air, space, and freedom necessary to the life of the new peoples.

2. *Recognition of certain New States ; Position of the Small Powers generally.* On the 18th January the representatives of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia were admitted to the first Plenary Session of the Conference. The formal recognition of their existence by this solemn act was of great importance, but Italian opposition prevented recognition from being extended to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, whose representatives took their seats simply as Serb delegates,¹ and were not recognized until the 1st May. Even so recognition was not everything. Direct participation in decisions was obviously of supreme importance to the four small states who were directly concerned in the break-up of Austria-Hungary, while Greece was vitally interested in the fate of Bulgaria. It cannot be thought surprising, therefore, that, when they realized that they were being excluded from the real decisions, they all made vigorous protests at the second Plenary Session of the 25th January. That these five small states of East Europe would make protests might be assumed as a matter of course, but it is of considerable interest that they were supported by M. Hymans on behalf of Belgium and by Sir Robert Borden on behalf of Canada. Clemenceau handled their claims with some brusqueness and intimated that the Great Powers controlled twelve million soldiers and had won the War. On the 27th January, when the League of Nations Commission was formed, at first Serbia, alone of the five Small Powers, was represented on it but subsequently, after a protest, the other four were admitted to participation on the 5th February, and also to some other important Commissions.² They were also all allowed to state their cases before the Territorial Commissions, though they never took part in their decisions. Though not satisfied they accepted their defeat until, at a later stage, the Minorities Treaties and a scheme for limitation of their armaments drove them into almost open mutiny against the decisions of the Great Powers.

¹ Serbia and Belgium were allowed three representatives, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, and Greece two each (v. Vol. I, p. 498).

² Cf. Vol. I, pp. 257-8, 269 ; Vol. III, pp. 54-5 ; C. T. Thompson, *The Peace Conference Day by Day*, p. 179.

3. *The Settlement of the Territorial Questions.* These were obviously of pressing urgency, for parts of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire were occupied by Italian, Yugo-slav, Czecho-Slovak, and Polish troops, sometimes with the consent, and sometimes against the wishes, of the Great Powers. It was dangerous to allow such occupations to continue in areas in which it was not desired. One of the first actions of the Supreme Council of the Great Powers on the 24th January was therefore the issuing of a 'solemn warning to the world'. They were 'deeply disturbed by the news which comes to them of the many instances in which armed force is being made use of, in many parts of Europe and the East, to gain possession of territory, the rightful claim to which the Peace Conference is to be asked to determine'.

'They deem it their duty to utter a solemn warning that possession gained by force will seriously prejudice the claims of those who use such means . . . If they (the occupying Powers) expect justice, they must refrain from force and place their claims in unclouded good faith in the hands of the Conference of Peace.'¹

This warning meant two things: first, that Powers, like Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, or Yugo-slavia, were not justified in indiscriminate occupation of territory; second, that the Great Powers would determine their claims as speedily as possible. The first problem dealt with was that of Teschen, an Austrian area now occupied partly by Czech and partly by Polish troops, who threatened to come to blows. An Inter-Allied Mission was at once authorized for Teschen (31 Jan. 1919), which finally concluded an agreement with the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments to decide the fate of Teschen by plebiscite.² Another Mission was despatched to Poland on the 29th January and a permanent Inter-Allied Polish Committee sat in Paris from the 1st February onwards; but these were chiefly concerned with negotiating between Germans and Poles or between Poles and Ruthenes, and had only an indirect effect on Austria or Hungary.

Territorial Commissions were speedily appointed for Czecho-Slovak (5th February), for Rumanian and Yugo-slav (1st and

¹ C. T. Thompson, *The Peace Conference Day by Day*, pp. 138-9. He ascribes the warning to the initiative of President Wilson.

² *v. infra*, Chap. VI, Part I.

18th February), and for Greek and Albanian affairs (5th and 24th February). A Central Co-ordinating Territorial Commission was appointed on the 27th March. All these worked with great energy, but certain important territorial decisions involving the disposal of Austro-Hungarian territory did not come within their competence. The western limit of territorial frontier on which the Rumanian and Yugo-slav Commission was commissioned to report was Point 1370 (some 17 kilometres south of Klagenfurt). The question of the frontier in the Tyrol and Trentino, where the Treaty of London had ceded the Brenner frontier to Italy, did not come within the competence of any Commission but was settled by the 'Four', who eventually decided on the Brenner line and prolonged it to connect up with Point 1370. On the 29th May and the 2nd June the frontiers of the New Austria were announced. Austria was reduced to a small and almost wholly German state, leaving three and a half million Germans to Czechoslovakia and to Italy. Two additions were ultimately made to these boundaries. On the 23rd June it was announced that the Klagenfurt Basin would be submitted to a plebiscite between Austria and Yugo-slavia, and on the 20th July it was announced that that part of Hungary, known as German West Hungary,¹ would be ceded to Austria without a plebiscite.

4. *Settlement of the Frontiers of Hungary.* Béla Kun's revolution produced one good effect, for, while it adjourned the Hungarian Treaty *sine die*, it compelled the 'Four' to announce their intentions as to the new frontiers and order Béla Kun to retire behind them. On the 13th June the new permanent frontiers of Hungary were made public, in so far as they bordered upon the territories of Czechoslovakia and Rumania. The Hungarian frontier with Yugo-slavia was not published at this time though already fixed, but the fact made little difference except in one area. In the Bačka and Baranya the Yugo-slav troops were already occupying a line beyond their permanent frontier. On the other hand, the district of the Prekomurje was to go to them but was not in their occupation. On the 1st August it was announced, therefore, that the Yugo-slavs had received permission to occupy this area, which they promptly did. The policy had thus been now announced

¹ Klagenfurt, v. Chap. VI, Part II ; German West Hungary, v. Chap. VI, Part III.

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of making the permanent frontiers of the new Austria and the new Hungary to correspond with the occupation lines actually sanctioned. By the end of August this policy had been applied all round except in a few instances.¹ It had been definitely settled by August 1919, then, in what manner the new frontiers of Austria and Hungary were to be drawn. But it had not been settled how a good deal of old Austro-Hungarian territory lying outside the New Austria and the New Hungary was to be disposed of.

5. *Assignment to different Allies of Territory ceded by Austria and Hungary, but not expressly mentioned in those Treaties.* Certain parts of Austrian and Hungarian territory were definitely ceded to a particular State, as, e. g. the territories of the historic Kingdom of Bohemia and Moravia to Czecho-Slovakia (Austria 53). The cessions to Italy (Art. 36) are less definite because the 'eastern frontier' of Italy is mentioned there as not yet defined. So also with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State to whom much territory was also ceded, though her western boundary with Italy remained uncertain. The net result is given in Austria 91:

'Austria renounces so far as she is concerned in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights and title over the territories which previously belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and which, being situated outside the new frontiers of Austria as described in Article 27, Part II (Frontiers of Austria), have not at present been assigned to any State.

'Austria undertakes to accept the settlement made by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in regard to these territories, particularly in so far as concerns the nationality of the inhabitants.'

This article makes it quite clear that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as a whole had full legal control over all former Austro-Hungarian territory not expressly ceded to an Allied Power or remaining to Austria or to Hungary. But

¹ The Yugo-slavs returned Radkersburg to Austria (17th July 1920). The Pécs-Baja area is still (January 1921) occupied by Yugo-slavs, but should be returned to Hungary on the coming into force of the Hungarian Treaty. The Hungarians still occupy German West Hungary, awarded to Austria on the coming into force of the Hungarian Treaty (v. p. 388 n.). The Poles still hold East Galicia (January 1921) in military occupation. The Yugo-slavs occupied the Bulgarian areas awarded to them under the Treaty as follows: Strumica (17th November 1919) and Tsaribrod (6th November 1920), in the latter case without consent of the Supreme Council. The Béla Kun régime caused the Rumanians to occupy Budapest and other parts of New Hungary (August 1919). But they evacuated Budapest by the 18th November 1919 and all other Hungarian territory by March 1920.

in practice Inter-Allied forces could not occupy or administer territories thus ceded to them. At Teschen there was one danger, a quarrel between Czechs and Poles, only bridged over with difficulty by the tact of Inter-Allied representatives. In Galicia a great problem arose between Ruthenes and Poles, and the latter showed no disposition to submit to the Supreme Council. On the 25th June 1919 the Supreme Council decided to give to East Galicia (the ethnically Ruthene part of Galicia) the right of self-determination, but permitted the Poles to occupy it in the military sense.¹ On the 8th May 1919 the Council assigned the western, or more ethnically Polish part of Galicia, to the Polish Republic. But East Galicia, with its 3,200,000 Ruthenes, still (January 1921) remains unassigned, though the Polish military occupation continues.¹ In the eastern corner of Czecho-Slovakia similar conditions occurred, for in this area were some quarter of a million Ruthenes. Ultimately this Ruthene area became an autonomous province of Czecho-Slovakia, but no elections have been held there and military rule continues.

A really serious crisis arose between Rumania and Yugoslavia over the frontier in the Banat. That frontier was fixed at the same time as the Austrian Treaty, i. e. on the 2nd June. But it was a very difficult task to persuade the Serbs to retire from Temesvár, which they occupied, and to induce each nation to deliver up some of its co-nationals to another Power and to surrender districts endeared by historic memories. Fortunately General Delobit and some French troops with their Headquarters at Velika(Nagy)-Kikinda, who had been keeping watch on Béla Kun, were able to arrange the matter. The Serbs delivered up Temesvár to the French, who handed it over to the Rumanians. By the beginning of August General Delobit could congratulate himself on having traced the frontier between Rumanians and Yugo-slavs and induced both parties to accept it peaceably. Feeling on both sides waxed strong but had gradually subsided before the end of 1919.

6. *The Treaty relative to certain frontiers, 10th August 1920.* It remained for the Principal Powers formally to give up their authority and control over areas belonging to the Old Dual Monarchy and hitherto unassigned. Nearly all such questions were finally regulated, formally and officially, by the Treaty

¹ v. Vol. I, pp. 335-9.

regarding certain frontiers of Poland, Rumania, the Czecho-Slovak and Serb-Croat-Slovene States, signed at Sèvres on the 10th August 1920 between those states and France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan. Subject to certain other agreements subsequently to be made, the Principal Powers now assigned in full sovereignty certain territories of old Austria-Hungary, not otherwise mentioned, to Poland, to Czecho-Slovakia, to Rumania and to Yugo-slavia respectively.¹ Poland received West Galicia with a slightly readjusted southern boundary. Rumania received the Bukovina, and defined her frontiers with Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-slavia. The eastern frontier of Rumania was not included, and that was settled later by another decision and Treaty (*v.* § 8). The whole northern and eastern frontiers of Yugo-slavia were defined, except in the Klagenfurt area, which awaited the result of a plebiscite. The Yugo-slav frontiers with Italy and Albania remained undefined. Czecho-Slovakia received territory on the basis of the award of the 28th July 1920 with reference to Teschen, Orava, and Zips, together with the autonomous province of Ruthenia. Beneš hailed this Treaty as the 'Magna Carta' of his State, and it was ratified with enthusiasm by the Czecho-Slovak Chamber on the 28th January 1921.² The Treaty will become effective at the same time as the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties come into force.

But the gravest difficulty—one of the most serious of the whole Conference—was that of establishing the frontier between Yugo-slavs and Italians. This was not settled at the close of the Conference; it was not even settled until the 1st May 1919 that a Serb-Croat-Slovene State existed. Italy occupied with her military forces the whole of the Treaty of London line in Gorizia and Istria and in Dalmatia, while she had an enormously preponderant force among the Inter-Allied detachments at Fiume. This difficulty was not settled by the Conference at all. It led, as is told elsewhere, to President Wilson's famous published statement of the 23rd April 1919,

¹ The United States did not sign. Rumania acceded to it the 28th October 1920. Yugo-slavia has yet to sign it.

² The 'New States' treaty, similarly dealing with economic relations of territories transferred from the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, was presented on the 10th August 1920 to Italy, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, and Yugo-slavia for signature. The last has yet (January 1921) to sign it.

to the absence of the Italian Delegation from the Conference for some weeks, to the escapades of D'Annunzio, and was only finally settled by the Treaty of Rapallo as the result of direct negotiation between the Yugo-slavs and Italians on the 12th November 1920.

7. *The Minorities Treaties and the Small Powers.* The problem of protecting racial minorities under the rule of alien powers was a particularly difficult question and one specially calculated to alarm or irritate the Small Powers. Its full treatment is reserved for Volume V, but it was essential to get the New States to sign special treaties of adherence to various special conventions as, e.g. Postal Conventions or Industrial Property, general conventions concerned with International Communications, etc. The Great Powers felt it essential also to protect the rights of racial minorities by means of the League of Nations, and to get the New States, to whom they were handed, to admit this principle. The question first arose in April 1919 with Poland and in connexion with the German Treaty. A Draft Treaty was also prepared with Czecho-Slovakia, these two states being wholly new ones. In May the 'Four' decided to extend this principle to the other states of South-Eastern Europe, which were not new but which were receiving large accessions of territory, i.e. Rumania, Yugo-slavia, and Greece, and clauses were inserted to that effect in the Draft Austrian Treaty of the 29th May. The result was a passionate protest from the Small Powers in which Brătianu took the lead on behalf of Rumania, followed by Poland and Yugo-slavia. Ultimately Poland signed the German Treaty, and Czecho-Slovakia the Austrian Treaty, which embodied their respective obligations (Art. 57).¹ But Yugo-slavia put up a strong resistance and refused to sign the Austrian Treaty on that account, and Rumania's opposition was even stronger.

¹ Austria. Art. 57: 'The Czecho-Slovak State accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers such provision as may be deemed necessary by these Powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of that State who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion.'

'The Czecho-Slovak State further accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as these Powers may deem necessary to protect freedom of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of other nations.' The Serb-Croat-Slovene State is bound by a similar Article (51), and Rumania by Art. 60. The Polish Article is Art. 98 of the German Treaty, v. Vol. III, pp. 163-4.

Ultimately, as is related elsewhere, Yugo-slavia was persuaded to sign on the 5th December, Rumania finally giving way on the 9th December 1919. Similar obligations on the part of Greece were embodied in Art. 46 of the Bulgarian Treaty, which she signed along with the other Powers on the 27th November 1919.

The reasons of the wrath shown by the Small Powers on the 31st May are not difficult to fathom. They had not been, as they thought, sufficiently consulted in the framing of the Austrian Treaty; they certainly had not received all the territorial or other concessions they desired. They regarded the Minorities Treaties as unfair because in the case of Italy the Powers contented themselves with recording a verbal declaration by Italy that she would respect the rights of her racial minorities,¹ while they forced the Small Powers to sign Treaties to that effect. Also immediately afterwards, on the 5th June, the Poles, Rumanians, and Yugo-slavs had to protest to the 'Four' against a scheme for limiting the armaments of their respective countries, which the Great Powers were considering.² The Small Powers, not perhaps unnaturally, considered both these actions as an attempt to infringe their sovereignty, and the result has certainly been unfortunate in causing them to regard the League of Nations with some suspicion and distrust. In the next volume, when the story is more fully told, it will be seen that, on grounds both of necessity and of right, the Great Powers had grounds for insisting upon these Treaties. Their ultimate right to do so consisted in the fact that the territories which they were handing over to the Small Powers belonged to the Great Powers by right of conquest. In ceding them to the Small they therefore considered themselves authorized to demand safeguards for those inhabitants of a race or religion different from the predominant one.

8. *Food Policy and Bolshevism.* Bolshevism offered difficulties in connexion with the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties, for Bolshevik Russia touched Poland and Rumania, and threatened Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary, and Bolshevism had to be taken into account in actually framing these

¹ v. quotation, Chap. V, Part I, § 2 (b). There were some reasons and precedents for the exception which will be related in Vol. V, Chap. II.

² v. Chap. III, and cf. C. T. Thompson, *The Peace Conference Day by Day*, pp. 390-1.

Treaties. It is manifest that the international system laid down by the Conference for the settlement of Austria and Hungary was, in a sense, quite revolutionary, for it uprooted old-established landmarks and substituted national for prescriptive rights or dynastic principles. Bolshevism, by being still more revolutionary, threatened to disrupt the new system altogether. It hoped to substitute an international revolution for national ones, and thereby to throw all East Europe into chaos. In East Europe the Conference sought to protect the new States against these influences by moral rather than by material means. For a time, indeed, French and Greek divisions aided in protecting the Rumanian frontier. But, in general, the policy followed in these areas was that indicated by an epigram attributed to President Wilson: 'Bolshevism cannot be stopped by force but can be stopped by food.' The magnificent work of the Hoover Relief Organization¹ and of many private relief agencies in Central Europe is described elsewhere. There can be no doubt that there were strongly Bolshevik tendencies at work in certain parts of Poland and Austria and even of Rumania and Yugo-slavia, and only the prompt provision of food and clothing drove famine, cold, and Bolshevism from the door together. In Hungary alone did Bolshevism actually break out under Béla Kun (21st March), who sought connexion with Russia. The Allies dealt with him by isolating and blockading the area involved until ultimately the Rumanians crushed the movement by occupying Budapest (8th August). It was this service probably which tended to make the Supreme Council acquiesce first in the union of Bessarabia to Rumania (9th March 1920), and last formally to recognize Rumanian sovereignty over Bessarabia in a Treaty signed on the 28th October 1920. During the whole period of the permanent Session of the Conference it had been hoped that some ultimate government for Russia would be found, which would then be consulted as to the fate of Bessarabia. When this hope disappeared the Supreme Council decided to recognize the facts and, in so far as Bolshevik Russia was concerned, disputed her title to dispose of this outlying province of the

¹ v. Vol. I, pp. 304-8. According to a statement by Mr. Hoover, 1st August 1919, 'They had been able to feed 200 millions. . . . They had expended under the jurisdiction of the Council more than 800 millions of dollars alone.' - *The Times*, 2nd August 1919.

Russian Empire. These decisions, however, were, in both cases, taken without consent of the United States, and must be regarded, therefore, as a later decision of the Supreme Council and not as a decision of the Peace Conference as such, which terminated its permanent sessions on the 20th January 1920.

To sum up, the difficulties of negotiating the Austrian Treaty, which served as the model for the Bulgarian and Hungarian, should be regarded in the following light. The Great Powers worked, always in fear of Bolshevism, against time and against difficulties to which there was no parallel in the German Treaty. For against the Germans in the west at any rate force could always have been used. But against Austria or Hungary force could either not be used or could only be used by giving *carte blanche* to one or two Allied Powers, Great or Small, whose particular claims would necessarily have been enhanced if they were called upon to perform service for the Conference as a whole. Actual frontier disputes between the different Allies, between Poles and Czechs, Yugo-slavs and Italians, Yugo-slavs and Rumanians, greatly increased the difficulties. For while enemies might be 'blockaded' into submission, and the threat proved effective in securing the German evacuation of the Baltic States, the process was only once tried against a friendly state, and then was not persisted in.¹ Such a policy could hardly have been continued towards a friendly power beyond a certain point, a fact well understood by the Small Powers. Thus the Conference encountered a more stubborn and united resistance from the Small Powers at certain critical moments in the Austrian Treaty than it had encountered from them in connexion with the German. Such resistance was more embarrassing, because more unexpected, and more difficult to overcome than the resistance of the enemy. On the whole, the signature of the Austrian and Bulgarian Treaties, and the adherence of Yugo-slavia and Rumania to them before the end of 1919, was a signal triumph for the Conference. For this success ensured the signature of the Hungarian Treaty and had been won by moral suasion.

¹ v. Vol. I, pp. 335-8.

CHAPTER III

DISARMAMENT

PART I

THE TREATY WITH AUSTRIA (TREATY OF ST. GERMAIN): THE MILITARY TERMS

A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. *Armistice of Villa Giusti, 3rd November 1918.* After the Armistice of Villa Giusti on the 3rd November 1918, the terms of which were even more severe than those of the Armistice of the 11th November with Germany, the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was complete. It broke up into three separate States, Austria, Hungary, and Czecho-Slovakia; large portions of the former Empire were also occupied by the Italian, Franco-Serbian, Polish, and Rumanian Armies. As Czecho-Slovakia was regarded as a State friendly to the Entente, the only States with which it was necessary to conclude Peace Treaties were Austria and Hungary.

Austria was in a desperate condition. The area under Austrian administration was no greater than that of a third-rate Power; her Army, demobilized under the terms of the Armistice, had melted away, what remained of it was undisciplined and unreliable, and she was quite unable to feed her population without outside assistance. No military danger was therefore to be apprehended from Austria, and the only fear was that, her people, in their despair, might fall into a state of anarchy and Bolshevism. Although Austria's economic condition demanded an early settlement, the necessity of concluding the Treaty with Germany was much greater, and as Austria's military strength was negligible, the Council of Four were justified in concentrating on the settlement with Germany, leaving the Treaty with Austria to be drawn up immediately after presentation of the first draft of the German Treaty.

2. *The drafting of the Treaty with Austria.* Towards the end of April, the military terms of the German Treaty being

ready, drafts of the military terms to be presented to Austria and Hungary were prepared, and completed by the 5th May.

Immediately before presentation to the Germans of the German Treaty on the 10th May, the Council of Four decided to complete the Austrian Treaty next, and issued orders accordingly. Owing to differences between M. Clemenceau and Marshal Foch, which have been revealed by the latter, the question of the military terms to be imposed on Austria was referred to the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council which sat at Versailles.¹ This involved a change of procedure, as the framing of the German Military terms had been carried out by Marshal Foch's Committee, the British share of which had been done by the Military Section at the Hotel Astoria. The new arrangement in reality absolved the British Military Section from responsibility for the military terms of the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties, but as they had already prepared drafts of these, the procedure, as far as the British were concerned, did not vary greatly. The only real difference was that Major-General Sir Charles Sackville-West, British Military Representative of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, acted as Senior British Representative in the discussions on the military terms of the Treaty; in the case of the German Treaty, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had been the Chief British Military Representative, but of course General Sackville-West acted throughout under Sir Henry Wilson's instructions.

On the 8th May, orders were received from the Central Secretariat of the Council of Four to draw up the military, naval, and aeronautical terms of the Austrian Treaty. Immediately on receipt of these orders, General Sackville-West circulated to the Allied Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council the British draft of the military terms. On the 11th May the Supreme War Council met at Versailles to discuss this draft, which formed the framework of the Austrian, and later on of the Hungarian, Treaty.

The British Military Section regarded Austria in quite a different light from that in which they viewed Germany,

¹ It has been stated in the press on good authority that Marshal Foch absented himself from these discussions to mark his disapproval of the abandonment of the principle of compulsory military service in the German Treaty.

and considered it necessary to make this clear in the Austrian Peace Treaty. It was held that, although the German military terms might to some extent serve as a general guide, it was of importance to show the despairing Austrian people that they were regarded with no special disfavour, and that, although the general principles of the Austrian military terms must remain the same as those of the German Treaty, they had been framed on somewhat different lines. Such clemency was all the more necessary in view of the disordered condition of Central Europe at that time; the Soviet misrule in Bavaria had only just been brought to an end, whilst Béla Kun had seized the reins of power in Hungary.

3. *The general principles of the Military Terms.* The main principles which guided the British Military Section in their draft of the military clauses of the Austrian Treaty (which was not materially altered by the Supreme War Council at Versailles, or by the Council of Four) were the following :

- (a) To continue the process of a general limitation of armaments, begun by the terms imposed on Germany.
- (b) To leave Austria with a sufficient Military Force to guarantee internal order and security, at the lowest possible cost.

In general, the military clauses were bound to follow the same lines as those of the German Treaty, i.e. to enforce early demobilization and disarmament, to abolish universal compulsory military service, and to provide guarantees against future war and aggression. Whilst keeping to these general principles, the draft aimed at making the terms vary from the German ones, and at showing that Austria was being treated on different lines. With this object in view, the proposal was made to allow Austria to combine both Colour and Reserve service, as she could not be allowed to retain compulsory service. Economy was essential, and a small Army would cost much less if a large proportion of the troops were permitted to go to the Reserve. If men only served for six years with the Colours and during that time learned a trade, their subsequent employment, either in that trade or in Government service, would be comparatively easy. By this plan it was hoped to reduce both the size and the cost of standing Armies. As regards Austria, it was originally proposed that she should be

allowed an Army of 40,000 men, of which only some 20,000 should be with the Colours, the remainder being in the Reserve.

B. THE AUSTRIAN MILITARY TERMS IN DETAIL

4. *The first Meeting of the Supreme War Council, 11th May 1919.* On the 11th May the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council met in the Council Chamber at Versailles to consider the military terms of the Treaty to be imposed on Austria. The British draft, which had for at least two days been in the hands of the Foreign Representatives, had been examined, and was now taken article by article. There were naturally a number of points on which discussion was inevitable, as the draft varied considerably from the terms of the German Treaty.¹

5. *Chapter I. General Considerations.* The first article of the British draft (Art. 118² of the Austrian Treaty) was challenged by General Belin, owing to the fact that a period of three months was fixed for the demobilization of the existing Military Forces in Austria, instead of two months, as in the German Treaty. This objection was, however, withdrawn in view of the state of disorder then reigning in Austria, and the British wording was accepted in full.

It is noteworthy that, in the original British draft, as accepted by the Military Representatives at Versailles, the demobilization of Austria's Military Forces was to take place 'within 3 months of the *signature* of the Treaty'. This was subsequently altered by the Drafting Committee, to 'within 3 months from the *coming into force* of the present Treaty'. This amendment was of course necessary in the legal sense, and practically unavoidable.³ However, it was certainly a dis-

¹ The following were the Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers:

<i>France.</i>	<i>Great Britain.</i>	<i>Italy.</i>	<i>United States of America.</i>
General Belin.	Major-General Hon. Sir Charles Sackville-West.	General Cavallero.	Brigadier-General P. D. Lochridge (acting for General Tasker-Bliss).

² ART. 118: 'Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the military forces of Austria shall be demobilized to the extent prescribed hereinafter.'

³ It might perhaps be argued that the obligations of Austria, as regards

advantage in the military sense that much precious time elapsed between signature and final ratification.

The second Article (Art. 119¹ of the Treaty) met with strong criticism from the French and Italians, who desired the retention of universal compulsory military service in Austria. The American Representative sided with the British, and eventually parallel recommendations were made. The main arguments put forward by the French and Italians were the question of cost, and the difficulty of raising an Army by voluntary service, as well as the general principle of universal service, which all Continental nations believe to be preferable to the system of a small highly-paid standing Army.

The American and British Representatives were mainly influenced by the fact that a voluntary service Army had been imposed on Germany, and that, unless the same principle was adopted in the case of the other enemy countries, it would be difficult to insist on so severe a penalty in the case of Germany.

When the question was referred to the Council of Four, they at once rejected the French and Italian recommendation with regard to universal compulsory military service, and adopted the British text. Thus the first two Articles, i.e. Chapter I of the military terms of the Peace Treaty, were accepted practically unchanged by the Military Representatives and by the Council of Four.²

6. *Chapter II. Effectives and Cadres.* Chapter II of the Military terms deals with Effectives and Cadres. The first two Articles of Chapter II, as drafted by the British Military Section, corresponded with Art. 160 of the Treaty with Germany, though important changes had of course been made regarding strengths, Commands, and other details.

The British draft of the first Article of this Chapter (Art. 120 of the Treaty) was accepted without amendment by the Supreme War Council, but was subsequently altered in certain respects by the Council of Four. The most important of these changes

demobilization or selling war material (Art. 131), dated from her ratification of the Treaty, but, in that case, she was encouraged to delay it as long as possible.

¹ ART. 119: 'Universal compulsory military service shall be abolished in Austria. The Austrian Army shall in future only be constituted and recruited by means of voluntary enlistment.'

² The French and Italian representatives raised the question of compulsory service again in Art. 9 (Art. 126 of the Treaty), but with the same result.

was the reduction of the strength of the Austrian Army from 40,000 to 30,000 ; the figure of 40,000 had been fixed at a time of great unrest, when Austria was threatened by internal troubles, and by the Bolshevik régime of Béla Kun in Hungary. In considering the strength of the force to be allowed to Austria, it must be remembered that the idea was for only about half of the total to be with the Colours, the remainder being with the Reserve. At the same time there is no doubt that, in view of the size of the new Austrian State, and of its impoverished condition, an Army of 40,000 would be excessive in normal times, and there can be no quarrel with the decision of the Supreme Council to reduce Austria's military strength to 30,000 men.

Other alterations subsequently made in this Article were :

- (a) The creation of maximum and minimum figures between which the Effectives¹ of Units were to be maintained.
- (b) The establishment of a percentage of officers and N.C.Os. to the total number of Effectives with the Colours, as opposed to the fixing of a maximum number, as had been done in the case of the German Treaty.
- (c) The fixing of a proportion of machine guns, guns and howitzers per 1,000 men with the Colours.
- (d) In the original British draft the first paragraph read : 'The total number of *Effectives and Reservists* in the Army of Austria must never exceed 40,000 men, including officers and establishment of depôts.' This was subsequently altered as follows : 'The total number of *military forces* in the Austrian Army shall not exceed 30,000 men, including officers and depôt troops.'²

As regards (a), (b) and (c), these alterations were of no serious importance ; in fact they introduced amendments which were quite sound, both in principle and in practice. On the other hand, these changes could have been inserted with equal ease in the Tables, and in any case, the original numbers were hardly of sufficient importance to justify the amendments. As regards (d), the amendment, presumably due to the Drafting Committee, resulted in subsequent objections from the Aus-

¹ i. e. establishments.

² Italics not in original.

trians, who argued that the wording of this Clause entitled them to keep a force of 30,000 men with the Colours, *in addition* to Reservists. Although there was in reality no justification for such a demand on the part of the Austrians, the Military Commission of Control was only able to settle this point after a good deal of trouble. This would have been avoided if the original wording had been adhered to.

The second Article (Art. 121 of the Austrian Treaty) was adopted in full by the Military Representatives, but was subsequently modified by the Drafting Commission. The original draft contemplated the establishment of an Army Corps Headquarters, as the highest formation in the Austrian Army. This has since been deleted, and under the terms of the present Treaty, no formation higher than a Division is allowed.

The third Article of the original British draft of Chapter II was approved by the Military Representatives, and was eventually accepted without alteration as Art. 122 of the Peace Treaty.¹

The next Article, based on Article 162 of the German Treaty, was adopted with a minor alteration, and was finally incorporated as Article 123 of the Austrian Treaty.²

At the suggestion of General Cavallero, a Clause was inserted at the end of Chapter II, to forbid any formation of troops not included in the Tables of Establishments, annexed to this Section of the Treaty. This addition met with the approval of the British, as it rendered certain the abolition of the *Volkswehr*, which was not under proper Government control. This Article was accepted by the Council of Four and became Article 124 of the Treaty. It runs as follows: 'Every

¹ ART. 122: 'All measures of mobilization, or appertaining to mobilization, are forbidden.

'In no case must formations, administrative services or staffs include supplementary cadres.

'The carrying out of any preparatory measures with a view to requisitioning animals or other means of military transport is forbidden.'

² ART. 123: 'The number of gendarmes, customs officers, foresters, members of the local or municipal police or other like officials may not exceed the number of men employed in a similar capacity in 1913 within the boundaries of Austria as fixed by the present Treaty.

'The number of these officials shall not be increased in the future except as may be necessary to maintain the same proportion between the number of officials and the total population in the localities or municipalities which employ them.

'These officials, as well as officials employed in the railway service, must not be assembled for the purpose of taking part in any military exercises.'

formation of troops not included in the Tables annexed to this Section is forbidden. Such other formations as may exist in excess of the 30,000 effectives authorised shall be suppressed within the period laid down by Article 118' (i.e. three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty).

7. *Chapter III. Recruiting and Military Training.* The eighth Article (Art. 125 of the Treaty) in the original draft corresponds to Article 175 of the German Treaty. It does not differ in any important degree from the German text, except that Austrian officers must undertake the obligation to serve up to the age of 40 years only, instead of 45, as in the case of the German Treaty. This Article was adopted by the Military Representatives, with a small amendment proposed by General Lochridge. The Council of Four eventually accepted it without alteration.¹

As has already been stated (Article 126²) the question of compulsory military service was once more raised on the ninth Article, but without result. The Article was of importance, as it meant the adoption of the principle of the combination of Colour service with Reserve service, a concession which had not been made to the Germans. This principle was subsequently applied to the Hungarian Treaty.

8. *Chapter IV. Schools, Educational Establishments, Military Clubs, and Societies.* The tenth Article was slightly amended by the Military Representatives, but was eventually restored by the Council of Four, the terms differing in only a small degree from the original draft, and became Article 127³ of the Treaty.

¹ v. *supra*, § 5, pp. 144-5.

² ART. 126: 'The period of enlistment for non-commissioned officers and privates must be for a total period of not less than 12 consecutive years, including at least 6 years with the colours.'

'The proportion of men discharged before the expiration of the period of their enlistment for reasons of health or as a result of disciplinary measures or for any other reasons must not in any year exceed one-twentieth of the total strength fixed by Article 120. If this proportion is unavoidably exceeded, the resulting shortage must not be made good by fresh enlistments.'

³ ART. 127: 'The number of students admitted to attend the courses in military schools shall be strictly in proportion to the vacancies to be filled in the cadres of officers. The students and the cadres shall be included in the effectives fixed by Article 120.'

'Consequently all military schools not required for this purpose shall be abolished.'

ART. 128: 'Educational establishments, other than those referred to in Article 127, as well as all sporting and other clubs, must not occupy themselves with any military matters.'

The eleventh Article of the original British draft was accepted without amendment by the Military Representatives, but was eventually cut down by the Council of Four and the Drafting Committee, to the rather emasculated terms of Article 128 of the Treaty.¹

Another Article, originally drafted by the British Military Section, and accepted by the Military Representatives of Versailles, was to the effect that the teaching of gymnastics was, in all schools and educational establishments, to be devoid of instruction or practice in the use of arms, or training for war. This Article, the introduction of which was based on experience derived from the Prussian measures between 1807 and 1813, was subsequently cut out by higher authority.

Eventually, therefore, Chapter IV was reduced to the six lines included in Articles 127 and 128 of the Treaty,¹ which correspond to Articles 176 and 177 of the Treaty of Versailles.

9. *Chapter V. Armament, Munitions and Material, Fortifications.* The thirteenth and fourteenth Articles of the original draft were adopted without amendment by the Military Representatives. Slight alterations were eventually made in these two Articles, but Articles 129 and 130 of the Treaty only differ slightly from the original draft. The fifteenth and sixteenth Articles were accepted by the Military Representatives with quite minor alterations. Subsequently the second paragraph of Article 132 of the Treaty was inserted, with the object of permitting the manufacture of sporting weapons in Austria. These two Articles, 131 and 132 of the Treaty, were eventually accepted without alteration by the Council of Four.

When Article 17 (Article 133 of the Treaty²) of the British draft came up for discussion, General Cavallero asked for an explanation in regard to the statement that all arms, munitions, and war material were to be handed over to the Allied and Associated Governments. He pointed out that the Italian Government was anxious for all this material to be handed over direct to the Italians, and considered it of importance to have

¹ v. p. 148, n. 3.

² ART. 133: 'Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, all arms, munitions, and war material, including any kind of anti-aircraft material, of whatever origin, existing in Austria in excess of the quantity authorized shall be handed over to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

'Delivery shall take place at such points in Austrian territory as may be appointed by the said Powers, who shall also decide on the disposal of such material.'

this laid down in the Treaty. The other Military Representatives found themselves unable to agree with this point of view, and eventually the Article was adopted with the addition of a paragraph, to the effect that the surrender of the material was to be effected at points in Austrian territory, selected by the Allied Governments, who would decide as to the disposal of the material. General Cavallero made a reservation to the effect that, in his opinion, the war material in question should be surrendered to the Italian Government, on behalf of the Allied and Associated Governments, who would decide as to its disposal.

When this Clause was considered by the Council of Four, they decided to accept the draft as approved by the majority of the Military Representatives, and rejected the Italian reservation.

In practice this decision has led to considerable trouble and delay. Ever since the Commission of Control for Austria entered upon its functions, the Italians have been trying to separate war material, which should have been handed over under the Armistice, from other material, with the result that, five months after the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, the work of separating the Armistice material from that to be surrendered under the terms of the Austrian Treaty had still not been completed (December 1920).

The eighteenth and nineteenth Articles (Articles 134 and 135 of the Peace Treaty) were adopted by the Military Representatives without alteration, except that the word *Flammenwerfer* was added in the first line of Article 135. These Articles were subsequently accepted by the Council of Four without further amendment.

10. *Tables of authorized Establishments and Armament.* In the original British draft three Tables were inserted at the end of the Military Terms, giving the establishment and maximum strength of effectives and reservists to be allowed for staffs and various formations, with the stipulation that these tabular statements were not to constitute a fixed establishment, but that the figures therein contained represented maximum figures, which must not be exceeded. They also laid down the maximum armament and stocks of artillery, trench mortar, and small arm ammunition authorized for Austria. These Tables were drawn up on exactly the same lines as those of

the German Peace Treaty, and were passed at the meeting of the 11th May by the Military Representatives, practically without comment, the only addition of importance being to allow the Austrians to keep mountain guns in place of field guns, if desired.

These Tables were subsequently amended in certain respects.

- (a) In Table I the establishment of an Army Corps Headquarters was cancelled, leaving the Division as the highest authorized formation in the Austrian Army.
- (b) In Table II, giving the establishment of a Cavalry Division, a group of motor machine guns and armoured cars was added.
- (c) The composition and maximum effectives were fixed for a Mixed Brigade, in a new Table III.
- (d) A Table IV was added, fixing the minimum effectives of all units in the Austrian Army, whatever organization should be adopted.

These amendments were not important, but may be said to constitute an improvement on the original draft.

- (e) Table V laid down the maximum authorized armaments and munition supplies, on a basis different from that proposed in the original British draft, and from that fixed in the German Treaty. A proportion of rifles, machine guns, trench mortars and guns or howitzers, per 1,000 men, was laid down, with a corresponding amount of munitions.

It is doubtful if the innovation introduced as the result of Table V¹ is an improvement. The whole object of the Treaty

¹ TABLE V. 'Maximum authorized Armaments and Munition Supplies.

<i>Material.</i>	<i>Quantity for 1,000 Men.</i>	<i>Amount of Munitions per Arm (rifles, guns, &c.).</i>
Rifles or carbines *	1,150	500 rounds
Machine guns, heavy or light	15	10,000 ..
Trench mortars, light	2	1,000 ..
Trench mortars, medium		500 ..
Guns or howitzers (field or mountain)	3	1,000 ..

* Automatic rifles or carbines are counted as light machine guns.

No heavy guns, i.e. of a calibre greater than 105 mm., is (*sic*) authorized, with the exception of the normal armament of fortified places.

was to enable Austria to maintain a force sufficient to keep order, whilst costing as little money as possible. With the limitation imposed by Table V, the amount of war material authorized for the State of Austria, would be barely enough if the full number of 30,000 troops were maintained. If, on the other hand, for reasons of economy, the Austrian Government decided to keep a smaller Army than 30,000, whilst relying on the patriotism of the people to bring the Army up to this number in case of serious need, there would be a shortage of arms and war material in the country, which could not be supplied at short notice. The alteration would seem, therefore, to have been unnecessary and hardly fair to Austria.

11. *Amendments made by the Council of Four.* When the Council of Four met to consider the military terms of the Treaty, they at once objected to the strength of 40,000, which had been proposed for the Austrian Army. The main reason for their attitude was the fact that, whereas Germany had only been allowed to maintain an Army of 100,000 for a population of fully 60 millions, Austria would have 40,000 for a population of about $6\frac{1}{2}$ millions. On this analogy, it was pointed out that Germany should have been allowed an Army of nearly 400,000 men. After some discussion, in the course of which it was pointed out that the internal state of Austria, and the existence of a large city like Vienna, demanded an armed force of a larger size in proportion than that required for Germany, it was decided to reduce the strength of the Austrian Army to 30,000 men. At the same time the question of limiting the armies of the other minor Powers, both enemy and allied, was raised; ¹ although proposals were made, the difficulty of such a proceeding was realized, and it was eventually settled merely to lay down maximum strength for the armies of the enemy Powers, leaving other reductions to take place when the enemy States had complied with the conditions of peace imposed upon them.

With this exception, few alterations were required by the Council of Four, and the Supreme War Council met again on the 7th June at Versailles, to settle upon the wording of a new draft, embodying the amendments of the Council of Four. The

¹ Some details of the scheme are given in C. T. Thompson, *Peace Conference Day by Day*, New York, 1920, pp. 390-1; v. also this volume, p. 138.

necessary alterations were rapidly made, and the new draft was then accepted by the Council of Four. On the 16th June the military terms were finally approved, and the General Clauses in connexion with the Military, Naval, and Air Clauses of the Treaty were accepted on the same date.

12. *Presentation of the Treaty and Austrian Counter-proposals.* The Second Draft Treaty of Peace was presented to the Austrians on the 20th July, after the signature of the German Treaty. The Austrians were undoubtedly surprised at the general severity of the peace terms offered them, as they had expected more lenient treatment. Their objections to the military terms were mainly concerned with the abolition of universal compulsory military service. It was only natural that they should want to retain universal service, which is regarded by every Continental nation as essential to the welfare and efficient Government of the State. The main argument employed by the Austrians was, however, that the cost of a voluntary Army would be so great as to be practically prohibitive, and that they could not possibly afford to pay for an Army raised by methods other than those of compulsion. The Austrian counter-proposals, of which this was the only really important one, were discussed at a meeting of the Military Representatives, held in the Council Chamber at Versailles, on the morning of the 11th August 1919. At this meeting the Italian Representative again advocated the alteration of Article 119, forbidding compulsory military service in Austria, and was supported by General Belin, though the latter recognized that the question had already been settled in principle by the Supreme Council. After some discussion, it was decided to reject the Austrian counter-proposals practically *in toto*.

13. *Inter-Allied Commissions of Control.* Articles 149–55, dealing with the work of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, were drawn up on exactly the same lines as Articles 203–10 of the German Treaty. The only difference of importance is that it was not definitely laid down in the Austrian Treaty that Austrian guns, rifles, and war material were to be destroyed; Article 153 of the Austrian Treaty, however, mentions supervision of ‘the works of destruction, and rendering things useless, . . . which are to be carried out in accordance with the present Treaty’.

14. *General Clauses.* Articles 156–9 contain the conditions to be imposed upon Austria under this heading.¹ Articles 156, 157, and 159 correspond to Articles 211, 212, and 213 of the German Treaty. Article 158 of the Austrian Treaty corresponds to Article 179 of the German Treaty. It will be seen that, in the Austrian Treaty, the accrediting to foreign countries of Military, Naval or Air Missions, etc., and the enrolment in foreign armies of Austrian nationals are included under the heading of General Clauses, whereas this question was dealt with under the Military Clauses of the German Treaty. The procedure adopted for the Austrian Treaty seems the more logical of the two, as Naval and Air questions are involved, as well as matters of purely military interest.

C.. EXECUTION OF THE TERMS OF THE AUSTRIAN TREATY

15. *The Delays in Final Ratification by the Allies.* Of those who witnessed the signature of the Austrian Treaty on the 10th September 1919, few imagined that it would not come into force for upwards of ten months. To the ordinary

¹

SECTION V.—GENERAL CLAUSES.

ART. 156 (152): 'After the expiration of a period of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Austrian laws must have been modified and shall be maintained by the Austrian Government in conformity with this Part of the present Treaty.'

'Within the same period all the administrative or other measures relating to the execution of this Part must have been taken by the Austrian Government.'

ART. 157 (153): 'The following portions of the Armistice of November 8, 1918: paragraphs 2 and 3 of Chapter I (Military Clauses), paragraphs 2, 3, 6 of Chapter I of the annexed Protocol (Military Clauses), remain in force so far as they are not inconsistent with the above stipulations.'

ART. 158: 'Austria undertakes, from the coming into force of the present Treaty, not to accredit nor to send to any foreign country any military, naval or air mission, nor to allow any such mission to leave her territory; Austria further agrees to take the necessary measures to prevent Austrian nationals from leaving her territory to enlist in the Army, Navy or Air service of any foreign Power, or to be attached to such Army, Navy or Air service for the purpose of assisting in the military, naval or air training thereof, or generally for the purpose of giving military, naval or air instruction in any foreign country.'

'The Allied and Associated Powers undertake, so far as they are concerned, that from the coming into force of the present Treaty they will not enrol in nor attach to their armies or naval or air forces any Austrian national for the purpose of assisting in the military training of such armies or naval or air forces, or otherwise employ any such Austrian national as military, naval or aeronautic instructor.'

'The present provision does not, however, affect the right of France to recruit for the Foreign Legion in accordance with French military laws and regulations.'

individual, inexperienced in the devious ways of politics, it appeared essential for the Governments of the Principal Allied Powers to ratify the Treaty with the least possible delay after ratification by Austria. In fact it was not till the 16th July 1920, when nearly a year had elapsed, that the machinery required to put the Treaty into force could come into action.

The British personnel of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control, with Colonel F. W. Gosset as its Chief, was ready to enter upon its duties as early as October 1919. The Austrian Government had already ratified the Treaty, and there seemed to be no possible reason for further delay. In spite of this, the matter dragged on through the winter of 1919-20, and through the spring and summer of 1920, until at last the ratification of the Allied Governments enabled the Treaty to come into force, after ten valuable months had been wasted.

On the 14th February 1920, the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris decided that Advanced Echelons of the Military Commission of Control might go to Austria to begin the general supervision of the execution of the Military Clauses of the Treaty. This was done, but no real progress could be made pending final ratification of the Treaty. However, the Advanced Echelons were soon faced with a question of some importance, which arose owing to the perversity of the Austrians in attempting to give a wilful misreading to Article 120. In the *Wehrgesetz* (Army Law) of the 18th March 1920, the Austrian Government tried to legalize an 'Active' Force of 30,000 men with the Colours plus some 25,000 Reservists, i.e. counting only the Active Troops in the 30,000 allowed under Article 120. In spite of the unfortunate change of wording, by which the original British draft of the Military Clauses had been altered (vide paragraph 10 above), it was abundantly clear that all Reservists must be included in the total of 30,000 men. On this being pointed out by General Zuccari, President of the Military Commission of Control, the Allied Military Committee of Versailles,¹ under the Presidency of Marshal Foch,

¹ The Allied Military Committee of Versailles was constituted on the 10th January 1920, under the Presidency of Marshal Foch, to replace the Supreme War Council of Versailles. Its duties were to be the following :

- (a) To act as advisory council to the Allied and Associated Governments in the military questions arising out of the execution of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.
- (b) To execute the orders given it by the Allied and Associated Powers

on the 28th May ruled that both Active Troops and Reservists must be included in the total force of 30,000 men allowed under the terms of the Peace Treaty.

The recommendations of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control for Austria for the necessary amendments to be introduced into the Austrian Army Law were approved by the Conference of Ambassadors on the 20th October. The Austrian Government should therefore introduce these amendments into the Army Bill at an early date, but no legislative steps have yet been taken (December 1920).

This incident shows the difficulty of wording the Clauses of a Treaty in such a way as to exclude all possible ambiguity and misreading; in this case, the intention of those responsible for drafting the Treaty had been to enable the Austrians to effect an economy, and the latter, whilst protesting their inability to raise and maintain an Army as large as 30,000 under voluntary service, attempted to establish a right to the maintenance of an Army of nearly 60,000 men.

16. *The Work of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control.* On the 16th July 1920 final ratification at last took place, and the Commission of Control proceeded to Vienna and got to work. Five months have elapsed since that date, and little real progress has been made. Business is conducted and affairs are regulated by a Headquarters Committee of seven officers, including no less than four Italian Members, with one French, one British, and one Japanese; this is of course a most unfair method, giving as it does entire control to the Italians, who have four votes against a total of three of the other Great Powers. In this criticism no reflection is intended on General Zuccari, who has made no unfair use whatever of the position.

For various reasons, extremely little has been accomplished in these five months, except by the Effectives Sub-Committee. Not a single cartridge, shell, rifle (except Russian rifles), machine gun or gun has been destroyed, and not one factory has been visited.¹ In Germany, for instance, as the result of the

in matters concerning the Commissions of Control and the Allied forces of occupation in the Rhineland and plebiscite areas.

- (c) Should the occasion arise, the Council to be consulted upon all military questions of common interest to the Allies which the latter might be agreed to submit to it.

The Allied Military Committee of Versailles held its first conference in Paris on the 12th January 1920.

¹ Large quantities of war material have been and are being removed to Italy, as the Italians have decided not to destroy their share.

labours of General Bingham's Sub-Committee for Armament, Munitions, and Material, in ten months, in spite of difficulties caused by the Kapp 'Putsch' and other disorders, nearly 3,000 factories have been inspected, whilst the destruction of some 30,000 guns, 20,000,000 shells, 7,000 trench mortars, 50,000 machine guns, 2,000,000 rifles, 170,000,000 rounds of small arm ammunition, has been controlled, in addition to the destruction of large quantities of other military stores of every kind (November 1920). The slowness of procedure in Austria is mainly due to the refusal of our Allies to permit the destruction of war material, as this was not laid down in the Treaty, although destruction has been consistently advocated by the British Imperial General Staff and by the Foreign Office, as the only means of ensuring the rapid execution of the Treaty. Another cause of delay, closely connected with the question of destruction, has been the anxiety of the Italians to collect the full amount of war material due under the terms of the Armistice of Villa Giusti, owing to the fact that they expect all this material to be finally allotted to them, whilst they will only receive a proportion of the remaining material.

Other reasons are the obstructive attitude of the Socialist Government, which was in power until October 1920, and of many of the subordinate officials, and lastly the indiscipline of the so-called Army, i. e. the *Wehrmacht*. This force, which is practically a Socialist bodyguard, is almost worthless as a fighting machine, owing to its low standard of discipline and the existence of Soldiers' Councils.

The result has been a practical decision to close down, as Austrian military conditions no longer cause alarm. On the 20th February 1921 the Austrian Commission of Control formally decided to finish its labours in Austria. A few officers were left for winding-up purposes, and some of its personnel will be used in conjunction with the Inter-Allied Military Mission already in Budapest to carry out the supervision of the Military Clauses of the Hungarian Peace Treaty, assuming (a somewhat bold assumption) that the ratification by the Allied Powers of this Treaty (ratified by Hungary on the 13th November 1920) is not delayed in a similar manner to that of the Treaty of St. Germain.

CHAPTER III

DISARMAMENT

PART II

THE TREATY WITH HUNGARY (TREATY OF THE TRIANON) —THE MILITARY TERMS

A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. *Armistice of Villa Giusti, 3rd November, and Military Convention of Belgrade, 13th November 1918.* On the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Army at the end of October 1918, and subsequent to the Armistice of Villa Giusti on the 3rd November, Hungary cut herself free from Austria, and proclaimed herself a separate State. The Military Convention of Belgrade, 13th November 1918, regulated the conditions under which the Armistice of Villa Giusti was to be applied to Hungary. The Armistice had decreed total demobilization of the Austro-Hungarian Army, surrender of half the Divisional, Corps, and Army artillery and equipment, together with all military and railway equipment within the territories to be occupied by the Allied troops; under the terms of the Military Convention of Belgrade, the Hungarian Army was reduced to six infantry and two cavalry divisions, required for the maintenance of internal order. In the Armistice it was prescribed that the twenty divisions, the maintenance of which in Austro-Hungarian territory was permitted, should be reduced to pre-war effectives. In the Convention of Belgrade of the 13th November this condition was not repeated, although in the Armistice and in the Convention it was stipulated that the Allies were to have the right of occupying any places or strategic points within Austro-Hungarian territory, as deemed necessary by the Higher Command of the Allied Armies. Allied troops were, moreover, allowed to pass through or remain in any part of Hungary, and the Allies were to have permanent right of use, for military purposes, of all rolling stock, shipping, and draught animals. A number of river vessels belonging to the Danube

flotilla, as well as locomotives, railway waggon, and 25,000 horses, were also to be handed over to the Allies.

These terms left Hungary completely at the mercy of her enemies, and she found her territories surrounded by Italian, French, Serbian, and Rumanian troops, and also by Yugoslav and Czecho-Slovak forces that had belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

2. *The Rumanian Advance into Transylvania and Eastern Hungary.* At the time of the signature of the Armistice of Villa Giusti and of the Military Convention of Belgrade, Rumania was not a belligerent, and no line of demarcation was therefore fixed for the Rumanian Armies. In the early part of 1919 the Rumanians proceeded to occupy Transylvania, and endeavoured to force their way to the line of the Theiss (Tisza), which had been given them as their frontier by the Secret Treaty of 1916. At the same time the Czecho-Slovaks, after the proclamation of the State of Czecho-Slovakia, advanced to the Danube and occupied Bratislava (Pressburg) and the island of the Grosse Schütt, also moving forward to the southern frontier of Slovakia, to the edge of the Great Hungarian Plain.¹

As hostilities between the Hungarians and Rumanians seemed imminent, it was proposed to fix a neutral zone between the two countries, lying as nearly as possible along the ethnological frontier. This proposal was laid before the Supreme Council on the 21st February 1919, and referred to the Supreme War Council, Versailles, for military examination and report. As a result of these deliberations a line of demarcation was fixed, and on the 21st March it was conveyed to the Hungarian Government by Colonel Vix, chief of the French Military Mission in Budapest. When the Hungarians were given this line, their despair was so great that Count Karolyi at once resigned, handing over the Government to the Extreme Left.

3. *The Establishment of a Bolshevik Government in Budapest, and their Offensive against Czecho-Slovakia.* Within the next few weeks the Bolshevik element in Budapest succeeded in gaining power, with the result that Béla Kun, a low-class Jew adventurer, became Foreign Minister and the real head of a Bolshevik Government.² The next three months were a time of utter misery and chaos in Hungary. At first the Bolshevik Ministers,

¹ v. Chap. IV, Pt. III, and map, p. 122.

² v. this volume (*supra*, p. 124; *infra*, pp. 488-90) and Vol. I, pp. 351-7.

who were practically all Jews, were supported by the Hungarian national spirit, and a large number of officers were willing to serve in the Red Army. At the beginning of April the Council of Four despatched an Inter-Allied Mission to Budapest under General Smuts, but, as related elsewhere, this failed to effect any *modus vivendi*. Early in May the Hungarian Red Army attacked the Czecho-Slovaks between the Danube and the Theiss, and drove them back with considerable ease, the Czecho-Slovak forces being at this time in an undisciplined and disordered state. Although the Council of Four actually gave instructions for a plan to be drawn up for combined action against Béla Kun (a plan which was worked out by the Military Representatives at Versailles and approved by Marshal Foch about the middle of June), no action was taken, in spite of the fact that Hungary was completely surrounded by French, Serbian, Rumanian, Czecho-Slovak, and Italian troops. Moreover, Béla Kun and Lenin were in close communication at this time, a fact which was frequently exposed and emphasized by the General Staff, as the connexion between Russian and Hungarian Bolsheviks was fraught with serious risks to the peace of Europe.

A Note was finally despatched to Béla Kun on the 8th June, requesting him to cease his offensive against the Czecho-Slovaks, and virtually inviting him to Paris. On the 13th June the new permanent boundaries of Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania were formally published. Partly as the result of this Note, and of the numerous Notes and telegrams from Paris which had already been sent, but mainly on account of bad staff work and the breakdown of the supply service, Béla Kun now arrested the Magyar advance into Czecho-Slovakia. Negotiations were then opened, and the Hungarians withdrew from the invaded portions of Czecho-Slovak territory. Soon afterwards, however, the Bolshevik Government at Budapest gave fresh evidence of their entire untrustworthiness, by taking advantage of the negotiations with Paris to organize an offensive against the Rumanians. By this time the strength of the Hungarian Army had increased, and its *moral* had improved considerably, as the result of the successes against the Czecho-Slovaks. In the absence of reliable information as to the efficiency of the Rumanian troops on this front, there was some doubt as to the degree of success which would be likely to attend a Hungarian

offensive, and the defeat of the Rumanian troops might have had serious consequences.

4. *The Hungarian Attack on the Rumanians, and Rumanian Occupation of Budapest.* When the Hungarian attack began, towards the end of July, it met with some success at first, as the Rumanians had adopted the tactics of keeping their reserves well in hand, whilst holding the front with only a light screen of advanced troops. The Rumanian counter-attacks completely restored the situation, and the ill-equipped and badly organized Hungarian Army soon melted away. The Rumanians pressed their advantage home, crossed the Theiss, and occupied Budapest early in August, without the sanction and contravention to the wishes of the Supreme Council.

From now onwards, the Supreme Council experienced almost as much difficulty in getting the Rumanians to attend to their telegrams and Notes as they had had with Béla Kun and his colleagues. An Allied Mission of Generals was despatched to Budapest early in August, Brigadier-General R. St. G. Gorton being the British representative, and they had a difficult time attempting to persuade the Rumanians to carry out the instructions of the Supreme Council. The Rumanians fully realized that, as the Supreme Council had not had the power to suppress the Bolshevik régime in Hungary, they were not likely to be in a position to force Rumania to withdraw; they were therefore firmly determined to remain in the country until they had amply recouped themselves for the losses and injury which they had sustained at the hands of the Austro-Hungarian, German, and Bulgarian troops during the war. In reality the Rumanian attitude was only natural, although some of their methods carried the policy of reprisals to an extreme limit. Had they been defeated by the Hungarian Red Army, it is doubtful if any assistance would have been forthcoming from the Allies, and the Supreme Council had shown themselves utterly powerless to deal with Béla Kun.

Eventually the Rumanians withdrew, and the Hungarian delegation was invited to Paris to receive the terms of the Peace Treaty (January 1920). The Military Clauses of the Treaty had been drawn up immediately after the Austrian terms, i.e. about the middle of May 1919, on the same lines as the original British draft, and were approved by the Supreme War Council of Versailles at a meeting held at Versailles on the 14th May 1920.

B. THE HUNGARIAN MILITARY TERMS IN DETAIL

5. *Similarity of Hungarian to Austrian Military Terms.* No special description of the Hungarian Military Terms is necessary. They agree almost entirely with the Austrian Military Terms, with the following differences :

- (a) The strength of the Hungarian Army has been fixed at 35,000 instead of the 30,000 fixed for the Austrian Army, as the new Hungarian population exceeds the new Austrian by about a million.
- (b) Sentences of minor importance have been added to Articles 107 and 115.
- (c) Article 131 of the Austrian Treaty, dealing with the armament of 45 places in Austria, did not apply to Hungary, in which State there were no fortifications of any kind.
- (d) In Table 1 of the Austrian Treaty, for some reason the Signal Detachment did not include a Telegraph Detachment ; this omission was rectified in the Hungarian Treaty.

It will be noted that, as in the case of the Treaty with Austria, no provision was made in the Hungarian Treaty for the destruction of war material by the Allies. This omission may certainly be regarded as a mistake, though it is unlikely to result in anything like the delay caused in Austria, as the Rumanians have stripped Hungary of by far the greater portion of her arms and ammunition, which are probably at present very little, if at all, in excess of the quantity allowed by the Peace Treaty.

C. EXECUTION OF THE TERMS OF THE HUNGARIAN TREATY

6. *The Signature of the Hungarian Treaty, 4th June 1920.* The draft of the Peace Treaty was presented to the Hungarian Delegation on the 15th January 1920. The military terms caused no particular opposition, as it had already been realized that they could not vary on any essential points from those of the Treaty with Austria. In presenting their 'counter-proposals', however, the Hungarians made a number of demands, of which the following are worthy of mention :

- (a) They desired to increase their military strength beyond the 35,000 effectives allowed under the terms of Article 108.
- (b) They wished to increase the number of forest guards to double that of 1913 (the number fixed by Article 107), and the police to $2\frac{1}{2}$ times the number existing in 1913.
- (c) They also asked permission to exclude candidates for Military Academies from the total number of effectives, and to alter the proportion of officers to be discharged each year.
- (d) Lastly, they appealed for the retention of the system of universal compulsory military service.

The inducement held out in each case was that the Hungarian Army was of great importance for the suppression of Bolshevism, and might be used to oppose the advance of the Bolshevik forces from Russia; this argument was repeated in various parts of the 'counter-proposals', and at other opportunities on subsequent dates. The Hungarian requests were rejected almost entirely, as it was clearly impossible to make any concessions to Hungary, when these had been refused both to Germany and Austria; the Commission of Control was, however, given a certain amount of discretion in matters of detail. Moreover, the warlike character of the Hungarian nation made it extremely probable that there would be no serious difficulty in raising the necessary number of men on the voluntary service system.

In their reply, the Allies pointed out the contradiction between arguments for 'raising an army to 85,000 effectives (as suggested by Hungary), and the impossibility alleged by Hungary of supporting the financial charges inherent in a voluntary army of 35,000 men'. In answer to this, however, the Hungarians could with justice point to the vast cost of a voluntary service army as compared with one raised by compulsory methods.

There was considerable delay in the signature of the Treaty, owing to the strong opposition of the Hungarians to the limitation of their frontiers. They eventually signed on the 4th June 1920, and ratified on the 13th November.

7. *The Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control.* Early in 1920, the British Government proposed that the supervision

of the execution of the Military Clauses of the Treaty should be carried out by the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control for Austria, either concurrently with its duties in Austria, or on completion of its work in that country. In this recommendation they were solely inspired by a desire for economy, in view of the impoverished state of the Hungarian finances, and because it seemed likely that the Commission of Control for Austria would not meet with any serious difficulty in carrying out its duties. It was hoped that, both in Austria and in Hungary, it would be possible to carry out all the work required in a comparatively short time, and with a limited personnel of officers and other ranks. Chiefly as the result of the arguments put forward by the British Representatives in Paris, the Conference of Ambassadors decided that the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control for Austria should also function for Hungary (5th June 1920).

When it became clear that General Zuccari's Commission was encountering far greater difficulties in Austria than had been anticipated, the British Government altered their point of view, and decided that a change of policy was desirable. By the middle of November, four months having elapsed since the final ratification of the Austrian Treaty, the British Government suggested that the work of the Military Commission of Control for Hungary should be entrusted to the Inter-Allied Mission of Generals, which had been in Hungary for over fifteen months. The intention was, that they should use their own staffs for the Treaty, supplemented by such officers of the Austrian Commission of Control as could be spared. Eventually, when General Zuccari's Commission had made sufficient progress in its work, it was to take over charge of the Hungarian Commission of Control from the Inter-Allied Generals in Budapest. The main object of this plan was to save time and money, and to utilize the experience and local knowledge of the Allied Generals and their staffs in Budapest.

Some difficulties arose, but eventually a compromise was adopted at the instance of Marshal Foch, laying down that the Allied Generals in Budapest should begin the work of Control under the orders of General Zuccari and the Headquarters of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control for Austria. Under this scheme, General Zuccari and his Headquarter staff, in consultation with the Allied Generals in

Budapest, are to fix the personnel required for the Hungarian Military Commission of Control, which is to be made up from the staff of the Allied Generals in Budapest, and from such officers of the Austrian Commission of Control as can be spared from their duties in Austria ; it is hoped that no other officers will be required. These measures should ensure immediate commencement of the work on final ratification, as well as the greatest possible economy.

The strength of the Hungarian Army is at present (March 1921) believed to be slightly in excess of that allowed by the Peace Treaty (35,000), especially in officers and non-commissioned officers, but this is not in any way a contravention of the Military Clauses, as reduction to the sanctioned establishment has not to take place until three months from the coming into force of the Treaty. Fear has been expressed that, owing to the large numbers of unemployed officers now in Budapest, there will be serious resistance to the execution of the military terms of the Treaty. This seems unlikely, though there will no doubt be some obstruction, if not on the part of the Government, at all events by the subordinate officials.

CHAPTER III

DISARMAMENT

PART III

THE TREATY WITH BULGARIA (TREATY OF NEUILLY); THE MILITARY TERMS

1. *Introductory.* The Armistice, signed on the 29th September with the Bulgars, has already been described as a non-reciprocal demobilization agreement (*v.* Chap. II, Pt. I). As such it had to be carried out. Bulgaria had the great advantage of being preserved from a military occupation by the troops of Serbia, Rumania, and Greece, whose inhabitants she had treated with great brutality in the days of her military pride. Her territory was temporarily occupied by British troops, then by Italians, and finally by a mixed force of Italians and French. Her attitude and her slowness to execute the terms of the Armistice gave rise to some suspicion,¹ and it was not to be expected that any special concessions would therefore be made to her under the Peace Treaty.

2. *The Question of Compulsory Military Service.* Like every other enemy State, Bulgaria desired compulsory military service. Among the Allies the military discussions on the subject were very short, and the Italian representative alone argued for conscription. The case of Bulgaria could not, however, be separated in this respect from that of Germany, Austria, and Hungary, and the Italian objection was ultimately withdrawn. The Bulgarian 'Observations' of the 24th October dwelt much on the fact that Bulgaria was in a different position from all the other nations, in that she was an agricultural State whose peasants were attached to their farms. She had no margin of needy or unemployed in her towns, suitable for long-period

¹ This refers to the period preceding the signature of peace. An important influence in Bulgaria's admission to the League of Nations is understood to have been a favourable report by Marshal Foch on her execution of the military terms.

service in the Army. They gave evidence to show that even the long-period enlistment for non-commissioned officers had always been difficult. 'Causes relating to the morals and life of the people make all prolonged service antipathetic to the Bulgar, as they remove him from his family and his land for a considerable time.' The result would be that the recruiting would be from the lowest of the population, and the cost would be prohibitive. The Allies replied shortly : 'The institution of a military régime resting on compulsory service is absolutely contrary to the principle of reduction of armaments which the Allied and Associated Powers have sought to impose on their old adversaries, as that alone is capable of assuring in the future the security of the World Peace.' It is difficult to see how the Allies could have given any other reply or made an exception in this case, but subsequent experience has confirmed the fact that this clause bore more hardly upon Bulgaria than on any other enemy State. No offers of money, or even of land, are likely to tempt a nation of stay-at-home peasants to enlist in an army whose period of service is twelve years (Articles 71-2).

The permission to combine six years of service with the colours and six years with the reserve (i.e. twelve years in all) was granted to Austria (Article 126) and to Hungary (Article 110), but not to Bulgaria. Her soldiers have to serve twelve consecutive years with the colours (Article 72), and it might fairly be contended that her peculiar circumstances demand this change in the Treaty. It is, at any rate, one which deserves most serious consideration.

3. *The Number of Effectives and Cadres.* The total of military forces was fixed at 20,000 men, including officers and dépôt troops. The proportion of officers, including personnel of staffs and special services, was not to exceed one-twentieth of the total effectives with the colours (Article 66). It had been originally intended to limit the number of gendarmes, officials, forest guards, etc., to that employed in 1913, as was provided in other cases.¹ This principle proved impracticable for two reasons. No accurate statistics existed, because the number of such persons could not be ascertained, as Bulgaria had not organized even in 1914 the number of gendarmerie required for the new populations and frontiers she had acquired in the

¹ Germany, Art. 162 ; Austria, Art. 123 ; Hungary, Art. 107.

Balkan War. Secondly, even if this had been ascertainable, the character of the population made it difficult to know how many would in future be required. The principle was therefore adopted of fixing a quota of 10,000, so that the total number of armed men allotted to Bulgaria was fixed at 30,000. The Bulgarians in their 'Observations' demanded a regular force of 25,000 men, with additions from frontier guards, gendarmes, etc., making 40,000 in all. They also asked for a more gradual demobilization of officers, and for their percentage to be fixed at one-fifteenth, not one-twentieth, of the total effectives. These two latter demands were categorically refused, but the Allies consented to the formation and maintenance of 3,000 frontier guards, thus making the total 33,000 men instead of 30,000. The British military representative introduced two important phrases in Article 69 dealing with these matters, which do not occur in other treaties. 'In no case shall the number of these officials (gendarmes, etc.) *who are armed with rifles* exceed 10,000, . . . frontier guards . . . must not exceed 3,000 men, *so that the total number of rifles in use in Bulgaria shall not exceed 33,000.*'¹ There is no other Treaty in which it is so explicitly made clear that the number of men armed with rifles is definitely limited. The ambiguity in the case of the German Treaty in this respect has already been noticed, and the wording of the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties, though less open to doubt, is not so definite as this.²

4. *Recruiting, Training, and Schools (Articles 71-5).* The Bulgarians in their 'Observations' demanded a military school for non-commissioned officers as well as for officers—that is, two in all. This demand was rejected by the Allies.³

5. *Armaments, Munitions, and Material, Fortifications (Articles 76-82).* These call for only one observation—that is, that Bulgaria had no munition factories, but is permitted under Article 79 to establish one under strict control and limitations. This is of importance, because it has sometimes been contended that the military clauses were imposed on enemies, and were intended entirely to disarm them. It will be seen that, in this case, the Allies had the power to prevent Bulgaria from estab-

¹ Italics not in original.

² v. Vol. II, pp. 181-4, and Art. 123 (Austria), and Art. 107 (Hungary).

³ In Art. 74 'boy scouts' societies' are prohibited, among other organizations, from military training: this is the only Treaty in which they receive the honour of mention.

lishing a factory which she did not already possess. They abstained in deference to the rule that each enemy State should be allowed to establish one such factory, and the result, therefore, is to permit Bulgaria to establish a totally new factory of arms. It is, however, improbable that Bulgaria, while benefiting under this head, will regard this concession as any compensation for the prohibition of universal compulsory service. But it is important to point out that the application of universal principles without regard to particular conditions sometimes actually benefits an enemy State.

One general observation as regards the Military Clauses of the three Treaties, Austrian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian, seems necessary. In the Treaty with Germany, provisions were made that all surrendered arms, munitions, and war material must be 'destroyed or rendered useless. This will also apply to any special plant intended for the manufacture of military material, except such as may be recognized as necessary for equipping the authorized strength of the German Army' (Germany, Article 169). It is unfortunate that no similar provision for destruction exists in the other three Treaties.¹ Russian war material lying in Germany or Austria is also involved in these considerations. It has been agreed, however, that Russian war material lying either in Germany or Austria shall be destroyed or rendered useless by the Commission of Control, the sale of the scrap being undertaken by the Reparations Commission, and the proceeds allotted to the different States representing the former Russian Empire in proportions which remain to be fixed. There is no obligation, however, to destroy the excess war material of Austria, Bulgaria, or Hungary. Each of the Allied Powers apparently has full latitude to do what it likes with the war material allotted to it. It is obvious that this principle is unsatisfactory because the last scrap of war material will have to be collected before such allotment can be made. The war material is accumulated at certain points in these different countries, and may be accumulated for an almost indefinite period. Such accumulation is obviously full of dangerous possibilities, in view of the possible or actual dis-

¹ v. *supra*, Pt. I, § 18, p. 158. Incidentally, it would seem to pass the wit of man to devise a definition of what is, and is not, 'war-material'.

turbed condition of the countries in question. The Versailles Military Committee has now (8th October 1920) been instructed to draw up a scheme for the distribution of war material among the various Allied Governments as soon as it is brought in, instead of waiting until it has all been collected, and to dispose of it as quickly as possible whether by destruction, as is the British policy, or by removal to the countries to which it has been allotted. There can be no doubt that the inability to arrive at an agreement in this particular case or to lay down a clear principle such as exists in the German Treaty is a defect in the Military Clauses of the other Treaties which may still have dangerous results, and has possibly led to leakage of war material in the past. It is only now, almost a year after these Treaties have been signed, that the defects of this system have been revealed, and that a serious attempt is being made to remedy them.

TABLE OF ARMED STRENGTHS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

Peace Effectives under the Three Treaties.

Austria, 90,000 ; Bulgaria, 33,000 ; Hungary, 35,000.

Peace Effectives of Successor States, etc. (Totals under arms or paid for in last available Budget.)

Czecho-Slovakia, 147,800 ; Greece, 250,000 ; Italy, 300,000 ; Rumania, 160,000 ; Serb-Croat-Slovene State, 200,000.

(Answer to Major M. Wood in House of Commons, 18th April 1921.)

For Austrian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian Naval Disarmament v. Vol. V,
pp. 156-7.

CHAPTER IV

THE LIBERATION OF THE NEW NATIONALITIES

PART I

THE YUGO-SLAVS

Introductory. The ideal of Yugo-slav unity was conceived by literary men and visionaries; it was realized by men of action under conditions and with a quickness which would have been thought incredible even ten years ago. Here, at least, events moved, as it were, of themselves. The problem in its complexity almost baffles description, for the three races of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were separated from one another by every sort of barrier. These Yugo-slavs were divided between four separate kingdoms—the Austrian Empire, the Hungarian Kingdom, the Kingdom of Serbia, and the Kingdom of Montenegro. But this did not end the matter. In Austria-Hungary itself the Yugo-slavs lived under five separate administrations,¹ and this separation was maintained and promoted by the Government. A race of some thirteen millions divided into four fragments was further subdivided into half a dozen more. Nor were political or administrative boundaries the only barriers. Hungarian railway policy severed Dalmatia from Croatia, and made it cheaper to send goods from Zagreb to Budapest than from Zagreb to Sarajevo. The Bosnian railways had no commercial possibilities, and the fine harbour of Spalato had no connexion with Croatia. Everywhere the motto of *divide et impera* had been systematically practised, and every economic or political means had been used to stimulate local or particularist prejudice. Yet in the end twelve

¹ Slovenes, Istria and Dalmatia were controlled directly by Austria; Serbs of South Hungary directly by Hungary; the Kingdom of Croatia included Serbs and Croats but was subject to Hungary, Fiume was separate under Hungary; lastly, Bosnia-Herzegovina was under joint Austro-Hungarian administration. The official term for the new kingdom is the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, though the term Yugo-slavia is popularly but less correctly used.

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million Yugo-slavs found themselves under the same Crown and Government, and of the three Yugo-slav Plenipotentiaries at the Conference the Serb had been three years in exile, the Croat had been condemned to death, and the Slovene had been an Austrian Minister during the war.

A. THE YUGO-SLAV PROBLEM IN 1914

1. *The four proposed solutions.* In the summer of 1914 the Yugo-slav lands were in a state of more than usual disturbance. The problem arose from the growing sense of national solidarity between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and the political division of the race between the national Governments of Serbia and Montenegro and the alien Governments in Austria, Hungary, and the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition to these general causes, the immediate reasons for unrest were the sympathy aroused amongst the Yugo-slavs for Serbia as a victor in the Balkan wars and the recent arbitrary character of the Magyar domination in Croatia.

The proposed solutions of the problem were as various as the interests concerned. These solutions may be summarized under the headings: Repression, Trialism, Greater Serbia, Yugo-slavia.

(a) *Repression.* Since 1906, when Count v. Aehrenthal became Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, the Habsburg Monarchy had followed a policy of adventure in the Balkans. Bosnia-Herzegovina was annexed in 1908, and the ultimate objective of this policy was asserted to be Salonica. The main obstacles to this ambition were first Serbia, where opinion was inflamed against the Monarchy, owing to the latter's opposition to the Serbian acquisition of a sea-port in 1912, and next the unrest in the Monarchy's own Yugo-slav provinces. It was generally believed in Austria-Hungary that this unrest was merely the artificial product of an agitation engineered and financed by Belgrade. To meet this situation the policy of repression had the merit of apparent simplicity. Its method was to treat all manifestations of Yugo-slav nationalism in the Monarchy as High Treason, and to apply the argument of the sword to Serbia. During a victorious war against Serbia the other Yugo-slavs might be so dragooned as to abandon their nationalist agitation.

Two objections to this policy are clear :

First : It was improbable that Russia would allow the extinction of Serbia or even its reduction to virtual dependence on Austria-Hungary, without recourse to arms. And Russia was by 1914 prepared to fight, if necessary.

Secondly : Repression would be no answer to those Yugoslavs who were loyal to the Monarchy but bitterly opposed to its existing form, while the conquest of Serbia would add to the Yugoslav opposition within the Monarchy an element more *intransigent* than all the rest.

(b) *Trialism*. A number of plans for the solution of the Southern Slav question may be grouped together under the common name of Trialism. They differed considerably in detail, but the main principle in each case was that instead of Austria-Hungary being based on a dualistic system with two opposing powers or units, the Germans and the Magyars, there should be three, German, Magyar and Slav.¹ The assumption, of course, was that German and Slav would work together, and consequently that the Magyars would be placed in a position of inferiority. This scheme was very popular in some circles, even in high diplomatic ones.

Franz Ferdinand was commonly, but inaccurately, supposed to be a supporter of Trialism.² His scheme, so far as imperfect evidence goes, was not of this type. He proposed, indeed, to upset the dualistic system, and thereby to overthrow the undue influence exercised by the Magyars in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but his actual proposal appears to have been to substitute a centralized control. He would have had a central executive for the whole Monarchy, but with very large local devolutions of power. Thus his scheme was not trialistic, though it was anti-dualistic. Some people might have said that it was a reconciliation of the two. There is not enough information, however, to show what his ultimate ideas were. It seems certain only that he was anti-Magyar and anti-Serb in his ideas. He proposed to support the Catholic Croats against the Orthodox Serbs, and to prevent the Magyars from paralysing the efforts

¹ The limits of the Slav State varied considerably, but they usually included Croatia, Bosnia, the Serbs of Southern Hungary, and the Dalmatians, and sometimes excluded the Slovenes.

² v. Seton-Watson, *German, Slav and Magyar*, pp. 109-12.

of the Dynasty to rally the various subject nationalities round the throne in a common loyalty.

The general aims of Trialism were not easy to realize. Even if the proposed Yugo-slav State did not include the Slovenes (and that would rob the settlement of any final character), there remained German islands in this area which the German nationalists could not abandon. The few Italians involved would resent their inclusion in a people whom they despised. Above all, the Magyars would never relinquish their hold on Croatia and their port of Fiume. On the contrary, Magyar policy aimed rather at the acquisition of Dalmatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and a future on the water. Lastly, the Serbs, both of Serbia and of Austria-Hungary, rejected any scheme of Trialism coming from the Habsburg dynasty itself; the Serbs of Serbia, because it would weaken the appeal of their kingdom as the destined unifier of their race; and the Serbs of the Monarchy, because it would mean their inclusion in a state founded on a Croatian and Catholic basis. The only consistent supporters of Trialism were to be found in those aristocratic and Catholic circles at Vienna who still held to the federalist ideas of 1860, and in the Croatian opposition parties (Frankists, Starčevists) at Zagreb whose political creed was the restoration of the mediaeval kingdom of Croatia to the exclusion of the Serbs. The attitude of the Slovenes during the war shows that there must before then have been considerable sympathy amongst them for the trialistic idea. But, lying as they do on the high road from Vienna to the sea, they were in 1914 so little likely to obtain inclusion in a Yugo-slav State that their aspirations were both unheeded and indeed unformed. Thus Trialism was essentially a Croatian solution based on the supposed character of the Croats as 'the truest Austrians'.

(c) *Greater Serbia*. This was as partial a solution, in the Serbian sense, as Trialism was in the Croatian. It aimed at gathering into Serbia all those of the Yugo-slav race who professed the Orthodox religion and used the Cyrillic alphabet. It was the undoubted aspiration of Serbian patriots that their kingdom should be the nucleus of a State at least as large as that, and consequently it is difficult to see how war between Serbia and the Habsburg Monarchy could ultimately have been avoided. The claims of the Pan-Serbs included Southern Dalmatia, most of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia

(Syrmia), and the Serbian districts of Bačka and the Banat in Southern Hungary.¹ Could she acquire these districts, Serbia would unite within herself all but a few thousands of Serbs, and she would possess an opening on the sea, indifferent for commercial purposes but secure. To the limited and unaggressive imagination of the Serbian peasant that was enough. But this solution left out of account the new solidarity of feeling, which had grown up in the decade preceding the war, between Serbs and Croats in Dalmatia and Croatia. Since 1908 the majority in the Parliament at Zagreb had continuously consisted of the Serbo-Croatian Coalition, a party whose basis was the common interests and co-operation of both branches of the race. Greater Serbia could only come into existence after successful war with Austria-Hungary; and, even in that apparently unlikely event, the enlarged State would have to consider its relation to the other Yugo-slavs, since the sentimental and cultural bonds between Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana (Laibach) were growing stronger every year. Politically, however, there had been a slight set-back, for the Serbo-Croatian Coalition in Croatia had come to terms with the Hungarian Government in 1913. The Slovenes were still standing aloof, and it was only in Dalmatia and Bosnia that political connexions with Serbia were increasing in 1914.

(d) *Yugo-slavia*. The remaining solution only entered the field of practical politics with the progress of the war. But even before 1914 there were in all the Yugo-slav lands, especially in Dalmatia, those who looked forward to the unification of their race in one independent State. Before the War these men could not openly declare for a Yugo-slav State wholly free from the Habsburg dynasty. As soon as hostilities began some of them fled to the Entente countries, notably Supilo, the chief creator of the Serbo-Croatian Coalition, Trumbić, afterwards the Yugo-slav delegate at the Peace Conference, Hinković, a Croatian deputy, Jedlovski, a Slovene of Trieste, and others. These men formed the Yugo-slav Committee, with its headquarters in London in 1915, and issued their programme of a united and free Yugo-slavia. Their difficulties were immense.

¹ Syrmia, the Bačka, and the Banat were organized separately from Hungary between 1848 and 1860 and known as the 'Serbian Voivodina'. The term 'Voivodina' is used to-day by the Yugo-slavs to designate the Bačka, the Banat, and that small part of the Baranja now conceded to them.

They definitely distrusted Russia, whom they suspected with reason of working for the 'Greater Serbia' idea, and elected to make their appeal to the Liberal Powers of the West. But public opinion in Great Britain and France was not inflamed against the Dual Monarchy. Yugo-slav affairs did not arouse any great interest in London or Paris. The governing classes in both countries were inclined to be favourable to Austria-Hungary, which was widely regarded as a European necessity in her character as a reconciler of many races, as conservative and normally peaceful by reason of her internal difficulties. Thus the Yugo-slav Committee had neither the support of the Entente, nor of the mass of the Yugo-slavs themselves. It is highly doubtful if they were even supported by the Serbian Government. It is true that the Crown Prince Alexander and his Ministry took an early opportunity in November 1914 of appealing to all the Yugo-slav race, proclaiming that Serbia was fighting for their freedom. But the Old Radical (ministerialist) party, which clung to the Russian connexion, did much to justify the suspicion of the Croats that in the hour of victory the Serbs might repudiate them.

Thus, when the war broke out, it witnessed the application of the 'Repression' solution by Austria-Hungary. 'Trialism' for the moment was dead, along with Franz Ferdinand and his mysterious scheme of regeneration. 'Greater Serbia' was the Russian solution, 'Yugo-slavia,' the dream of a small class of *intelligentsia* in the Yugo-slav lands, and of a few idealists in England and France. The Entente as a whole had no Yugo-slav policy.

B. THE YUGO-SLAV MOVEMENT DURING THE WAR

2. *Austro-Hungarian policy on the eve of and during the War (1914-17).* The policy of Repression already alluded to must have led ultimately to war, but it is not quite clear that the leading statesmen of the Monarchy had definitely committed themselves to this view before the murder of Franz Ferdinand. The militarist party under Conrad von Hoetzendorff had long advocated this view. Conrad has himself stated that, on his appointment as Chief of the General Staff in the winter of 1906, he had at once expressed the view that the Yugo-slav problem was decisive in importance for the Monarchy. To

settle it properly, Italy must first be defeated, and accordingly he advocated war against that power in 1907. He again advocated war, this time with Serbia, in 1908-9, and again in 1912 and 1913; and once more in a Memorandum of the 21st June 1914, one week before the death of Franz Ferdinand. 'The present position of the Monarchy has therefore become such,' he wrote, that she 'must be prepared to take weighty steps to decide about her continued existence.' There is therefore no doubt about the militarist point of view, but it does not seem absolutely fair to assume that this view was accepted by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office. The Memorandum of Count Berchtold, written before the murder of Franz Ferdinand and quoted by Francis Joseph in a letter to the Kaiser of the 2nd July 1914, does not seem to prove that he actually advocated war, though he certainly contemplated it as a possibility.¹

On the 7th July 1914 the Council of Ministers for Common Concerns decided on warlike action against Serbia, with the notable and important exception of Count Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister. Tisza understood, as perhaps no one else, the extreme delicacy of the dualistic system and the danger of interfering with it. Consequently even then he wished to inflict merely a great diplomatic defeat on Serbia and if possible still to avoid war. He held the view that 'warlike action should only be resorted to if it was impossible to humiliate Serbia diplomatically'. Even after the war began his aims were still very moderate as compared with those of the other Austro-Hungarian statesmen. He opposed altogether Conrad's plan for wholesale annexation of Serbia and Montenegro, and the partition of Albania between Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Greece. He was utterly opposed to the addition of several millions of Serbs to the Yugo-slavs already within the Monarchy. In his confidential Note to Count Burian, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, on the 20th December 1915, he wrote that

¹ It was of course possible that this Memorandum may have been tampered with, as the object of Francis Joseph would be to convince the Kaiser that war was inevitable after the murder of Franz Ferdinand, and this object might be attained if he could prove that his ideas previous to the 28th June 1914 had been pacific. Nothing in the history of this period makes such falsification impossible, but necessary confirmation is lacking. The chief authorities on these points are Austrian Red Book, Parts I—III, 28th June—27th August 1914 (esp. pp. 1 to 13, Part I), London, 1920; and articles in *The New Europe* by Professor R. J. Kerner and by Spectator, 30th September and 7th October 1920 respectively.

'such action would lay the Monarchy open to internal disruption, and would not mean an increase in strength but a diminution in our living power and would compromise the future of the Monarchy'. The Serbs in the Monarchy already gave trouble enough to both Croats and Magyars. The only safe policy, therefore, was, to quote his Memorandum again, 'to cut off from the body of the Serb State all that has been promised to Bulgaria, to give to Albania those parts of Serbia and Montenegro which naturally belong to it, cut Montenegro off from the Adriatic, and we need only to annex the north-west corner of Serbia, to separate Serbia and Montenegro from the outer world, and to make them economically wholly dependent on the Monarchy'. Count Burian appears to have had a plan more extreme than Tisza's, and more moderate than Conrad's. He wished apparently to annex the region about Belgrade, and to advance in Novi Bazar until the Monarchy touched Albania. The differences here outlined seem to show that no common policy had been agreed on even by the end of 1915, and certainly not before the 28th June 1914. Whatever was the technical situation, the practical influence of the Hungarian Prime Minister was always most important, and until he was brought into line, it seems clear that the Common Ministers could not have committed Austria-Hungary to war. Moreover, it is clear that the different Ministers were not agreed as to what were their precise aims and objects, and continued to disagree actually during the war. It would appear, therefore, to follow that though the logical result of the policy of Repression was war, it was not an object which had actually been decided on previous to the 28th June 1914. Like almost everything else in the affairs of the Dual Monarchy, hesitation, inconsistency and opposed policies prevailed until the moment when the Monarchy was put to its final test and disappeared for ever.

The ideas of Count Tisza at the end of 1915 have already been indicated, and they summed up the Hungarian attitude with sufficient accuracy until the end of the war. Some faint Austrian attempts to use milder and more conciliatory methods during 1917 were wrecked on the Hungarian rock. Consequently the above general indications seem all that is necessary to show the positive and constructive ideas of the chief servants of the Habsburg dynasty. In practice there was brutal and savage repression in all Yugo-slav areas both within and

without Austria-Hungary by Austrian and Hungarian officials and military commanders.

The last really authentic evidence of the Yugo-slav policy of the Common Monarchy is in the interview between the German Chancellor and Count Czernin in the presence of the German General Staff at Kreuznach on the 17-18 May 1917, when an agreement as to peace terms was reached upon the following lines: 'complete integrity of the (Austro-Hungarian) Monarchy with Mount Lovćen (in Montenegro) in addition, military rectifications of frontier in Serbia (particularly the Mačva), the establishment of a new small Serbia without harbours, the restoration of Montenegro and Northern Albania, all three States to be militarily, politically, and economically dependent on Austria-Hungary. The eventual establishment of a New Serbia, dependent upon Austria-Hungary, with an outlet to the Adriatic, will be regarded as a great sacrifice on the part of Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary will be friendly to Bulgaria's ambitions in Serbia, especially her desire for the Lower Morava.'¹ On the whole Tisza's policy would appear to have triumphed. Only a small part of Serbia was to be annexed to Austria-Hungary, while outlying parts of her territory were carved off for Bulgaria and Northern Albania. The only direction in which Tisza's policy has been departed from was that Montenegro, New Serbia, and North Albania were to be under military and political control by Austria-Hungary. This declaration of policy is the last agreed and definite scheme to which the Old Austro-Hungarian Government adhered, with the definite intention of solving the Yugo-slav difficulty, and the only one to which Germany is known to have consented. It was intended to settle once for all 'affairs in the East and the Balkans'. It was, however, only one part of a larger conception which included an Austro-Hungarian economic control of Rumania and a German one of Bulgaria. This again appears to have been only the prelude to the establishment of 'a common Germano-Austro-Hungarian economic state'. As such it went too far, and was probably quite impracticable, for the economic serfdom

¹ Ludendorff, *General Staff and its Problems* (1920), vol. ii, pp. 437-8. Germany differed only in details. She wished Montenegro to be a part of 'a new large Serbia' and Prishtina to be ceded to Bulgaria. She wished there to be no doubt as to the military, economic, and political control by Austria-Hungary of Northern Albania and New Serbia, but considered the details not to be her concern.

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of the Balkans meant the destruction of their national aspirations, and incidentally also of those of Hungary, to which Tisza would never have consented. Hence, even in this case, when the Central Powers had for once reached a measure of agreement, the essentially temporary character of their military and economic solutions of national problems revealed itself.

The later schemes of conciliation, inaugurated by the Emperor Charles, were either not persisted in long enough or were so badly received by the various parties concerned, that we need not discuss them. They had no practical importance except as indicating that all previous policies of repression or economic absorption or denationalization of the Yugo-slavs had completely failed.¹

3. *The policy of repression in action.* That the Yugo-slav nationalist agitation was deep-seated in the Dual Monarchy and not a mere creation of Belgrade, was shown by the measures directed by Austria-Hungary against her own subjects. At the outbreak of war the authorities applied repressive measures particularly to the Serbs, several thousands of whom were interned in Bosnia, especially the educated supporters of the national idea. Other elements of the population were systematically encouraged by the prospect of loot to attack or inform against the Serbs. Bands of irregular troops, largely gipsies and Moslems of the lower class, were employed to exercise terror in the countryside. Dr. Frank, the ultra-Croatian leader in the Parliament of Zagreb, declared in 1917 that he was approached in July 1914 by the chief of police with proposals for the murder of several prominent Serbian politicians.

But the attentions of the Government were not confined to the Serbs. Austria-Hungary knew that the certainty of war with Serbia would cause the flight of Yugo-slavs of military age, particularly in Dalmatia. Accordingly the news of the ultimatum to Serbia was not published in that province until after it had expired, and the interval was used for a wholesale 'drive' of educated Yugo-slavs, who were either imprisoned or drafted into the army. Similar measures were carried out elsewhere. Dr. Trešić-Pavičić, a Dalmatian deputy, after three months' imprisonment was brought before a judge, who explained his ignorance of the charge against the prisoner on the ground that it was impossible to keep pace with the arrests, of which there

¹ v. Chap. I, Part III.

had been 5,000 in Dalmatia, Istria, and Carinthia alone. At Trieste more than a thousand were arrested. Even in the early days of the war a prominent rôle among the nationalists was played in some districts by the Roman Catholic clergy, of whom sixty-seven from Istria were imprisoned. Altogether, the Yugoslav estimate of 10,000 persons incarcerated seems to be an under-statement, and cannot include a considerable number who died in various internment camps in the later stages of the war.

The early stages of the war added to the sufferings of the people in the districts near the Serbian frontier, populated chiefly by Serbs. It had been expected that the campaign against Serbia would be in the nature of a short, sharp, punitive expedition. But the Serbians ejected the invading force from their country after a fortnight's fighting and themselves crossed the Save and the Drina, occupying considerable districts of Syrmia and Bosnia. Here the population welcomed them as national deliverers, and the reports of the Austro-Hungarian Command show that the Imperial and Royal troops had to contend with great difficulties caused by local civilians who acted as spies, cut the telegraph and telephone wires, and in many ways hindered operations. The General Officer Commanding at Zagreb further complained in September that the Croatian Government was intentionally blind to the Serbophile activities in Syrmia. When, however, in the autumn the Serbian Army was forced to retire to its own side of the frontier, its late hosts had to pay for their reception of the Monarchy's enemies, unless they had taken the precaution of also crossing the river with the Serbians. All subjects of the Monarchy, who were abroad and suspected of working with the enemy, were deprived of their citizenship, their property was confiscated, and their families were liable to deportation. By March 1915 the semi-official *Bosnische Post* was able to announce the expulsion into Serbia and Montenegro of 5,260 destitute families and 5,510 cases of confiscation of property.

After the second defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Army at the hands of the Serbians in December 1914, and its expulsion from Serbia, fighting was suspended on the Balkan front for nine months. It was clear that the Serbian Army on its own ground was a very much more formidable opponent than had been anticipated. Also the ravages of typhus made Serbia an

unwholesome area for operations. The Austro-Hungarian authorities used the interval systematically to lay waste their own frontier areas, evacuating the border population and destroying houses and churches. Thus from an early stage of the war, the Southern Slav lands were peopled with wandering bands of homeless refugees, later reinforced by deserters from the army, and becoming an increasing menace to public security.

The year 1915 was also filled with High Treason trials. The number of public hangmen was increased from two to ten. These officials were kept busy, for in October 1916, the assistant hangman at Vienna, though sentenced to ten days' imprisonment for being drunk and disorderly, was discharged on the ground that his services were constantly in demand. At the close of the year the third and final invasion of Serbia, carried out by German, Austro-Hungarian, and Bulgarian forces, was successful, and the populations of Serbia and Montenegro became, like the other Yugo-slavs, helpless suspects under an alien government. One third of Serbia was assigned by the conquerors to the Dual Monarchy; the remainder, ostensibly on grounds of nationality, to Bulgaria. The Serbian Court and Ministry found a resting-place at Corfu, where the gallant remnants of the Serbian Army were reconstituted. The entire Yugo-slav territories were now in the hands of foreign Powers, and the Yugo-slav movement seemed to be destroyed. But—as it was once true of Austria that 'it lay in the camp of Radetsky'—it was true not only of Serbia but of all Yugo-slavia that its future lay in the Serbian camp at Salonica.

The year 1916 was the worst period of the Yugo-slav fortunes. Any freedom of expression was still impossible in the Dual Monarchy, although the Croatian Parliament continued its sessions, the authorities of Budapest appearing convinced that the Croats could be trusted to support the Monarchy, especially in view of the change which had taken place in the character of the Entente.

4. *The Treaty of London, 26th April 1915; its effects on the Yugo-slavs.* In May 1915 Italy entered the war. The Yugo-slav Committee, in their appeal to France and Great Britain, issued a somewhat nervous welcome to the new Ally, pointing out that they claimed for their nation the whole Adriatic coast east of Monfalcone, and adding that the prospect of annexation by Italy of any of the Yugo-slav lands would be the one force

capable of rallying the Croats and Slovenes heartily to the Habsburg cause. The Governments of the Entente maintained a careful secrecy as to the terms of the Treaty of London (26th April 1915), on the strength of which Italy had joined the Alliance. But Supilo had an interview with Sazonoff, in the course of which he claimed that his suspicions were justified, and that Yugo-slav lands had been promised to Italy. The Yugo-slav Committee evidently knew the substance of the Treaty, for their map, published early in 1916, gave the territorial provisions with but trifling errors.

The chief grounds of offence to Yugo-slav sentiment were the attribution to Italy of the Yugo-slav territories on the Austrian littoral and the northern half of Dalmatia, and the special treatment proposed for Croatia as separate from Serbia. The treaty assigned Fiume and the Croatian coast to Croatia, and the south Dalmatian coast, most of which was to be neutralized, to Serbia and Montenegro. Thus, in the event of an Allied victory, their lands were once more to be divided between two or three Yugo-slav States and a foreign Power, while it appeared that the bulk of the Slovenes were expected to remain under Austrian rule, even if Croatia were made independent.

The discussion of this treaty had two effects. It split the Yugo-slav Committee. Supilo openly denounced Russia as the betrayer of Slav interests in her anxiety to create a 'Greater Serbia' and her willingness to sacrifice the Croats and Slovenes. He left the Committee after urging upon Trumbić and the Prince Regent of Serbia that the union of Serbs and Croats, the true aim of Serbian policy, could only be secured by ceasing to take orders from Petrograd. United Yugo-slavia, he maintained, would only be possible 'if strongly supported by England'. The Serbian Government, however, were not officially informed of the contents of the Treaty of London,¹ and the Yugo-slav Committee continued to adhere to Tsarist Russia until the revolution of 1917. Ultimately Supilo became reconciled with Trumbić, and almost the last act of his life was to express approval of the 'Pact of Corfu'.

¹ The Treaty was published by the Bolsheviks in the winter of 1917. The Yugo-slavs received no official information of its existence until January 1920. President Wilson has stated that he did not know of its existence until January 1919, when he formally refused to recognize it. *V. also infra* Chap. V. *passim*. and Vol. I, pp. 170-1.

Secondly, the effect of the Treaty in the Dual Monarchy was disastrous. The Yugo-slavs received the impression that their interests were a matter of indifference to the Entente. Their soldiers were stimulated to fight for Austria-Hungary, who had found in Italy an enemy to whom the Yugo-slavs could be trusted not to desert in large numbers. The situation was one of tragic irony. The Habsburg Government was obliged to repress a disaffected race, and yet that race placed its superb fighting qualities at that Government's disposal. Yet even so the attempt of the Hungarian Government in 1915 to extract from the Croatian Parliament a repudiation of the Yugo-slav Committee and a declaration of loyalty to the Monarchy met with slight success. The Parliament refused to disavow the Committee's programme, and the central authorities had to be content with a protest against Italian aspirations and a vague assertion of loyalty to the Emperor-King; after which Parliament was prorogued. To the disastrous effect of the Treaty of London on the Yugo-slavs should also be added that of Rumania's entry into the war in the autumn of 1916 on the strength of another secret agreement. It is difficult to ensure secrecy for far-reaching measures in war-time, and it is highly probable that the Serbs of the Banat were quickly aware of the Allies' promise of that province to the Rumanians. This would account for the unwillingness of the Yugo-slav volunteers in the Dobrudja to co-operate with the Rumanian Army.

5. *Revival of Yugo-slav Moral.* Cases of desertion to the Russian and Serbian Armies were numerous in the early stages of the war.¹ By the end of 1916 there were in Russia over 60,000 Yugo-slav troops, largely Croats and Slovenes. The Yugo-slav Committee in Odessa had taken up their enlistment into Volunteer Divisions in 1915, and eventually, despite the suspicious attitude of the Tsarist Government, succeeded in organizing the enrolment of 46,000 men, who proved their excellent fighting qualities. Officers were sent from the re-constituted Serbian Army in 1916 to take over the command. The first Yugo-slav Division, which took part in the disastrous

¹ It was, however, admitted that certain Croat regiments had participated in the terrorism of occupied Serbia. These regiments seem to have been under Frankist influences as they were largely recruited from the Zagorje the stronghold of Frank. For Dr. Frank v. p. 188, n. 1.

fighting in the Dobrudja at the end of 1916, was almost annihilated. This misfortune, along with friction over their maintenance and supplies, Red propaganda and their unwillingness to fight for Rumania, caused disputes in the ranks of the volunteers. A certain cleavage between the Serbs and the others became apparent. Some Croatian and Slovene officers published a protest, emphasizing the united Yugo-slav character of their ideals, which were opposed to the predominance of any part of the race over the remainder.

Towards the close of 1916 the delicate plant of Yugo-slav nationalism seemed on the point of death, although the Serbian Army gave proof of its resurrection in its successful advance on Monastir. Along with the other nationalities of the Dual Monarchy, the Yugo-slavs seemed destined to sink into the new *Mittel-Europa*, whose organization was being prepared. But the next two years witnessed the steady growth of the Yugo-slav movement and its ultimate triumph. Several events mark the early stages of this resurrection.

(a) *The Death of the Emperor*. On the 21st November 1916 the Emperor Francis Joseph died. His successor, the young Emperor Charles, was reported to share the views of his murdered uncle, Franz Ferdinand, in favour of something like Trialism. He issued a proclamation promising to respect the equality of all the peoples of his Monarchy. The germanizing v. Koerber and the Magyar Burian were displaced in favour of Clam-Martinić and Czernin, as Austrian Prime Minister and as Foreign Minister respectively. Clam-Martinić made a declaration of his policy, which he declared to be one of justice and conciliation to all the nationalities. Even if the Slavs by long experience had learned to suspect the promises of Vienna, it was clear that a milder régime had begun, an impression greatly strengthened by the new Emperor's act in releasing a number of prominent Slavs imprisoned for political offences.

(b) *The Allied War-aims*. In December 1916 the Central Empires began overtures for peace, and President Wilson requested the opposing sides to make a statement of their war-aims. Hitherto, the Entente Powers had been officially pledged to no undertaking with regard to the Yugo-slavs beyond the promise of Yugo-slav lands to Italy and Rumania. Now, however, on the 10th January 1917, they despatched to America a Note, in which they required the restoration 'with

the compensations due to them ' of Serbia and Montenegro and ' the liberation of the Italians, as also of the Slavs, Rumanes, and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination'.¹ Since the Czecho-Slovaks here received special mention and the Polish question was treated in a separate paragraph, the word 'Slavs' could only refer to the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The Allied Governments had by no means committed themselves to the dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy, but their words showed the direction in which their policy was naturally evolving. At last the Entente was coming forward definitely as the champion of national self-determination at the expense of such non-national States as the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires. The Allied Note might be interpreted as no more than an intention to demand autonomy for the subject races. But a promising start had already been made. The Yugo-slavs of the Dual Monarchy might henceforth reasonably suppose that they had the sympathy of the Entente.

(c) *The Russian Revolution.* Although for eight months after the revolution of March 1917, Russia remained a member of the Entente, it very soon became clear that a wholly new situation had been created on the Eastern Front. The Russian Armies were of little further use to the Allied cause. But the Central Empires could no longer point to the menace of Tsarism to stimulate the loyalty of their subject peoples. Instead of urging the Catholic Slavs against the Russian bayonets, the Central Empires now had to preserve them from contamination by Russian revolutionary ideas. Democratic phrases began to be bandied about in Austria-Hungary. A new atmosphere was created. Above all, the sinister influence of Tsarism, which had kept Serbs and Croats apart, was removed. The Serbian Government and the representatives of the Yugo-slavs were now free to lay down the lines of a common policy.

(d) *The Entry of America into the War.* If the military collapse of Russia enabled the Austro-Hungarian authorities to represent the final triumph of the Entente as impossible, the balance of power was gradually restored by the appearance of America as a belligerent. Of the Western Powers America was probably the best known, at any rate to the poorer classes of the Yugo-slavs. The Yugo-slav colony in America was incomparably greater than that in any European country, and

¹ v. Text in Vol. I, App. I; cf. also Vol. I, pp. 172-3.

it was from North and South America that most of the funds and support of the Yugo-slav Committee were forthcoming. The Yugo-slavs saw in America a great democratic nation, evidently not moved by the desire for territorial acquisitions, naturally fitted for impartiality in European affairs. Further, America was not bound by those secret treaties which had aroused so much distrust. The United States could invoke the ideals of nationalism and self-determination unhampered by any previous territorial bargaining, and in the great Republic the Yugo-slavs could expect to find a sympathetic supporter.

(e) *The Restoration of Political Life in Austria.* The Emperor Charles seems to have been convinced that the Monarchy's interests would be best served by conciliation of the nationalities and freedom of political discussion. The Hungarian Government would have nothing to say to such ideas, and in any case were able to display the uninterrupted continuance of the Hungarian Parliament, in which, however, the Magyar predominance underlay and rendered nugatory the façade of constitutional forms. But in Austria preparations were made for the early re-opening of the Reichsrat. The Austrian Government found themselves in a position of great difficulty. In the Reichsrat the Slavs were in a small majority over any combination of the other races. In order to secure that first necessity of constitutional life, the passage of the Budget, the Government issued hints as to local autonomy, and kept Pan-Germanism as far as possible in the background. The Slavs, however, came to the parliamentary battle-field determined not to be bought with phrases, and saw their opportunity in the Monarchy's extreme economic necessities. Following the example of the Czechs and Poles, the Yugo-slav deputies formed themselves into one club, in which Slovene Clericals and Dalmatian Liberals united under the leadership of a young Slovene priest from Marburg, Fr. Korošec. When the Reichsrat met on the 30th May 1917 the Yugo-slav Club at once put forward a declaration demanding 'on the basis of the national principle and Croatian State Right the unification of all territories of the Monarchy inhabited by Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in one independent political body, free from all foreign domination and founded on a democratic basis, under the sceptre of the Habsburg dynasty'. This manifesto was signed by all the thirty-three Yugo-slav deputies, even including the two

(Šuštersić and Jaklić), who subsequently separated from their colleagues and supported the Government. The reference to the Habsburg dynasty appeared to be dictated only by prudential motives ; and such was the interpretation put upon it by the Yugo-slav and the Viennese press. In subsequent Yugo-slav declarations the 'May manifesto' was taken as a minimum, and the reference to the house of Habsburg usually omitted. It is not surprising that the German-Austrian newspapers denounced the Yugo-slavs as traitors, and said that their leaders spoke as if they were paid agents of the Entente.

In the agitation which followed this declaration of policy the lead was taken by the Slovenes, owing to the Government's repressive measures in Istria and Dalmatia. It is interesting to note how the Catholic Slovenes, led largely by their clergy, moved steadily towards the idea of union with Orthodox Serbia. The movement was evidently widespread, for in 1917 a petition for incorporation in a state which should include all Yugo-slavs was reported to have received the signatures of 200,000 women, i. e. about one-seventh of the total Slovene population. The sufferings of the Slovenes during the war and the Government's indifference to their interests, must have been great in order to cause this rapid development of a national sentiment, which was present but not conspicuous before 1914.

The new reign had also brought a resumption of parliamentary life in Croatia.¹ Here the ministerialist Coalition party could not go so far as the Slovenes without endangering the measure of Home Rule which Croatia enjoyed. Yet they also issued a declaration of a moderate Yugo-slav kind. On the 2nd March 1917 they demanded the reunion of Dalmatia to Croatia in the framework of the Hungaro-Croatian Common State. But for the time being the Coalition leaders were more occupied with the immediate task of securing an extension of the narrow Croatian franchise and the appointment of a patriotic Croat as Ban (head of their government). These objects were furthered by the Emperor-King's dismissal of the conservative Count Tisza in May, and the nomination as

¹ The parties in Croatia were as follows: the Serbo-Croat Coalition (Svetozar Pribičević), which stood for reconciliation between Serbs and Croats; the Starčevićs (Pavelić), who advocated the revival of the Croatian kingdom; the Frankists (Dr. Frank), who stood for obedience to Vienna; the Peasant Party, or followers of Radić, who advocated a wild plan of agrarian reform.

Hungarian Premier of Count Eszterházy, who was expected to launch a scheme of electoral reform in Transleithania. The new Premier had to choose with regard to Croatia between a Government based on the support of the Coalition, or a Government based on the Frankists, the only enthusiastically pro-Habsburg party at Zagreb, or a frankly unconstitutional dictatorship. The last two would have been in contradiction to the new parliamentary orientation of the Monarchy, and their mere suggestion aroused the protests of the more liberal press in both halves of the Monarchy. Also the Frankists were known to be anti-Magyar and to look to Vienna for deliverance from Budapest. Eventually, a landlord of Slavonia, Mihalović, was appointed Ban. On the 12th July the new Ban presented to the Parliament of Zagreb his cabinet and his programme, which was to be one of nationalism and electoral reform. The only sign of Yugo-slav aspirations was an allusion to our people 'without distinction of name, religion or class'. But, if the Coalition were opportunist, and continued to pay lip-service to the union with Hungary, the opposition parties at Zagreb developed a fierce attack on that union. The Starčevićs came forward as the champions of Yugo-slav nationalism. From having been stiff supporters of the exclusively Croatian state-idea, they now accepted the ideal of the 'May manifesto', thereby drawing to themselves those Serbs who were discontented with the Coalition's moderation. In August, Radić, the leader of the small Peasants' Party, made a considerable sensation by declaring that the will of the people could not be fulfilled without complete independence and the union of all the Yugo-slavs in one State. On the 1st July the Frankist organ, *Hrvatska*, lamented that 'to-day 90 per cent. of the Croatian intellectuals are enthusiastic for the chimerical Yugo-slavia'.

It was at this moment, when the national idea was rapidly capturing all localities and the most varied interests amongst the Yugo-slavs, that a definite programme was announced to the world by their exiled fellow-countrymen outside the Monarchy.

(f) *The Manifesto (Pact) of Corfu, 20th July 1917.*¹ After the fall of the Russian autocracy there was no reason why the

¹ v. Text in Vol. V, App. III. No Montenegrin representative was present.

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Serbian Government should not openly adhere to the programme of United Yugo-slavia. The Serbian Prime Minister, M. Pašić, and the President of the Yugo-slav Committee, Dr. Trumbić, entered into negotiation, and on the 20th July 1917 issued the Manifesto of Corfu, which laid down the bases of the future 'Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes'. This future State was to be a 'democratic and parliamentary monarchy under the Karageorgević Dynasty', in which the maintenance of both the Latin and the Cyrillic alphabets and the equality of the three religions, Orthodox, Catholic and Mohammedan, were guaranteed. The signatories claimed all the lands inhabited in territorial continuity by their nation, including Montenegro, and repudiated any partial attempt at the national unification. The details of the future Constitution were to be elaborated by a Constituent Assembly, elected by universal suffrage; but it was provided that local autonomies should be established in accordance with natural, social and economic conditions. This State, it was asserted, would contain twelve million inhabitants, would be a strong bulwark against the Germanic thrust southwards, and a worthy member of the new Community of Nations, based on the rule of international law and justice.

The publication of this Manifesto marks a decisive point in the Yugo-slav movement. At last all nationalist sections of the people had a definite war-aim before them, even if within the Dual Monarchy some were doubtful about certain points and nobody could in so many words declare his adhesion to the document. Although none of the Entente Powers officially expressed approval of the Manifesto, yet the favourable reception accorded to it in the Entente countries acted as a great encouragement to Yugo-slavs both within and without the Dual Monarchy. A steady stream of Yugo-slav volunteers from America began to flow into the Serbian Army. The Croatian and Slovene newspapers published the text of the Manifesto without any comment, thus infuriating the official press of Vienna and especially Budapest, where a revival of Trialism was feared and threats of separation were levelled at Austria for her inability to keep her Slavs in order.

Proposals of Trialism were indeed now put forward as attempts to conciliate the Yugo-slavs. Dr. Pilar, in August 1917, proposed a scheme by which Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia

and Bosnia-Herzegovina should be united in an autonomous and constitutional state, under a Habsburg duke of Croatia, and joining in the common affairs of the Monarchy through the medium of a third delegation equal in number to the Austrian or the Hungarian. In November, Mgr Stadler, the Catholic Archbishop of Sarajevo, issued a declaration in favour of the revival of an autonomous Croatian kingdom, containing all the territories mentioned by Dr. Pilar, as well as Eastern Istria, and even, it was hoped, at some future date the Slovene lands. These plans were denounced by the Magyars, who saw in the growing movement a danger to their possession of a littoral and their exploitation of the nationalities.

It is remarkable that the clergy, even some noted for devotion to the Habsburg dynasty, were conspicuous in their support of the Yugo-slav Club's May declaration. Mgr Stadler's organ, *Hrvatski Dnevnik*, and some of the higher Croatian clergy adopted it; the Slovene clergy preached it; and in September the very influential Prince-Bishop of Ljubljana (Laibach), Mgr Jeglič, expressed his approval of the nationalist demand. The now famous Fr. Korošec visited Bosnia and Croatia to organize the national movement, to the indignation of the Magyar press, which declared that it was the Government's duty to hang on the nearest tree persons who thus came from Austria on to Hungarian soil in order to stir up treason against the Hungarian State. Growing bolder, Fr. Korošec in October 1917 denounced the Austrian Government's indifference to Yugo-slav claims, and declared that the matter would be settled 'in the forum outside the Monarchy, which would be to the interest neither of the Monarchy nor of the dynasty'.

In October 1917 the Dual Monarchy, rapidly sinking into economic and social chaos, seemed galvanized once more into life by the victory of Caporetto, and the support accorded to the Austrian Ministry by the Poles, in return for the promise of the inclusion of Galicia in the Polish kingdom. This impression was strengthened when in November the Bolshevik Government of Russia opened negotiations for peace. The apparent deadlock on the Western Front, and the disappearance of Russia as a belligerent caused the Entente statesmen to put forward more guarded and moderate declarations with regard to the Dual Monarchy. In his speech of the 5th January 1918

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Mr. Lloyd George said that 'the break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war-aims', and that, if genuine self-government on democratic principles were given to the nationalities, 'Austria-Hungary would become a Power whose strength would conduce to the permanent peace and freedom of Europe'. Although President Wilson spoke clearly on the 8th January in favour of self-determination, he said also that he did not wish to break up Austria-Hungary, and the Entente seemed for the moment to despair of complete victory and to be making attempts at the detachment of Austria-Hungary from Germany.¹ This policy was probably quite impracticable, owing to Germany's hold on her ally, and, had it been successful, would only have meant the continuance of national struggles in the Dual Monarchy, where the Slavs were now determined not to compromise.

Despite the moderation of the Entente's pronouncements, manifestations of Yugo-slav nationalism increased in 1918. On the 31st January the Yugo-slav Club sent out a Memorandum to the Peace Conference at Brest-Litovsk, denouncing the Dual Monarchy for not permitting its nationalities to be represented at the Conference, and demanding that free self-determination which the Bolsheviks had proposed as a condition of peace and without which peace was impossible.

The publication of this document was forbidden by the Austrian censor, but it appeared in the *Obzor* of Zagreb on the 3rd February. The Croatian censor had before shown his Yugo-slav sympathies by permitting the publication of Trešić-Pavičić's famous speech in the Reichsrat on the 19th October 1917, with its revelations of appalling atrocities in Dalmatia and Bosnia.² The press of Vienna in March 1918 complained that in Croatia the police declined to interfere with demonstrations, and that public officials collaborated in disorder. On the 31st January the *Novine*, the organ of Archbishop Bauer of Zagreb, stated that the Gordian knot of Yugo-slav difficulties

¹ Cf. Vol. I, pp. 189-95, 371. Text of Wilson's speech is in Vol. I, pp. 481-5.

² The speech was delivered in the Reichsrat on the 19th October, and a censored edition appeared in *Novosti* (the Croat journal) on 25th-26th October; the full text was long in being disclosed. The censored text is in *Les Souffrances d'un peuple*, Mémoire du parti socialiste serbe, Préface de Camille Huysman, Geneva, 1918. On the 20th February 1918, Trešić-Pavičić referred to this previous speech and said that what he had then said was only the 'pale reflection' of what had actually occurred and was still occurring in various districts.

'must be cut by the sword of Alexander', a thinly-veiled reference to the Prince-Regent of Serbia. The sixtieth birthday of Count Lujo Vojnović, the Dalmatian poet, lately released from prison, was made the occasion of Yugo-slav *fêtes*, at which complete independence from Habsburg rule was demanded. The list of demonstrations in 1918 could be indefinitely prolonged. Mention should, however, be made of the feeling shown by the Yugo-slav troops. One Bosnian regiment (the 22nd) mutinied in February. Many deserters took to the hills and forests of Bosnia and Croatia, where they formed irregular 'Green Bands', causing a state of siege to be proclaimed in Croatia. Most striking of all was the mutiny in the fleet at Cattaro in February. The Yugo-slav sailors, who formed a large proportion of the personnel, secured possession of a number of vessels, and, when threatened by loyalist ships, sent an aviator to Italy to ask for assistance, but without success.¹

The Yugo-slav leaders were now convinced that the Dual Monarchy could not emancipate itself from Pan-German control. The transference of the Yugo-slav volunteers from Archangel to the Serbian Front in Macedonia, and the development of Yugo-slav propaganda across the lines in Italy, had great moral effect and the increasing numbers of the Entente's forces compelled belief in their power, as soon as the German thrust of March was brought to a standstill. But the Yugo-slavs could not commit themselves to the Entente, as long as they suspected Italy of designs on their lands. It was, therefore, of great importance that early in 1918 Signor Orlando countenanced discussions with Dr. Trumbić which resulted in the Pact of Rome, signed in March by Dr. Trumbić and by Signor Torre, representing a strong committee of the Italian Parliament.² This agreement received wide support among instructed Italian circles which had become convinced of the anti-Habsburg nature of the Yugo-slav movement, and of the necessity for Italo-Yugo-slav friendship and co-operation. By this convention it was agreed that each of the two nations was vitally interested in the completion of the unity and independence of the other; that to both nations the liberation of the Adriatic was of equal importance; that both bound themselves to solve

¹ Cp. pp. 50, 123, 205-6.

² v. also Chap. V, pp. 293-5.

their territorial controversies on the basis of national self-determination, though with respect for the vital interests of each; and that any groups of one nation, which should be included within the frontiers of the other, should receive guarantees for their cultural and economic welfare. This agreement, though not supported by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had far-reaching effects in persuading the Yugo-slavs that in Italy they had a friend and not an enemy.

Their confidence in the Entente was increased by the American declaration of the 28th June, that 'all branches of the Slav race should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule'.¹ The revolutionary movement now spread rapidly in the Austro-Hungarian Army and Navy, and prepared the way for the collapse of the Dual Monarchy's forces in October.

C. THE YUGO-SLAV REVOLUTION

6. *The Serbian offensive of September 1918.* The Gordian knot of Yugo-slav politics was 'cut by the sword of Alexander'. The advance of the Serbian Army from the Salonica Front profoundly affected the Southern Slav lands and brought on their complete break with the Dual Monarchy. In August the situation in Macedonia decided the Allied Command in favour of an offensive. Most of the German troops had been withdrawn. The Allies were reinforced by nine Greek divisions. The position of the Western Front was hopeful, and the *moral* of the Bulgars was known to be considerably lowered. The plan adopted was to pierce the Bulgarian line in the centre on a front of thirty kilometres, to press on across very difficult mountainous country, to reach and bestride the middle Vardar, and so to cut off the Bulgarian forces in western Macedonia from the remainder and from their own country, while at the same time turning the flank of the Bulgarian fortified line north of Doiran. On the whole line the Bulgarians had a slight numerical superiority in rifle strength, but on the portion of the front selected for the break-through the six Serbian and two French divisions were concentrated, so that there they outnumbered the enemy by more than three to one, with a corresponding superiority in artillery and machine guns. Despite the advantage of numbers, however, it might well have been

¹ Cf. Vol. I, pp. 198-200.

doubted if the attack could prove successful, so strong was the enemy position on the precipitous Moglenitza mountains. On the 15th September the attack opened all along the line. In the centre the French and Serbians effected the proposed breach, and then, while the British and Greeks slowly pressed forward in the face of strenuous resistance, the Serbians poured through the gap and hurried northwards. The country was too difficult to permit of any kind of wheeled transport. But the Serbs are masters of mountain warfare. They left their transport behind, and within a week two of their divisions were on the Middle Vardar in the neighbourhood of Krivolak. The Bulgars began to retreat at every point. While the British crossed the Bulgarian frontier and entered the Strumica valley. The Serbians continued their pursuit through Štip and up the Bregalnica. After eleven days from the opening of the offensive the Bulgars asked for terms, and on the 29th September an armistice was signed at Salonica.

Although chagrined at being prevented by the armistice from entering Bulgaria, the Serbians without delay proceeded to the task of clearing their own country of Austrian troops and the German divisions which had been brought up to save the situation. The peasantry everywhere joined their efforts to those of the victorious army, which continued to advance rapidly, despite the ravages of influenza and the methodical destruction of roads and railways by the enemy.

On the 1st November the Serbian cavalry rode into Belgrade. Immediately deputations began to arrive from the Banat, from Syrmia, and finally, on the 5th November, from the National Council at Zagreb, asking for Serbian troops in view of the anarchy prevailing in those territories. Accordingly the Serbian Army passed on out of its country to the occupation of the Yugo-slav lands. In the south some of the Yugo-slav division were already in Montenegro. By the 17th November the Serbs occupied a line Temesvár-Subotica-Baja-Pécs.¹ The headquarters of the second army was established at Sarajevo. Serbian troops were already at Zagreb, whence one battalion had gone on to Fiume on the 15th. Small detachments were at Spalato and Ragusa. At the end of the two months' offensive the Serbians, who had started with a rifle-strength of less than 40,000, had taken 26,000 prisoners, and found them-

¹ v. Map of ultimate armistice line, opp. p. 122.

selves in occupation of territory six times the size of their own kingdom. Meanwhile events had occurred elsewhere which caused the Yugo-slavs as a whole to look upon the Serbians not only as conquering brothers of their race and language, but also as their only defence against invasion from another quarter.

7. *The Revolutionary Movement within Austria-Hungary, October–November 1918.* By August the authority of the Central Government was coming to an end in the Slovene lands. On the 16th–19th a congress was held at Ljubljana (Laibach), at which a Slovene National Council was formed under the presidency of Fr. Korošec, who declared that it was merely preparatory to a united Yugo-slav Council soon to be established at Zagreb. The council at once began to assume the character of an unofficial executive. In October the Yugo-slav Club issued a declaration insisting that

- (a) The Yugo-slavs were a single, indivisible people ;
- (b) They demanded national self-determination ;
- (c) They would grant cultural privileges to any racial minorities in their midst, and would open the Adriatic ports to free commerce ;
- (d) They demanded representation at the Peace Conference.

Members of all political parties signed this statement, except the official Coalition and the Frankists. Coming shortly after the Bulgarian collapse it was taken to indicate that the end of the Habsburg Monarchy was considered to be imminent, and that the wrath of Vienna need no longer be considered.

The Governments of Vienna and Budapest were meanwhile carrying on somewhat academic discussions on the solution of the Yugo-slav problem. It was clear that large concessions to Yugo-slav nationalism could no longer be avoided. Indeed they were necessary for the Monarchy's attempt to secure terms of peace through President Wilson.

But to the last all such plans were wrecked on the mutual opposition of Austria and Hungary. The Austrian Premier alluded to forthcoming measures which should provide for the unity and autonomy of the Yugo-slavs. This was met by the Hungarian demand that any such unity must be effected within the Hungarian State-system and under the crown of St. Stephen. Count Tisza toured through Bosnia to secure

support for a Hungarian solution of the problem, but found no adherents worth consideration. Finally, on the 16th October, the Emperor Charles issued a manifesto converting Austria into a federation of self-governing national States, but expressly providing that no alteration should be made with regard to Hungary. This was no solution of Yugo-slav difficulties, since it could apply only to Dalmatia, Istria and the Slovene lands, and even if it had dealt with the whole question, it was too late. None of the nationalities of Austria accepted the Imperial offer. Instead they took it as the signal for the break-up of the Habsburg Monarchy. The day after the promulgation of the manifesto, Fr. Korošec in the War Committee of the Austrian Delegation, repudiated the Imperial solution. The political representatives of the Yugo-slavs had no further dealings with the Central Government, and now transferred their activities to Zagreb.

On the 11th October there had been a meeting between the Yugo-slav parties pledged to the formation of a National Council and the Serbo-Croatian Coalition. Two days later the *Jug* was able to report that 'a perfect accord was reached as to the Coalition's adhesion to the great National Council'. The National Council was finally composed of eighty-five members representing the various Yugo-slav provinces, on the rough basis of one to every 100,000 inhabitants, with five members from each of the Parliament of Zagreb, the Yugo-slav Club and the Bosnian Diet. Fiume and Trieste each had its representative. The President was Fr. Korošec, and the Vice-Presidents Dr. A. Pavelić (Starčevist) and Svetozar Pribičević (Serb of the Serbo-Croatian Coalition). These three, with three other politicians of Zagreb, formed the executive committee in whose hands lay the direction of policy. On the 19th October, as an answer to the Imperial Manifesto, the now constituted National Council issued a declaration in favour of self-determination similar to that of the Yugo-slav Club. But for the final step of a break with Austria-Hungary the Parliament of Zagreb waited for the issue of Count Andrassy's overtures to President Wilson. The Italian Government on the 25th September had announced that it considered 'the movement of the Yugo-slav peoples for the acquisition of their independence and for their constitution in a free State as being in harmony with the principles for which the Allies are fighting, as well as with the

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aims of a just and durable peace'. But this statement, admirable in itself, did not bind the Allies, and the Yugo-slavs were not certain whether the Entente might not even yet come to terms with the Habsburg Monarchy. Count Andrassy had asked the American President what form of autonomy for the nationalities would meet with his approval. The President replied that this was a question for the Czechs and Yugo-slavs to decide, and at this word the Habsburg Monarchy finally dissolved.¹ Everywhere National Councils took over the government of their various peoples. The President's reply was published in Zagreb on the 21st October, and became known elsewhere in the course of the next few days. Everywhere Croatian and Yugo-slav tricolors were hoisted and adhesion to the National Council declared. There followed indescribable confusion. The German and Magyar troops of occupation were disarmed, and began to move off towards their homes. All the Adriatic ports and the railways were choked with hundreds of thousands of men who crossed each other's routes on their disorganized journey to their own portions of the Monarchy.

But the creation of the new political order was begun at once. On the 29th October the Parliament of Zagreb unanimously denounced all connexion with the Habsburg Monarchy, proclaimed the national union of Croatia with all the Croatian, Serbian and Slovene lands, and despatched a telegram recalling the Yugo-slav troops from the Italian front. The presence of General Sunarić and other military chiefs indicated that the Croatian forces adhered to the national revolution. The Ban Mihalović then rose, and speaking in the name of the Government, surrendered the executive power to the National Council, which thus became the recognized Government of the nation. Local National Councils were quickly organized in the various provinces to take over the direction of affairs from the Imperial and Royal authorities, and to preserve order. Thus the Yugo-slav revolution was carried out peacefully; and its rapid execution justified the attitude of the various parties during the war. Fr. Korošec and the Slovenes, who had had nothing to lose but their personal freedom, had led the way and pro-

¹ Cp. Chap. I, Part III, §§ 30, 37. v. 'How Austria-Hungary collapsed', by J. Š. Lupis-Vukić, *New Europe*, 25 December 1919, pp. 334-8; v. also *supra* Chap. II, Part II.

gressively increased the Yugo-slav demands, supported by the opposition at Zagreb. The Coalition had made no open move until the Government of Budapest was helpless to resist. When the moment came, all the Yugo-slav parties of the Monarchy united, and the government passed automatically into their hands. The officers and functionaries of Croatia merely had to change the badges on their caps for the national tricolor stamped with the letters S.H.S. (Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenaci).¹

The new State which had thus come into existence was only a temporary expedient. It was recognized by no authority beyond its frontiers, except the Austrian Emperor, who on the 31st October accepted the inevitable and sanctioned the transference to it of the Austro-Hungarian fleet on the Adriatic. The National Council had internal problems to face. Besides the prevailing anarchy, there were those who wished to see an S.C.S. Republic; also certain elements who could scarcely endure the thought of merging their national life in that of 'barbarous' Serbia; also the Italian part of the population in Istria, Fiume, and Zara, who might be expected not to share in the general Yugo-slav enthusiasm. But the two pressing problems, on which all else depended, were those of the new State's relation to Serbia and its relation to the Entente. These two issues were closely interrelated, but it may be convenient for clarity to consider them separately.

8. *The Union with Serbia, 4th December 1918.* All Austrian or Hungarian solutions of the Yugo-slav problem being now out of the question, it remained to be seen whether the mutual jealousies of Serbs and Croats were still strong enough to create a Greater Serbia and a separate Croatia, or if the unity of the race would at last produce united Yugo-slavia. The union of all the Yugo-slav provinces with Serbia on the basis of the Manifesto of Corfu was the aim of the National Council from its first assumption of authority. Already by the 28th October Fr. Korošec with other delegates had arrived at Geneva to get into touch with the Yugo-slav Committee and the Serbian Government, and to inform the Entente Powers of the desires of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The delegation at once conferred upon Dr. Trumbić, president of the Yugo-slav Committee, the task of representing the National Council with the Allies until a common Serbo-Yugo-slav organ of diplomatic

¹ Usually written in English S.C.S. (Serb-Croat-Slovene).

action should be formed. Fr. Korošec then approached the Allied Powers, requesting recognition of the National Council as a belligerent government. By the 6th November, M. Pašić, Dr. Trumbić, and representatives of the various parties in the Serbian Parliament had reached Geneva and met the Yugo-slav delegation in a four days' conference. Recognition of the National Council was immediately accorded by the Serbian Prime Minister, who also instructed the Serbian Ministers at London, Paris, Rome and Washington to approach the Governments to which they were accredited with a view to obtaining similar recognition for the S.C.S. State and for its volunteer troops as an Allied army. Secondly, the Conference proceeded to the formation of a joint Ministry, which should not supersede the Serbian Royal Government or the National Council, but should act as a Serbo-Yugo-slav Federal Cabinet dealing with war, joint finance, communications, reconstruction, prisoners of war and the preparations for the united Constituent Assembly announced by the Manifesto of Corfu. This ministry was to be formed of three Serbians and three Yugo-slavs. At the same time it was announced that all economic and political frontiers were abolished within the united territories of Serbia and the Yugo-slav lands, though the existing *de facto* organs of government were called upon to continue their functions for the time being. Thirdly, the conference discussed the question of Montenegro, where public opinion was believed to be strongly in favour of union with the new State, and invited the Montenegrins to declare themselves in that sense. The Conference then left for Paris to constitute the joint ministry and to press their demand for the Entente's recognition. The difficulties put in the way of the former object (owing, it was believed, to 'Great Serbian' intrigues on the part of some members of the Conference) cast discredit on the new-born union of the whole Yugo-slav people. Recognition was not accorded by the Entente Powers.

The National Council were distressed to find that the Entente did not at once accept them as friends and allies. They were still further distressed and alarmed at the Italian occupation of those Yugo-slav lands which the Treaty of London had attributed to Italy. In particular, the Dalmatian and Slovene delegates, who were among the most eager for the union of the whole nation, saw their own provinces occupied

by foreign troops, and urged the immediate necessity of adherence to Serbia as providing the only chance of recognition by the Entente. Thus Italian pressure acted as a political solidifier, and hastened the last steps towards Yugo-slav unity. On the 24th November the S.C.S. military forces were merged in the Serbian Army, and the National Council decided to appeal from the politicians in Paris direct to the Prince Regent Alexander, to whom they proposed to offer the Regency over all Yugo-slavs. The resolution which contained this offer called upon the Prince to appoint a joint Ministry of Serbians and Yugo-slavs, and to summon a 'State Council' consisting of the National Council, fifty representatives of the Kingdom of Serbia, and five each from Montenegro and the Voivodina¹ (Banat and Bačka). This State Council, to which the joint Ministry was to be responsible, was to draw up the election procedure for the Constituent Assembly which was to be convened as soon as peace and order were restored. Meanwhile the administration of the various provinces was to proceed under the direction of provincial governors appointed by the Prince Regent. The reluctance of Zagreb to submit the control of the nation to Belgrade is noticeable in the provision that the State Council and the Constituent Assembly were both to sit in Sarajevo, evidently considered a suitable capital for the new kingdom as a compromise and as lying nearer to the centre of the kingdom's territories.

On the 1st December a deputation from the National Council conveyed this offer to Prince Alexander at Belgrade and received his acceptance. No territorial name could be found to describe the new kingdom, and the nomenclature used in the Manifesto of Corfu was adopted. On the 4th December the National Council proclaimed the 'Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes', and this action was regularized in an Act passed by the National Council and Skupshtina sitting together as an Assembly on the 16th December.

9. *Union with Montenegro.* In the closing stages of the war two elements claimed to speak for the Montenegrins: King Nicholas and the Montenegrin Committee. The King professed enthusiasm for united Yugo-slavia, but insisted that it should take the form of a confederation, in which his own

¹ The Assembly at Podgorica sent a special resolution to Belgrade (20th November), as did the Voivodina (25th November).

kingdom should retain its separate identity under his own dynasty, and he consistently demanded separate representation for his Government at the Inter-Allied preliminary Conference and at the Peace Conference. The Montenegrin Committee, which was organized by M. Andrija Radović, ex-Premier of Montenegro, claimed that Montenegro's historic rôle as the refuge of those Serbs who would not submit to foreign government, was now wholly unnecessary, and that Montenegrin feeling was already swallowed in a wider Serbian patriotism. They stood for the Manifesto of Corfu, with its absorption of Montenegro in the new kingdom. They also represented King Nicholas as having played a double game, himself apparently adhering to the Entente, while his son, Prince Mirko, lived at Vienna with a view to preserving the dynasty if the Central Empires proved victorious.

When the Montenegrins rose against the Austrian occupation in September and October 1918, a temporary national Government, hostile to King Nicholas, was set up. The arrival of small detachments of the Serbian Army (chiefly Yugo-slavs and Montenegrins) strengthened the authority of this Government. Two members of the Montenegrin Committee, MM. Radović and Spassojević, arrived in November and proceeded at once to organize a response to the Geneva Conference's invitation for an expression of opinion from Montenegro. On the 26th November a 'National Assembly' met at Podgorica and voted the union of the country with Serbia and the deposition of King Nicholas and the Petrović dynasty. A deputation then left for Belgrade to lay this resolution before the Prince Regent, who received it on the 16th December, and signified his acceptance, which was embodied by the Assembly in an Act passed on that day.

The unionist Montenegrins claim that this closed the question of Montenegro, which was henceforth regarded by the Yugo-slavs as an integral part of Serbia. Inter-Allied forces were in the neighbourhood at Cattaro. An American major stopped an Italian force proceeding to Cetinje in November, and mediated between the new Government and insurgents in January 1919. But in fact the country has since been the scene of frequent disturbance. The facts are exceedingly obscure, and it is doubtful if they are known to any living persons. It is probable that the Assembly at

Podgorica was most irregularly elected, and contained only partisans of union. On the other hand, if any considerable particularist opposition had existed in Montenegro, the fact that only unionist opinion was articulate cannot be explained by the pressure of the very small Serbian military forces. There seems to be no doubt that the Montenegrins, as a whole, desire to form part of united Yugo-slavia, but that they cannot in a moment forget their particularist tradition and resent being administered in a draconian fashion by men who have spent their lives in Serbia. A new *régime* under such circumstances cannot be popular, but it is remarkable that the growth of a feeling for autonomy under some form or other of union with Yugo-slavia seems to have continued, while the followers of King Nicholas have greatly declined in numbers.

King Nicholas refused to accept his deposition at the hands of the Podgorica Assembly and published a proclamation to that effect.¹ His position at the Conference was never defined; he addressed a letter to President Wilson which remained unanswered; his representatives were never summoned to the Conference²; and his Prime Minister has subsequently demanded the admission of Montenegro into the League of Nations without success. Theoretically the Allied and Associated Powers had not recognized the deposition of King Nicholas. France and Great Britain both stopped paying their subsidies to him in November 1920, the latter's diplomatic representation ceasing at his court after the 24th August. He remained a King *in partibus* of an independent State with a dwindling revenue and entourage. The legal position was that Serbian troops were keeping order in Montenegro on behalf of the Allies, until the Supreme Council should decide on her destiny. In Great Britain a number of parliamentary representatives took up the case of Montenegro, and the British policy, as

¹ His proclamation announced that he was not against union in a Yugo-slav state but that there must be two separate dynasties. King Nicholas was residing in France at this time.

² It is stated that the Supreme Council decided on the 12th January 1919 that Montenegro should be represented by a delegate, but that his appointment should be left open. Subsequently the S.C.S. Government appointed M. Radović as one of their plenipotentiaries, who might conceivably be held to be a delegate of Montenegro, though not of King Nicholas. The revised proposals of Clemenceau and Lloyd George (14th January 1920, *v.* p. 317) contemplated a Serb-Croat-Slovene State in contact with North Albania (*i. e.* Montenegro would be included in the former), but this arrangement did not materialize. *v.* A. Devine, *Mystery of Montenegro*, 1920, and Letter in *Truth*, 9th March 1921.

eventually announced, was as follows. Lord Crawford on the 29th November 1920 stated that independent reports had already been presented on the condition of Montenegro since the Armistice by two British officials who had visited the country. 'His Majesty's Government were reluctant to accept the decision of the Podgorica Assembly as definite and decided to await the result of the elections to the Constituent Assembly.' A third official,¹ the Assistant Commissioner at the Klagenfurt plebiscite, was then despatched 'to visit Montenegro in order that he might be present while the people are actually voting', and 'judge properly as to the correctness of the official returns'.

The result was that out of ten deputies in Old Montenegro ² 4 voted Communist and 1 Republican, the other 5 were Democrat or Radical, but all favoured some form of union in the Yugo-slav state. King Nicholas's partisans could not agree on a candidate. Over 67 per cent. of the electors voted. This election was considered decisive, and on the 30th December 1920 France withdrew her diplomatic representative from King Nicholas (who died 1st March 1921); Great Britain cancelled the exequaturs of Montenegrin consuls (17th March). The future of Montenegro, therefore, was to lie in Yugo-slavia.

10. *Relations with the Allies after the Armistice.* The fall of the Dual Monarchy occurred before the Allies had made any decision on the Yugo-slav question. The question of the Habsburg Empire was decided by its own disruption. That of the Czecho-Slovaks and of the Poles was comparatively easy. Both were recognized allies, and their claims did not collide with those of the Entente. But the Yugo-slavs had at the moment no recognized organ of representation, and their claims were in most serious conflict with those of Italy, not to mention the Rumanian claim to the whole of the Banat. Allied opinion was divided on the Treaty of London. The Governments of Great Britain and France stood committed to it.

¹ These three officials were Count de Salis, Major H. W. V. Temperley and Mr. Roland Bryce, who were accompanied by Major L. E. Ottilley.

² v. Parl. Paper. Misc. nos. 1-2 (1921), Cmd. 1123-4. The charge of intimidation would appear to be groundless as the Government was at least as much opposed to Communists as to partisans of King Nicholas. 'Old Montenegro' as an electoral area means pre-1913 Montenegro, which contained about 300,000 persons. New or North-East Montenegro voted separately in the electoral area of Serbia. It contains about 135,000 persons, mostly Albanians, who were not likely to favour King Nicholas.

The United States was not informed of the existence or contents of the treaty, nor was Serbia, the country most nearly concerned. But during 1918 the Italian Government had shown increasing sympathy with the Yugo-slav national idea. At the end of October there occurred the complete collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Army in Venetia, and Italy found herself suddenly triumphant, with no enemy before her. Instead, barring her onward progress with words and appeals to nationalistic principles, appeared the nation which until a few days before had given devoted military service to the Habsburg crown. In a moment of such exaltation the Italian authorities could hardly be expected to pause and do homage to the national principle, as represented by their late opponents. Thus a collision of interests between Italy and Serbia was imminent, and the situation one of the greatest delicacy.

The Armistice¹ (3rd Nov.), handed to the Austro-Hungarian command by General Diaz, provided for the inter-Allied occupation of certain territories lying along the Adriatic, which the Yugo-slavs were alarmed to find corresponded with the districts assigned to Italy by the Treaty of London. The Italians claimed to occupy these areas without inter-Allied co-operation, and some facts suggested that they regarded them as annexed to the kingdom of Italy. The Yugo-slavs demanded either no occupation, since they were the allies of the Entente, or else occupation by Powers not themselves directly concerned in the local national dispute.

A difficulty at once arose over the Austro-Hungarian fleet. On the 30th October, at Pola, the Yugo-slav sailors, who formed a large proportion of the naval personnel, with the help of Czech and Polish supporters, mutinied, and it was decided that the Yugo-slav National Committee at Pola should take over the vessels in the port. The next day the Emperor Charles formally made over the whole fleet on the Adriatic to the National Council. The Croatian flag was hoisted, and a message was despatched to the Entente Powers explaining the situation. As by an unfortunate accident the Dreadnought *Viribus Unitis* was next day sunk by the Italians, the Yugo-slav Naval Command addressed a message to the American commander at Corfu, declaring its readiness to surrender the fleet to the

¹ v. for fuller discussion of all these problems, Chap. II, Part I, and Chap. V, Part I.

United States or to the Allied Navies. An Italian naval force entered Pola on the 5th November, and the Inter-Allied naval officers jointly arranged for the surrender of the whole fleet to the Allies, not recognizing it as made to the Yugo-slavs.

The Italian Army then proceeded to the sole occupation of the areas within the line drawn by the Armistice. They also occupied other points, Cattaro, Antivari, the neighbourhood of Laibach, and eventually Fiume, which, though assigned to Croatia by the Treaty of London, was declared to have expressed a desire for annexation to Italy. Here they came into competition with their French and Serbian Allies. They therefore abandoned South Dalmatia and Scutari to mixed Allied occupation and Carniola to the Serbians. They associated small British, French and American forces with themselves at Fiume, inducing the Serbians, who had been the first Allied troops to arrive in that town, to evacuate it on conditions to which Italy did not subsequently adhere.

11. *The Question of Recognition.* As regards the raising of the blockade and commercial intercourse, Yugo-slavia fared very badly at the hands of the Allies. On the 8th February free commercial intercourse was permitted with Czecho-Slovakia, and on the 28th February with Bulgaria (as from the 21st). No such permission was given to Yugo-slavia till the end of March. This bore hardly on Serbia, which was then approachable by rail only across Bosnia or Croatia. Thus the Serbians, to say nothing of the Croats and Slovenes, were worse treated than late technical enemies like the Czecho-Slovaks or real enemies like the Bulgarians.

Meanwhile the members of the Geneva Conference were at Paris pressing for Entente recognition of the National Council. The Entente Governments refused recognition of the Yugo-slavs as Allies until two conditions were fulfilled. The conditions of the Armistice must first be carried out and a common Serbian-Yugo-slav Government formed. The surrender of the fleet and the successful insistence of the Allies that the Yugo-slav military forces must be disbanded (though they were free to volunteer for the Serbian Army) fulfilled the former condition. The announcement in *The Times* on the 3rd January 1919 of the first united Yugo-slav Ministry under the presidency of M. Protić, with Fr. Korošec as vice-president, fulfilled the second. Recognition of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State was

accorded by President Wilson on the 5th February, but not by the other Great Powers ; and the three delegates sent by this joint Government to the Peace Conference, although they were M. Pašić of Serbia, Dr. Trumbić, a Dalmatian Croat, and Dr. Zolger, a Slovene, came officially to Paris as the representatives of Serbia.¹

D. THE YUGO-SLAVS AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

12. *The Yugo-slav Memorandum of Claims.* The memorandum of the claims of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, as presented to the Conference, was, like all such statements, of considerable length. It was also, like all the rest, based upon considerations partly ethnic, partly historic, and partly strategic and economic. But it differed from almost all the others, as, for example, the Italian, the Greek and the Rumanian, in that the ethnic argument was the strongest and most permanent element on which the Yugo-slavs could rely.²

The Memorandum which they presented bore obvious traces of the hand of M. Cvijić, the most learned and enlightened not only of Serbian, but of all Balkan geographic experts. It began by a demonstration of the unique character of Serbia as a 'guardian of the gate' between the East and West, as the chief upholder of the doctrine of right against might and liberty against force, in the recent (and indeed in the age-long) history of her resistance to the aggression of the Germans and Austrians towards the East (*Drang nach Osten*). It went on to say that the war had enabled the three sections of the Yugo-slav race—the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—to demonstrate their solidarity and conjunction with Montenegro, as shown by the vote of its Assembly at Podgorica in November 1918 (which deposed King Nicholas), and to show to the world

¹ In the rules of the Preliminary Peace Conference (18th January 1919), printed in April 1919 (*v. Supplement to the American Journal of International Law*), 'Serbia' alone is mentioned. Recognition was in fact accorded by the Allied and Associated Powers on the 1st May 1919, when credentials were exchanged with the German Delegation in the name of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. Great Britain and France made the fact that they had recognized the new State public on the 2nd and 6th June respectively. Italy withheld her recognition in name but not in fact. On the 28th June the Treaty of Versailles, signed by Italy as well as by the other Powers, contained a full acknowledgement, which soon became public, of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. *v. also Chap. VII and Vol. V, Table III, note on Recognition.*

² For statistical examination, *v. Vol. V, Table I.*

that the long-sundered fragments of the Yugo-slav race were at last reunited as one nation and people with an undivided purpose and aim. As such they appealed to the doctrine of self-determination as accepted by the Powers, and claimed that the principle of nationalities and the right of the nations to dispose themselves of their destinies constituted the basis of their claims.

In regard to Bulgaria the Memorandum claimed rectifications on grounds that were partly ethnic and partly strategic. It claimed the Strumica salient, an extension of the frontier into Bulgarian territory some 20 kilometres east of the 1913 boundary near Vranje, the Dragoman Pass, and possession of territory sufficient to protect the railway from Zajecar to Negotin and to include the great fortress of Vidin.¹ It was claimed, with some truth, that some of the inhabitants in the areas thus affected were actually Serb, and that, in any case, strategic necessities required that a protective belt should be given to Serbia on this frontier to prevent Bulgarian raids or attacks in the future, as Bulgaria had proved herself untrustworthy in the past.

In regard to Rumania, a strong claim in favour of the Western Banat was put up on grounds of historic or ethnic justification. The boundary actually claimed here extended to a point just south of Arad, and thence descended due south, in an irregular line, to the Danube. The very important railway centre of Temesvár and the riverine port of Bâziâs were included in this claim. In fact neither town was predominantly Yugo-slav, and such claims as existed would have rested on economic, historic or strategic grounds.

In regard to Hungary the Yugo-slavs made the following claim. From a point just south of Arad, they argued, the frontier should run westwards to the Danube, just falling south of Szegedin, placing Szabadka (Subotica or Maria Theresiopol) in Yugo-slav hands, but assigning Baja to the new Hungary. In the Baranja the suggested line ran south of Pécs, and included a long strip of territory north of the Drave. The Medjumurye, which had been severed from Croatia by Hungary, and the Prekomurye were both claimed on the ground of their Slav origin and sympathies.

¹ Neither Vidin nor Tsaribrod, the two chief towns affected, had any considerable number of Serb inhabitants. v. Map opp. p. 452.

It is with the Slovene territory that the question of the relation of towns to their surrounding districts arose in an acute form. The line as drawn west of the Prekomurje to the Italian frontier at Pontafel included four very important and predominantly German towns—Radkersburg, Marburg, Klagenfurt, Villach—the latter an extremely important strategic point, forming the centre of the railway connexion between the Tyrol, Italy, and Vienna. In this area then the Yugo-slavs were conflicting partly with the ethnic principle, partly with the principle of freedom of communication.

From Pontafel southwards a more purely ethnographic frontier was claimed following a course about 15 kilometres west of the right bank of the Isonzo, and reaching the sea at Monfalcone—which it left to Italy. The whole of the Istrian peninsula (which contains 223,318 Yugo-slavs to 147,417 Italians), including the predominantly Italian towns of Trieste and Pola, was claimed for Yugo-slavia. The Memorandum spoke even of the ‘absurdity’ of Italian claims on Trieste, and this in a town which in 1910 numbered 57 per cent. of Italians against 43 per cent. of Yugo-slavs.¹ Effective use was made of a sentence of Baron Sonnino: ‘The vindication of Trieste as a right would be an exaggeration of the principle of nationalities without presenting any real interest for our defence’ (*La Rassegna Settimanale*, No. 29, 1881, p. 338). A phrase, which described the Italian towns on the west side of the Istrian peninsula as ‘buttons on the Slav mantle’, was quoted with approval. The important city of Fiume, which, with its suburb Šušak, has a Slav majority against Italians, was claimed *in toto* for Yugo-slavia. It was also pointed out, with a considerable amount of emphasis, that President Wilson, in speaking of ‘self-determination’, took care to add ‘of the nations’, ‘and his thoughts never went so far as the small communities’. Fiume commanded ‘the accesses to Northern Bosnia, Croatia, Hungary, Northern Serbia, . . . in one word to Slav and certain adjacent countries’. It was claimed, however, that Fiume should be Yugo-slav and not international. For ‘if it is equit-

¹ There was more logic in the argument that the retention of Trieste by Italy would force the Italians to claim the 220,000 Slavs of Istria, the 155,000 Slavs of Gorizia and 100,000 Slavs from Carniola. It was contended that this would separate 884,000 Slavs in all ‘from the living organism of their nation’. (This is not very clear; about 700,000 Slavs would have passed to Italy under the Treaty of London.)

able and right to procure, by artificial means, such issues to nations which do not possess them, the more it is right to leave the natural issues to nations which possess them'.

As regards Dalmatia, it was pointed out that the census of 1910 gave 610,660 Serbo-Croats against 18,028 Italians, or 96.19 per cent. to 2.84 per cent., and that Dalmatia was 'the purest of all Slav countries'. It was not stated that Zara possessed a majority of Italians, and that two Istrian islands (Lussin and Veglia) had strong minorities of Italians. The whole Dalmatian coast, plus the islands, was claimed unreservedly for Yugo-slavia on the grounds of the ethnic predominance of the Yugo-slav.

In respect to Albania the Memorandum was vague in its language, though it recognized the possible independence of Albania. But, with obvious reference to Italy, it claimed that if the Conference 'were disposed to recognize to a foreign State a right of occupation or protectorate over the totality or a part of the said territory, we must declare that we mean to keep the right of guaranteeing our vital interests in these regions—claiming the same rights for our states'. What this meant is shown by one of the maps attached to the Memorandum. It includes the towns of Alessio and Scutari in Yugo-slav territory, as well as the line of the Drin to a point near Dibra; in addition the whole of the shores of Lake Ochrida with the town of Pogradetz would pass into Yugo-slav hands. Scutari, Alessio and Pogradetz are all almost purely Albanian towns, and the rest of the territory included is Albanian in race, if not always in sentiment. Thus, whatever claims the Yugo-slavs might advance to Albania were based on the principle of balance, of compensation or of strategy, and not upon that of ethnic justice.

13. *The General Principles underlying the Settlement of the Yugo-slav Boundaries at the Conference.* (a) *The Northern Frontier to Beremend.* The western boundary of Yugo-slavia was subsequently settled at Rapallo by direct negotiation between Yugo-slavia and Italy.¹ As such it is described elsewhere. The northern boundary starts at Pec, the place where Italy, Austria and Yugo-slavia meet. The result of the Klagenfurt plebiscite has handed over more than 80,000 Slovenes to Austria, and the boundary here follows the Karavanken.² The Prekomurje is a pronounced projection to the north. The frontier eastwards follows the line of the Mur and the Drave

¹ v. Chap. V, Part I.

² v. Chap. VI, Part II.

until it reaches Beremend. This frontier is obviously an almost purely ethnic line. The only two departures from this rule are the inclusion in Yugo-slavia of the German districts of Gottschee and the German town of Marburg (Maribor). These do not really raise much question of principle. Gottschee is an island in a Slav sea, and Marburg is surrounded by Slovene villages, and is important to Yugo-slavia from a communication point of view.

(b) *The Baranja.* From Beremend the frontier proceeds eastward through the Baranja, to hit the Danube below Mohacs. This frontier is not purely ethnic, but the continual shifting of the bed of both Drave and Danube rendered the river lines here unsuitable as frontiers. The present frontier gives the Yugo-slavs an extension to the north, and includes a ridge of hills of importance for defence. Hungary retains the valuable coal-mines of Pécs, and holds another mountain-line which strengthens her defensive position. Neither side is in a position to assume the offensive.

(c) *The Bačka and Banat.* The Yugo-slav frontier in the Bačka includes the important town of Szabadka (Subotica), and stops just south of Szegedin. It then turns in a general south-easterly direction towards the Danube, including Nagy Kikinda and Versecz (Všrac) in Yugo-slavia. The ethnic character of these areas is exceedingly mixed in both cases, and the main objects of the boundary are two: first, to give Belgrade a substantial bridgehead on the north side of the Danube; second, to draw lines suited to the ethnic features. Most people will admit that the Bačka frontier—between Yugo-slav and Magyar—is not drawn to the advantage of the latter, but that the Banat frontier is a fair compromise between the conflicting Rumanian and Yugo-slav claims. On the whole, then, the northern boundary of the Yugo-slavs (and the eastern to the Danube) is one that satisfies their claims equitably, and in the Bačka even exceeds their expectations. The Yugo-Slavs claimed Temesvár¹ in virtue of historic rights, but the ethnic case against them was overwhelming. Much irritation, which has now finally died down, was caused in the summer of 1919 when the frontiers were made definite.

(d) *The Frontier with Bulgaria.* This is described in detail elsewhere.² The main points illustrate, however, a valuable

¹ The environs are German or Rumanian and less than 5 per cent. of the town population are Serb. For further treatment *v.* Part II, § 18 (c), pp. 229–30.

² Chap. VIII, § 7, C, and map opp. p. 453.

principle. The strategic character of the frontier is admitted, but care has been taken to draw a line, which puts both sides in a good defensive position, without giving either the capacity for an offensive. Had the Serbs secured Vidin and the Dragomanci Pass, the Bulgars would have been helpless, and Sofia would have been threatened at the outbreak of war. This was not permitted, and Bulgaria still has a good defensive position, while she is unable to threaten the vital railway line from Nish to Salonica. She has lost some population of Bulgarian race, but once granted the necessity of strategic rectifications, this was inevitable, and the numbers involved are small. It is instructive to compare the Yugo-slav frontier with Bulgaria, and in the Baranja, with the Italian in the Brenner. In the latter case Italy obtains a capacity for the offensive against Austria, while the Yugo-slavs only possess sound defensive positions against Hungary and Bulgaria.

(e) *The Albanian Frontier* (v. Chap. V, Part II, *passim*).

(f) *Fiume and Dalmatia* (v. Chap. V, Part I, *passim*).

(g) *General Conclusions*. The Yugo-slavs have obtained an excellent frontier to the north, exceeding in some respects that advocated by fervent champions of their cause in 1915. The striking feature is that, though they have lost the Slovenes of the Klagenfurt basin by plebiscite, they have been enabled to obtain the control of large numbers of Magyars, Germans and Rumans in the Bačka and Banat with a frontier highly favourable to Yugo-slavia and without the agency of a plebiscite.¹ The principles on which the Powers acted in this decision have not been revealed to the world. It is, however, obvious that plebiscites would have been very difficult in a area which is a parti-coloured mosaic of nationalities. As the boundaries in Hungary are not distinguished by any natural features, they will form a study of peculiar interest in the future. As regards the two boundaries (Baranja and Bulgaria), these are a model of how to draw a just and moderate strategic frontier. On the whole, Yugo-slavia has gained greatly, having acquired areas of vast agricultural wealth, to which at least two other nationalities laid claim. Provided free communication through Fiume is assured, the economic possibilities of Yugo-slavia are great.

¹ In the case of nearly half a million Slavs assigned to Italy without plebiscite, the 'sanctity of treaties' was asserted by the three Powers as a principle. v. Chap. VII, pp. 405-6.

CHAPTER IV

THE LIBERATION OF THE NEW NATIONALITIES

PART II

RUMANIA AND THE REDEMPTION OF THE RUMANIANS

1. *Parallel between Rumania and Italy ; relations to Central Powers.* A close parallel has rightly been drawn between the situation of Rumania and that of Italy at the outbreak of the European War—a situation which in both countries developed, further, on somewhat similar lines through the opening stages of the Peace Conference. Like her western 'Latin sister', Rumania, at the outbreak of war, found herself the associate of the Central Powers, with whose policy of aggression every consideration alike of sentiment and of interest induced her strongly to disagree. Italy had entered into the Austro-German alliance in the 'eighties partly as a mistaken reply to the supposed aggressions of France in Africa, but chiefly because only some such move could assuage or defer the burning controversy of *Italia irredenta*. Rumania, on her part, had similarly attached herself in 1883 to the same group of Powers, moved alike by resentment against and fear of Russian policy and also by the desire to improve by this peaceful means the lot of the 3½ million Rumans of Austria-Hungary whom she was too weak to liberate by force. The difference between the position of Italy and of Rumania lay in the fact that the former was an open, the latter an undeclared, ally of the Central Powers. The agreement of the 30th October 1883, arrived at between Andrásy and the elder Brătianu, under Bismarck's auspices (to which Germany and Italy became partners, and which was constantly renewed¹), had never been submitted to the Rumanian Parliament. Its endorsement might have been hard to procure, for it was not generally accepted in Rumania, where Gallophilism was a cherished tradition, as anything more than a supposed diplomatic manceuvre. Nevertheless, the

¹ In 1888, 1892, 1896, 1902, and 1913.

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practical results of the Entente of 1883 were of vital importance. They meant that for thirty years Rumania became a client of Austro-German commercial enterprise, and that through commerce and finance Germanic policy was able to control, even against its will, the Rumanian Government.

2. *Rumania refuses to enter the War, 1914.* The outbreak of war brought matters to a head. The tradition of attachment to the Hohenzollern-Habsburg cause weighed strongly with King Charles, himself a Hohenzollern. It was not only the natural ties of descent and friendship with the German rulers, but a rooted and sincere belief that only by the closest collaboration with Germany could Rumania now reap the fruits of the work which for forty-eight years he had painstakingly fostered, that of imitation of German methods alike military, scientific, and commercial. Convinced that the Austro-German *bloc* would be victorious, and that its victory would be a victory for efficiency and civilization over the Slav masses that surrounded Rumania on every side, King Charles could not hesitate as to his decision. The day after the outbreak of the general war he summoned to Sinaia a Crown Council, at which alike the Government and opposition leaders were fully represented, and proposed that Rumania should enter the war as the logical fulfilment of the policy of 1883.

It is no purpose of this record to recount the subsequent course of events: it is generally known how the Rumanian Government under M. Ion Brătianu cautiously refused to commit themselves to the King's proposals. The only opposition leader who favoured King Charles's plan was M. Petru Carp, a sincere enemy of Russia, who saw in Germany the natural friend and patron of Rumania's future development, alike political and economic. M. Carp was alone in advocating active intervention. Of his former colleagues in the Conservative party, M. Marghiloman, representative of the landed proprietors, a boyar of considerable intelligence for all his pro-German views, was against active intervention and counselled a resolute policy of neutrality. His former associates, led by Nicolae Filipescu, strongly pro-Entente in sympathy, were urgent for intervention against the Germanic Powers to achieve the liberation of Transylvania. Their divergence of view led shortly after to a disruption in the Conservative party and to an alliance between Filipescu and the leader of the Conservative

Democratic party, Take Ionescu, a statesman whose knowledge of European and British politics, unrivalled in Rumania, led him to foresee, as few others in South-East Europe did, the certainty of the eventual victory of the side on which were cast the full strength of the British Empire and the sympathies, and eventually the resources, of the United States.

3. *Neutral and Waiting Policy of Brătianu, 1914-16.* Three months later King Charles died, but the accession of his nephew, King Ferdinand, made momentarily no difference to the policy of watchful neutrality on which the Rumanian Government had decided. It was easily within M. Brătianu's power at any moment to bring his country into the war, for not only had the elections of December 1913 given the Liberal party the crushing majority in Parliament to which Governments in Rumania consider themselves entitled, but, further, such action would have been heartily endorsed, indeed it was clamoured for, by the greater bulk of the opposition now acting as a united group under the joint leadership of Filipescu and Take Ionescu. But Brătianu had much to make him hesitate. To break Rumania's ties with Germany might appear to him a serious step which only the certain defeat and collapse of the Central Powers could justify. Rumanian commerce and industry were closely bound up with those of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and to sever this profitable connexion of forty years was a serious step to take. M. Brătianu's own party, the 'National Liberals', were themselves greatly interested in banking and financial enterprises based fundamentally on the credit and support of the great German banks. Such considerations could not be ignored. And again, M. Brătianu could plead with reason—and events indeed more than justified such a plea—that Rumania was unprepared for war, that her supplies of guns, of munitions, of aircraft, of the requisite rolling-stock were inadequate to the task proposed, and that, unless the Dardanelles were forced or a means of contact with the West secured through Bulgaria, Rumania would have to depend for her equipment and reinforcement on the tedious and insecure route through Russia.

All this must M. Brătianu have considered, and no doubt urged to his King and colleagues. Yet he was not unmoved by the glittering prospect of using this unique opportunity for doubling the size and importance of his country by the acquisition of the neighbouring lands of Austria-Hungary, in which

the Rumanians are the predominating and perhaps the most ancient element of the population. Brătianu did not fall a victim to the Giolitti-like doctrine, preached by Marghiloman's supporters, that much could be gained without the ordeal of war, that the Central Powers could find a *parecchio* to reward Rumania's good behaviour, and that war on Russia for the recovery of Bessarabia (annexed by Tsar Alexander I in 1812) was a more urgent duty than war on Austria-Hungary for the liberation of the three and a half million Rumanians of the Dual Monarchy. M. Brătianu did not fall a victim to this theory. Like Baron Sonnino, he was filled with a patriotic—even chauvinistic—desire to use to the full this chance of founding the greater Rumania which the war had brought. But he lacked trust in his fellow men, and brought into international politics the methods of the bazaar. It is perhaps unfair to criticize the Prime Minister of a small State, a neighbour too of a great Empire ruled by an autocratic Government whose aims were intensely suspect to Rumania, for desiring a written bond before undertaking to plunge his country into the horrors of the world war. That M. Brătianu asked for a written alliance, while M. Venizelos did not, gives perhaps the measure of the two men. But M. Brătianu was at least as justified by circumstances as was Baron Sonnino.

4. *The Secret Treaty with the Entente, 17th August 1916.* The long story of the negotiations between M. Brătianu and the Entente Governments can find no place here. They were spread over nearly two years—from the autumn of 1914 until the 17th August 1916, when the fateful treaty was signed. Brătianu's enthusiasm for intervention waxed and waned with the periodical successes and reverses of the Entente Powers. At the same time, he found the Russian Government less inclined in the hour of success to accord him favourable territorial terms. Consequently there were many delays. Many in Rumania had expected and desired intervention in April 1915, simultaneously with Italy, and bitterly criticized the Italian Government for having failed to seek or secure Rumanian co-operation. The interventionist cry was still louder when the Central Powers began their final invasion of Serbia, and even M. Brătianu, while sticking resolutely to his neutrality—political and commercial—pushed on with his diplomatic negotiations. The Brussiloff offensive in June 1916 quickened his zeal, and its

waning vigour made the Tsarist Government more amenable to Rumanian demands. Already the Russian Government had accepted the idea of large Rumanian acquisitions in Transylvania and beyond. They now agreed (in their haste abandoning the Serbs of Torontál, as in April 1915 they had abandoned the Croats) to the annexation of the whole of the Banat to Rumania, a claim partly justified indeed on geographical and strategic grounds, but clashing seriously with Serbian racial and historic aspirations. The British and French Governments, heartily anxious to obtain Rumanian co-operation, raised no further objections to the territorial demands put forward by the Rumanian Government, and agreed to a frontier running up the Theiss to Szegedin, thence north-east diagonally (passing west of Békés-Csaba) to Vásáros-namény, and comprising, in conclusion, all Bukovina south of the Dniester.¹

With most of the clauses of the Pact concluded on the 17th August we are not here concerned, for most of them dealt with military obligations. Two points, however, merit special attention. By Article 6 of the treaty, Rumania was promised 'the same rights as her Allies' in regard to negotiation and discussion at the future congress of peace. To M. Brătianu this concession seemed of vital importance; he seems somewhat naïvely to have imagined that this clause was a sort of diplomatic charter raising Rumania to the rank of a great Power. Once again his sense of reality was at fault, justified though his aspirations to equality of treatment might be. On the other hand, article 5 pledged both the contracting parties to conclude 'no separate or general peace except jointly and simultaneously'—a fateful undertaking on the execution of which the validity of the whole treaty was to depend.

5. *Rumania's entry into the War and her Defeat, 1916.* Faithful to her engagements, Rumania entered the war ten days later. Her proclamations showed that she intended to claim the Banat. The heated controversies that have raged over Rumanian and Allied strategy during the three months following her entry into the war cannot be reopened here. The accusations against the Rumanian Government of blindly misdirecting their energies to the Transylvanian instead of the Bulgarian front would appear strangely unjust, for not only must this plan long have been known to the Allied Governments, but further,

¹ v. map opp. pp. 122, 210.

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the latter must have been aware that to the Rumanian people as a whole, whose cherished and direct aim was the liberation of Transylvania, a diversion of hostilities to Bulgaria would have been impossibly unpopular. Moreover, Rumanians can reply with some force, that the Allied Governments on their part did little to enhance the importance of the Balkan campaign; small indeed and ill-sustained were the efforts to develop a great offensive from Salonica on which Rumania claims to have relied and Rumanian popular songs bitterly attacked the delays of General Sarrail. Right or wrong, a Transylvanian offensive was the course adopted. A month of easy successes was followed by swift retaliation on the enemy's part. As to whether Russian dilatoriness or the inexperience of the Rumanian command was to blame, various opinions have been held. Desperate attempts to turn the tide of invasion were made but without success. On the 6th December 1916 the German armies entered Bucharest, and the Rumanian Court, Government and military forces evacuated Wallachia and transferred themselves to the sister country of Moldavia.

For nearly two years Wallachia had to endure enemy rule. Actual atrocities were few in number as compared with what went on in Serbia and elsewhere, but hardships there were. Cattle, horses, foodstuffs, metals, rolling-stock were seized and carried off to the enemy countries. Conditions of life were hard; and harder still for the many thousands of refugees who fled to Moldavia. The outbreak of typhus here added to the distress, and the loss of life was heavy. Yet amidst these disasters the country awakened to a new and sterner sense of life. With the help of General Berthelot and his French Mission, the Rumanian Army, under General Averescu's command, was reorganized and regained, or rather increased, its efficiency. The inadequacy of political conditions in the time of crisis was apparent. M. Brătianu, who had hitherto denied to the opposition any participation in affairs, now invited (December 1916) M. Take Ionescu and other Conservative leaders¹ into the Cabinet, and the new Coalition Government proclaimed a policy of universal suffrage and division of the big estates, to which six months later, quickened by the influence of the Russian revolution, Parliament gave legislative form.

6. *The Armistice, December 1917; the Peace of Bucharest,*

¹ Nicolae Filipescu had died some months before.

7th May 1918. The reorganization of the Rumanian Army proved itself in the fighting of July and August 1917, when at the battles of Mărăști and Mărășești severe defeats were inflicted on the German invader. But the Russian Front was already broken or sapped, and with the advent of the Bolsheviks to power on the 6th November, Rumania's position became exceedingly grave. Following on the conclusion of an armistice on the 15th December, the notorious negotiations of Brest-Litovsk were opened on the 22nd December, and as it became clear that the Bolshevik Government had no scruples about signing peace treaties or any other 'scraps of paper' that the Germans might tender them, the imminent danger of Rumania being isolated from all Allied support had to be considered alike by her and the Western Powers. M. Brătianu could not be insensible to the fact that by making peace with the enemy he would violate the treaty of alliance of 1916 and run the risk of forfeiting all the advantages Rumania drew therefrom. He was therefore reluctant to engage himself and his party in peace negotiations, for he found it impossible to obtain from the British and French Governments authorization to conclude peace with the enemy so long as Rumania had an army in the field. On the 9th December, however, he concluded an armistice at Focșani with a view to peace pourparlers.¹ The Western Powers were not insensible to the difficulties of Rumania's position: on her southern and western flanks the enemy armies were threatening to renew what might prove a decisive invasion of Moldavia; to the north and east was Russia, whose Bolshevik Government openly menaced Rumania with war, and was in fact engaged in practical hostilities against her. But it was felt in Paris and London that any course was preferable to surrender, and that there might be some hope that the large and remodelled Rumanian Army, if the worst came to the worst, might evacuate Moldavia altogether and retire towards the Caucasus, where contact with the Allied Powers could be re-established. Whether or not this course were feasible, it found adherents even in Rumania: M. Take Ionescu and others of his way of thinking strongly urged that preparations should be made to continue resistance to the last, and to evacuate the country rather than submit. On the other hand, both King Ferdinand and the Rumanian Higher Command

¹ v. Vol. I, p. 221.

considered this a fatal course. They hoped by negotiations at least to save the army from destruction, and the King had been led to believe from the first tentative pourparlers with the Austro-Germans that an immediate readiness to treat would be rewarded by the enemy with lenient terms of peace. Unwilling to compromise himself, M. Brătianu resigned on the 8th February, and the King called on General Averescu, as an act of military duty, to form a Cabinet for the unpalatable task of concluding peace. Averescu felt he had no course but to obey. Negotiations were opened and on the 5th March—two days after the signature of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk—Rumania signed at Buftea the preliminaries of peace with the enemy powers. The terms were crushingly severe: Rumania ceded practically the whole of the Dobrudja, agreed to the reduction of her military forces to the minimum required to maintain order, and practically submitted to complete economic subjugation to the Central Powers, who were assured far-reaching control over all the productive industries and commerce of the country. Two months later (on the 7th May) the full treaty was signed at Bucharest, but before this—on the 18th March—General Averescu had given place to M. Marghiloman, an elderly Conservative statesman who had all along preached the advantages of neutrality and the *tertius gaudens*.¹

7. *Rumania re-enters the War* (9th November 1918). The six ensuing months of Rumania's enforced neutrality do not here closely concern us. Elections were held and a Parliament, consisting mainly of the Government's nominees, preserved the simulacrum of independence. The declaration of the reunion of Bessarabia with the mother-country, which the 'Council of the Land' adopted at Chişinău (Kishineff) in April, slightly consoled public opinion, and was advertised by M. Marghiloman as a personal triumph for himself. But even his Parliament of nominees were careful not to ratify the Treaty of Bucharest, hoping thereby to save themselves from the charge that the 1916 alliance had been violated. The tide of German success was already on the ebb. On the 26th September came the surrender of Bulgaria, followed by the armistice of the 29th September; on the 3rd November the armistice with Austria-Hungary. On the 9th November, just two days before the final act, King Ferdinand felt it was safe

¹ v. summary of text in Vol. III, pp. 49-50.

to return to the charge. M. Marghiloman was replaced by General Coandă. War was re-declared on Germany on the ground that the latter had violated the Treaty of Bucharest by increasing her troops in Wallachia beyond the agreed strength—an unfortunate contention, for it supported the view that the Treaty of Bucharest was a valid act, and that consequently the 1916 alliance had been destroyed. But in the excitement of the moment legal considerations were forgotten. The Rumanian troops had time to cross the frontiers into Bukovina and Transylvania before the Armistice of Spa.

8. *Relations with Serbia.* In the west during the previous weeks the imminence of the German catastrophe had been at least clearer than in Rumania, clearer not only to Frenchmen and Englishmen but to Rumanians abroad. Chief among them was M. Take Ionescu, whom, after long delays, the German authorities had permitted to pass through to Paris and London in the month of July. Take Ionescu saw clearly that peace was near and that Rumania was not prepared for it: he appreciated in full that such unreadiness would involve a danger of isolation and disregard. Rumania must come to the Peace Conference not only with the goodwill of France and Britain—which was not lacking—but with some understanding with those who would be her associates or rivals, the States of South-East Europe. With the new Czecho-Slovak State there could be no real ground of serious difference, and with Greece friendly relations (thanks largely to M. Venizelos's own desire for co-operation) were assured. Only with Serbia—or the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom which was now to take Serbia's place—were relations strained. Serbia had naturally and strongly resented her complete exclusion from the negotiations which preceded Rumania's intervention in the war. The terms of the Alliance of August 1916 had not been published,¹ but it soon transpired that the entire Banat had been attributed to Rumania, and to this Serbian public opinion and policy alike, both for ethnic and strategic reasons, were unshakeably opposed. No impartial person could doubt that friendship between the two countries was definitely excluded, if Rumania were to acquire the whole of the western (predominantly Serbian) part of the Banat up

¹ Its substance was, however, published by the Bolsheviki (*v. App. II, p. 515*). The text has since appeared in the *Temps* and is given in *App. II, pp. 516-17*. Cp. also *Vol. I, 171 n.*

to the gates of Belgrade. Even were the Treaty of 1916 still a valid document, it was clear that Rumania would have to modify its terms in Yugo-slavia's favour, if only for the reason that the United States, whose consent appeared essential, had not been a party to the act any more than to the Treaty of London. Neither of these arrangements was entirely consistent with President Wilson's Fourteen Points. To so keen-sighted a statesman as M. Take Ionescu all this was clear. But his visits to Paris and London clearly showed him, further, that the French and British Governments, though they had no wish to embarrass Rumania by public declarations on the subject, did not regard the 1916 Treaty as any longer valid since Rumania had technically violated it by the conclusion of a separate peace. It was therefore essential that a Serbo-Rumanian understanding should be reached at once, not only to prevent the Banat becoming a source of serious friction between the two neighbours, but in order that a foundation might be laid for the formation of a Czecho-Slovak-Yugo-slav-Greek-Rumanian *bloc* which, speaking with one voice, might hope to count as an important factor at the forthcoming Peace Conference.

9. *Negotiations of Take Ionescu, Venizelos, and Pašić, October 1918.* Early in October, therefore, Take Ionescu took advantage of the simultaneous presence of MM. Venizelos, Pašić, and Trumbić in London to broach his idea of Balkan co-operation. In regard to the Banat question he found the Serbian Prime Minister willing to be satisfied with quite modest concessions to Yugo-slav racial feeling and the requirements of the defence of Belgrade. An understanding was reached which, while securing to Yugo-slavia the south-west portion of the Banat, left to Rumania not only the whole of the important Arad-Báziás railway, but the course of the Maros up to Szegedin. Nor, in view of the fact that the treaty had not yet publicly been declared a dead letter, need M. Pašić have considered that he had made a bad bargain. This promising beginning was followed by unfortunate delays. M. Pašić was ill. Grave internal difficulties, arising out of jealousy of the ruling party in Serbia of the claims of the Croat and Slovene representatives to a full share of power, held up the formation of a united national Yugo-slav Government and the formulation of a clear foreign policy. Further, M. Take Ionescu's successful diplomacy was obstructed by jealousy at home.

Behind the new Coandă Government which took office on the 9th November 1918, loomed M. Brătianu and the Liberals, who obstinately (though perhaps wrongly) considered their reputation bound up with the recognition of the validity of the 1916 Treaty, for which they were personally responsible. As the news leaked out, M. Take Ionescu's opponents at home did not scruple to pillory him as the traitor who sold the Banat : public resentment was worked up to fever-point, and a question which, with goodwill on both sides, could easily have been disposed of at once, remained to embitter Serbo-Rumanian relations and to demand the attention of the Peace Conference. Take Ionescu had no official position. When Brătianu replaced General Coandă in power in December he did indeed telegraph to Paris an offer that Take Ionescu and some of his followers should enter his Cabinet, and that in such a case M. Ionescu might expect a place in the Rumanian peace delegation, but the latter could have had no choice but to refuse a post in which he would have been a mere subordinate attached to a policy of which he strongly disapproved. Consequently, M. Brătianu formed a Government solely of his own partisans, and looked merely among his own supporters and a few persons not deeply committed to fixed views for the formation of the Rumanian delegation to the Peace Conference.

Thus ended the one far-sighted attempt to weld the small States of South-East Europe into a united harmonious *bloc*. Whether by its formation it could have altered the course of the Peace Conference is doubtful but possible : it showed at least a keen sense of statesmanship on M. Take Ionescu's part that he was prepared to risk much in the attempt. He calculated that the four small Powers—even without Poland, which might, if possible, be added—could point to a united population of 50,000,000—greater than France or Italy. If all their differences were composed between themselves and a common programme agreed upon, it would have been hard indeed to have refused them a share in some, if not in all, of the deliberations of the Supreme Council. The attempt was shattered by events beyond Ionescu's power. M. Brătianu, rightly or wrongly, preferred another method which he believed was more suited to the dignity of his position, but the effect of which was that, disunited, the South-East European Powers appeared before the Conference rather in the light of quarrelsome and

helpless children. It was symbolical of the change that their first appearance was in fact when the Rumanians on the one hand, the Yugo-slavs on the other, were summoned before the Council of Ten to dispute before their judges the question of the Banat which they had themselves been within an ace of settling. It was only two years later, in August 1920, that the alliance of the succession States for which M. Take Ionescu had worked, could again be negotiated on the basis of the so-called 'Little Entente'.

10. *M. Brătianu at the Conference.* The centre of the Rumanian peace delegation in every sense was M. Ion Brătianu. It is only just to one whose policy and personality have been overwhelmed with hostile criticism to endeavour to set them forth in an impartial light. Brătianu was in many ways a victim of circumstance. Son of the man who had during the 'seventies and 'eighties dominated Rumanian politics and for twelve years unbrokenly held the office of Prime Minister, the younger Brătianu had from his entry into public life the hope, and ultimately the satisfaction, of continuing the programme of the National Liberal party his father had built up. That programme was an intensely nationalist one. Under the battle-cry of 'Rumania for the Rumanians', it campaigned against the supposed designs of its 'Conservative' opponents to shackle the country to the control of foreign capitalists. To some extent its intentions were sincere and justified by national sentiment, if not by economic requirements. But in practice the triumph of this policy meant the control of the country's resources not by the State as a whole, but by one party, one business association, in the State. Nor could even that party by its own independent attitude maintain that national independence for which it campaigned. The Liberals for all their xenophobia had to look abroad for foreign financial assistance, and force of circumstances directed them to German capital for support. This strange anomaly accounts for much in M. Brătianu's policy. Himself an enthusiastic, perhaps exaggerated Nationalist in sentiment, he feared for economic reasons too sudden and complete a rupture with the Central Powers. He honestly wished for the aggrandizement of his own country and the union of the whole Rumanian race in one State. But he dreaded the inevitable result of the assertion of this claim—a complete breach with Germany and all

that Germany stood for politically and economically. He would willingly, if he could, have localized Rumania's war to a quarrel with Austria-Hungary alone. Events, however, threw his country and himself into the greater struggle.

From his political upbringing M. Brătianu had had little chance of learning to view the Western Powers sympathetically. Isolated in Rumania, he had won by a certain force of character and political capacity a reputation in the eyes of his own countrymen which, he might hope, would be reflected and enhanced at Paris. But he had failed to study or to divine beforehand the atmosphere of the Peace Conference or the character of those who would judge his claims. France he knew more from books and newspapers than from close practical contact with French statesmen, and the honest impatience of M. Clemenceau he could neither deal with nor forgive. Italian policy he admired and clung to, but drew no profit from. The Anglo-Saxons he neither understood nor liked. Himself without appreciation of vague moral aspirations, he considered British and American statesmen complete hypocrites, and the whole structure of the League of Nations as an artifice of the strong to ensnare and enslave the weak. Lastly, he had a profound contempt for all his 'Balkan' neighbours, and a rooted conviction that Rumania was threatened by the Slavs. To his mind the one way of escape was to secure by French and Italian help the recognition of Rumania as a Great Power, a bulwark of Latin civilization in the East.

11. *Brătianu and the Secret Treaty, 17th August 1916.* It was this recognition which Brătianu believed he had secured by the Treaty of August 1916. He therefore pleaded his case to full membership of the Supreme Council on the basis of the validity of this treaty. But to the French and British Governments, as we have seen, the treaty was no longer a binding engagement, for Rumania, by signing a separate peace with Germany, had violated its provisions. Of this M. Brătianu had been previously informed and warned that he ought to find other grounds than those of the articles of the treaty on which to base his territorial demands. Of this he was partly sensible, and, while refusing to recognize the release of his European Allies from their engagements to him, he was willing to find other pleas in defence of his claims which might meet with acceptance on the part of America and Japan.

M. Brătianu's first appearance before the Council of Ten was on the 8th February,¹ when, accompanied by M. Mîsu, Rumanian Minister in London, and Dr. Vaida-Voevod, one of the Transylvanian leaders who had distinguished himself in the political struggle against the Magyars, he argued in favour of Rumania's claim to the Banat in its entirety, and while adducing various cogent geographical and economic reasons in support of this demand, above all laid stress on his favourite theme that between Rumania and her Slav neighbours only wide river frontiers—Danube, Theiss, Dniester—could keep the peace. In reply the Yugo-slav leaders stated their case based on ethnic grounds and national sentiment. The conflict of views was sharp, and the hope of reconciling them remote. The expedient of a plebiscite was accepted by the Yugo-slavs under certain reservations of area. Brătianu was prudent enough neither to accept nor to refuse but asked for further consideration. A commission of impartial inquiry was clearly necessary, and on the following day its formation—with two American, two British, two French, and two Italian members—was announced, and thus came into being the first of the five territorial commissions at which all the preliminary work of drawing the new frontiers was transacted.

On the following day M. Brătianu resumed his argument before the Ten, and endeavoured to justify on racial, geographic, economic, and strategical grounds his claim to the frontiers of the 1916 Treaty, together with the addition of the north-east corner of Hungarian Ruthenia and the north of Bukovina (excluded from the 1916 Treaty at Russia's insistence), and the whole of Bessarabia. His case was stated with skill, but it is alleged that there was a certain languor of manner which appears to have convinced the Ten that in fact it was not the arguments he used, but the Treaty of 1916 on which he considered his case really rested. Further examination of the question was referred at once to the new Commission on Rumanian territorial claims.

12. *The Commission on Rumanian Territorial Claims.* The judgment of the detailed work of this commission on the new frontiers is a subject rather too detailed for complete examination here.² About the character of this work,

¹ v. Vol. I, pp. 249–50, and also 257–8.

² v. also this chapter, Part I, p. 211, and Chap. II, Part II, pp. 133–5.

however, one or two misapprehensions should be removed. To begin with, the commission had no competence to pronounce judgment on the validity or non-validity of the 1916 Treaty. It was true that the French and British Governments were agreed in considering that, through Rumania's own action, it was no longer in force. The United States Government had, moreover, never been a party to it, and for them it was not binding. The Italian Government, on the other hand, fearful lest by the disownment of the 1916 Treaty the 1915 Treaty of London might suffer, anxious, too, to win Brătianu as a useful ally against the Slavs whom they both opposed, were inclined discreetly to uphold the validity of the treaty. But with all this the commission were not concerned. Their mandate was not to decide what the frontiers of Rumania were to be, but to report to the Council of Ten what in their opinion, on ethnic, geographic, and necessary economic grounds those frontiers ought to be. Strategic reasons, arising from temporary political exigencies, were not permitted to influence their decision.

The commission were at first only given a month in which to present their report, a period afterwards extended to two months. The greater part of their labours was therefore completed by the beginning of April, though during the following months additional questions that arose called more than once for reconsideration, and in a few cases for modification. Within two months there was much work to be done. The Rumanian and Yugo-slav delegates had to be heard in person and their voluminous cases examined in detail. The figures and arguments they submitted had to be compared with and checked by the masses of statistics available from Hungarian official sources and the impartial testimony of outsiders. Failing recourse to plebiscites on a large scale, for which the necessary machinery of control, in the shape of occupation of territory by Allied troops was lacking, it was clearly necessary for the commission to assume as a general principle that a community of race implied a common racial consciousness. Ethnic considerations took the first place in determining the commission's decisions. But it could not be exclusively ethnic considerations, for there were certain broad principles of geography and economics, certain imperative considerations of transport and communications, which had to be allowed to play their part.

13. *The Ethnic Frontiers*¹: (a) *Transylvania*. Broadly speaking, the ethnic frontier between Hungarians and Rumanians was clear enough. It ran from north-east to south-west, passing just east of the three towns of Szatmár Nemeti, Nagy Várád, and Arad. Yet to draw the frontier so would have been a crime as well as a blunder, for, though the towns were predominantly Magyar in population—a predominance which the Rumanians, however, insisted had been artificially created and would in natural circumstances disappear—they were the three essential points on the big railway line joining north-east to south-west. This line the Rumanians could hardly replace, for the tangled cross-hills of Transylvania would hardly admit the construction of such a north-south railway.² Consequently, unless the three towns were united to Rumania, there could be no certain connexion between the north and south of Transylvania. Even people trained exclusively in the 'Fourteen Points' could not fail to see the force of this argument. It was unanimously accepted by the commission, with the exception that at one point—Nagyszalonta to Kisjenő—where it seemed possible for Rumania to build a substitute line, Hungarian claims were upheld.

(b) *Bukovina and Bessarabia*. Bukovina offered less difficulty. An attempt indeed was made to draw a frontier slightly east of the old provincial boundary so as to exclude 85,000 Ruthenes (and only some 300 Rumanians), but it was finally abandoned on the ground that since an independent Eastern Galicia seemed a remote improbability it was useless either to attach this further Ruthene element to Poland or to leave it 'in the air'. Nor was there any difference of opinion on the merits of the Bessarabian case. Geographically, and historically a Rumanian province with a predominantly Rumanian population, Bessarabia was clearly marked out for reunion with Rumania. It was considered that any discontent that might have arisen during the past year of Rumanian occupation was due to personal mistakes or the general hard times rather than to any deep distaste for union with Rumania, in which, it was felt, lay Bessarabia's (and Rumania's) best hope of progress and peace. Diplomatically, however, there was the

¹ For statistical information *v.* Vol. V, Table I.

² An indented railway line could indeed have been constructed, but only with difficulty and expense and after long delay.

difficulty of Russian susceptibilities, and it was attempted to salve these by phrasing the decision in the most tactful words. In fact, however, more than a year elapsed before the European Powers could be brought to definite signature of a treaty recognizing Rumanian sovereignty over Bessarabia, and even then the United States refused concurrence.¹ The Bolsheviks, though for quite different reasons, also declined to recognize the arrangement.

(c) *The Banat.* The thorniest question of all was the Banat. The Rumanians, as we have seen, claimed the whole ; the Serbs the western and central parts. On ethnic grounds neither claim can have seemed to the commission justified, for, while in Torontál, the westernmost county, there were (according to the Hungarian statistics of 1910) only 86,937 Rumanians as against 199,750 Serbs out of a total of 615,151, there were in Temes out of a total population of 500,835 only 96,905 Serbs as against 169,030 Rumanians. In both counties the Magyar element was comparatively small. There was indeed a large 'Swabian' population, but since these Germans could scarcely have claimed union with Germany or Austria, a formal expression of their wishes would hardly have helped the commission in their task. There was indeed something to be said, on geographical grounds, for the assignment of the undivided Banat to Rumania. But the strength of numbers and national sentiment among the Serbs of Torontál made that an impossible solution. No clear ethnic frontier could be drawn, and the only two principles that were adopted were (1) the assignment to each party of its chief town centres with the necessary environs ; (2) the endeavour to balance, as far as possible, the numbers of Serbs under Rumanian and of Rumanians under Yugo-slav rule. It was unfortunate that in the final decision perhaps over-importance was attached to the Serb claim to the town of Versecz, for the attribution of this to Serbia meant the cutting of the main line from Arad to Báziás, to which Rumania looked for transport, and the drawing of a somewhat curiously rambling frontier.²

¹ The Peace Conference had never sanctioned anything but the military occupation of Bessarabia. It was announced on the 9th March 1920 that the Supreme Council (i. e. British Empire, France, and Italy) had recognized the reunion of Bessarabia with Rumania. It remained to regularize this procedure by a treaty protecting the rights and property of various nations. The Bessarabian Treaty was signed on the 28th October 1920. v. Chap. II, Part II, p. 139.

² v. Map opp. p. 282 and Vol. V, Text Hungarian Treaty. v. also *supra*, p. 211.

14. *Brătianu refuses to accept Proposed Frontiers, 2nd June 1919.* The commission's proposals have been recapitulated here because they were adopted unaltered by the Supreme Council. Some months later they were communicated to the parties concerned, according as the presentation of the various draft treaties to the enemy Powers demanded it. The first public expression of opposition was made on the 31st May. At the Plenary Session of the Peace Conference to approve the text to be presented to the Austrian delegation on the 2nd June, M. Brătianu made a vigorous protest against the way in which Rumania's wishes had been ignored in the drafting of the treaty. On general grounds his point of view was shared by all the smaller States, who considered that their interests had been neglected or overridden by the selfish ambitions of the Great Powers. What touched Brătianu particularly was, however, to find that not only had a small part of the Bukovina, which under the 1916 Treaty Rumania would have received, been excluded—though, as we have seen, this ruling was afterwards modified in Rumania's favour—but that here was the first formal proof that the 1916 Treaty was not considered to be in force. Also an Article (No. 60) had been introduced in the Austrian Treaty which bound Rumania to sign a treaty granting to the alien minorities in her territories such security as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should judge necessary. This provision Brătianu refused absolutely to accept, and in consequence did not take part in the presentation of the first draft of the treaty to the Austrian delegation on the 2nd June.¹ The frontiers were published, however, on the 13th June.

Shortly after, Brătianu left Paris to return to Rumania. He had become an embittered opponent of the Peace Conference and of its chief plenipotentiaries, and for the next six months relations between Rumania and Paris became strained almost to breaking point, more particularly over the question of Rumanian policy in Hungary.

15. *Rumanian Policy in Hungary ; Occupation of Budapest, 8th August 1919.* In an earlier part of this History² an account has been given of the difficulties which had arisen in regard to

¹ This whole controversy is dealt with more fully in Vol. V, Chap. II.

² Chap. II, Part I, Vol. I, pp. 352-7, and this volume, Chap. III, pp. 159-61, and map, p. 122.

the occupation of what was still legally Hungarian territory under the terms of the Military Convention of Belgrade of the 13th November 1918. The resentment at the slights which it was felt had been inflicted upon Rumania at the Conference was intensified by the inadequate demarcation line she was allowed to hold. An attempt to rectify this in February led to the artificially-engineered Communist revolution in Budapest. The Rumanian forces took advantage of the general turmoil to advance to the line of the Theiss. This act of independence was severely judged by the Great Powers. Hopes were entertained in Paris that a peaceful arrangement could be come to with Béla Kun, and the solution, favoured not only by Rumanians but by many other observers, of an immediate Inter-Allied occupation of Budapest was refused. Categorical injunctions were sent to the Rumanian Government to halt their armies at the Theiss. This for the moment they did, and for two months or more no further advance was made, Béla Kun's attention being turned rather towards Slovakia, through which he hoped to establish territorial contact with Moscow. Kun's final failure in this enterprise maddened him, and as a last desperate throw he began on the 20th July an offensive against the Rumanians. It was not unforeseen, and after five days' stiff fighting, completely failed. The Rumanians in turn felt that the matter must be settled for good and all. Whatever the orders or lack of orders from the Supreme Council, they had to finish with the danger threatening from Hungary. Their counter-offensive was completely successful, and by the 4th August they had entered Budapest, from which they advanced their line a considerable distance both to the north and west.

16. *Brătianu defies the Supreme Council.* So far, it may be claimed that the Rumanians had been justified, if not in theory, at least by hard facts. In the hour of success, unfortunately, they did not show any proper restraint. Though they had entered Budapest with the tacit goodwill of a large part of the Magyar nation, who cared not what help they could utilize to rid them of the communist tyranny, the Rumanians neglected totally to conciliate the population of the country. Requisitioning went on on an almost unprecedented scale—rolling-stock, agricultural machinery, manufactured goods, whatever attracted the fancy of the invaders, was carried off, and the railways were

choked with trucks filled with materials. It is idle to blame the Rumanian soldier. Himself a peasant, he had his secular grievances against the Magyar, and during the war had seen his cattle and corn carried off by the armies of the Central Powers for their own use.¹ He was but 'getting his own back', and naturally had but little understanding of the principles of common reparation to which his Government, like all the other Powers, had pledged themselves in Paris. It is the Rumanian Government and the military authorities who must fairly bear the blame. M. Brătianu did nothing effectual to stop what was going on. His legitimate pride in the courageous step Rumania had taken in settling the communist danger alone was swollen by the feeling that at last he had shown his defiance of Paris, and that in future he could conduct his policy without the slightest regard for their wishes. He felt that the time had come for Rumania to stand alone or to pick and choose such allies as suited her best, and that all the hypocrisy of the League of Nations had been at last shown up. Somewhat inconsistently, at a moment when the Rumanian Armies of occupation by their arbitrary methods of requisitioning were increasing the deep resentment of the Magyar people, Brătianu toyed with schemes for a Hungarian-Rumanian alliance, perhaps to be cemented by a union of the two crowns. To this alliance Poland and the future Ukrainian State could adhere, and a *bloc* powerful enough to confront the Slav world and to defy the Western Powers would be created, geographically and economically self-contained.

To the urgent and peremptory demands of the Conference for an explanation of his acts and intentions no reply was vouchsafed. To repeated telegrams from Paris M. Brătianu returned no answer. Both sides perhaps were to blame for the estrangement, for if M. Brătianu, as we have seen, was in practice violating all the principles to which he had pledged his country in Paris, the Conference on their part seemed unable to see or to acknowledge what all South-East Europe felt, namely, that Rumania, by her resolute action, had saved all that part of the world from communism or anarchy. But, whatever the rights or wrongs of the situation, it could not be allowed to continue. Since it was impossible to obtain any answer from M. Brătianu to telegraphic demands, it was

¹ v. also Chap. VII, Part II, § 10, p. 426; also pp. 490-1, 517-19.

decided to send an envoy direct from the Conference to Bucharest to require a clear explanation of the Rumanian Government's intention. Sir George Clerk, the new British Minister designate to Prague, was chosen by the Supreme Council for this mission, the object of which was to demand a definite statement from M. Brătianu as to his intentions, and an undertaking to abide by the principles he had accepted for the settlement of the reparation question in the peace treaty. On the 7th September Sir George Clerk left Paris and arrived in Bucharest on the 11th.

17. *Sir George Clerk's Arrival in Rumania, 11th September 1919; Resignation of Brătianu.* On the day of Sir George Clerk's arrival M. Brătianu resigned, hoping thereby to rally round him every chauvinist current in the country against the insolent interference of foreign Powers. The King was thereby placed in an awkward situation, for the Parliament, elected in 1914 and restored after the Armistice (when the Parliament elected during the German occupation was declared null and void), possessed a large Brătianist majority, and till such time as an appeal could be made to the country there was little hope of one of the Opposition leaders being able to establish himself in power. An attempt was indeed made to form a ministry under M. Manolescu-Rîmniceanu, one of the judges of the Supreme Court, whom Brătianu hoped to mould to his wishes, but without success, and finally King Ferdinand fell back on the expedient of a 'non-party' Government under General Văitoianu, who formed a Cabinet composed mainly of generals, but with M. Mișu, the Minister to the Court of St. James's, at the Foreign Office. It was under the auspices of this Cabinet, which was popularly supposed to be a mere tool of Brătianu's, that the elections were eventually held at the beginning of November.

In the meantime, however, M. Brătianu carried on the administration, and it was with him as its *de facto* head that Sir George Clerk negotiated. The negotiations were throughout of the most amiable character. M. Brătianu professed himself in complete sympathy with the ideals of the alliance, complained that it was Paris, not he, that was responsible for any friction that might have occurred, and while denying or palliating any abuses that might have been committed by the Rumanian troops in Hungary, promised that a searching inquiry should be made into these, that not only should all further requisitioning

at once stop, but that any goods beyond Rumania's proper share that had been carried off should be, after inquiry, promptly returned. On this question everything seemed capable of arrangement, but behind it lay the burning resentment of Brătianu at his treatment by the Conference, which for him was symbolized in two acts—the partition of the Banat and the Minorities Treaty. These subjects could not be kept out of the discussion; though they lay outside the objects of Sir George Clerk's mission, he was bound to report to Paris on them, and indeed it was clear to all that they were the crux of the Rumanian question of the moment.

18. *Brătianu's Opposition to Minorities Treaty.* It was clear that M. Brătianu had no intention of signing the Minorities Treaty, the clause of which handing over to the League of Nations the safeguard of minorities' rights he regarded as mere cover for the designs of the Great Powers on Rumania's natural wealth.¹ It was on this that he preferred to rest his case against the Conference and to rouse his fellow-countrymen to a policy of 'national resistance'. By skilful manipulation of the press quite a wave of popular feeling was aroused, and for the moment M. Brătianu, in spite of his personal unpopularity, might count on the success of his policy in the country and the complete ascendancy of his influence on the makeshift Government that succeeded him.

In regard to the actual questions on which Sir George Clerk had been instructed to ask for explanations, M. Brătianu was, however, most conciliatory. While objecting—and with some dignity—to the remonstrances of the Conference on the Rumanian occupation of Budapest, he professed himself perfectly willing to withdraw his troops immediately, which was more, in fact, than the Supreme Council had demanded, from fear lest an abrupt withdrawal might be followed by chaos. Further, M. Brătianu, while denying that there had been any undue requisitioning, agreed that a commission, provided there was a Rumanian representative on it, should be empowered to make an examination of the question on the spot, while all requisitioning, apart from materials necessary for the maintenance of the army of occupation, should at once cease. M. Brătianu's answers were, on the whole, quite satisfactory, but unfortunately no practical steps were taken to

¹ See further, in Vol. V, Chap. II, *passim*.

discontinue the requisitioning, which had gone on, and consequently there was no cessation of tension between Rumania and the Conference.

Sir George Clerk returned to Paris in the first days of October, and presented his report. On the basis of it the Supreme Council continued during the whole month to negotiate with the Rumanian Government for the evacuation of Budapest, the examination of the requisitioning abuses, and finally, the signature of the Minorities Treaty. The Văitoianu Government, however, which had come into office on the 28th September, in view of the approaching elections, had no idea but procrastination. The Supreme Council were unable to obtain the satisfaction they desired, and were forced to threaten extreme measures to bring the Rumanian Government to reason.

19. *The Elections ; Ultimatum from Supreme Council, November 1919.* In the meantime the elections were held in Rumania—with surprising results. The majority on which Brătianu had hitherto relied, and which he hoped to maintain, disappeared completely. In spite of the fact that M. Take Ionescu's 'Democratic' Party and General Averescu's 'People's League' ostentatiously refrained from all participation, the Liberal party suffered a severe defeat even in Old Rumania, where only 93 Liberal members were returned out of the total number of 244. The successful Opposition consisted mainly of peasant deputies and other 'independent' groups. In Transylvania, there was an even greater catastrophe for the Government party, the greater number of deputies returned belonging to the newly-formed Transylvanian *bloc* under the leadership of M. Maniu, President of the 'Directing Council', which had governed Transylvania since the Armistice, and Dr. Vaida-Voevod. The obvious consequence should have been the immediate resignation of the Văitoianu Cabinet, but King Ferdinand may well have hesitated in view of the difficulty of finding a successor to it. The Transylvanian party hesitated to take on themselves the odium of responsibility for acceptance of the Allies' demands and signature of the Minorities Treaty, for M. Brătianu had roused public feeling in Old Rumania to a fever over this question. On the other hand, General Averescu and M. Take Ionescu, who would have undertaken this responsibility, were quite unrepresented in Parliament. Consequently, King Ferdinand clung to the Văitoianu

administration, and maintained them in office to cope with the controversy with Paris. To the Supreme Council's demands the Văitoianu Government returned the most satisfactory reply. It was clear that they were merely playing for time, and before long the patience of the Conference was at an end, and in the last days of November a firm Note, demanding, though in friendly fashion, immediate satisfaction, on pain of the rupture of diplomatic relations, confronted the Rumanian Government, with the choice of compliance, resistance, or resignation.

20. *The Rumanians yield and sign the Minorities Treaty, 9th December 1919.* In these circumstances General Văitoianu had no course open to him but to bow before the storm. In spite of M. Brătianu's ardour, resistance was fantastic. It would have definitely meant the exclusion of Rumania from the circle of the Allied and Associated Powers, and her relegation to a position of isolation which neither the King nor the country was prepared to face. King Ferdinand wisely listened to the advice that was tendered him, and a new effort was made to persuade the Transylvanian leaders to take office, as their numerical superiority in Parliament now gave them the right to. After much persuasion, their natural shyness at intervening so directly in Old Rumanian politics was overcome, and while M. Maniu preferred himself to refrain from taking office, he made no difficulties about his colleague Dr. Vaida-Voevod doing so. Dr. Vaida promptly formed a Cabinet consisting of Transylvanians, Old Rumanians of the Peasant and Socialist parties (including Dr. Lupu as Minister of the Interior), and, for a very few days, General Averescu himself, who, however, almost immediately regretted his action, and on the 17th December resigned. The successful efforts of Dr. Vaida to improve Rumania's relations with the Western Powers, his visit to Paris and his abrupt dismissal by King Ferdinand in March, lie beyond the scope of this short sketch. Immediately on his accession to power, however, he instructed the Rumanian plenipotentiary in Paris, General Coandă, to sign the Minorities Treaty (slightly amended, to meet Rumania's wishes). Its signature on the 9th December 1919 brought to an end an artificial controversy which had seriously threatened Rumania's relations with her Western Allies.¹

¹ The text of the final Despatch of the Supreme Council of the 8th December 1919 is given in App. II, pp. 517-19.

CHAPTER IV

THE LIBERATION OF THE NEW NATIONALITIES

PART III

THE FORMATION OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK STATE

A. BOHEMIA AND THE CZECHS

FROM the standpoint of the mapmaker, the most sensational feature of the peace settlement in Central Europe has been the revival, after complete national extinction, of the two famous mediaeval States of Poland and Bohemia. Each has assumed a new form more suited to the requirements of the twentieth century; but in each case it is history and its inspiring traditions that have imparted substance and reality to what had seemed to many a mere dream, even on the very eve of fulfilment. How far these two political reincarnations will learn from experience, and avoid the weaknesses and blunders which proved fatal to them in the past, is a riddle which only the future can reveal.

In some respects the record of Bohemia is quite unique. Here is a nation in the very centre of Europe, which after playing a memorable part in the field of political and religious progress, and becoming thoroughly imbued with western civilization, was crushed ruthlessly out of existence, lay like a corpse for two whole centuries, and then arose once more to recover, almost unaided, its lost nationhood. Poland, though at times far more brutally treated, never sank so low; and even the supreme crime of partition had at least the one advantage that it rendered a uniform system of denationalization impossible and, by imparting to Polish culture a certain quality of quicksilver, saved it from utter extinction. But Bohemia—her nobility wellnigh exterminated, her middle class driven into exile, her peasantry reduced once more to serfdom, her national faith suppressed, her hierarchy and administration alike in the hands of foreigners—seemed by the beginning of last century lost beyond all possibility of recovery. It is told

that Jungman, one of the pioneers of Czech philology, was in the habit of meeting a small group of other patriots in a Prague inn, and that on one occasion he exclaimed, 'If this roof should fall, there would be an end of the Czech national movement.' The truth of this anecdote has been seriously challenged, and even if true, it exaggerates the actual situation of that day; but none the less it may stand as symbolic of the dire straits into which the nation had fallen.

The most remarkable feature in the Czech national revival of last century is the pre-eminent part played by intellectuals. And yet it was not a mere accident that the movement should have begun with the philologist, the scholar, the historian, the professor. This was an entirely natural evolution among a people which had long since selected as its national heroes John Hus, priest, professor, reformer, and philosopher—truly the 'poor persone' of his day—and Comenius, one of the founders of modern education. Upon each successive step the savant left his indelible mark. First Dobrovsky and Jungman laid the necessary linguistic and scientific basis, then followed Šafárik with his epoch-making studies in Slavonic archaeology, and Palacky, the founder and inspirer of Czech historical research, and the leader of the nation during the revolution of 1848 and throughout the period of constitutional experiment in Austria. It was thus in one sense a perfectly natural evolution that placed the real leadership of the Czech nation during the Great War in the hands of a triumvirate of savants—the veteran philosopher and 'Realist' Masaryk, and his two untried but tireless and resourceful lieutenants Beneš and Štefanik.

Bohemian history has for many centuries been dominated by the rivalry of Czech and German. The powerful dynasty of the Přemysls steadily encouraged German settlers in the towns and mining districts of Bohemia and Moravia, while at the very same time pursuing a policy of armed aggression against the neighbouring German duchies of Austria and Styria. With the foundation of the University of Prague (1349) the rivalry of the two nations was transferred to the intellectual field, and racial cleavage played a vital part in the struggle that centred round the figure of John Hus, and after his execution round the rival interpretations placed upon his ideas. Hus, to an even greater degree than Luther a century later,

united in his person the two currents of religious enthusiasm and national sentiment ; and it is to be noted that the Germans were foremost in their opposition to him, seceding from the University in protest against his championship of the Czech language and forming the spearhead of attack in all the long series of crusades directed against the later Hussites. Luther's dramatic discovery that ' we have all been Hussites without knowing it ' ushered in a period when the national feud was allayed by common religious ties. It might, then, have been supposed that the uniformity of faith so drastically enforced by the Jesuit reaction of the seventeenth century would have deadened the animosities of German and Czech by reducing both to the same dead level of stagnation and decay. But the horrors of the Thirty Years' War, in which Bohemia's independence perished, could never be erased from the national consciousness ; and even the more statesmanlike aggression of Maria Theresa and Joseph II only served to strengthen the conviction that Germanism was identical with absolutist rule and involved inroads alike upon faith and nationality.

It is obvious that such a view was much exaggerated, and that only too often, as under Francis and Metternich, the German suffered scarcely less than the Slav from the centralizing tendencies of a bureaucracy which was a mere slave of the throne. Notably in the forties of last century really amicable relations were growing up between the two races in Prague ; and such men as Alfred Meissner, like his far greater contemporary Lenau, sang the achievements of the Hussites and welcomed the re-birth of Czech sentiment. That curious dual tendency which had made of Bohemia at one and the same time a strong independent kingdom and one of the seven electorates of the Holy Roman Empire, had survived right up to our own day, and had quite naturally created a school of thought which was ready, under certain conditions, to accept the connexion with Vienna as inevitable, or at least tolerable. It would, moreover, be absurd to deny that the Czechs owe in large measure to the admixture of German blood in their veins those qualities of organization and perseverance which differentiate them from most of their fellow-Slavs ; nay more, that German culture, in the older and truer sense of the word, has left a noticeable impress upon them.

It was the refusal of the Czechs to send representatives to

the Federal Parliament of Frankfurt in 1848, and their summons of a rival Pan-Slav Congress in Prague, that once more revealed the abyss between the two nations. From 1849 to 1918 Austrian history came to centre more and more round the German-Czech quarrel. Yet its causes were far more complex than was at first apparent to foreign observers, deafened and disgusted by the stridency of linguistic brawlers. Social and economic motives forced the growing Czech middle class to accentuate still further its national pose; and the struggle against centralism and against a national bureaucracy was complicated by keen competition for posts of which the State could never create a sufficient number.

B. CZECH NATIONAL CLAIMS

1. *Origin of the Czech National Movement.* Czech national claims have passed through a gradual evolution, whose successive stages can easily be traced, even though they flow into each other. The first was the period of complete independence under the Přemysl and Luxemburg dynasties, during which Bohemia acquired more or less effective suzerainty over Silesia and actual possession of Lusatia.¹ The second followed upon the accession of the House of Habsburg, after the disastrous battle of Mohacs in 1526. From that date until the fall of Bohemian independence in 1620 Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary were connected by a loose Personal Union, and in the two latter countries the elective principle was upheld, despite the Crown's constant encroachments upon constitutional practice.

The conflict between the House of Habsburg and the Czechs assumed almost from the first the double aspect of a duel between reaction and reform in the Church, and between the absolutist and representative principles in the State. Then, as now, Bohemia stood in Europe as an outpost of progressive ideas, alike religious and political; but in the seventeenth century her geographical situation made her the

¹ The former was of course wrested by Frederic the Great from the Habsburgs, who, in point of law, held it as Kings of Bohemia; the latter was ceded by them in 1685 to the Elector of Saxony for service rendered to the Imperial cause. It should be borne in mind that Frederic, in concluding peace with Maria Theresa after the robbery, imposed the condition that the Bohemian Diet should give its formal sanction to the cession of territory.

prey of forces which modern conditions seem slowly to be rendering inoperative. Yet even after the battle of the White Mountain and the triumph of Ferdinand II, the Bohemian constitution was allowed to survive in a truncated form, under the so-called 'Renewed Ordinance' of 1627.¹ Many of its essential features had been destroyed, and the spirit of the nation for the time being killed by religious persecution and by the uprooting of its nobility and middle class. But 'Bohemia' remained, however faint the image of her former self might be. As the late Austrian Chancellor, Dr. Renner, has pointed out in those brilliant political treatises upon which his reputation rests, the two centuries following upon the Thirty Years' War were the golden age of aristocratic privilege—the Habsburg dynasty finding its chief support in the various provincial 'Estates', in which the representative principle was watered down to suit the vested interests of a narrow caste.

In Bohemia, however, a further stage was reached in 1749, when Maria Theresa commenced her long series of administrative and bureaucratic reforms. Henceforth Bohemia, Moravia, and what was left of Silesia after the onslaught of Frederic the Great were steadily absorbed in the centralist machine of the new 'Austria'. Henceforth, too, the official mind adhered stubbornly to the fiction that in the Empire of Austria—a title which strictly speaking existed only from 1804 to 1918—all save Galicia and the Italian provinces was essentially German.

As the Czech national movement gathered strength during the nineteenth century, its leaders laid increasing emphasis upon historical tradition, and claimed the restoration of the ancient Bohemian constitution, as it had existed from the Golden Bull of Charles IV down to the White Mountain. The *Böhmisches Staatsrecht* became one of the battle-cries of Austrian internal politics; and the Crown of St. Wenceslas or of 'the Bohemian lands' was pitted against the Holy Crown of St. Stephen, round which the Magyars had woven a strange halo compounded of mysticism and legalism.

2. *The Czech Movement, 1848-67.* Palacky and Rieger, the two foremost advocates of Czech constitutional claims, were decried as Pan-Slavs, and their action in convoking the

¹ Of 10th May, followed by the 'Letter of Majesty' of 27th May 1627.

Slav Congress of 1848 was undoubtedly a bid for the leadership of the Western Slavs and for the moral support of Russia. But it is to be remembered that they were also originally firm believers in a reformed Austria, and for years hoped against hope that the Habsburg absolutism would give place to a confederation of free nationalities, sharing the State between them on equal terms, and united by the common link of the dynasty. It was Palacky who coined the oft-quoted phrase which political parrots have repeated ever since: 'If there were no Austria, it would be necessary to create one.' In this spirit he worked out his famous project of federalism, to which the vast majority of his own and the succeeding generations of Czechs would undoubtedly have rallied.¹ In Havlíček, the founder of Czech journalism, this attitude was already tinged with scepticism. 'Austria', he declared in 1850, 'will be what we want her to be, or she will cease to be. . . . The bayonets beyond which you hide (addressing the Central Government)—they are *we*, our people. They do not know it to-day, but to-morrow, in a year, in a few years, they will know. Our partisans were counted yesterday by hundreds, now they count by thousands, soon they will be millions.' This represents the transitional stage from conservatism to radicalism; and Palacky himself, in a later mood, as the hopelessness of his earlier policy became apparent, was driven to exclaim, 'Before Austria was, we were, and when Austria no longer is, we still shall be.' There spoke the true Czech, and it is but just to him to quote in this connexion another of his memorable phrases: 'If we once had to cease being Czechs, it would be a matter of indifference to us whether we became Germans, Italians, Magyars, or Russians.' Among his Slovak contemporaries, crushed beneath the Magyar heel, this idea took on a keener edge, and M. M. Hodža, the Lutheran pastor who led the Slovak bands in 1848, was not afraid to write: 'Rather the Russian knout than Magyar domination: for the one could only enslave our bodies, while the other threatens us with moral ruin and death.'

From the Revolution of 1848 till the close of the 'seventies (the Berlin Congress, by crystallizing the Balkan situation for another generation, had the further effect of stabilizing the internal structure of the Dual Monarchy), Czech opinion inclined to favour the view that an honourable compromise

¹ See the German edition, *Oesterreichs Staatsidee* (Prague, 1878).

could be reached between Bohemian 'state rights' and the federal principle. But such an aim evoked the strongest possible opposition from the Magyars, to whose constitutional theories federalism, based upon the equal rights of all nationalities, would have dealt a fatal blow. The era of constitutional experiment between Solferino and Königgrätz, resolved itself into a triangular contest between Germans, Magyars, and Czechs, in which the two former, with the connivance of the Poles, came to terms with the dynasty and each other at the expense of the Czechs and the so-called 'unhistoric nations'. In 1867, by the establishment of the Dual System between Austria and Hungary, Magyar constitutional law and theory triumphed over its Czech rival. This was but natural in view of three great advantages enjoyed by Hungary. Firstly, the latter had produced in Deák, Andrassy and Eötvös three statesmen of the front rank who added moderation to their other qualities. Secondly, the whole influence of the powerful Magyar aristocracy was thrown into the scales at Court and elsewhere, whereas the Czech nobility, with but rare exceptions, was lost to the nation and out of touch with its aspirations. Thirdly, the Magyars had a strong weapon in their county autonomy and the unbroken political tradition which it had nourished, whereas the Czechs had lost all control of the administrative machine and lacked the political experience and restraint which adversity was to teach them during the two coming generations.

3. *The Czechs and the 'Ausgleich'*. The Czechs did not lose heart after their failure in 1867, and Rieger, returning to Prague, declared: 'We are driven back, not conquered, and I am convinced that what the Emperor ill-informed refused, the Emperor better informed will accord.' He was wrong: Francis Joseph to the last clung to his own fatal creation, the Dual System, and Rieger's blunt cry 'We won't give in', became the watchword of his nation. In 1861 Francis Joseph had already pledged himself to a deputation of the Bohemian Diet that he would restore the constitution and be crowned in Prague. In 1871, under the influence of the Hohenwart Cabinet and its supporters among the old feudal nobility, he publicly reaffirmed these pledges by an Imperial Rescript of the 12th September, which would have involved the complete reorganization of Austria-Hungary on federal lines. The

Magyars at once strained every nerve to secure the reversal of a decision which would have killed Dualism in its infancy, and destroyed all their dreams of a 'unitary Magyar state'. Strong in the backing of Bismarck and victorious Prussia, Count Andr  ssy induced the Emperor to dismiss Hohenwart and rely upon the German Liberals; and the alliance with Germany, which was concluded soon after, set the seal upon Dualism.

The Czechs, who openly denounced the 'Ausgleich' of 1867 as 'an attempt to subjugate the Slav nations in both parts of the Empire' (Rieger's phrase), vented their anger in abstention from the Parliament of Vienna. But these tactics, by which in the early 'sixties the Magyars had rendered Schmerling's centralist Parliament impossible, proved futile under the much altered internal and external situation of the 'seventies. Henceforth till the outbreak of the Great War, they pursued a policy of parliamentary haggling with successive cabinets, broken by interludes of acute obstruction. But Czech opinion never forgave Francis Joseph for his double perjury, and there was a growing under-current of anti-dynastic feeling, which flared up in the Omladina trial of 1893 and in the mutinies of Czech troops during the Bosnian crisis of 1908. Indeed it was only fitting that, on the sixtieth anniversary of Francis Joseph, a state of siege should have been declared in Prague.

With all this, it would be alike uncritical and unjust to describe the Czechs as victims of Austrian *oppression*. That word must be reserved for the treatment of the Slovaks by Hungary. The Czechs for their part were increasingly conscious of their great past, of their kinship with the Slavonic world, of their right to full nationhood, of the many restrictions upon their development, and of their economic exploitation by Vienna. Compared to the Germans and Magyars they were citizens of the second rank, but they were highly organized alike in industry and in agriculture, they held the richest lands of Austria in their possession, they had as few illiterates as their German neighbours and had attained a high level in education, art, music, and science. Over foreign policy they had no control, but there were limits within which none dared touch them, and they felt themselves growing stronger year by year.

C. THE SLOVAKS

4. *Origins of Slovak National Revival.* Meanwhile their unfortunate kinsmen, the Slovaks, were the victims of a system of political tyranny which had no parallel outside the Tsar's dominions. During the long centuries that followed the fall of the short-lived Moravian Empire of Svatopluk and Methodius, the Slovaks lived the life of an agricultural and pastoral people. Their nobles accepted Magyar feudalism, their townsmen were for the most part German colonists, protected by far-reaching charters of autonomy and a rigid guild-system. Latent national feeling undoubtedly furthered the spread of Hussitism, and even after the advent of Lutheranism from Germany, Czech permanently survived as the language of the liturgy among the Slovak Protestants.

The national revival began quite as early among the Slovaks as among the Magyars. The first Slovak newspaper appeared in Pressburg in 1783, and an Institute of Slav language and literature was founded at the Lycée of that town in 1803. Two of the founders of Slavonic study, Kollar and Šafařík, were Slovaks, and Palacky was trained under Slovak teachers. But their geographical position placed them at a growing disadvantage, as the tide of national feeling rose among the Magyars. From the 'forties onwards the dominant note in Hungarian policy was the mad resolve to Magyarize by all and every means the other races of the country. No one was more zealous in this cause than Louis Kossuth, himself of Slovak origin and the nephew of a Slovak minor poet; and among his own people the gibbets upon which Slovak patriots were hanged during his régime in 1848-9 are still known as 'Kossuth gallows'.

The Lutheran Church, whose pastors were a mainstay of Slovak culture and patriotism, was turned into a specially active instrument of Magyarization, whose triumph its Inspector-General, Count Zay, as early as 1841 declared to be 'the victory of reason, liberty, and intelligence'. In 1843, when a purely Slovak congregation protested at a pastor who spoke nothing but Magyar being forced upon it, its leaders were publicly flogged by order of the county authorities; and this procedure was justified by the long famous phrase, 'Talia requirit linguae nationalis dignitas'. A generation later (1883) another Inspector-General, Baron Prónay, addressed the Church

in words which may stand as the motto of an epoch and as a symbol of the causes that brought Hungary to ruin: 'We must favour the Magyar at all costs, and spread the Magyar spirit and love of our common country. Let us remember the Roman adage, "Where medicine does not succeed, the sword must be used, and where the sword does not suffice, the fire".'

5. *Magyar policy towards Slovaks.* This is not the place to go through the dreary catalogue of injustice and repression to which the Slovaks, like the Rumanians, Serbs, Croats, and even Germans of Hungary, were subjected. The 'Ausgleich' of 1867 was followed next year by a Law guaranteeing the Equal Rights of the Nationalities; but from the first this remained a dead letter in almost every particular, and the very idea of its being put into execution was denounced time and again by Magyar public opinion. The Magyar popular proverb, 'The Slovak is no man' (*tót nem ember*) was re-echoed by the Hungarian Premier Coloman Tisza, when he declared, amid the applause of Parliament, that 'there is no Slovak nation' (1875). The occasion which provoked this characteristic phrase was a debate on the arbitrary dissolution of the Slovak Academy, the confiscation of its museum, library, and funds, and the closing of all the Slovak middle schools.

Since then two and a half million Slovaks have been stunted in their development by the deliberate policy of successive Magyar governments. Not a single Slovak middle school has been provided for them by the State, and permission to found private schools of their own has been persistently withheld; while the number of their primary schools was reduced from 1921 in 1869 to 429 in 1909.¹ The extent to which Magyarization had been practised is revealed by a comparison of the total

¹ See *Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv*, vol. xviii (1910), p. 314.

<i>Hungarian schools.</i>	<i>Kinder-garten.</i>	<i>Kinder-garten training schools.</i>	<i>Primary schools.</i>	<i>Industrial and commercial schools.</i>	<i>Grammar schools.</i>
Total .	353	16	3,777	118	95
Slovak .	—	—	429	—	—
	<i>Middle schools.</i>	<i>Girls' schools.</i>	<i>Academies of law.</i>	<i>Theological colleges.</i>	
Total .	39	6	4	11	
Slovak .	—	—	—	—	

number of educational institutions in the fifteen main Slovak counties and the number of those where the Slovak language was employed.¹

According to statistics supplied to the Peace Conference by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation there were among the 12,447 state officials of Hungary only 35 Slovaks, among the 948 county officials in Slovakia only 18 Slovaks, among the 823 municipal officials of Slovakia only 11 Slovaks, among the 464 judges and Crown law officials in Slovakia no Slovak at all, among the 1,133 public and district notaries of Slovakia only 33 Slovaks, among the 660 professors in the secondary schools of Slovakia only 10 Slovaks. The Slovak language was excluded from the administration and from every public office. In the law-courts it was not tolerated, and a Slovak priest was savagely denounced for stating the simple fact that in his native land 'the Slovak peasant was dumb as an ox before his accuser'. Even on the railways and in the post offices Slovak inscriptions were not tolerated; and it was by no means a rare occurrence for boys to be expelled from school for daring to speak their native language. The Slovak press was subjected to continual confiscation, its staff to imprisonment and fines. The crime of 'incitement of one nationality against another' was applied against the non-Magyars with a thoroughness which rendered almost any expression of national feeling a criminal offence, and which contrasted with the complete immunity of Magyar agitators. The right of association and assembly was virtually non-existent. The Sokol societies were of course not tolerated, and even singing clubs found it difficult to secure a licence. Finally, thanks to an amazing electoral system, the non-Magyar races were deprived of parliamentary representation and kept in the position of political helots. Gerrymandering, a narrow and complicated franchise, absence of the ballot, bribery and corruption on a gigantic scale, the wholesale use of troops and gendarmes to prevent opposition voters from reaching the polls, the cooking of electoral rolls, illegal disqualifications, sham counts, official terrorism, and often actual bloodshed—such are but a few of the methods by which the Magyar oligarchy preserved its political monopoly during

¹ For a detailed account of the sufferings of the Slovaks under Magyar rule, see *Racial Problems in Hungary* (1908) by R. W. Seton-Watson, and *Les Slovaques* (1917) by Ernest Denis.

the fifty years of Dualism. It is but fair to add that the position of the Magyar peasantry and working classes was hardly less deplorable, but they were at least spared encroachments on their language and national customs.

Under such cruel circumstances the young Slovak, who desired to make his way in the world, found every avenue closed, unless he was ready to renounce his nationality; and the growing class of 'Magyarones' had introduced an element of cynicism and moral obliquity into the public life of Slovakia before the War. Every possible effort was made by the Magyar authorities to prevent the Slovaks from visiting, and above all studying at Prague, and even to discourage Czech visitors to Slovakia. But the Slovaks were conscious that their sole hope of escape from eventual national extinction lay in close collaboration and union with their Czech kinsmen, and when the moment of liberation came, their leaders turned naturally and without hesitation towards Prague for help.

D. CZECH ACTION DURING THE WAR

6. *Repression of Czechs within Austria.* With the outbreak of war the position of the Czechs changed almost abruptly; and the wholesale methods of espionage and censorship, by which the authorities sought to control every action of the citizen, soon amounted to little short of a reign of terror. As the Reichsrat had been prorogued since March 1914, and was not sitting when the crisis arose, the Delegations could not be summoned; and Austria was plunged into war without her peoples or their representatives being in any way consulted.¹ Indeed there is little doubt that one motive for the suddenness of the ultimatum to Serbia and the shortness of its time limit, was the desire to take public opinion by storm, and to leave no time for the growth of a demand that the Reichsrat should be consulted. The persistent refusal of the Austrian Cabinet to convoke the Reichsrat till after the accession of the new Emperor, was the most practical of all proofs that a majority of the popular representatives was hostile to the war. It had the further advantage of suspending the immunity of the only men who could have risked organized and open criticism.

¹ The Hungarian Parliament, however, was in session during July, and enthusiastically endorsed the war policy of its Government.

The silence thus artificially imposed enabled the authorities for a time to create abroad the false impression that unanimity prevailed among the motley races of the Dual Monarchy. Very special efforts were made to obtain from the Slav party leaders declarations of loyalty to the Habsburg throne and state; but not one could be induced to come forward. Not merely did the Czechs keenly resent being dragged into war by the arbitrary decision of their rulers and in reality at the heels of Germany, but they regarded a war waged against their Slav kinsmen of Serbia and Russia as little better than a civil war. The Russophil sentiments of the Czechs need no emphasis. Dr. Kramář, the leader of the Young Czech party, was the soul of the Neo-Slav movement and of the Slav Congress which it had summoned to Prague in 1908, and even those who by no means shared his peculiar angle of vision, looked no less eagerly towards Russia—even though a different Russia. Sympathy for Serbia had already been strong during the Bosnian crisis of 1908, and Dr. Kramář's famous Delegation speech on Austria's Balkan policy had its parallel in Professor Masaryk's protests against the Zagreb Treason Trial and the Magyar régime in Croatia and his exposure of Count Aehrenthal's share in the Friedjung forgeries.

The resentment of the masses found expression in wholesale desertions on the Russian and Serbian Fronts, followed by fierce reprisals on the part of the Austrian authorities.¹ This was at first a perilous operation, for they had to run the gauntlet between German or Magyar machine-gunners in the rear and suspicious Russians in front. It has been stated that, of the 70,000 prisoners taken by Serbia in the winter of 1914, roughly half were Czechs; at least 300,000 more surrendered voluntarily to the Russians, and close upon 30,000 to the Italians.

Meanwhile it is estimated that over 20,000 Czech civilians were interned as 'political suspects', and that close on 5,000 were sentenced to death by courts martial. The mere possession of a copy of the Grand Duke Nicholas's manifesto of August 1914 was in some cases a sufficient reason for imposing the death penalty. The extent to which terrorism was practised in Austria may be gathered from the assertion of the Polish

¹ For typical instances of disaffection *v. Nosek*, *Independent Bohemia*, p. 72; *cp. Chap. I, Part II, pp. 50-5.*

Socialist leader, M. Daszynski, in the Reichsrat in February 1918, that there had been no less than 30,000 executions in Galicia alone.

So long as Vienna hoped to secure the declarations of loyalty already alluded to, the Czech leaders were left unmolested, though closely watched. The only one to be arrested in 1914 was M. Klofač, the National Socialist who was alleged to have received incriminating letters from Switzerland. Dr. Kramář and the other leaders, bourgeois and Socialist alike, realizing their helplessness, remained at first altogether passive and awaited the Russian advance upon Cracow. Professor Masaryk, chief of the small but influential group of 'Realist' intellectuals, attempted to establish secret relations with his friends in Entente countries, and after two initial visits of inquiry to Holland,¹ made his way to Italy in December, and there decided not to return to Bohemia but to make himself the interpreter of Czech aspirations abroad. This step, and the death of the Statthalter of Bohemia, Prince Francis Thun, a man of high character and genuine moderation, coincided with the increasing severity of the régime now imposed upon the Czechs. In May 1915 Dr. Kramář² and Dr. Rašin,³ the two Young Czech leaders, and the two editors of the chief Prague daily, *Narodní Listy*, were arrested on a charge of high treason, and eventually (3rd June 1916) sentenced to death. After a severe struggle, milder counsels prevailed in Vienna, and they were reprieved, but remained in prison till after the general political amnesty proclaimed by the Emperor Charles in July 1917. M. Klofač⁴ remained in prison untried from September 1914 till July 1917; and four other deputies of the National Socialist party, MM. Choc, Buřival, Vojna, and Netolický, were imprisoned for shorter periods. In December 1916 Professor Masaryk was sentenced to death *in contumaciam*, and an attempt was made to intimidate him by imprisoning his daughter Dr. Alice Masaryk.⁵ She remained untried in solitary confinement for nearly a year, until the

¹ In October 1914 he spent two days secretly in Rotterdam, with Mr. Seton-Watson, who brought back his considered views on the Austrian and international situation.

² First Prime Minister of the Republic.

³ Minister of Finance under Dr. Kramář.

⁴ Minister of National Defence in the Kramář and Tusar Cabinets.

⁵ President of the Czecho-Slovak Red Cross, and first woman deputy.

energetic protests of American feminist societies secured her release. The wife of Dr. Edward Beneš,¹ Masaryk's most active lieutenant in exile, long shared the same fate. Other prominent Czechs who suffered imprisonment were Dr. Scheiner, president of the famous Sokol gymnastic organization, on a charge of encouraging surrender to the 'enemy'; Dr. Jaroslav Preiss, chairman of the Živostenská Banka, for his lukewarm attitude towards Austrian war-loans, and M. Soukup, the Social Democratic leader.

The Czech press was effectively muzzled, the organs of the National Socialist and Radical parties being suppressed in the autumn of 1914, Masaryk's daily the *Čas*, in the summer of 1915, and *Narodní Listy* in May 1918—not to mention many lesser journals. The Social Democrats were reduced to two journals, *Pravo Lidu* and *Rovnost*. Confiscation and suspension were almost daily occurrences, and an elaborate system was established by the Prague police, by which the press was compelled, under dire penalties, to print the articles supplied to it, without any indication of their source, and thus to propagate views which it detested and to mislead foreign opinion as to its true sentiments.² The Magyars were even more drastic, and by an early stage in the war the Slovak press had literally ceased to exist.

All public meetings were prohibited, and during the winter of 1915 the authorities proceeded to dissolve the Sokol Association (with its 953 branches and 110,000 members) and all the various Slav societies of Prague. Many of the classics of Czech literature were confiscated, the portraits of Hus and other national heroes were withdrawn from circulation, many favourite folk-songs were condemned as seditious, and the operas of Smetana were no longer allowed. In January 1916 German was proclaimed as the official language of political administration throughout Bohemia. The Cardinal Archbishop of Prague, Mgr. Skrbensky, was transferred to Olmütz and replaced by an ardent German prelate, Count Huyn. Until the change of régime which followed the death of Francis Joseph, the Czechs were as completely muzzled as any people in Europe.

¹ Foreign Minister since 1918.

² For instance, they were ordered to attack the Czech leaders abroad by publishing on 25th March and 8th April 1916, articles entitled 'In Foreign Pay' and 'The Czechs in America against Masaryk's agents'.

Detestable as were such methods of repression, the Czechs would to-day be the first to admit that the Austrian authorities were fully justified in regarding every Czech as an actual or potential enemy of the Habsburg State. The true history of the Czech 'Mafia'—a secret society in Bohemia which organized passive resistance to Austria and even economic and military sabotage, which established a rival system of secret intelligence, and which by every imaginable device maintained the necessary connexion with the leaders of the Czech movement abroad—will, when it comes to be written, provide one of the sensations of Central Europe. Its leaders were M. Šámal, now 'Chancellor' to the President of the Republic, M. Švehla, leader of the Agrarian party and first Minister of the Interior, and M. Scheiner, President of the Sokols and afterwards Inspector-General of the new army. Their most active lieutenant was M. Štěpánek, who in October 1918 crossed the Adriatic in a fishing-boat as the joint-bearer of messages from the Czech and Yugo-slav revolutionary committees, and who after the Revolution became a permanent secretary in the new Foreign Office at Prague. The success of the 'Mafia' contrasts strikingly with the failure of the Austrian police in Prague, whose elaborate dossiers, published in book-form since the revolution, show them to have been ignorant of some of the most important agents of the Czech movement.

7. *The Czech Triumvirate's political action outside Austria.* Political action being impossible inside Austria, the advocacy of Czech claims was by tacit but universal consent left to the leaders in exile, and notably to Professor Masaryk, who established the Czecho-Slovak National Committee in Paris, with its organ *La Nation Tchèque*, and made his own headquarters in London, where profound ignorance still prevailed regarding the subject races of Austria-Hungary and their claims. In October 1915 he was appointed lecturer at London University and inaugurated the School of Slavonic Studies at King's College by a remarkable address on 'The Problem of Small Nations'. On the 14th November he and the leaders of the Czech and Slovak colonies in Entente countries and in America issued a manifesto¹ denouncing the Habsburgs as 'mere valets of the Hohenzollern' and Austria for having proclaimed her own abdication, and demanding complete independence for

¹ *La Nation Tchèque*, No. 14.

Bohemia. Henceforth it was war to the knife between the rival Austrian and Czech ideals.

No account of Czecho-Slovakia's share in the war and in the peace would be complete without some brief reference to the triumvirate—Masaryk, Beneš, and Štefanik—which henceforth guided her cause, first to Allied recognition and then to complete political triumph. Those acquainted with the Slav world had long known Thomas Masaryk as one of the most profound and healthy influences upon the younger generation, alike as a philosopher and ethical teacher and as the champion of honesty and consistency as the only true basis of political 'realism'. Of simple, even Spartan tastes, opposed to convention and indifferent to popularity, he had more than once set himself against the prevailing current—notably in his exposure of the forged ballads to which Czech national sentiment had attached itself so eagerly, in his defence of the Jew Hilsner against the mythical charge of Ritual Murder, and in his championship of the Serbo-Croat Coalition against the forgery, terrorism, and espionage of Count Aehrenthal and his unscrupulous agents. To an intimate working knowledge of Austro-Hungarian, German, and Balkan problems, he added a profound acquaintance with Russia¹; while his marriage to an American lady had brought him into close touch with the New World. Thus when the crisis of his life came, he was better prepared than perhaps any statesman of his time to grapple with the great European problems which the war had raised.

His two helpers, Edward Beneš and Milan Štefanik, were young and untried forces (respectively 31 and 34 at the outbreak of war). The former, already known as a lecturer and writer on sociology and economics at Prague University, soon developed diplomatic talents of the very first rank and a quite unusual capacity for discovering the psychological time and place for every action. The latter, the son of a Slovak Lutheran pastor, had left Hungary in his teens, no career being open to any non-Magyar who refused to be denationalized; and had won a reputation as astronomer and explorer in the French service. He distinguished himself as an airman on the Balkan and Italian Fronts and, though incapacitated by a dreadful accident, kept himself alive by sheer will-force, and devoted

¹ See *The Spirit of Russia* (2 vols.), 1919, the German edition of which had made a deep impression in Germany in 1918.

his very considerable influence in French and Italian military and political circles to furthering the cause of his oppressed nation.

8. *The Liberation of the Czecho-Slovaks included in Allied War-aims, 10th January 1917.* The first concrete result of their joint labours was the insertion in the Allied note to President Wilson (10th January 1917) of a demand for 'the liberation of the Italians, as also of the Slavs, Rumanes, and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination'. The phrase should of course have run, 'Italians, Yugo-slavs, Rumanes, and Czecho-Slovaks'; but Baron Sonnino, with the Secret Treaty of London in his pocket, stubbornly opposed the inclusion of the Yugo-slavs, and the vaguer drafting 'Italians, Slavs, and Rumanes' was generally accepted. At the last moment, however, the Czecho-Slovaks, who naturally laid great stress upon being specially mentioned by name, prevailed upon the French to insist upon their inclusion; and as the Italians remained obdurate, the words 'and Czecho-Slovaks' were added at the end.¹

The Entente's endorsement of Czecho-Slovak aspirations came at a turning-point in the political history of the war, when Russia was on the very eve of Revolution, when President Wilson had already accepted intervention as inevitable, and when the Emperor Charles and his advisers were planning an elaborate peace offensive in favour of a drawn game. Not for the last time, the Czecho-Slovak triumvirate had seized the psychological moment.

In certain respects their position was easier than that of other political exiles. The Poles were gravely handicapped by their triple allegiance, by divergent party aims, by the Entente's desire not to offend Tsarist Russia, and by the fact that their own territory was one of the main battle-fields of Europe. Even the Yugo-slavs, to whom the existence of a Serbian 'Piedmont' was of inestimable value, alike in a military and in a moral sense, often suffered from divided counsels. Masaryk and his friends were untrammelled by ordinary diplomatic conventions, and enjoying the unbounded confidence of the 'Mafia' (in which every party and shade of opinion was represented), they virtually had a free hand in the great game of international politics.

¹ Cp. Vol. I, pp. 428-9 for text of Allied Reply, 10th January 1917, and for discussion Vol. I, pp. 171-3.

9. *Opening of Reichsrat; Declaration of 30th May 1917.*

The next stage in the Czech drama was to be enacted in Vienna. Early in 1917 the Emperor Charles and his two chief advisers Counts Czernin and Clam-Martinić, realizing the desperate state of Austria-Hungary, had warned Berlin of their failing powers of resistance, and at the same time made secret overtures to the Entente through the medium of Prince Sixtes of Parma. Now, as a foretaste of their liberal intentions, and under pressure of the events in Russia, they decided to summon the Austrian Parliament on the 30th May 1917, after it had been kept in abeyance for over three years. But this step only served to reveal to all the world the pent-up discontent of the Austrian nationalities. On the opening day the spokesmen of the Poles, Yugo-slavs, Czechs, and Ruthenes in turn put forward resolutions embodying their national claims, and couched in terms hitherto unknown to that assembly.

The Czech attitude had already been foreshadowed in a Memorial drawn up a month previously by 150 leading Czech intellectuals, and by a manifesto issued by the Czech Parliamentary Club on the 20th May. In it they promised to urge 'our ancient programme of independence', but also to advance 'new claims such as the results of the world-war have brought into being'. Thus the resolution of the 30th May demanded the transformation of Austria-Hungary 'into a federal state of free and equal national states', and the union of all Czechs and Slovaks 'in a single democratic Bohemian state'. The international situation, and the paper ideals put forward on all sides by statesmen whose real sentiments were expressed in a series of secret diplomatic compacts, had already had a noticeable influence upon the presentment of Czech claims. These now rested upon the double and in some sense contradictory bases of 'historic rights' and 'national self-determination'. The former unquestionably supplied Bohemia with the title to her historic frontiers, but the same claim which allowed the detachment of Slovakia from Hungary would, if logically applied, have left the Germans of Bohemia free to unite with Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, and Prussia.

The resolutions of the 30th May¹ were of course unpalatable to the Austrian Government, but they were a direct declaration of war upon Hungary, and were received as such in Budapest.

¹ Consult also Chap. I, Part III, pp. 78-80.

For it was at once obvious that neither Czecho-Slovak nor Yugo-slav nor Rumanian unity could be achieved, save by the dismemberment of the traditional Kingdom of Hungary, and this quite irrespective of the larger question, whether the Habsburg Monarchy was to be dissolved or merely reconstructed on federal lines. The Dual System proved, as its founders had intended, an insurmountable obstacle to the regrouping of forces on a racial basis, since Yugo-slavs and Czecho-Slovaks in particular were kept in unnatural division by the internal frontier between Austria and Hungary.

Dr. von Seidler, who soon afterwards succeeded Count Clam-Martinić as Austrian Premier, found himself at the mercy of his Hungarian colleague, and at the dictation of the latter, and of the Pan-German element in Austria, formally denounced all idea of federalism and proposed the futile alternative of national autonomy in each of the seventeen provinces of Austria, leaving Hungary of course entirely untouched. The Czech Parliamentary Club retorted by refusing to enter the Commission for constitutional revision, and by concluding a working alliance with the Yugo-slavs, Ukrainians, and, to a lesser degree, the Poles.

The summer and autumn session was interspersed by audacious speeches from the Czech deputies, designed very largely for foreign consumption. M. Kalina¹ voiced their repudiation of all responsibility for the war, and greeted demonstratively the liberation of Russia. M. Stránský² declared the time to be ripe for the opening of Austria's 'Peter and Paul' fortress. The Agrarian leader M. Staněk² declared that real peace in Europe was impossible until 'on the ruins of the Dual Monarchy new national states shall arise'. Father Zahradník² not merely insisted upon 'an independent Czecho-Slovak State with all the attributes of sovereignty', but for the first time put forward the contention that the Czech problem could only be decided at the Peace Conference, not in Vienna.

When the collapse of the Russian Army and the Bolshevik Revolution were followed by pourparlers between Moscow and the Central Powers, the Czech and Yugo-slav members of the

¹ First Czecho-Slovak Minister to Yugo-slavia.

² Ministers of Commerce, Public Works, and Railways respectively in the Kramář Cabinet.

Austrian Delegation issued a declaration, in which they demanded full self-determination for all the nations of the Monarchy and the appointment of a committee selected from the Parliaments of Vienna and Budapest *on a strict basis of nationality*, for the purpose of conducting peace negotiations. It was obvious that such demands would not be considered for a moment, but on the 5th December the Czech Socialist leader M. Tusar¹ improved the occasion by declaring that 'Count Czernin does not represent the nations of Austria and has no right to speak in our name; he is merely the plenipotentiary of the dynasty'. If, he added, it be treason to claim liberty and independence, 'then each of us is a traitor, but such treason is an honour, not a dishonour.'

10. *The Czecho-Slovak attitude defined, January–April 1918.* Henceforth till the end of the war every fresh utterance of the rival political leaders was addressed even more to the outside world than to the home public. Meanwhile Count Czernin was engaged in an elaborate double game. On the one hand, he kept warning the Czechs that blind reliance upon the Entente would lead to their undoing, and cited the Austrophil currents in London and Paris as a proof that Prague would be wise to make its peace with Vienna.² At the same time he made all possible use of his subterranean channels, in the hope of deluding the Entente statesmen both as to the true sentiments of the subject races and also as to the real extent of Vienna's dependence upon Berlin. The secret meeting of General Smuts and Count Mensdorff in Switzerland in December 1917 was, so far as Austria was concerned, a last despairing effort to delude the enemy into reducing his terms. For a moment it seemed as though it might succeed. The speech of Mr. Lloyd George on the 5th January and President Wilson's message to Congress on the 8th January—in both of which the attempt was made to replace the pledge of 'liberation', contained in the Allied Note of the previous January, by a vague promise of 'autonomy', were probably influenced by Mensdorff's plausible assurances. It is but fair to add that the meaning of the word 'autonomy' differs fundamentally, according as it

¹ Czecho-Slovak Premier June 1919 to autumn 1920.

² It was known to the Czechs abroad that he had more than once taken this line to MM. Staněk, Tusar, and others, when they came to impress upon him the hopeless economic condition of Austria.

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is used in Washington and London, in Vienna, or in Prague and Zagreb.

Even before these pronouncements had been made, Dr. Beneš had duly warned his colleagues in Prague of the need for action such as should render the nation's wishes obvious even to the most obtuse intelligence. On the 6th January 1918, therefore, there met at Prague a Convention of all the Czech deputies in the Reichsrat and the three provincial Diets, of the deprived deputies, and of the leaders of the literary and business world. They protested vigorously against Czernin's policy at Brest-Litovsk, reaffirmed the principle of self-determination, denounced Hungary's brutal exploitation of the Slovaks, and demanded a sovereign state of their own, 'within the historic boundaries of the Bohemian lands and of Slovakia, guaranteeing full and equal national rights to all minorities'. They also formulated the demand for participation at the Peace Conference. The Austrian Premier, who prohibited the publication of this manifesto in the press, rightly interpreted it as 'conceived in a sense absolutely hostile to the State', and announced that Austria would resist it 'by all the means at her disposal'. Count Czernin, shortly before his fall, vented his ill-humour in an attack upon 'the miserable Masaryk' and upon those other Masaryks within the Monarchy, who used their immunity to encourage the enemy. His allegation that the Czech nation did not stand behind its leaders, was promptly answered by the summons to Prague of some 6,000 delegates, who on the 13th April took a solemn oath to 'hold on till victory' and independence.

11. *The Congress of Oppressed Nationalities at Rome (April); its results.* Within the same week (8th-10th April 1918) a Congress of the Oppressed Nationalities of Austria-Hungary met at Rome, with the sanction and approval of the Allied Governments, who by this time had realized the hopelessness of a separate peace with Vienna and the insatiable ambition of the military leaders in Berlin. This congress marks a fresh turning point in the political history of the war, for it sealed the union of the Italians, Czecho-Slovaks (represented by MM. Beneš and Štefanik), Poles, Yugo-slavs, and Rumanians in their opposition to the Habsburg dynasty and state, and laid down the joint lines for a remarkably effective propagandist campaign for the disintegration of the Austrian Front. Signor

Orlando, the Italian Premier, in welcoming the delegates, identified the cause of Italy with the truly Mazzinian aims of Austria's Slav and Latin victims.

The Congress reverberated throughout the tottering Dual Monarchy and there was a prompt response at the Congress held in Prague on the 16th May, the jubilee of the Czech National Theatre. The celebrations were attended, not only by representatives of every Czech and Slovak party or shade of opinion, but by many prominent Polish, Italian, Yugo-slav, and Rumanian delegates—care being taken that the same nationalities which had been represented in Rome should bear witness to their solidarity on the other side of the barrier of the trenches. After a whole series of outspoken speeches, resolutions were passed on behalf of the five nations represented, demanding full independence and democratic government, a universal League of Nations, and an end to 'the predominance of one nation over another', and promising mutual help till their ideals should triumph.¹ The authorities not unnaturally took alarm, prohibiting further meetings in Prague, and the use of Slav colours. But it was no longer possible to arrest the general process of internal disintegration in Austria; the administrative machine was increasingly unreliable, and intimidation was losing its effect upon the masses.

The failure of the Austrian offensive upon the Piave in the second half of June was materially assisted by the parallel process of disintegration in the army, produced by intensive Allied propaganda. Czech, Yugo-slav, Rumanian, and Polish experts co-operated with the Italian Irredentists at the central bureau of Signor Ojetti in Padua, and found volunteers for the perilous task of maintaining contact with their comrades in the opposite trenches. Above all, regular Czecho-Slovak regiments took their place side by side with the Allied contingents on the Italian Front.

12. *The Czecho-Slovak Legions: their importance.* This was the final stage in a policy long and deliberately pursued by Masaryk and his group abroad, who realized that to the Entente leaders the most convincing of all arguments in favour of the Czecho-Slovak cause was to provide soldiers ready to shed their blood for it. Small Czecho-Slovak legions had been formed in France and Russia early in the war, and many of the

¹ Text in Vol. V, App. III, § iii; v. also pp. 193-4 and Chap. V, pp. 279, 293-5.

Czech colony in London enlisted in the British Army. But the Tsarist régime frowned upon the formation of regular corps from the Austrian prisoners, and it was not till after the March Revolution of 1917 that the Czecho-Slovak Army in Russia came into being. Professor Masaryk himself went to Russia in May 1917, and thanks to his intervention the Legion rapidly grew into a brigade, and then an army corps. These Czech troops formed the backbone of the last brief offensive launched by General Brussiloff in July 1917, and distinguished themselves by heavy captures of prisoners and guns. The utter collapse of the Russian Army rendered further fighting impossible, but left the Czechs free to extend their formations and to become virtually a small state within the state. Professor Masaryk scrupulously avoided taking any part in the internal party disputes of Russia, rightly holding that the sole business of his troops was to fight the Central Powers, in the cause of Czecho-Slovak independence. After the Bolsheviki came into power, all his efforts were concentrated upon securing their withdrawal from Russia and their transfer to the French Front. Several thousand men realized this ambition, having been transported from Archangel and Murmansk to England, about the same time as those Yugo-slav divisions in which so many Czech officers had first won their spurs. But the great mass, over 80,000 in number, were cut off in Central Russia, and had no alternative but to withdraw into Siberia, in the hope of extricating themselves through Vladivostok. Their retirement was actively opposed by Austrian and by Magyar ex-prisoners of war; and agents of the Central Powers prevailed upon the Bolshevik Government to attempt their disarmament as 'anti-revolutionary forces'. This is not the place to describe the amazing Odyssey of the Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia, but it is important to point out that by policing the Siberian railway and providing a stiffening for the disorganized Russian forces in the East, they not merely rendered signal service to the Allied cause, but thereby established a right to that recognition which turned the scale in favour of their national cause. The importance which the Allies attached to their presence in Siberia was shown by the dispatch of General Janin and other French officers on a special mission to their army.

Meanwhile Dr. Beneš had continued his work in Western Europe, and on the 16th December 1917 secured from the French

Government the recognition of an autonomous Czecho-Slovak army, fighting under its own flag against the Central Powers, and acknowledging the military authority of the French High Command, but the political control of the National Council in Paris.¹ The moral effect of this recognition more than outweighed the depression caused by the ambiguous speeches of Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson a few weeks later; and the angry comments of the Austrian and Magyar press showed that the blow had struck home. One effect of the Congress of Rome was that the Italian Government, though less publicly, extended the same recognition, and arranged with Colonel Štefanik the formation of Czecho-Slovak units on the Italian Front. When the Prince of Wales visited Rome on the 23rd May, the guard of honour was formed by Czecho-Slovaks—an incident which was scarcely noticed in England, but which caused a profound sensation throughout Austria-Hungary.

13. *Qualified Recognition by the Allied Powers, May-September 1918.* In May 1918 Professor Masaryk reached the United States from Siberia and was accorded a triumphant reception by the Czecho-Slovaks of Chicago and other American cities. One early result was the official statement issued by Mr. Lansing, on the 29th May, endorsing in the name of America the proceedings of the Rome Congress, and expressing 'earnest sympathy' with 'the nationalist aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-slavs'. A further declaration was issued at Versailles on the 3rd June by Britain, France, and Italy, but its vague and cautious phrases were exploited and distorted by the enemy press; but on the 28th June Mr. Lansing swept away all doubts by announcing that America desired 'that all branches of the Slav race should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule'. On the 30th June President Poincaré presented colours to the Czecho-Slovak Army, and the French Government formally recognized the National Council as 'the first step towards a future government'. On the 9th August

¹ Decree of French War Ministry as regards Czecho-Slovak Army, 10th December 1917:

ART. 2: 'Cette armée nationale est placée, au point de vue politique, sous la direction du Conseil national des pays tchèques et slovaques, dont le siège central se trouve à Paris.'

ART. 3: 'La mise sur pied de l'armée tchécoslovaque, ainsi que son fonctionnement ultérieur, sont assurées par le gouvernement français.'

(the statement being published on the 11th) Great Britain recognized the Czecho-Slovaks as an allied nation, their armies as regular belligerents, and the National Council as 'the present trustee of the future Czecho-Slovak Government'. On the 2nd September America recognized the National Council 'as a *de facto* belligerent government'. The statement was published on the 3rd.

14. *Czecho-Slovak Movement within Austria.* During the summer and autumn of 1918 the Slav deputies in the Reichsrat spoke with even greater freedom than before. On the 16th July M. Tusar declared that 'the war must end with the creation of a Czecho-Slovak state', and next day M. Stříbrný sang the praises of the Czech troops fighting for the Entente, gloried in the name of 'traitors to Austria' and renewed the claim to complete independence, while M. Stránský denounced the Austria of Seidler as 'a constitutional monarchy without crown and without constitution'. In August the Czech parliamentary leaders attended the congress organized by the Slovenes at Laibach (Ljubljana), and laid special stress upon the solidarity of bourgeoisie and proletariat, of Clerical and Socialist, in support of the national cause; and on the 3rd September the Czech clergy of Bohemia, fired by the example of Bishop Jeglič of Laibach, issued a manifesto declaring their adhesion to the 'National Oath' and describing 'the realization of an independent Czecho-Slovak state as an act of God's historic justice'.

By this time the internal political situation had reached a deadlock both in Austria and in Hungary,¹ since Vienna and Budapest were irreconcilably at variance in the matter of constitutional reform, and since the parliamentary leaders of the non-German and non-Magyar nationalities combined to reject every overture 'from above'. The collapse of the Balkan Front and Bulgaria's rapid capitulation produced a veritable panic in the official circles of the Monarchy. When on the 1st October the new Premier Baron Hussarek told the Reichsrat that the introduction of national autonomy must now be regarded as inevitable, he was openly flouted by the Slav leaders. M. Staněk, speaking for the Czech Club, declared that his nation could not be excluded from a share in the peace negotiations, and would be represented by the Czecho-Slovak Legions! He actually concluded by urging unconditional

¹ See Chap. I, Part III, pp. 90-5.

surrender to the Entente. Father Korošec, in the name of the Yugo-slavs, demanded 'full freedom or death', and the Premier was reduced to a nervous and ineffective protest against 'the glorification of felony and treason'. Austria-Hungary's formal acceptance of President Wilson's speeches as a basis of negotiation (7th October) was followed by a fresh speech of Hussarek on the 8th October, admitting that the 'Fourteen Points' were incompatible with the existing structure of the Monarchy. Magyar public opinion at once took alarm, and there was a veritable stampede towards separatism, in the vain hope of saving Hungary from the consequences of liquidation in Austria. So breakneck was the speed of events, that within less than a week such pillars of the existing order as Count Tisza and Dr. Wekerle had abandoned the basis of the Dual System, and the latter, in once more accepting office, was allowed to announce the Crown's approval of the programme of Personal Union. Driven by the necessity of outbidding the more radical leader Count Károlyi in the popular favour, Count Tisza even went on to demand separate representation for Hungary at the peace negotiations. The whole machine of State was tottering on the edge of an abyss, and all that was still needed were a few firm blows from the outside at the critical moment. These were administered by Professor Masaryk and President Wilson.

15. *The Revolution in Bohemia ; President Wilson's Note, 18th October 1918.* On the 14th October Dr. Beneš notified to all the Allied Governments that a provisional Czecho-Slovak Government had been formed under the presidency of Professor Masaryk, with himself as Foreign Minister and Colonel Štefanik (with the rank of General) as Minister of War. *Chargés d'Affaires* were simultaneously appointed in London, Paris, Rome, Washington, and Omsk. On the 18th the Czecho-Slovak Declaration of Independence was published by the same triumvirate. But M. Pichon had already issued a *communiqué* that he 'unreservedly recognizes the existence of the new Government, and adds an expression of his profound satisfaction' ¹ (15th October 1918).

¹ In view of the qualified recognition by Great Britain (9th August) and the United States (3rd September) (*v.* §§ 8, 13, pp. 254-61), this French recognition almost settled the question. Full formal recognition may be taken as dating from the admission of Czecho-Slovak plenipotentiaries at the Peace Conference (18th January 1919), *v.* Chap. II, Part II, § 2, p. 181. Cp. Vol. V, Table III.

On the 16th October the Emperor Charles issued a manifesto 'To My Peoples', announcing the federalization of Austria (not Austria-Hungary). The old Austria was to be replaced by four national States—German, Czech, Yugo-slav, and Ukrainian: Trieste was to be a free port, and the Poles of Galicia were to be free to unite with Poland. Austria had allowed herself to be forestalled by the Czech proclamation. The new project satisfied no one, and was universally accepted as a formal notification of death. Indeed the Germans were the first to set about the task of convoking a National Assembly, and within a few days special national committees sprang into existence in every part of the Habsburg Monarchy. On the 19th October the *Narodni Výbor* (or Czech National Committee), which had been formed as early as July 1918 from representatives of every Czech party, issued its formal reply to the Emperor and to Hussarek. It declared that the Czech people could no longer negotiate with Vienna as to its future, and that the Bohemian question, which had now become international, could only be solved on a basis of absolute state independence; and after dwelling upon the sufferings of the Slovaks under Magyar rule, it proclaimed itself to be the sole legal representative of the will of the entire Czecho-Slovak nation.

The real death-blow was dealt by President Wilson's Note of the 18th October, in answer to Count Burián's offer to negotiate. America, he pointed out, had materially modified the standpoint expressed in the 'Fourteen Points' by her recognition of a belligerent Czecho-Slovak Government and of the justice of Yugo-slav claims, and was no longer free to discuss a settlement, save on a basis satisfactory to those two nations.¹ The effect in Bohemia and Croatia in particular was electrical, and if the National Council in Prague was perhaps slower to act than that of Zagreb, this was mainly because the Czech party leaders had set out upon a hurried visit to Switzerland, in order to establish contact with Dr. Beneš and decide with him their joint line of action. Thus it was not till the very close of the month that the final stage of revolution was reached, and in the meantime Hussarek had been replaced by Professor Lammasch, and Burián as Joint Foreign Minister by Count Andrássy. Seldom has there been a more dramatic instance of historical retribu-

¹ Cp. Chap. I, Part III, pp. 111-12, and this chapter, Part I, p. 198.

tion, than when the son, in ten days of office, undid the lifework of his father, the elder Andrassy. His Peace Note of the 27th October, accepting President Wilson's standpoint in the Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-slav questions as a basis for negotiation, annihilated at one blow not merely the Dual System, but the whole structure of political, dynastic, and constitutional theory upon which 'Austria-Hungary' had rested for two generations. On the next day (28th October) the Narodni Výbor in Prague took over the civil administration of Bohemia and received the submission of the garrison and its commanders. The new Czecho-Slovak Republic entered on its existence by an entirely bloodless revolution. Thanks to the foresight of the 'Mafia' and the National Committee, an elaborate plan for taking over the government offices, railways, and strategic points, could be put into immediate operation, and the historic frontiers of Bohemia were soon secure from attack. Meanwhile the Slovak National Committee in Turčiansky Sv. Martin—in whose name Father Juriga had on the 16th October in the Hungarian Parliament asserted the right of self-determination—declared itself on the 29th October for the unity of Czechs and Slovaks in a single state, and Dr. Vavro Šrobár was admitted as its delegate to the National Council in Prague.

16. *Meeting of the Assembly of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, 14th November 1918.* On the 14th November the first National Assembly of the new Republic met in Prague. As the holding of elections would have involved a dangerous delay, and as the summons of the three provincial Diets would have been a step at once centrifugal and retrograde (in view of the narrow franchise by which they were elected), a certain amount of improvisation was clearly inevitable. The National Council apportioned mandates among all the existing parties, according to the number of votes polled by each at the last election to the Reichsrat, under universal suffrage; and at first forty-one, and afterwards fourteen more, Slovak delegates were co-opted on the advice of the Slovak National Council. The Germans of Bohemia, under the influence of extremist leaders, held completely aloof, in the mistaken calculation that they would be allowed to assert their independence; and unfortunately some of the Czech leaders did nothing to encourage a more conciliatory attitude.

The Assembly was opened by the Young Czech leader, Dr. Kramář, and proceeded to elect Professor Masaryk by acclamation as President of the Republic, and to nominate the members of a cabinet of concentration, in which every party from Left to Right was represented. Dr. Šrobár, as Minister for Slovakia, was left free to form what was in effect a sub-Cabinet of thirteen prominent Slovaks, sitting at Bratislava (Pressburg) and administering Slovakia on virtually autonomous lines. Dr. Kramář, as Premier, and Dr. Beneš, as Foreign Minister, became the two Peace Delegates of the Republic.

17. *Czecho-Slovak Ideals.* This is not the place to describe the long series of legislative reforms introduced by the revolutionary Assembly, first under the Concentration Cabinet of Dr. Kramář, and since June 1919 under his successor M. Tusař and a Coalition of Socialists and Agrarians. The new municipal elections were held in June under the new franchise—universal suffrage for both sexes and proportional representation—and supplied a fair test of feeling in the country, which was turning slowly away from the old bourgeois Chauvinist channels of the Habsburg era, in favour of a programme of advanced social reform and racial conciliation and against all ideas of adventure in foreign policy. It is in this direction that President Masaryk, Dr. Beneš, and their colleagues are throwing the whole weight of constructive statesmanship.

The original Declaration of Independence, with its deliberate rejection of the divine right of kings for 'the principles of Lincoln and of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen'—principles which the nation of Hus and Comenius justly claimed as its own—remains a key to the mentality and aims of the new Republic. It is sufficient to compare the broad lines laid down in this document with the actual legislation of the first eighteen months of the Republic. 'The Czecho-Slovak State', it declares, 'shall be a republic in constant endeavour for progress. It will guarantee complete freedom of conscience, religion and science, literature and art, speech, the press and the right of assembly and petition. The Church shall be separated from the State. Our democracy shall rest on universal suffrage; women shall be placed on an equal footing with men politically, socially, and culturally, while the right of the minority shall be safeguarded by proportional representation. National minorities shall enjoy equal rights. The

government shall be parliamentary in form and shall recognize the principles of initiative and referendum. The standing army will be replaced by militia.¹ The Czecho-Slovak nation will carry out far-reaching social and economic reforms. The large estates will be redeemed for home colonization, and patents of nobility will be abolished. . . . On the basis of democracy mankind will be reorganized. . . . We believe in democracy, we believe in liberty and liberty for evermore.' These words are a fitting conclusion to our survey of the Czech struggle for independence.

E. THE CZECHO-SLOVAKS AT THE CONFERENCE.

The first and most essential part of the Czecho-Slovak programme—unity and independence—had been automatically achieved by the collapse and dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. The task which confronted the Czecho-Slovak delegates at the Peace Conference was thus greatly simplified, and consisted above all in guarding what had already been obtained. It will not therefore be necessary to enter into very great detail as regards the territorial provisions, but merely to indicate the points at which the settlement finally accepted by the Supreme Council differed from the claims put forward, and the reasons which prompted such differences.

The official claims of the Czecho-Slovak Delegation fall under seven heads, which it may be convenient to take in the same order.²

18. *The Lands of the Bohemian Crown.* The lands of the Bohemian Crown—the three Austrian provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia—were claimed in their entirety, in virtue of historic right and juridical continuity; and rectifications of frontier in favour of the Republic were demanded: (1) at Glatz (Kladsko)—an enclave in Prussian Silesia, formerly entirely Czech and still containing 60,000 Czech inhabitants; (2) in the district of Ratibor (also in Prussian Silesia), a mixed district where the Czechs claim a slight majority over Poles and Germans; and (3) at Gmünd and Thermenau (Postorná) in Lower Austria.

On the basis of 'State Rights' the claim to the ancient

¹ Here alone a modification of the programme has been found necessary.

² For statistics v. Vol. V, Table I.

frontiers of Bohemia was unanswerable. On the other hand, it was argued that the German districts, which lie on the periphery, should also be allowed to exercise the right of self-determination, and to unite either with the rest of German Austria or with the German Reich. On its theoretical side, such a claim raised the whole question as to what constitutes a unit entitled to self-determination. But the real obstacles to the claim were of a strictly practical nature. German Bohemia could not under any circumstances form a single unit, distinct from the Czech districts; for it falls into four more or less isolated fragments—the north-west or Eger-Karlsbad district, the north-east or Reichenberg-Trautenau district, the Moravian-Silesian group, lying between Olmütz and Troppau, and the strip adjoining Upper Austria, to the south of Budejovice (Budweis). Of these, only the fourth could be united to the Austrian Republic; the other three, if severed from Czecho-Slovakia, would have to be assigned to Bavaria, Saxony, and Prussia respectively. Even if it were decided to ignore the Czech racial minorities in these frontier districts, it would have been well-nigh impossible to discover a tolerable line of division between Czechs and Germans; for though the centre of the country is overwhelmingly Czech, and the periphery no less overwhelmingly German, there are many intermediate districts where the two races are inextricably mingled. The abandonment of the historic frontiers—more sharply defined by Nature herself than almost any others in Europe—would have had a treble disadvantage. It would have left Czecho-Slovakia so entirely defenceless as to be really incapable of independent life; it would have deprived her of a large proportion of those mineral resources upon which Bohemia's prosperity had always rested; and it would have cut off the German districts themselves from their natural market in the agricultural centre of Bohemia, robbed their industries of the Czech workmen on whom they depend, and exposed them to most formidable competition from the great industrial rings of Germany. These appear to have been the main considerations which influenced the Supreme Council in accepting unaltered the old historic frontier between Bohemia and Germany. To this there is a single exception, in the extreme south corner of Prussian Silesia, where Germany cedes to Czecho-Slovakia portions of the Kreise of Leobschütz and Ratibor (Arts. 27 and

83)—the intention being to avoid an unnatural and dangerous salient of German territory between Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, in the event of the 'Plebiscite Area' of Upper Silesia falling to the latter (*v.* pp. 366–7). The old frontier between Bohemia and Austria (Upper and Lower) is adopted, with certain not unimportant modifications in favour of the former, near the junction of the Thaya and the Morava (March) and to the north-west of Gmünd, where the Czechs secure certain railway lines on which the traffic of southern Bohemia depends.

In one direction alone was the delineation of the frontiers held in suspense—in the Duchy of Teschen (Těšzn, Cieszyn), but this is dealt with fully elsewhere.¹

19. *The German Minorities.* Meanwhile the problem of the German minorities in Bohemia undoubtedly remains the most difficult with which the new Republic is confronted; and the Supreme Council in pursuance of its general policy included in the Treaty of Versailles a clause (Art. 86), pledging the Republic to protect the interests of all racial and religious minorities.² This pledge was readily accepted by the Czecho-Slovak Government in the Language Law of the 29th February 1920, of which the main provisions are indicated in the Treaty.³

It may be useful at this point to give the numbers of the population in that portion of the new Republic which belonged to Austria, according to the last census (1910):

	<i>Czecho-Slovak.</i>	<i>German.</i>	<i>Polish.</i>	<i>Total (including other racial fragments).</i>
Bohemia .	4,241,918	2,467,724	1,541	6,709,548
Moravia .	1,868,971	719,435	14,924	2,622,271
Silesia .	177,896	278,799	138,417	608,128
	6,288,785	3,465,958	154,882	9,999,947

These figures cannot be taken as an exact index of racial distribution, for the simple reason that quite apart from possible bias in their compilation, they are based not upon 'the mother-tongue', but upon 'the language habitually spoken' (*Umgangssprache*). Nor will the figures of the recent parliamentary elections (April 1920) serve altogether as a corrective, even though they were conducted on a basis of

¹ See Chap. VI, Part I, which discusses the plebiscite, as well as those at Orava and Zips.

² Vol. V, Chap. II, *passim*.

³ See Vol. V, App. IV, § iv.

universal suffrage and proportional representation ; for though all the leading parties secured very exact representation, the system of *scrutin de liste* produced in many cases the effect of forcing the smaller groups to follow social rather than racial lines of cleavage.

20. *Slovakia.* The claim to Slovakia was made to rest upon the right of national self-determination. References to the shadowy Moravian Empire of the ninth century and even to the temporary union under the Hussites, were obviously inadequate historical arguments to set against the patent fact of Hungary's territorial unity during ten centuries. On the other hand, no one acquainted with conditions in Slovakia before and during the war, could be in any doubt as to the alacrity with which the Slovaks would welcome the first chance of shaking off Magyar rule. As a result of the amazing system of electoral corruption and terrorism prevalent in Hungary, there were only three elected Slovak deputies ; and thus the sole authority which could serve as a substitute to the Magyars when the great upheaval came, was the Slovak National Council in Turčiansky Sv. Martin. On the 6th November 1918 its delegate to Prague, Dr. Šrobár, accompanied by MM. Blaho, Derer, and Štefanik, entered Skalice and backed by only a few hundred gendarmes and legionaries, established a provisional régime in the western Slovak counties, while the northern counties fell automatically under the control of the National Council. Early in 1919 Dr. Šrobár and his thirteen 'Referents', or permanent heads of departments, took up their headquarters in Bratislava (Pressburg), and began to reorganize the whole administration from there. The number of Slovaks in any way qualified for responsible posts was utterly inadequate ; and it was necessary to import officials from Bohemia, especially in the sphere of justice and education and in the railway and postal services. But the central control remained entirely Slovak.

The problem of frontier delimitation proved far more difficult for Slovakia than for Bohemia. To the north the old frontier between Hungary and Galicia is not merely a formidable geographical barrier, but also coincides with the racial cleavage between Slovaks on the one hand and Poles and Ruthenes on the other. There are, however, 38,500 Ruthenes north of Šaryš county. The only other qualifications to this

statement are in regard to certain villages in the counties of Orava and Zips. None the less, the Poles prevailed upon the Supreme Council to allow two plebiscites among a population which is essentially Slovak, despite certain Polish dialectical influences.¹

On the south, on the other hand, there is no obvious frontier, and the line of ethnic division is very much a matter of dispute, owing to the slow process of Magyarization to which these border districts had been specially subject. Thus a whole series of doubtful points had to be decided by the experts in Paris, before the final frontier could be established.

(a) The town of Bratislava (Pressburg), according to the Hungarian census of 1910, contained 31,705 Magyars, 32,790 Germans, and only 11,673 Slovaks. But to the very gates of the town the population is Slovak, and it was rightly held that it could not be separated from its hinterland, and that it was destined to play an important and indeed essential part as the Danubian port of Czecho-Slovakia. A district of some 4 sq. km. in extent, lying to the south of the Danube, opposite the town, was also assigned to Czecho-Slovakia, both as a guarantee against hostile raids, and as being the property of the municipality; but no fortifications are allowed on the right bank.

(b) From Bratislava eastwards as far as the junction of the Ipoly (Eipel) with the Danube, the latter was decided on as the only possible frontier between Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary, although considerable Magyar minorities are to be found on the left bank, in the southern portions of the counties of Nitra and Tekov (Bars). This is the more excusable because even these minorities are undoubtedly for the most part Slovaks who have been Magyarized during the last century, and because their whole economic life is bound up with the left bank of the Danube. A much more contentious point was the fate of the 'Grosse Schütt', the large and fertile island in the Danube, stretching from a few miles east of Bratislava, to the former fortress of Komárom (Komorno). Though here the population is exclusively Magyar (over 100,000), it was decided that the southern channel was the only possible frontier, and the whole island was therefore assigned to Czecho-Slovakia. The only apparent defence for this decision is that the island's economic

¹ v. Chap. VI, Part I, B, pp. 364-6.

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ties are undoubtedly with Bratislava and the north bank, and that without it Czech access to the Danube might have been seriously curtailed.

(c) From the mouth of the Ipoly to the point at which autonomous Ruthenia begins, there was a wide divergence between the extreme claim put forward by Czecho-Slovakia and that finally allowed. There can be little doubt that the latter represents a reasonable solution, and that it would have been a very real injustice to the Magyars to deprive them of the coal-mines of Salgótarján, of the vineyards of Tokaj, and of the genuinely Magyar towns of Vác, Miskolcz, and Sáros-patak. The town of Sátoralja-Ujhely was also left to Hungary, but its railway station (a mile away), the junction of Csapp and the line connecting it with Košice (Kassa) were left to Czecho-Slovakia, in order to assure the latter's communications with Rumania.

Until a new and careful census can be taken, all existing estimates of the population of Slovakia can merely be approximate. According to the 1910 census there were 2,945,846 inhabitants, comprising 1,897,552 Slovaks, 801,793 Magyars, 111,687 Ruthenes, and 198,887 Germans. It should be added that according to the Hungarian census of 1910 there are close upon 300,000 Jews in the counties now assigned to Slovakia and Ruthenia.¹

21. *Ruthenia*. The union of the Czecho-Slovak and Rumanian races each in a single national state, left the Ruthenes—the most backward and isolated of all the non-Magyar races—virtually suspended in mid-air. According to the census of 1910 they numbered 464,259, but according to the statistics of the Uniate Church, to which they belong, the true figures were 537,962. It has been the very definite policy of the Magyars to prevent any national movement among the Ruthenes, to keep them without intellectual leaders and to promote so far as possible their complete absorption. At the outbreak of war they had not a single school, secondary or primary, in which their language was taught, no political newspaper of any kind, and practically no periodical literature.

¹ Most of the Jews thus given are really included in the figures of the Magyars and, to a less degree, of the Germans, which are quoted above. The figures (1910) for autonomous Ruthenia are 4,057 Slovaks, 62,187 Germans, 169,434 Magyars, 319,361 Ruthenes, others 171,114. Total, 572,028.

On the other hand, they had a higher percentage of illiterates than any other race in Hungary, and a very high percentage of emigrants, and among them economic exploitation by the great landed proprietors, by the Magyar officials, and by the Jewish traders and inn-keepers had reached its height. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that such leaders of opposition as the Ruthenes of Hungary possess, should look back upon Magyar rule as upon a long and evil nightmare.

During his visit to America in 1919 Professor Masaryk was approached by delegates of all the 'Carpatho-Ruthene' and 'Ugro-Russian' colonies of the United States, with a request for the union of their European homeland with Czecho-Slovakia. In December 1918 a deputation from the newly-formed Ruthene National Council at Munkačevo (Munkács) went to Prague with the same object. The Czecho-Slovak Government, in welcoming these overtures from close kinsmen and neighbours whom it was genuinely desirous of helping, was quite frankly influenced by reasons of general policy; since the union of Ruthenia with the new Republic would give the latter direct territorial access to Rumania and above all to Russia, and would at the same time avert the strategic dangers involved in its union with whatever power might become mistress of the northern Carpathian slopes.

The Peace Conference decided to assign Ruthenia to Czecho-Slovakia, but as an autonomous province, with its own Diet, governing council and language. The constitutional details have not yet been fully worked out; and many years must inevitably pass before conditions can become anything like normal.

22. *'The Corridor.'*¹ The Czecho-Slovaks advanced a claim for territorial contiguity with the Yugo-slavs, to be attained by the creation of a corridor running from the Danube to the Drave, and comprising the districts lying to the east of the old frontier between Austria and Hungary. They sought to justify this claim by the undoubted fact that nearly 25 per cent. of the population of the territory in question were Slavs, and that these were the survivors from century-long German and Magyar aggression against a Slav land. But, of course, their

¹ The chief arguments for the 'Corridor' are given in *De Prague à l'Adriatique* by Arthur Chervin (Paris, 1919), who claims to be the author of both phrase and ideal.

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avowed aim was to establish a common frontier between the two most westerly Slav States, and to drive a wedge between Magyars and Germans, as a preventive measure for the future. It was, however, held at Paris that such a structure would be altogether too artificial, and might indeed provoke the very dangers which it was designed to combat; and the whole project therefore fell to the ground.

23. *Proposed internationalization of certain communications.* The Czecho-Slovaks demanded the internationalization of the Elbe, the Danube, the Vistula, and of the railways connecting Bratislava (Pressburg) with Trieste and Fiume, and Prague with Strasbourg via Fürth and Nürnberg.

Under the Treaty (Art. 340) they obtained full satisfaction on the first of these points, the Elbe (with the Vltava-Moldau from Prague) being placed under an International Commission of ten members (4 for the German riverine states, 2 for Czecho-Slovakia, 1 each for Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium); and free zones in the ports of Hamburg and Stettin were assigned to Czecho-Slovakia, on a lease of 99 years, for the direct transit of goods by river—the details being left to a commission of 3 delegates (1 German, 1 Czecho-Slovak, and 1 British) and subject to revision every ten years (Arts. 363-4).

The European Commission of the Danube, which already existed before the war, was reconstituted under Articles 346 to 353 of the Treaty, but on new and provisional lines. At first all river jurisdiction was vested in four Powers—Britain, France, Italy, and Rumania—but a new international commission was to be formed as soon as possible after ratification of the treaty, consisting of 11 members—2 for the German riverine states, one each for the above-mentioned four Powers, and one for each of the remaining riverine states—viz. Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Yugo-slavia, and Bulgaria. This whole question receives special treatment elsewhere.¹

The plea for the internationalization of the Vistula was not allowed.

As regards railways, no special provision was made for transit between France and Czecho-Slovakia across German territory, this being left dependent upon the general traffic provisions of Article 365. On the other hand, free railway

¹ Vol. II, pp. 107-8.

communication between Czecho-Slovakia and the Adriatic was specially guaranteed by Articles 322-4 of the Treaty of St. Germain—for the route Bratislava-Fiume via Oedenburg (Sopron) and for the route Budejovice (Budweis)-Trieste via Linz and Klagenfurt.¹

24. *The Czechs of Austria and the Serbs of Lusatia.* Finally, the Czecho-Slovak delegation advanced special pleas on behalf of the Czech minority in Lower Austria and of the Serbs of Lusatia. It was obvious that neither question could be settled by annexation.

According to the Austrian census of 1910 there were 122,329 Czechs in Lower Austria (102,000 in Vienna), and the Czechs themselves contend that there are as many as 400,000, including of course those whose parents were of Czech origin. Their interests are safeguarded by Articles 62 to 69 of the Treaty of St. Germain, which pledges the Austrian Republic to the protection of its minorities, and in particular to the provision of adequate instruction in the mother-tongue. In the case of the Serbs—whose numbers are estimated at 160,000 and who occupy the districts of Cottbus and Bautzen—it was urged by the Czechs that they should no longer be divided between Prussia and Saxony, but united with the latter and granted a special autonomous position. This claim, however, was allowed to lapse in Paris, and the Serbs remain as before victims to well-nigh certain Germanization.

25. *Attitude of Austria and the Supreme Council towards the boundaries of Czecho-Slovakia.* In conclusion, it may be useful to place before the reader some of the arguments by which the Austrians opposed, and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers defended, this settlement of the frontiers.

(a) *The Austrian Position.* Vast contiguous territories in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia are inhabited by three million Germans. 'All this people, free up till now and highly civilized, will, without reference to its motives and aspirations, be rendered subject to Czecho-Slovakia.' It was claimed that the communal elections, held under the Czecho-Slovak Government, showed the strength of German feeling. The southern districts of Bohemia and Moravia, with 300,000 Germans, were attached to Upper and Lower Austria by economic ties, and plebiscites were accordingly proposed in these areas.

¹ On all these points v. Vol. II, Chap. I, Part V, *passim*.

They also complained that Lower Austria had been deprived of some 18,000 inhabitants.

(b) *The Allied Reply.* As regards Czecho-Slovakia, the Powers replied that they intended to preserve to the old Czech provinces of the Crown of Bohemia their historic frontiers to the greatest possible extent. 'They have thought that the populations of German speech inhabiting the borders of these provinces should remain associated with the Czech populations to collaborate with them in the development of the national unity with which history has bound them up (*les a rendues solidaires*).' 'The Powers have considered that the best pledge of that national unity would consist in economic unity of which the Imperial and Royal administration (of the former monarchy) had taken no account. They are, consequently, compelled to assure to the Czecho-Slovak State a complete system of means of communication.' This caused an alteration of the frontier at two points: (1) in the region of the Thaya to include the railway line of Lundenburg-Feldsberg-Znaim, which was necessary to unite Moravia with the more southerly part of Czecho-Slovakia; (2) near Gmünd, to include in Czecho-Slovak territory the point where meet the two Czech great lines from Prague via Tabor to Gmünd, and from Pilsen via Budweis. In each a corner of Lower Austria was cut off. 'Although in the course of the second examination . . . they have made Austria definite concessions and reduced the territory beyond the historic frontier to what was strictly necessary, the Powers believed and believe that they should maintain the principle of the double rectification indicated.' In a joint memorandum of the 17th February 1920, by M. Millerand and Mr. Lloyd George to President Wilson, the following remarks throw light on the decisions of the Conference: 'That ethnographic reasons cannot be the only ones to be taken into account is clearly shown by the inclusion of 3,000,000 Germans in Czecho-Slovakia.'

(c) *Comments.* This discussion is important as indicating the one instance in which historic, rather than ethnic, economic or strategic, arguments were used. It is curious that the Hungarian Delegation sought to use the instance of Czecho-Slovakia to uphold the principle of an undivided Hungary on the basis of historic rights. But the cases were really different; Hungary reduced to a domain almost exclusively Magyar could

still live though with difficulty, Czecho-Slovakia in similar case could not. The real argument was that the area defined by history was that in which lay the lands of the Bohemian Crown. But this was insufficient unless accompanied by full freedom of communications and possibilities of economic existence. It may, in general, be said that Czecho-Slovak frontiers were the frontiers of history supplemented by the additions demanded by the necessities of economic life.¹

¹ This does not mean that this general principle applied to particular areas, as, e.g., the Grosse Schütt, which was assigned to Czecho-Slovakia and is the most questionable transaction in the whole settlement.

CHAPTER V

THE TREATY OF LONDON

PART I

ITALY'S NEW FRONTIERS: THE TYROL, ISTRIA, FIUME¹

Introductory. The Treaty of London and President Wilson's Ninth Point. The results of the Treaty of London permeate and modify the whole of the Peace Settlement of Austria and of Hungary. The problem of the Italian frontiers was one of the most important in the whole Conference because it threatened at one stage to delay, or even to prevent the signature of the German Treaty and, more serious still, because it conflicted with the Wilsonian principles—and most serious of all, because the action of d'Annunzio in seizing Fiume threatened not only internal revolution to Italy herself but a complete overthrow of the moral and practical authority of the Conference and the Supreme Council. It was therefore inevitable that fierce passions should have been engendered and the wildest controversies should have raged around many of the questions involved.² One point it is necessary to emphasize at the outset. This is that 'Signor Orlando, as head of the Italian Government, has stated that in the discussions preceding the German request for an Armistice, and the application of the "Fourteen Points", he declared formally that he must make reservations as to Point 9, which referred to the future frontiers of Italy'.

¹ For statistics, v. Vol. V, Table I.

² v. Vol. V. App. IV for text of the most important documents. Nearly all available documents are published by 'Adriaticus' in *La Question Adriatique*, Paris, 1920. Some important gaps are supplied by Professor F. Šišić, *Jadransko Pitanje*, Zagreb, 1920, which gives reports of the conversations of the 18th–14th and the 20th January 1920. *The Times* of the 28th January 1920 admirably summarizes the various phases up to that date. *Correspondence relating to the Adriatic*, Parl. Paper, Misc. No. 2, 1920, Cmd. 586, gives most but not all of the correspondence from January to March 1920. For the Italian side, v. Italian Green Book dealing with Austrian negotiations up to the 10th May 1915 (published in English), and Italian Parliamentary Debates, which are most valuable.

(Point *Nine* runs as follows: 'A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.')

On both occasions it was replied by the other Allied delegates that this was not the moment to discuss points not applicable to Germany and that Point 9 was therefore not in question.

'On the second occasion, Signor Orlando said that at the proper moment he would renew the exception he had already taken.'¹

Orlando's reservation as to Point 9 did not therefore appear in the Allied Memorandum of the 4th November 1918, which was addressed to President Wilson, and embodied by him in his Reply to the German Government of the 5th November, which formed the binding part of the pre-Armistice Agreement and the legal basis of the German Treaty. It is now clear that Orlando should either not have acquiesced in this decision or, if he did, should have published at once his reservation on Point 9. For the unfortunate Orlando found no 'proper moment' to 'renew the exception he had already taken', as no pre-Armistice agreements preceded the Austrian, Hungarian, or Bulgarian treaties. Had he publicly stated, before the signature of the German Armistice on the 11th November 1918, that Italy was not bound by Point 9, she could not fairly have been charged, as she was subsequently on many occasions, with refusing to accept the Wilsonian principles after having solemnly subscribed to them. She could no more have been charged with inconsistency than could the British Empire for having made public its reservation as to Point 2 dealing with the 'Freedom of the Seas'. When Orlando did at last make public his reservation as to Point 9 (1st May 1919), it was too late to impress or influence public opinion, and the fact is even now much less widely known than it should be. To some extent, however, Orlando suffered, and suffered justly, for his secrecy. For his only public indications of the relations between Italy and the Yugo-slavs had been shown in the sympathy he extended to the Pact of Rome (the Torre-Trumbić agreement of April 1918, and in the *communiqué* of the 8th September 1918, which will be considered below). The net result appears to be that Orlando considered that his secret reservation (which he did not make

¹ Authorized statement of Signor Orlando to *The Times* Special Correspondent in Rome on the 1st May 1919, published in *The Times* of the 2nd May 1919.

public till the 1st May 1919) exempted him from any commitments incurred by his expressions of sympathy with the cause of Yugo-slav nationality, which had already been public for over a year. There is no more instructive example of the difficulties of 'Secret Diplomacy'.

It is convenient to treat the question of the northern frontier, which related chiefly to the new Austria, separately from the other problems relating to the command of the Adriatic and to the frontiers with Yugo-slavia.

A. THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF ITALY

The Brenner-Trentino and Alto Adige.

1. *Historical, Ethnic, and Strategic Facts.* The districts of Trentino and Alto Adige form the Süd-Tirol; the area of the former is 2,454 square miles (6,356 sq. km.), and of the latter (including Ampezzo) 2,953 square miles (7,848 sq. km.). These were the districts originally in dispute between Italy and Austria, subsequently the Brenner area was discussed between the Allies and the latter.

The historical facts are not very illuminating. The counties of Trent (Trient) and Bozen (Bolzano) were under the temporal rule of the Prince-Bishop of Trent from the Middle Ages until their secularization (1803) and final annexation to the Tyrol (1814). The Austrian Emperor at the same time annexed the adjacent counties of Brixen and Vintgau (Val Venosta). All had in practice been under Habsburg influence or control for some centuries. A revolutionary change was indeed introduced by Napoleon in 1810, who took this whole Alto Adige and Trentino area from Austria and included it in his kingdom of North Italy under the name of the Alto Adige. This last action was frequently referred to at the Peace Conference by the Italian Delegation as an argument in their favour. But the importance of this decision was not really historical, but geographical and strategical. For, if Italy is considered as a geographic unit, the frontier might be carried along the main divide of the Alps and the Trentino, and Alto Adige would then naturally fall within these limits. This, however, could only be done by doing violence to ethical and national claims.

The statistics are analysed elsewhere,¹ but the broad racial

¹ v. Vol. V, Table I.

facts are simple enough. The Trentino, as such, is almost wholly Italian, or at least Romance, for there are Ladins as well as Italians. The sympathy of the Ladins is claimed (and apparently with justice) for the Italians. The Germans in the Trentino are numerically negligible.¹ On the other hand, in the Alto Adige there is a very great German preponderance.² North of the Alto Adige there are practically no Italians, but south of Trentino there are a few German islands. There does not seem any reasonable doubt about the feelings of the populations, which run purely on racial lines. The Trentino has always been violently pro-Italian, and the Alto Adige and further districts to the west vehemently pro-German.

From the Italian point of view the question was partly national, partly strategical, and it is difficult to say where one ended and the other began. But there can be no doubt of the grave danger to Italy from the position of the Trentino. It had been lavishly fortified and was an impregnable strategic bastion from which sorties could be made down to the broad plains of Lombardy and Venetia. The great Austrian offensive in 1916 shows clearly the danger to which Italy was exposed. Her alliance of over a generation with Austria-Hungary had made no difference to the latter's military preparations in the Trentino. It was natural, inevitable, and right that this menace to Italy should be removed. But the real question was how far could ethnic and strategic justice be reconciled? It was easy to see that they might conflict. '*Italia irredenta*' might mean one thing, and '*sacro egoismo*' quite another.

2. *The Italian demand for a frontier rectification and the Austro-Hungarian offer.* The pourparlers instituted between Italy and Austria-Hungary during the first few months of the war are of singular interest.³ They can only be summarized here. On the 15th January 1915 Sonnino demanded a rectification of frontier owing to 'popular Italian sentiment', and stated to Prince Bülow (then on a special German diplomatic mission to Italy) 'that a permanent condition of harmony'⁴ would not be

¹ Austrian census of 1910. Trentino: Germans, 18,450; Italians and Ladins, 360,847.

² Austrian census of 1910. Alto Adige: Germans, 215,796; Italians and Ladins, 22,500.

³ v. Italian Green Book. Diplomatic Documents, submitted to Italian Parliament (20th May 1915). English Translation, London, New York, and Toronto, 1915.

⁴ Harmony between Austria and Italy is meant.

attained until it were possible entirely to eliminate the irredentist formula of "Trent and Trieste"'.¹ Finally, on the 8th April 1915, he formulated eleven Articles as indispensable to future co-operation which he despatched to the Austro-Hungarian Government. Some of these did not affect the Tyrol, and need not therefore be mentioned here. But the line demanded in the Tyrol started from the existing Italian frontier at Cevedale, turned north-eastwards to include Bozen, and thence followed an irregular line eastwards until it reached Cortina d'Ampezzo and the existing Italian frontier by Auronzo.² It not only completely pinched out the Trentino salient but gave to Italy the important railway junction of Bozen and severed the important Meran railway line from the Brenner line. Baron Burian, the Austro-Hungarian-Foreign Minister, was prepared to sacrifice the Trentino, but nothing else, particularly not Bozen. He offered a line running some 30 kilometres to the south of Bozen, which would have brought the Austrian frontier to within some 17 kilometres of Trent.³ He insisted on the strategic necessity of retaining 'the eastern side of the valley of the Noce, which would remain insecure without possession of the heights protecting the region of Bozen'. Sonnino summed up as follows: 'On one point only, that which regards the Trentino, has the Imperial and Royal Government shown itself disposed to cede a little more than in its first proposals; but even in this there is no provision that will overcome the main disadvantages of the present situation, whether considered from the linguistic, the ethnological, or the military point of view' (21st April 1915).⁴ On the 3rd May 1915 Sonnino instructed the Italian representative at Vienna that Italy 'must renounce the hope of coming to an agreement . . . and proclaims that she resumes from this moment her complete liberty of action, and declares as cancelled and as henceforth without effect her treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary'. In point of fact, Italy had already resumed 'her complete liberty of action', for she had signed the secret Treaty of London with the Entente on the 26th April 1915.

¹ v. Italian Green Book, p. 24.

² Ibid., pp. 82-5; v. map.

³ Ibid., pp. 86-9.

⁴ Ibid., p. 89. Fassa and Ampezzo were Ladinian and were excluded from Baron Burian's offer to Italy. It appears that at the last moment (11th May) Burian privately offered more concessions via Giolitti (*New Europe*, 30th October 1919, pp. 82-3).

3. *The Settlement of the Brenner frontier at the Peace Conference.* The Treaty of London shows a much more pronounced strategic claim on the part of Italy than that put forward in negotiation with Austria-Hungary.¹ The frontier was to be pushed forward to an average depth of over 30 kilometres in advance of the previous extreme Italian claim, so as to include the Brenner Pass. This not only conferred on Italy complete protection but gave her a strategic offensive and put her as regards much of the Tyrol in the same position as she had been when the Trentino was Austrian. The ethnic facts were not in dispute, and this frontier involved handing over a total of about a quarter of a million Germans to Italy. It included valleys like the Oetzthal and the Zillerthal, containing populations of the purest German race.

So far as they have been stated the arguments appear to be almost purely strategic. As has been elsewhere mentioned, this demand was conceded finally on the 29th May 1919.² The statements of the different parties at the Conference follow herewith.

(a) *The Austrian Position.* 'According to the Conditions, the Southern Tyrol will be practically deprived of its liberty . . . The victorious powers, during the war and since its end, have brought before the whole world—before the triumphant as well as before the defeated peoples—a régime of equity and the abolition of every social and political servitude . . . The mountaineers of the Tyrol . . . submitted with full confidence to the victors, believing that their fate and their future were in the hands of just judges. Yet it is actually the Tyrol, till now, except Switzerland, the most burning centre of liberty and resistance to all foreign domination, which will be sacrificed to strategic considerations, as an offering on the altar of militarism.'

'The frontiers she (Italy) demands in the present peace treaty extend beyond the line of waterparting, beyond the territory contemplated in the Treaty of London, and beyond those delimited in virtue of the armistice.'³ To satisfy strategic

¹ v. *infra*, pp. 286–7, and text, Vol. V, App. III.

² v. *infra*, pp. 391–2. According to Thompson, *Peace Conference Day by Day*, p. 372, the tension was foreshadowed on the 12th May.

³ 'Mt. Tarvis' is mentioned in the Treaty of London as a point of demarcation, and in the Armistice (which latter had no political bearing). The town of Tarvis is well known, but no such mountain is known to exist. It might be argued that it meant the heights north or south of the town, a very great difference from the Italian point of view. The 'Sexten valley' is not mentioned in the Armistice. The Austrian treaty of the 10th September

necessities the Austrian Government advanced a project for completely neutralizing the Tyrol. But it contended that in point of fact the ethnic frontier gave all the strategic protection that Italy required. 'Give bare justice to the Tyrol and Peace to the world!' In claiming its nationals and their domiciles 'German Austria can limit itself to the facts set out above with complete freedom of verification. She need use no other arguments than those of truth, no other claims than those of justice' (Austrian despatch, 10th June 1919).

(b) *The Powers' Position.* 'The Allied and Associated Powers consider that no modification should be made in the tracing of the frontier between Italy and Austria, as presented ... in the conditions of peace. It results from the very clear declarations made by the President of the Council of Italian Ministers to the Parliament at Rome, that the Italian Government proposes to adopt a broadly liberal policy towards its new subjects of German race, in what concerns their language, culture, and economic interests' (Reply of Allied and Associated Powers, 2nd September 1919).

(c) *Later Evidence of the Powers' Position ; Comments.* In the numerous protests made by the Smaller Powers against signing the Minorities Treaties, none was more frequent or more felt than the argument that the Italians signed no such treaty. Some of the objections to the cession would have been removed had the Italians taken this course.¹

As regards the actual frontier of the Brenner and the reasons for its cession, some light is thrown by a telegram to the Italian Government from Mr. Lansing (12th November 1919):²

'Your Excellency cannot fail to recognize that the attitude of the American Government throughout the negotiations has been one of sincere sympathy for Italy and of an earnest desire to meet her demands. Italy claimed a frontier on the Brenner Pass, and the demand was granted in order to assure to Italy the greatest possible protection on her northern front, although it involved annexing to Italy a considerable region populated by alien inhabitants.'

This explanation was quoted—apparently with approval—in the Joint Franco-British-American Memorandum to Italy

1919 ultimately gave Italy the Sexten valley, the town of Tarvis, and the heights north of it.

¹ Cf. Vol. V, Chap. II.

² v. and for further quotations, *Correspondence relating to the Adriatic Question*, Misc. No. 2, 1920 (Cmd. 586), Parl. Paper.

of the 9th December 1919. Sonnino, in *communiqués* to the Press and speeches, never concealed the fact that this frontier was demanded because of the Treaty of London and in deference to strategic necessities ; this is, at least, an intelligible argument. It is, however, not easy to reconcile the following passage in the Franco-British-American Memorandum of the 9th December 1919 with the disposition of the Tyrol in the Austrian Treaty :

‘ But an appeal to an historical argument may be permitted to the representatives of three countries to whom the liberation of Italian territories from foreign domination has been a matter of unwavering concern and sympathy through generations of noble and often terrible struggles. Modern Italy won the place in the hearts of all liberty-loving peoples, which she has never since lost, by the pure spirit of her patriotism which set before her people the generous aim of uniting under the Italian flag those extensive provinces formerly within the ancient Italian boundaries which were and have remained essentially Italian territories in virtue of their compact Italian population. The sympathies of the world have accompanied Italy’s advance to the outer borders of *Italia irredenta* in pursuit of the sacred principle of the self-determination of the peoples. This principle is now invoked by other nations. Not invariably is it possible, owing to the complicated interaction of racial, geographical, economic, and strategical factors, to do complete justice to the ethnic principle. Small isolated communities surrounded and outnumbered by populations of different race cannot, in most cases, be attached to the territory of their own nation from which they are effectively separated, but the broad principle remains that it is neither just nor expedient to annex, as the spoils of war, territories inhabited by an alien race, anxious and able to maintain a separate national State.’

This argument was invoked in favour of the Yugo-slavs, but it seems equally applicable to the Germans of the Tyrol. Between Point 9 of President Wilson and the obligations of the Treaty of London there is a clear conflict.

The British and French Memorandum (17th February 1920) to President Wilson throws much light on the attempt to reconcile these conflicting principles :

‘ In thus entering the war on the side of human freedom Italy made it a condition that the Allies should secure for her as against Austria-Hungary strategic frontiers which would guarantee her against the retention by the Central Powers of the strategic command of the northern plains of Italy. Had the Austro-Hungarian Empire remained in existence as the ally of Germany, the provisions of the Treaty of London would have been sound. Relying upon the word of her Allies, Italy endured the war to the end. She suffered a loss in killed of over 500,000 men and in wounded of three times that number, while her people are burdened by crushing debt. It was clearly impossible for her Allies to declare at the end of the war that their signature to the treaty meant nothing but

a scrap of paper, and that they did not intend to apply the terms of their bond. They agreed with President Wilson that the circumstances under which the Treaty of London was concluded had been transformed by the war itself. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had disappeared, and the menace to Italy, against which the terms of the treaty were intended to provide, had largely diminished. . . .

One of the principal difficulties encountered by the heads of Governments during the negotiations of peace was that of reconciling treaty obligations with national aspirations, . . . many of them born during the war and formulated with unexampled clarity and elevation by the President of the United States himself. It was equally clearly impossible to ignore treaties. In fact, the war began in order to enforce upon Germany respect for the solemn treaty she had made nearly eighty years before in regard to the neutrality of Belgium. It is the task of the statesmen of the world to endeavour to adjust national aspirations and ideals, many of which are only transitory and ephemeral, with one another and with international treaties. The difficulty of the task, the patience required in order to effect it successfully, the uselessness of endeavouring to enforce preconceived ideas on refractory material, has been recognised by no one more clearly than by the President of the United States. In his address at the opening session of the Peace Conference he pointed out how impossible it was to expect imperfect human beings and imperfect nations to agree at once upon ideal solutions. He made it clear that in his judgment the only course before the Peace Conference was to do the best it could in the circumstances and to create machinery whereby improvements and rectifications could be effected by reason and common sense under the authority of the League of Nations instead of by resort to war. Accordingly not only was the League of Nations established, but Article IX was specially inserted in the Covenant providing that the "Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world". Thus an essential part of the Treaties of Peace has been the constitution of machinery for modifying and correcting those treaties themselves, where experience shows it to be necessary.

It cannot be said, however, that this argument ends the matter. If treaty obligation was paramount, the Italians were fortunate to obtain Tarvis and the Sexten Valley. If, as Great Britain and France admitted, 'the menace to Italy had diminished,' it seems to follow that the demand for the frontier of the Brenner should diminish also. In point of fact, this frontier is open to objection not only for ethnic reasons, but because it renders possible a strategic offensive on the part of Italy without giving adequate defence to Austria. Two other lines farther to the south could have been drawn, which would not have included so many Germans, and yet would have given adequate strategic protection to Italy, but deprived her of advantages in

taking the offensive. There is no evidence that the Austrian project of neutralizing and demilitarizing the Tyrol was ever seriously discussed, still less that of determining the fate of the Tyrol by plebiscite.¹ It is therefore on the treaty obligation, and on that alone, that the Italian claim to this frontier must be based. It is therefore to the League, and to the League alone, that Austria can look for redress or revision.

B. THE TREATY OR PACT OF LONDON, 26TH APRIL 1915 ; AND THE PACT OF ROME, 10TH APRIL 1918

4. *Preliminaries and General Principles.* The account of the Italian negotiations with Austria-Hungary may be called the origin of the Treaty of London. For Baron Sonnino always insisted that the cession of the Trentino was only one part of his scheme. In addition to this he had demanded from Austria the Gorizia (Görz) district and an independent position for Trieste. Next came the problem of the Adriatic, where he demanded the cession of the Curzolare group of islands off the coast of Dalmatia, and the Albanian question, in which he demanded that Albania, as defined in 1913, should be neutral, but that Italy should receive Valona (which she had already occupied) in full sovereignty. On none of these questions except the Trentino would Baron Burian offer any concessions, and this might be held to show that the questions of Trieste, of the Dalmatian islands, and of Valona were actually more important in his view than the Tyrol.

The Treaty of London aimed, like these negotiations, at a general settlement of all outstanding questions in favour of Italy. A study of its provisions shows that there were seven main problems to be dealt with.

These were (a) The Brenner frontier ; (b) Trieste and Gorizia ; (c) Istria and Fiume ; (d) Dalmatia and islands ; (e) Albania ; (f) The Eastern Mediterranean ; (g-m) Certain General Provisions.

¹ There was some division on the subject in the German part of the Tyrol. Vor-Arlberg was only prevented with difficulty by the Supreme Council from obtaining incorporation with Switzerland, and the German Tyrolers do not seem to have made up their mind definitely to remain a unit. There is no doubt, however, that no Germans wished to be absorbed by Italy. On the 20th January 1919 the Tyrolese Diet passed a resolution refusing to recognize the separation of South Tyrol. Since then (April 1921) a large majority of voters in Austrian Tyrol voted for union with Germany.

Two main principles ran through the settlement agreed to in the London Treaty: first, strategic security; second, readjustment or maintenance of the balance of power by territorial compensation to Italy. The second was equally important with the first, and is indeed difficult to separate from it. During the negotiations with Burian Sonnino continually insisted that Italy had an interest in maintaining the integrity of Serbia, and that the weakening of her position by Austria-Hungary demanded the strengthening of the natural defences of Italy. But Sonnino was naturally embarrassed in demanding territorial concessions from an Ally. In negotiating the Treaty of London he had a free hand, and this instrument discloses a complete plan for the readjustment of Europe, in so far as the Italian Government realized the future in the spring of 1915. The underlying conceptions of future political adjustment appear to have been the following. The entry of Italy into the war would lead to the military defeat, but not to the political collapse, of Austria-Hungary.¹ Consequently some of her outlying provinces could be lopped. The Brenner frontier to the north, and that of the Julian Alps to the east, could be obtained by Italy. Fiume was to be left as the port of Croatia, which might be autonomous but still dependent on Austria-Hungary, or even be independent. Serbia would remain independent, and would acquire Bosnia-Herzegovina and possibly the southern half of Dalmatia. Italy, by obtaining Trieste, Pola, the whole of the Istrian peninsula, and the northern half of Dalmatia, including the harbours of Zara and Sebenico, would dominate the Adriatic. All other Dalmatian harbours were to be demilitarized as well as Cattaro. Montenegro was to remain independent. Albania was to be withdrawn from Austro-Hungarian influence and partitioned. Montenegro and Serbia were to divide the north, Italy was to 'protect' an autonomous state in the centre, and Greece to have the south. Italy was to obtain Valona in full sovereignty. The new settlement of East Europe would result in a crippled Austria-Hungary and a strengthened Serbia which would prevent her future aggressions. There was no danger of a united Yugo-slavia, for Croatia

¹ Salandra, who was Prime Minister at the time of the signature, wrote 'the complete dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was not then considered as a possible war-aim'. Letter, 19th October 1919 (*New Europe*, 30th October 1919, p. 88).

would be autonomous and Catholic, Montenegro Orthodox and independent. Italy would hold the keys of the Adriatic and be secure from all military attack behind two impregnable mountain walls on the north and on the east. It is important to bear in mind these conceptions, because the actual political conditions had greatly changed at the end of the War; and the question at once arose as to how far a treaty could be binding, whose provisions were based on conceptions which had proved illusory.

5. *The Terms.* The detailed demands of Italy were as follows :

(a) *The Brenner Frontier (Art. 4).*¹ This frontier has already been mentioned and may be dismissed, as there was ultimately no dispute except in details.

(b) *Gorizia, Trieste, and Pola (Art. 4).* Italy claimed Gorizia as a continuation to the east of her system of defences to the north. Gorizia is in an area predominantly Slovene in race, but there was not much hesitation in allowing Italian claims to Gorizia itself and to the predominantly Italian towns and harbours of Trieste and Pola. The whole controversies of the Peace Conference dealt with the line east of Gorizia and with the eastern half of the Istrian peninsula.

(c) *East Istria and Fiume (Art. 4).* Italy acquired East Istria by the Treaty and a line running just west of Fiume, giving her the heights which dominate the town in the military and every other sense. This dispute proved the storm-centre of the whole Conference. Fiume was not demanded in the Treaty as it was intended to be the port of a self-governing Croatia, which would, it was thought, be either independent or be controlled by a weakened Austria-Hungary.²

¹ A detailed commentary on Articles 4 and 5 is to be found in an Italian memorandum of the 10th January 1920. Parl. Paper, Cmd. 586, 1920, pp. 14-15. For text of Treaty v. Vol. V, App. III, § i; and also statistics, Vol. V, Table I.

² It is not true, as is sometimes stated, that Fiume was 'forgotten' in the Treaty. On the contrary, Sonnino addressed a telegram to Italian representatives in Paris, London, and Petrograd, 21st March 1915: 'To Croatia, whether she remain united to Austria-Hungary or separate herself from it, will remain the coast from Volosca to Dalmatia with the nearest islands of Veglia, Arbe, Pago, etc. As principal port she would have Fiume besides other smaller ports in the channel of Morlacca.' v. A. H. E. Taylor in *Balkan Review*, December 1920, p. 381. Nitti (7th February 1920) said that by the Treaty of London 'the whole city of Fiume and the zone as far as Dalmatia were to be given to the Croats, whether Austria remained united or was divided

(d) *Dalmatia and the Islands*. Italy received North Dalmatia, including Zara, the only predominantly Italian town of Dalmatia and an area extending up to and beyond Knin and Sebenico. Here again great controversies arose.

(e) *Albania*. Italy received control over Central Albania and the sovereignty of Valona, thus enabling her to 'bottle' the Adriatic. The final outcome of these claims is discussed elsewhere.¹

(f) *The Eastern Mediterranean and Asia Minor*. Italy was to receive 'entire sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands which she is at present occupying' (Art. 8). 'Generally speaking, France, Great Britain and Russia recognize that Italy is interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean' (Art. 9). In the event of the total or partial partition of Turkey Italy was to 'obtain a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Adalia, where Italy has already acquired rights and interests which formed the subject of an Italo-British convention'. In the case of Turkish territorial integrity being maintained, the interests of Italy would 'also be taken into consideration'.

(g) *Rights in Africa and Asia*. All rights and privileges of the Sultan to be transferred to Italy (Art. 10). 'In the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany, those two Powers agree in principle that Italy may claim some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favour of the questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya and the neighbouring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain' (Art. 13).

(h) *Holy Places in Asia*. Italy associates herself with the Franco-British-Russian declaration on this head (Art. 12).

(j) *General Provisions. Indemnity*. 'Italy shall receive up' (italics not in original). v. *New Europe*, 19th February 1920, p. 142. In their memorandum of the 17th February 1920 Clemenceau and Lloyd George state, 'Under the Treaty of London Italy has had to abandon Fiume altogether and hand it over to *Yugo-slavia*.' This is clearly an error for Croatia. There seems to be no doubt that the Italian contention in their memo. of the 10th January 1920 is correct. After quoting Art. 5 and Note of the London Treaty they say, 'Il ressort clairement de ce texte que la base de la stipulation qui y est envisagée consiste dans l'hypothèse de la formation de trois États différents : le Monténégro, la Serbie et la Croatie.' Serbia in this instance might, of course, include Bosnia, Herzegovina, and South Dalmatia.

¹ *infra*, Part II of this chapter.

a share of any eventual war indemnity corresponding to her efforts and her sacrifices' (Art. 11).

(k) *Peace Negotiations and the Papacy.* 'France, Great Britain and Russia shall support such opposition as Italy may make to any proposal in the direction of introducing a representative of the Holy See in any peace negotiations or negotiations for the settlement of questions raised by the present war' (Art. 15). This Article apparently disabled the Allies from answering the pope's appeal for peace on the 1st August 1917. An answer was not sent by England or France, but only by President Wilson.¹

(l) *Secrecy.* 'The present arrangement shall be held secret' (Art. 16).

This provision was rendered ineffective by the fact that the Yugo-slav Committee discovered the substance of the Treaty and published a map illustrating the proposed territorial changes. In November 1917 the Bolsheviks published a version of the whole Treaty which was incorrect only in a few details. The Italian Parliament discussed this version in January 1918, but the official version was not made known to Serbia (then the Serb-Croat-Slovene State) until January 1920.

(m) *Italian Co-operation with the Allies.* 'The adherence of Italy to the Declaration of the 5th September 1914 (agreement of France, Great Britain, and Russia to "make no separate peace") shall alone be made public, immediately upon declaration of war by or against Italy' (Art. 16).

This was done apparently on the 30th November 1915.

'On her part, Italy undertakes to use her entire resources for the purpose of waging war jointly with France, Great Britain and Russia against all their enemies' (Art. 2).

Italy declared war at once on Austria-Hungary on the 23rd May 1915.² But the declaration of war against Germany did not take place until the 27th August 1916 (i.e. over a year after Italy's entry into the War), and seems to have been prompted by Rumania's entry into the War³ (v. p. 310).

6. *The Entente Attitude towards the Treaty of London up to the*

¹ v. Vol. I, p. 186 and n., p. 187.

² She declared war on Turkey 20th Aug., and on Bulgaria Oct. 1915.

³ Salandra 'boasted' of this delay, 'as an important service rendered to my country.' Letter, 19th October 1919, in reply to Giolitti's speech of the 12th October 1919. *New Europe*, 30th October 1919, pp. 80-3. v. *infra*, p. 310.

Armistice. (a) *French Attitude.* The attitude of France does not appear to have been anywhere stated, but it seems certain that she was interested in the general balance of naval power in the Adriatic and Mediterranean and in the commercial possibilities of Fiume. The claims of Italy in Asia Minor raised questions in which France has always been interested.

(b) *The British Attitude.* This has been defined by Lord (then Sir Edward) Grey and Mr. Asquith, the two principal British authors of the Treaty, though Mr. Lloyd George no doubt shared the responsibility as being a member of the Cabinet. As both the former Ministers resigned at the end of 1916 their later views may reasonably be taken as expressive of their attitude at the time of the signature of the Treaty.

On the 5th February 1920 Mr. Asquith said, 'It is one of the most complex and difficult questions of the whole world to disentangle the problems of nationality upon the north and east of the Adriatic. We had to do the best we could, and I am prepared to defend, in the circumstances of the case, every one of the provisions in that Treaty (i.e. of London) as being dictated or justified by ethnological or historical or strategic considerations. And I should be only too glad for that secret Treaty to go before the League of Nations—very likely it will, sooner or later, if they cannot get a better arrangement between the Yugo-slavs and Italy—and there be subjected to the most minute and, if you please, suspicious criticism by impartial representatives of all the Powers of the world.'¹

This explanation is not very illuminating, for there is no acquisition or even claim at the Peace Conference which could not be so justified under 'ethnological or historical or strategic considerations'. Lord Grey seems to have been less optimistic. He made no direct allusion to the London Treaty, but said, 'In War you will have secret Treaties. Many things regarded as criminal are inevitable in time of war' (Speech at Institute of International Affairs, 5th July 1920).

The attitude of Mr. Lloyd George's Government appears to have been stated by Mr. Balfour, when he said that the secret treaties were 'no obstacle to peace', and the British Government would listen to 'reasonable suggestions' (20th June 1918).²

¹ 5th February 1920. *The Paisley Policy*, pp. 125-6. Cf. also Vol. I, pp. 190-1 and n.

² v. Vol. I, p. 190, n. 2. Mr. Lloyd George in his speech of 5th January

(c) *The Russian and Yugo-slav Attitudes.* These must always remain obscure because of the 'dark forces' in the Tsarist Government which influenced so many negotiations. It appears certain that M. Sazonoff disapproved of some at any rate of its provisions. The official Russian attitude appears to have been an insistence on the separation of Catholic Croatia from Orthodox Serbia and Bosnia.¹ Thus Russia was, in some sense, anti-Yugo-slav. The Treaty was speedily revealed to the Yugo-slavs with consequences which produced a split in their ranks which is related elsewhere.²

7. *The Italian Attitude.* (a) *The Pact of Rome, 10th April 1918.* As the Treaty gradually came to light debates of one kind or another upon it took place both in the press and in the Italian legislature, where the Bolshevik version of the Treaty was openly discussed in January 1918. There was very little criticism of the fact that Fiume was not demanded for Italy, but there was some Socialist attack on the various provisions as 'imperialistic', notably by Bissolati. This view gained ground, for towards the end of 1917 and the early part of 1918, both Army and people in Italy received a notable chastening. The terrible disaster of Caporetto had shaken their nerves and produced profound humiliation. The soldiers had discovered that many of the villagers in the Bainsizza plateau, whom they had redeemed in the name of Italy, were unable to talk to them in Italian. The cry of *Italia irredenta* attracted the bourgeois rather than the Socialist masses of the peasants. The general public, as in all other lands, had begun to think about the Bolshevik phrase of 'No annexations'. Orlando, the new Premier, at the beginning of 1918, had strong idealistic leanings, though he was often unable to realize them. He favoured a movement in the Italian Parliament of men drawn from different parties, which constituted a Committee to arrange an understanding between Italians and Yugo-slavs (February 1918). The latter were now fortified in their aspirations towards unity by their manifesto

1918 said, 'We regard as vital the satisfaction of the legitimate claims of the Italians for union with those of their own race and tongue.' This implies that union with men of Slav race and tongue was not 'vital'.

¹ v. Salandra, Letter, 19th October 1919. Other authorities differ and say that Sazonoff's sole opposition to Italy was that South Dalmatia should not be Italian. v. *New Europe* (30th October 1919), p. 83.

² v. Chap. IV, Part I, pp. 182-4.

of Corfu, and were not unwilling, in the evil times now falling on Europe, to come to terms with the Italians. It was to the interest both of Italians and of Yugo-slavs to attempt to demoralize the Austro-Hungarian Army by appealing to their brethren who were fighting in it. The opportunity came when Signor Torre, as head of the Italian Parliamentary Committee, visited London, and concluded a written agreement with Dr. Trumbić, the head of the Yugo-slav Committee, on the 7th March 1918. It was then arranged that a Congress of Oppressed Nationalities should meet in Rome and define this agreement further.

(b) *Terms of the Pact of Rome, 10th April 1918.* The Congress took place in the second week of April and was officially greeted by Orlando as head of the Italian Government. The Torre-Trumbić Agreement was there expanded into 'The Pact of Rome' (10th April 1918).¹ Its first three provisions were common to all nationalities oppressed by Austria-Hungary. The last four formed the basis of the Italo-Yugo-slav pact, concluded by Torre and Trumbić as the representatives of the Italian and Yugo-slav peoples. It was recognized that the 'unity and independence' of the Yugo-slav nation ('known also as the nation of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes') was a vital interest for Italy, and that 'the completion of Italian national unity is a vital interest for the Yugo-slav nation' (Art. 4), as was also, for both, the 'freedom of the Adriatic Sea and its defence against every enemy present or future' (Art. 5). 'They engage to decide amicably, equally in the interests of good and sincere future relations between the two peoples the pending territorial questions on the basis of the principle of nationalities and of the right of peoples to dispose of their own destinies, and that so as not to prejudice the vital interests of the two nations, which will be defined at the moment of peace' (Art. 6). 'To those groups (*noyau*) of one people who find themselves included in the frontiers of the other, will be recognized and guaranteed the right of seeing their language, culture, and moral and economic interests respected' (Art. 7).

(c) *Comments.* This document is vague in character, but one or two conclusions emerge. Unfortunately for Yugo-slavia

¹ Text in Vol. V, App. III. It has been revealed that Mr. E. C. Wickham-Steed and Mr. R. W. Seton-Watson had much to do with this Congress and the preceding negotiation.

the Treaty of London is not mentioned by name, although the text of the Secret Treaty was read in the Italian Chamber in January 1918.¹

The rights of people to dispose of their own destinies and the principles of nationality are to be the bases of settlement. In other words the Wilsonian principles of Point 9 and self-determination are to be applied. In the ultimate settlement it is difficult to say that the spirit or letter of either of these arrangements has been preserved. On the other hand, it is only fair to say that the Treaty does contemplate that minorities of alien race will be placed under the domination of both Italy and Yugo-slavia. Also, neither Italian nor Serb Government was legally bound, though both were to some extent committed, by these negotiations.

On the 8th September 1918 the Italian Government, on the proposal of Signor Bissolati, published a statement to the effect that 'Italy considered that the movement of the Yugo-slav people for independence and for the constitution of a free state corresponded to the principles for which the Allies were fighting and to the aim of a just and lasting peace'.² This was the highest point ever reached in agreement by the two countries until the Treaty of Rapallo.

(d) *President Wilson's Attitude before the Meeting of the Peace Conference.* The new factors in the situation had been the stress of the War and the pressure of the United States which, as led by President Wilson, had taken up a strong stand on the rights of nationalities. But, as the stress of war ceased, certain features became clear. The whole political structure of the Treaty of London was passing away. The signature of the Armistice (3rd November 1918) meant that Austria-Hungary ceased to exist, and the Slovenes and Croats had already proclaimed their unity with the Serbs, which aim Italy on the 8th September had expressly approved. But Italy was now faced with quite a new problem. Instead of a small weak

¹ v. *New Europe*, 19th February 1920, p. 140.

² *The Times*, 14th February 1920. Further information is given on 10th January 1921. 'Baron Sonnino opposed with all his strength the proposition of Signor Bissolati, but at last had to give way. But, as the *Corriere della Sera* points out, Baron Sonnino, in forwarding the statement to the Italian ambassadors at the Entente capitals, interpreted it as a negligible expedient of war propaganda with no subsequent value. Time, however, has proved the wisdom of the policy of the late Signor Bissolati.' (Special Correspondent of *The Times*.)

Croatia and Montenegro separated from Serbia, there was to be a new strong Yugo-slav state with over thirteen million inhabitants on the very borders of Italy, and actually claiming Trieste. The reply to this danger was for Italy to claim Fiume. Sonnino and Orlando saw their chance of advocating the utmost strategic demands as defined in the Treaty of London, and carried the day.

It is a curious fact that, in January 1919, Bissolati—the Socialist ex-Minister—anticipated something of the final settlement by claiming Fiume, but advocating the restoration of Dalmatia to the Yugo-slavs. But he was savagely attacked by the Italian 'Imperialists'. Sonnino was now in the ascendant; he demanded the Treaty of London line in Dalmatia and everywhere else. Orlando demanded the city of Fiume, which was not included in the Treaty at all.¹ But, though Italian claims had thus revived in all their magnitude, there was an obstacle in the way. If the Treaty of London was to be applied Italy would lose Fiume, while, if it was null and void, she would certainly lose Dalmatia and perhaps Fiume as well. Italy's claim to Fiume was not good even with England and France, but there was a greater obstacle still. For even if the situation had changed, President Wilson's views had not. Almost his first act, on arriving at the Conference, was to refuse to recognize the Treaty of London, then, as he said, for the first time revealed to him.² The Treaty of London and Point Nine were bound to conflict, and it was thus that began one of the most important struggles from the point of view of principle and of result in which the Peace Conference was ever engaged.

C. THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE ITALO-YUGO-SLAV FRONTIER

8. *The Yugo-slav Attitude at the Conference up to the 23rd April 1919.* The Yugo-slav deputation, having arrived at the Conference, proceeded on the only basis which they could assume as correct, viz. that the Torre-Trumbić Agreement still held

¹ Nitti (7th February 1920) ascribes this demand to 'the spontaneous, sincere, and noble demonstration of the city of Fiume' (quoted in *New Europe*, 19th February 1920, p. 142). Barzilai, in the Italian Senate on the 16th December 1920, said 'No one thought of Fiume (for Italy) before the Armistice'.

² v. his statement to Senate Committee, 19th August 1919, quoted in Vol. III, p. 71.

good with regard to Italy. They were soon undeceived. The Italians resented the idea that Croats and Slovenes, who had recently been fighting Italians, should now be regarded as Allies. Feeling ran very high, the parts of Yugo-slav territory occupied by Italy were placed under a repressive régime, and on the 18th January 1919 Italy's opposition caused the Great Powers to refuse to recognize any Yugo-slav Delegates to the Conference except as representatives of Serbia.¹

President Wilson replied to this action by recognizing the Serb-Croat-Slovene state on the 5th February. On the 2nd February d'Annunzio published a fiery declamatory letter denouncing not only Yugo-slavs but also the Great Powers and demanding Fiume and Dalmatia for Italy.

On the 1st February the Supreme Council appointed a strong Territorial Commission on Rumanian and Yugo-slav questions. On the 18th the Yugo-slav (or as it was still called, the Serbian) Delegation appeared to state their case formally before the Council of Ten, and on the 25th entered into detailed discussion with the Commission itself. The views there expressed were embodied in a Memorandum signed by Dr. Trumbić, which has been analysed elsewhere.² On the 11th February the Yugo-slav Delegation had addressed a letter to Clemenceau as President of the Conference, and a second letter to President Wilson, offering to accept the latter's arbitration in all outstanding questions between them and the Italians. This request was answered by M. Clemenceau on the 3rd March to the effect that the Italians refused to accept the proposition.

Affairs from that time forward seem to have gone from bad to worse. Early in April it was known that the 'Big Four' were hard at work discussing the question of Fiume. How great was the strain may be illustrated from the journal of a well-informed observer. 'April 3. The Council of Four added another trouble to its list. It called in M. Trumbić, the Yugo-slav Minister, to get his view on the Adriatic question. Premier Orlando immediately withdrew from the Council, declaring that

¹ On the 18th January 1919 the representatives of Poland and of Czecho-Slovakia were formally admitted under those names to the First Plenary Session of the Conference.

² v. Chap. IV, Part I, § 12, pp. 207-10. As noted above, the Territorial Commission had no mandate to deal with the boundary beyond point 1,370 (about 15 kilometres east of Assling). Consequently all controversial questions with Italy were dealt with by the 'Four'.

it would be as suitable for the Council of Four to call in a German as to call in a Yugo-slav !' ¹ Almost exactly a year before Orlando had himself welcomed Dr. Trumbić with enthusiasm to the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities at Rome, which was directed against Austria-Hungary and Germany.

9. *President Wilson's Memoranda of the 14th and the 23rd April 1919.* On the 14th April President Wilson addressed a Memorandum direct to the Italian Delegation.² He took his stand upon his own principles and claimed that the situation had been entirely changed by the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and by the erection of independent states. He admitted that 'Italy should obtain the whole length of her northern frontier, as granted by the Act known as the Pact of London. But I am convinced that the Pact of London can no longer apply to the regulation of her Eastern frontiers.' The line traced in the Treaty of London was to give Italy 'a perfect security . . . against every eventual act of hostility or aggression on the part of Austria-Hungary' ! Austria-Hungary no longer existed and Italy's frontiers would touch those of independent states, frontiers 'constituted with a view of satisfying their legitimate aspirations. . . . States not hostile to the new order of Europe, but on the contrary, emanating from that order itself, interested in its maintenance, dependent on the maintenance of relations of friendship, and bound to a common policy of peace and good neighbourliness in virtue of the Covenant of the League of Nations'.

(a) *The 'Wilson Line'.* In this light he approached the whole question. He gave Trieste, Pola, and the greater half of the Istrian peninsula to Italy, but followed northwards a geographic line, traced on a map, and subsequently very famous as the 'Wilson Line'. This started from the mouth of the river Arsa and followed the central backbone of the Istrian peninsula in its natural continuation northwards to Tarvis. 'Beyond (that is to the west of) this line on the Italian side, are considerable groups of non-Italian populations,³ but their fate is so naturally

¹ C. T. Thompson, *Peace Conference Day by Day*, New York, 1920, pp. 284-5. A statement of Italian claims—declared to be official—was printed in *Gazzetta del Popolo*, 12th March 1919. v. Summaries in *International Review*, April 1919, pp. 320-6.

² Vol. V, App. III, § iii. The passages are translated from the French version (v. *La Question Adriatique*, by 'Adriaticus'. Paris, 1920, pp. 48-7).

³ Nearly 870,000 Yugo-slavs in all in Gorizia, Gradisca and Trieste, part of Carniola and Istria.

mixed by the nature of the country with the fate of the Italian people that their inclusion in Italian territory is fully justified.'

(b) *Fiume*. 'In my view there is no similar justification for including Fiume, or any of the coast south of Fiume within the limits of the Kingdom of Italy.' This at once disposed of the whole Italian claim to Dalmatia, while Yugo-slavia had already received the eastern half of the Istrian peninsula. Fiume was therefore left an island in a Yugo-slav sea. 'Fiume is by its situation and by all its conditions of development, not an Italian port but an international port, serving the country east and north of the gulf of Fiume.' Fiume was therefore to enjoy a very real autonomy, though included in the Yugo-slav customs régime. It was to be none the less 'left free in its own interests and in those of the surrounding states, to devote itself to the service of the commerce which, naturally and inevitably, seeks its outlets at its port'.

'The States which this port serves are new states.¹ They ought absolutely to count upon access to the sea. Friendship and the relations of the future will depend very largely on an agreement such as I have suggested; and friendship, Co-operation, freedom of action, should be at the base of the agreement of the peace if that peace is to be durable.'

(c) *Adriatic Islands and Valona*. The President advocated the cession of the Yugo-slav island of Lissa and the Albanian port of Valona to Italy. He advocated also demilitarization of fortified places on other Adriatic isles and a limitation of armaments in this area by the League of Nations, which would reduce the naval forces on the east side of the Adriatic to the level of police forces. He concluded by stating that the League of Nations would protect the rights of Italian minorities in the Adriatic archipelago and on the Dalmatian coast. He considered that Italy had received all that historic justice demanded.

The Italian Delegation seem to have shown a resolute opposition to this project. Sonnino stated subsequently to the Press that, throughout the Conference, he had stood out for the Treaty of London line in Dalmatia, demanding Istria, Zara, and Sebenico, and the islands. Orlando added to it the demand for Fiume which was not in that treaty at all. Consequently

¹ In his statement of the 23rd April, President Wilson names them. They are 'Hungary, Bohemia, Rumania, and the states of the new Yugo-slavic group'.

a complete deadlock ensued. Agreement was not assisted by the Yugo-slavs, who demanded a plebiscite for disputed areas (16th April) and conveyed a deputation to the President the next day, asserting that a plebiscite, already taken secretly in Dalmatia, registered an overwhelmingly anti-Italian result. If the latter statement were correct the Italians could hardly be expected to accept the proposal. If the plebiscite was certain to go against them they might as well yield at once. On the 19th it was reported that 'Orlando had intimated he may not sign the Peace Treaty if the Adriatic question is not settled'¹ (presumably in his favour). On the 20th 'the President withdrew from the Council of Four, feeling that it was useless to go on with a discussion which had been fruitless. . . . He has given his views and let it be known they are a finality. . . . He is definitely opposed to Italy's claims to Fiume.'¹ Orlando and Wilson both remained away from the Council on the 21st, when the President prepared a public statement 'in case there is a break'. The other American delegates 'were unanimous in approving its unyielding attitude against the secret Treaty of London'.² It has been reported that Lloyd George and Clemenceau spent these days in trying to find an agreement. If so, it was in vain. On the 23rd April the President issued to the public his statement on the Italian issue. The deadlock was evident and the public sensation immense. It increased in the evening when it was announced that 'as a result of the declaration by President Wilson on the Adriatic question the Italian Delegation has decided to leave Paris to-morrow'.

10. *Results of President Wilson's Statement of the 23rd April 1919.* The publicity of this famous statement, after secrets had been so carefully guarded by 'the Four', was only one cause of the excitement it created. The attitude of England and France remained obscure, but it was reported in the Press that they had produced, though they never published, a Memorandum on similar lines to that of the President.³ It was at least obviously to their interests to preserve the principle of free communication and the commercial independence, in one

¹ C. T. Thompson, *Peace Conference Day by Day*, p. 317.

² *Ibid.*, p. 319.

³ There is both good British and good American authority for this view. Cf. H. Wilson Harris: *Peace in the Making*, London, 1920, pp. 89-90, has some suggestions on this subject; and C. T. Thompson, *Peace Conference Day by Day*, pp. 338-9, who attacks Clemenceau and Lloyd George.

form or another, of Fiume. The Italian attitude, both official and popular, was one of indignation. Much of the complaint at the suddenness of the publication was somewhat unjust. A comparison of the statement of the 23rd with that of the 14th shows that there is only one difference between them.¹ The former is written as an appeal to both American and Italian peoples. It was at once interpreted by Orlando in his published reply of the 24th,¹ as an appeal 'to peoples outside of the governments which represent them, I should say, almost in opposition to their governments'. He claimed the Treaty of London line on grounds of security, Fiume as an ancient Italian town, and Dalmatia because it had been forcibly denationalized in recent years, though 'Roman genius and Venetian activity' had made it 'noble and great'. On that night Orlando left for Rome and was followed by Sonnino the next day to show Europe that the Italian nation was behind the Italian Government. There was much violence and excitement in the Italian press, but on the whole the departure of the Italian Delegation was of less importance than might have been expected. Ultimately they realized that they would be excluded from the benefits of the Treaty and the League unless they returned.

Credentials had been verified for the German Treaty (1st May), which recognized the Serb-Croat-Slovene state as a negotiator, so that little time was left if Italy wished to take part in the Treaty. On the 5th May the Italian Delegation left Rome to return to Paris, and on the 9th Orlando again joined the Council of Four. He had not added to his personal popularity in his own country, but the Italian people had shown no wish to adopt the ideas of President Wilson, against whom personal feeling was marked. On the 19th June Orlando was defeated in the Italian Parliament, and he and Sonnino were succeeded in their respective positions by Signori Nitti and Tittoni.

11. *Considerations governing the Fiume-Dalmatian question; ethnic, economic, and strategic.* If the Treaty of London had been enforced some 750,000 Yugo-slavs would have gone to Italy, and if Fiume had gone to Croatia some 28,000 Italians (about 23,000 in Fiume) would have been under Yugo-slavia.

¹ v. Vol. V. App. III for text. It has been reported that President Wilson published his statement because he heard that the Italian papers were announcing that 'Italy had definitely annexed Fiume'. See V. Bartlett, *Behind the Scenes at the Peace Conference, 1919*, p. 156. Contrast Lansing, *Peace Negotiations*, pp. 206-7.

It is true that Orlando pointed out that though Italy was 'suspected' of 'imperialistic cupidity', 'none of the reorganized peoples will count within its new frontiers a number of people of another race proportionately less than that which would be assigned to Italy.' The 'Wilson Line' gave to Italy over 360,000 Yugo-slavs contiguous to Italy. But there can be no doubt that the proposed additional Italian annexation of about 274,000 Dalmatians, an overseas population nowhere contiguous to Italy, was a very grave matter. But for the Treaty of London it could hardly have been discussed, and it formed as great an obstacle to agreement on ethnic grounds as Fiume did upon economic ones.

(a) *Fiume*. The elements of the Fiume problem may be made clear by tracing the 'Wilson Line'. This extended northwards from the mouth of the Arsa river so as to give to Italy the whole of the Trieste-Pola railway, then passed west of Castelnovo, Senosicche and Idria, leaving on the Italian side the towns of Grahovo, Tolmino and Plezzo, till it ended on the Péc heights near Tarvis. The aim of this line was to exclude the Italians from military positions which dominated Fiume, such as the Monte Maggiore, or similar ones dominating the roads to Laibach, such as Monte Nevoso (Schneeberg) and Blegoš. It gave to the Yugo-slavs the whole St. Peter or Fiume-Laibach railway, the quicksilver mines of Idria, which are the second richest in the world, and removed Italy a considerable distance from the very important strategic railway line of Laibach-Assling-Villach, whence communications ran to both Germany and Vienna.¹ Except at Fiume all the territory included in Yugo-slavia was indisputably Yugo-slav in race, though the Wilson 'line' gave about 365,000 Yugo-slavs to Italy.

The facts as to Fiume are very simple. The town of Fiume itself is as closely connected with its suburb of Šušak as is the City of London with Westminster, only a small stream parting the two municipalities. According to the Hungarian census of 1910, the following were the figures :

	<i>Italians.</i>	<i>Yugo-slavs.</i>
Fiume . . .	22,488	18,351
Šušak . . .	1,500	11,000
	28,988	24,351

Majority of Yugo-slavs over Italians in both cities = 363.

¹ Cf. *infra*, pp. 368-9.

The surrounding population was overwhelmingly Slav, and, consequently on ethnic grounds, Fiume could only be claimed by Italy, as a single city, detached not only from Šušak but from all the surrounding countryside. On commercial grounds it was really as fatal to detach Fiume from Šušak as it is to separate an oyster from its shell. Fiume has a fine modern harbour with the latest improvements and capacity for big draught ships, Šušak has only Port Baross, which is not suited for large traffic. There can be no reasonable doubt that the commercial considerations were more important than the ethnic, and these told entirely in favour of Fiume being a free port under international guarantee. For Trieste is the port of export for Austria and South Germany, Fiume that for Hungary. Consequently, if Italy were to control the railway rates and the ports of both Trieste and Fiume, all the countries of Central Europe would be at her good pleasure if she chose to toll and tax them. Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania by their trade on the Danube were interested in the freedom of Fiume, while Croatia and Hungary found in it their sole outlet. For Yugo-slavia Fiume was, and is, vital. The Trans-Bosnian railway is purely strategic, and the magnificent harbours of Dalmatia have no connexion with the hinterland. Consequently Dalmatia must find a 'free port' for her sea-borne trade at Fiume, while it must also be the outlet for the land-traffic of Croatia and of Bosnia. This did not end the matter—any radical change in the railway rates at Trieste (e. g. by Italy) would affect greatly the railway lines at Fiume and the connexion with Vienna and Laibach. In point of strict justice all commercial arrangements arrived at after the war with regard to Trieste should have been followed by complementary arrangements at Fiume. It would have been best for the League of Nations to guarantee the commerce of both, and, failing that, it seemed unwise to hand both over to Italy. The case was really analogous to that of Danzig, though the ethnic claims of Italy to Fiume-Šušak were not as strong as those of the Yugo-slavs, and the presence of a fifth nation at Fiume would naturally alarm the four others whose commerce depended on that outlet being free.

(b) *Tarvis-Assling-Idria* (v. Chap. VI, Part II).

(c) *Dalmatia—ethnic, economic and strategic considerations.*
To hand over northern Dalmatia to Italy meant that an alien and oversea people would control 274,184 Slavs in the

interests of only 13,859 of their own countrymen. The figures are remarkable. The Austrian census of 1910 gave 17,989 Italians in all Dalmatia as against 610,571 Slavs. It was contended that the census was falsified, but even the most extreme Italian writers did not claim more than 60,000 Italians, or less than 10 per cent. of all Dalmatia. Two-thirds of the whole Italian population was concentrated in Zara and its neighbourhood, and the town of Zara itself (with 9,278 Italians to 3,532 Slavs) was the only town with an Italian majority in the whole of Dalmatia. The facts of the situation were that, while Italian brains, capital, and enterprise had dominated the coast and the towns in the Middle Ages, the last generation had seen the development of economic life among the Slavs, and consequently the peaceful expulsion of Italian influences. The Slavs, once simply peasants, had become shopkeepers, shippers, and bankers, and needed no Italian aid. The best proof of this is that Spalato, the chief Slav town, had become a more important commercial centre than Zara, the only Italian town.¹ It is probable that the Italians, who had been living on historic memories, did not realize the intensity of Yugo-slav feeling in Dalmatia at the time of signing the Treaty of London. They very soon realized that hostility after occupying the areas in question. Order could only be maintained with the greatest difficulty on either islands or mainland. The best proof of the difficulties the Italians met with was in the necessity under which they lay of deporting the most eminent citizens of the country. As early as June 1919 a list of fifty-eight deported notables, beginning with a Bishop and a Deputy, was made out.² It is certain that many hundreds of men with lesser names were also deported. These facts made it very evident that the ethnic argument in Dalmatia was most decisively in

¹ In 1872 the Austrian Emperor visited the port at Traù (Trogir) and signed his name in the visitors' book as 'Francesco-Giuseppe'. The Italian population there is now a wholly insignificant minority.

² Signor Salvemini, in the Italian Chamber of Deputies (24th November 1920), is reported as saying that 'the Italian Government had had to dissolve 30 municipal councils out of 33 (in Dalmatia), so that at the head of the communes there were Italian officials and not properly-elected mayors. Moreover, all liberties were suppressed. No Slav newspaper was allowed to circulate. All Slav societies were dissolved, and 32 out of 57 magistrates were dismissed. Teachers, doctors, and priests were either deported or expelled from the country. . . . These facts must not be attributed to cruelty or folly. They were evidently imposed by the necessity of keeping order in a country which was wholly hostile.'

favour of the Yugo-slavs, and that the Italians could only remain there by exercising armed force.

From the military, as distinct from the naval, point of view, however, there was little to be said. It is obvious, as a great authority pointed out,¹ that 'such places, if held at all, must be held in strength'. The garrison would depend on, and could only be maintained by, sea power. It would have to be strong and, in the case of war, would almost certainly be overwhelmed. Dalmatia, thus garrisoned and separated from land access to Italy, would have been cut off and been a 'hostage to fortune'. The fact is there were two Italian points of view, the military and the naval, which actually conflicted. Admiral Thaon di Revel published in the *Westminster Gazette* an elaborate naval argument for the retention of the northern part of Dalmatia by Italy. But the whole argument for the extension of the frontier to Fiume was one of military necessity, of protecting Italy against invasion. Dalmatia Italy could not claim to hold on military grounds, for it was in the military sense a serious danger.

Italy, however, had a strong case on strategic grounds for obtaining some 'central island' as a naval base. Between Venice and Brindisi there is practically no good harbour on the Italian east coast, merely open roadsteads exposed to the terrible winds which sweep down through the gaps in the Dalmatian mountains. Dalmatia, on the other hand, abounds in excellent harbours which were in the past the haunts of pirates and could now be made nests for submarines. To defend herself against this Italy required a sheltered harbour, not necessarily on the land, but on some island off the east coast of the Adriatic. The justice of some such claim was generally allowed; Lissa was at first suggested, but ultimately the islands of Lagosta and Pelagosa were found more suitable for this purpose. These concessions gave Italy all the naval security she could reasonably demand. It is true that she could protest that Sebenico was a possible nest for submarines and Cattaro one of the finest harbours in the world. But these did little to offset the naval advantages which Italy already possessed. With Pola and Valona and a 'central island base' Italy carried the three keys of the Adriatic at her girdle.

12. *Proposals for settlement.* *The Tardieu Compromise*, 30th May 1919. On the 29th May President Wilson made the

¹ v. Lord Cavan, *Army Quarterly*, No. 1, October 1920, p. 18.

great concession to Italy of the Brenner frontier. But it appears that he made it only on the understanding that Italy would moderate her claims elsewhere.¹

Therefore, even before Orlando had fallen, a compromise was not only in the air but had been actually proposed. It is called from its French author the 'Tardieu Compromise'. It was proposed on the 30th May to the Yugo-slav Delegation by Colonel House, in the presence of the whole American Delegation except President Wilson. Colonel House explained that the proposal did not come from the President, who adhered to his declaration of the 23rd April, but that he would not oppose a settlement on which Italy and the Yugo-slavs were agreed. The chief point of this project was to create a temporarily independent and demilitarized 'buffer-state' under the League of Nations, including the town of Fiume (but not Šušak) and a hinterland stretching up to the Assling railway triangle and including the St. Peter railway. Its western boundary approximated to the 'Wilson Line'. Some islands were also to be included. The definite destiny of this area was to be decided in fifteen years by plebiscite; Italy was to give up the hinterland of Dalmatia but to annex Zara and Sebenico in Dalmatia, the islands of Cherso, Lissa, Lussin, and Pelagosa, and to have the mandate over Albania.² Orlando was stated to have agreed to this, but the Yugo-slavs would not. They demanded that the proposed plebiscite should be held in three years and that the Yugo-slav Government should meanwhile enjoy a position in Fiume equivalent to the Polish position in Danzig. The scheme therefore broke down, but it remained the basis for several other important schemes in the future. It is of great importance, for it was the last product of the period when the 'Big Four' were still in personal and permanent Session.

¹ 'In the Northern Italian frontiers agreements have already been reached which depart from the Treaty of London line, and which were made with the *understanding that negotiations were proceeding on quite a new basis.*' Italics not in original. (President Wilson's memo., 25th February 1920, to French and British Prime Ministers.)

² v. *La Question Adriatique*, Paris, 1920, p. 52. The Yugo-slavs and Italians had unofficially discussed a project on the 14th May. v. *The Times*, 28th January 1920. This arranged for Italy to have Fiume and Yugo-slavia Sušak, each in full sovereignty. That section of the port of Fiume between the river Retchina and the railway station to be leased to Yugo-slavia for 99 years, but to be controlled by a joint Italian and Yugo-slav board.

D. THE SUPREME COUNCIL AND FIUME

9TH DECEMBER 1919–6TH MARCH 1920

13. *D'Annunzio and The Riots at Fiume, July–September 1919.* (a) *Events at Fiume—July.* The Government set up in Fiume in November 1918, after the departure of the Serb troops,¹ was an Inter-Allied one, but the Italian General Grazioli was in supreme command. There was one British battalion, two French, one American (withdrawn 11th Feb.), and a strong Italian force. General Savy was the French commander—General Gordon the British. The Italian 'National Council' of Fiume obtained control of the Government and proceeded to great lengths of propaganda. A so-called plebiscite was arranged by them, and on the 10th May 1919 the press announced that they had adopted the Italian Penal Code and passed a resolution of loyalty to King Victor Emmanuel. These actions were disavowed by General Grazioli, but in June the young Italians of Fiume ('the Fiumani') began to raise a volunteer force which they armed and drilled. These 'Fiumani' ultimately began acts of sabotage against not only Yugo-slavs but against some of the French troops. The French had developed a base for supply of the Franco-Serb troops in Fiume, and this had irritated the 'Fiumani'. The result might have been predicted.

(b) *The Fiume Riots—and the Supreme Council.* On the night of the 2nd–3rd July the Croat Club at Fiume was wrecked and a French officer wounded. Finally, on the nights of the 6th and 7th July 9 French soldiers were killed and 58 wounded, in an affray with the 'Fiumani', in which some Italian soldiers joined and in which one Italian soldier was killed. It was decided by the Supreme Council on the 8th July to send a Commission of Generals to inquire into the disturbances at Fiume, and the conclusions of their report were given to the press at the beginning of September. These were stated to be: ²

- (1) Dissolution of the 'National Council' and election of a municipality under control of an Inter-Allied commission.

¹ v. Chap. II, Part I, p. 122.

² *La Question Adriatique*, Paris, 1920, p. 53.

- (2) Dissolution of the League of Volunteers of Fiume.
- (3) Reduction of Italian armed forces to one brigade of infantry and one squadron of cavalry.
- (4) The *personnel* of the French naval base at Fiume to be reconstituted, i.e. to be superseded by a British or American *personnel*.
- (5) Nomination of an Inter-Allied Commission to control the municipal administration.
- (6) Maintenance of public order to be entrusted to a British or American police force.

According to the same reports these conclusions were accepted by the Supreme Council, and General Grazioli was instructed to resign the command. But on the 12th September (the very day on which the British police were to take over control), to the amazement of the world a number of adventurers, commanded by D'Annunzio, occupied the town of which D'Annunzio proclaimed himself dictator. It needed a poet and a genius to produce a third sensation at Fiume, which in its popular appeal exceeded even the excitement produced by Wilson's manifesto and by the anti-French riots.

(c) *D'Annunzio's coup d'état, 12th September 1919.* The Allied troops (including the Italian regulars) hastily withdrew from the town. D'Annunzio, with the aid of deserters and adventurers, formed a small army and occupied the environs of Fiume and even sent expeditions over-sea to Dalmatia. He had some success at Zara (12th November), and won adherents, but experienced a severe repulse at Traù. This small town was garrisoned with a few Yugo-slav soldiers but was within the American naval sphere under the armistice.¹ The American naval commander gave D'Annunzio's adventurers two hours in which to retire, and at the end of it Traù was evacuated. D'Annunzio showed no further desire to try conclusions with sailors or soldiers who did not speak his own tongue. The Italian Government proceeded to draw a cordon of regular troops around Fiume, and thus cut off D'Annunzio from direct access to the Yugo-slav troops at Bakar (Buccari).

The attitude of the Supreme Council appears to have been that D'Annunzio's escapades were the concern of the Italian Government. He was an outlaw, whom Signor Nitti had

¹ v. Chap. II, Part I, p. 123. The S.C.S. Government issued a decree, 23rd October 1919, annexing Šušak, then occupied by D'Annunzio.

disavowed and promised ultimately to subdue. Not much is known of D'Annunzio's attitude towards Italy or of his government of Fiume. As to the latter, one thing is certain. He was intensely autocratic and ultimately became very unpopular with all but a small section of the city. It is not clear where he obtained his supplies or the money to pay his soldiers and officials. The blockade ultimately became quite nominal, and the poet-dictator was visited by friends and by many journalists to whom he never failed to supply invaluable 'copy'. From an attitude of relative loyalty towards Italy and the Monarchy he ultimately passed to the wildest republicanism, and even to a species of Bolshevism, and issued proclamations by aeroplane containing the coarsest abuse of Nitti, of Giolitti, and of the Supreme Council. Even his famous letter of the 2nd February 1919 was outdone in extravagance. President Wilson, for instance, was described as a 'cold-hearted maniac who wished to crucify Italy with nails torn from the German Chancellor of the scrap of paper'. In this orgy of literary exuberance we need take no part except to remark that his example was even more eloquent than his language. It was easy to laugh at his rhodomontade, but he had done something that was more important than words. In Italy he awakened consternation, for he might sow dissension both in the army and the State. He had expelled the soldiers of England, he had defied the Supreme Council and continued to flout its authority for over a twelvemonth. His example was infectious, not only in Italy but elsewhere, and not only at the time, but, as is to be feared, for the future.

14. *The Franco-British-American Memorandum to Italy of the 9th December 1919.* (a) *New Orientation of the Fiume question.* With the departure from Paris of the principal protagonists it was easier for their successors to discuss proposals for a settlement. The situation was clearer now. Northern Dalmatia, except Zara, was no longer an object of serious contention. It was a pawn in the game which Italy was prepared to abandon if she could secure concessions as to Fiume, which was not secured to her in the London Treaty while Northern Dalmatia was. With the arrival of Nitti and Tittoni (afterwards succeeded as Foreign Minister by Scialoja) the question of the binding character of the Treaty of London was raised. These two, on arriving at Paris, were greeted on the

28th June 1919 with a communication from Lloyd George and Clemenceau to the effect that the Treaty of London and subsequent Conventions had no longer 'a juridical value', but were precedent acts which would serve as a basis for discussion.¹ The chief ground for this appears to have been that Italy had violated her Treaty obligations by not declaring war immediately on Germany (Art. 2). Signor Tittoni on the 7th July contested this view, asserting that no date had been specified and that Italy went to war with Germany as soon as the state of her military preparations allowed of her doing so. At a later date (19th October 1919) Salandra, who had been responsible for signing the Treaty, 'boasted' of this delay 'as an important service rendered to my country'. Giolitti, on the other hand, stated in the Italian Chamber that Italy's delay had violated Article 2 of the Treaty and 'She thus failed to keep the Pact' (12th October 1919).² It is not easy to see the merits of the quarrel, but it does not appear that England and France protested in 1915 at the delay in question. In view of this most international jurists would not accept the view that the violation or non-execution of one clause in a Treaty rendered the whole Treaty null and void. At any rate the controversy was dropped, for about seven months later Clemenceau and Lloyd George declared themselves bound by the Treaty of London.³

All parties except D'Annunzio were now in a mood for compromise over Fiume. A scheme had already been published on the 25th August which emanated from Washington. The general idea was to give the city of Fiume to Italy and of Šušak to Yugo-slavia, and to place the port and inland communications in the hands of the League of Nations. As the 'Wilson line' was to be maintained Fiume would not have been contiguous with Italy. This scheme might have produced a favourable solution, had not the startling events at Fiume interrupted it.

¹ v. Scialoja's speech in the Italian Senate, 14th July 1920. Tittoni's reply of 7th July has been published, but the contents of the Franco-British communication has been only indicated. v. *supra*, p. 291.

² v. *New Europe*, 30th October 1919.

³ e.g. 'The British and French Governments have consistently declared their willingness to abide by the Treaty of London' (Joint Franco-British Memorandum to Italy, 9th January 1920). The Reparation Commission has since (15th April 1921) fixed the date of Italy's *de facto* belligerency with Germany as 28th May 1915, thus implying that Italy committed acts of hostility against Germany at once, though she did not declare war.

(b) *Franco-British-American Memorandum, 9th December 1919. The Six Points.* The underlying idea was, however, taken up by the Council of Five, sitting *en permanence* at Paris, and worked out in a joint Franco-British-American Memorandum presented to Italy on the 9th December 1919. It was a definite attempt to find a solution before the Council of Five dissolved, and summarized some previous negotiations between Washington and Rome, which had continued from September to November.

The following six points had been agreed between President Wilson and Signor Nitti :

(1) *Eastern boundary of Italy.* Acceptance of the Wilson line—in principle. The extreme southern boundary, however, was to run to the east of the Arsa River, giving Albona to Italy, 'in spite of the considerable additional number of Yugoslavs (40,000) thereby incorporated (in Italy)'. A 'buffer-state' was to be formed consisting of the town of Fiume—and stretching north to the Karavanken, so as to include the Assling railway triangle. The western boundary of this was to be the 'Wilson line' as modified, thus giving to the 'buffer-state' the quicksilver mines of Idria. The 'buffer-state' was to be demilitarized as well as an area between the Arsa River and Cape Promontore.

(2) *'Buffer-state' of Fiume.* The 'buffer-state' of Fiume was to include about 200,000 Slavs and 40,000 Italians, but there was to be no plebiscite as to its future, as the 'Tardieu compromise' had suggested on the 30th May. On the contrary, 'in deference to Italy's objection that the incorporation of this region in the Serb-Croat-Slovene State by free act of the inhabitants, might create a real menace, it is now agreed that the determination of the whole future of the State shall be left to the League of Nations, which, in conformity with Italian requirements, shall not fail to provide the full measure of autonomy which the city of Fiume enjoyed under Austro-Hungarian rule'.

(3) *Dalmatia.* With regard to 'the difficult question of Dalmatia' the three representatives . . . 'feel that the Italian Government have acted on an enlightened view of their higher interests in officially withdrawing territorial claims to an area where to enforce them would have meant permanent discord with the inhabitants of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and

prevented all possibility of friendly relations with them. In order, however, to safeguard every Italian racial and sentimental interest, it has been agreed that the city of Zara shall enjoy a special régime. Its geographical position indicates Zara as a part of the Yugo-slav State, but provided the town is left within the Yugo-slav Customs Union, it is to be given complete sovereignty under the League of Nations, and freedom to control its own affairs.'

(4) *The Dalmatian and Istrian islands.* 'The Italian Government appear to be one with President Wilson in realizing the necessary racial, geographic, and political connexion of the Dalmatian coastal islands with the Yugo-slav State. On the other hand, the possession of certain outlying islands, though ethnically Yugo-slav and economically connected with Yugoslavia, is considered by the Italian Government necessary to Italy's strategic control of the Adriatic, and the reasonableness of this claim has been accepted, the following islands being accorded to Italy, on a demilitarized status, namely :

- (a) The Pelagosa group.
- (b) Lissa and the small islands west of it.
- (c) Lussin and Unie.

These islands are to pass in full sovereignty to Italy, who on her part is to make an agreement with the Slav population of Lissa, providing for their complete local autonomy.'

(5) and (6). *Albania.* 'Italy is to receive a mandate for the administration of the independent State of Albania, under the League of Nations.'¹ A boundary line for Albania was sketched which entitled Greece to certain areas in the south.

'The city of Valona, together with such hinterland as may be strictly necessary to its defence and economic development, is to be granted to Italy in full sovereignty.'

On these concessions the Memorandum commented as follows :

'The above six points, in their general aspects, are those on which, after many months' negotiation, the Italian Government have happily reached an agreement with the President of the United States. They appear to afford to Italy full satisfaction of her historic national aspirations, based on the desire to unite the Italian race ; they give her the absolute

¹ For further details v. Part II of this chapter.

strategic control of the Adriatic; they offer her complete guarantees against whatever aggression she might fear in the future from her Yugo-slav neighbours—an aggression which the three representatives on their part consider as most improbable if the lines of a just and lasting settlement are reached. They have even carried their concern for Italian security to the point of neutralizing the Dalmatian islands and adjacent waters from the northern border of the Ragusa region to Fiume.'

9th December Memorandum.

Italian claims.

(1) 'Control by Italy of the diplomatic relations of Zara.'

(2) 'An arrangement by which the city of Fiume, the so-called *corpus separatum*, should be dissociated from the Free State of Fiume and made completely independent, though its port and railway should be left to the Free State.'

(4) 'Annexation to Italy of the island of Lagosta.'

(3) The third Italian claim was the most important. They demanded 'direct connexion of the city of Fiume with the Italian Province of Istria by the annexation to Italy of a long, narrow strip of territory running along the coast from Fiume to Volosca, between the railway and the sea, the Italian frontier

Franco-British-American concessions.

As regards (1) Zara was to be included in the Yugo-slav Customs Union but 'the city shall be completely independent, under the League of Nations. The city will therefore be entirely free to decide, subject to the approval of the League of Nations, how it shall be diplomatically represented abroad.'

(2) Fiume to have 'precisely the same degree of autonomy as the city had under Austro-Hungarian rule'. The 'absolute sovereignty' over it to be 'vested in the League of Nations' which could protect racial minorities. No concessions as to altering the boundaries of the 'buffer-state'.

(4) No concession here made.

in Istria being pushed eastwards so as to include the whole peninsula within Italy'. To this the Joint Memorandum replied: 'With respect to the new Italian proposal for the annexation to Italy of the long narrow strip of coast from Fianona to the gate of the city of Fiume there are difficulties of a practical nature. The reason for which the Italian Government have made this demand is stated to be a purely sentimental one, namely, the desire that the city of Fiume should not be separated from Italy by any intervening foreign country. No doubt such a sentimental reason may be of great importance in the eyes of the Italian Government, but it would appear to rest on a misapprehension of the real position of Fiume. The creation of the buffer State, which is to be completely independent of Yugo-slavia, was, among other reasons, precisely intended to safeguard the position of Fiume; and the free State, of which Fiume must, as indicated in the preceding paragraph, form an essential part, is already in direct contact with the Kingdom of Italy not only by sea, but by a long land frontier of approximately 100 miles. Full effect, therefore, is already given to the sentimental considerations to which the Italian Government attach so much value. In fact, the new Italian plan would not achieve this object so well, as in practice it is to be feared that it would be quite unworkable. The Italian Government do not propose to interfere with the railway connecting Fiume with the north, which they admit is to remain within the Free State. This railway runs for a considerable distance along the coast, and the Italian proposal amounts, so far as this region is concerned, to cutting off from the Free State, and incorporating with Italy, the line of sandy and barren beach intervening between the railway and the sea. Whilst the injury to the Free State, which would in this eccentric way be entirely cut off from its only seaboard, is obvious and unmeasurable, it is not easy to understand what would be the benefit to Italy, unless it be considered a benefit to her that the Free State should be so crippled. Nor does it seem necessary to dwell on the extraordinary complexities that would arise as regards customs control, coastguard services, and cognate matters in a territory of such unusual configuration. The plan appears to run counter to every known consideration of geography, economics, and territorial convenience, and it may perhaps be assumed that if these considerations

were overlooked by the Italian Government, this was due to their having connected it in their mind with the question of annexing to Italy all that remains of the Yugo-slav portion of the peninsula of Istria. This question of further annexation of Yugo-slav territory is raised quite unambiguously both by the demand for the whole of Istria and by the proposal to annex the island of Lagosta. In neither case do even considerations of strategy arise. For the strategical command of the whole Adriatic is already completely assured to Italy by the possession of Trieste, Pola, the islands facing Fiume, Pelagosa, and Valona. Additional security is afforded by the proposed demilitarization of the whole Free State of Fiume, together with a large zone lying to the north of it, and of the small portion of Istria remaining to the Free State of Fiume.'

'Economic considerations being equally excluded, there remains nothing but a desire for further territory. Now the territories coveted are admittedly inhabited by Yugo-slavs, they contain practically no Italian elements. This being so, it is necessary to refer to the way in which President Wilson, with the cordial approval of Great Britain and France, has met every successive Italian demand for the absorption in Italy of territories inhabited by peoples not Italian, and not in favour of being so absorbed. . . .'

'From this point of view the inclusion in Italy of purely Yugo-slav territories where neither security nor geographical nor economic considerations compel annexation, is not in itself a commendable policy. It would be bound to create within the Italian borders a compact body of irredentism exactly analogous in kind to that which justified the demand of *Italia irredenta* for union with the Italian State.'

'The three representatives venture with all deference to express the opinion that, in declining to agree to the incorporation of more Yugo-slav territory, they are acting in the highest interest of the Italian nation itself.'

15. '*The January Compromise.*' (a) *Proposals of Italy 6th January 1920, of France and Great Britain 14th January 1920.* On the 8th December 1919 Signor Scialoja, now Foreign Minister of Italy, on hearing from Lord Curzon of the proposed Memorandum, objected that it merely reiterated the Wilsonian position, and that it gave Sebenico and Cattaro to Yugo-slavia and thereby exposed 'the entire central and southern flank of

Italy to attack'. He asked (1) that the note, if presented, should not be made public; (2) that Italy should be permitted to reply; (3) that the Memorandum should not be regarded 'as the last word in the controversy'. These conditions were agreed to by the Council of Five at Paris on the 9th December 1919. On the 6th January 1920, Signor Nitti saw Mr. Lloyd George in London and submitted a statement in writing on the same day, asking for the 'fulfilment of the Pact of London' and requesting eight modifications of the December Memorandum. This resulted in a joint Memorandum of M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George of the 9th January, which contained the interesting statement that 'the British and French Governments have consistently declared their willingness to abide by the Treaty of London', and replied in detail to Signor Nitti's eight points. Subsequently Nitti protested against the 'buffer-state' and the League of Nations control. Some revision of the Lloyd George and Clemenceau proposals took place. According to the press, Dr. Trumbić was heard at great length before the Conference on the 10th and 12th, and on the 13th the Conference appears to have discussed the suggestion that there should be Italian sovereignty over Fiume; but this was not pressed. On the 14th January the revised proposals were finally handed to MM. Trumbić and Pašić in Paris by M. Clemenceau. These revised proposals are known as the 'January Compromise'.

*Nitti Memorandum, 6th January
1920.*

*'January Compromise' — Revised
proposals of Clemenceau and
Lloyd George, 14th January 1920.*

(1) 'Free State of Fiume according to Wilson's plan' but frontier modified so as to be contiguous with Italy.

(2) *Corpus separatum*¹ of Fiume to have a statute safeguarding its 'Italianità' from the great Slav majority in the buffer-state.

(1) *Corpus separatum* of Fiume¹ to be independent under the League 'with the right to choose its own diplomatic representation'. Šušak to go in full sovereignty to Yugoslavia. Port and railway communications of Fiume to be under the League of Nations.

(2) Buffer-state to disappear, but Yugo-slav boundary to include Šušak.

¹ i. e. the district just round the city of Fiume, Šušak not included. This meant the disappearance of the 'buffer-state'.

Nitti Memorandum, 6th January 1920.

(3) Contiguity between Italy and *corpus separatum*.

(4) Cherso and Lagosta, 'besides those (islands) already assigned by Wilson' (i.e. Pelagosa, Lissa, Lussin and Unie) 'to be assigned to Italy'.

(6) 'Effective neutralisation of the islands, and also of the whole coast and of the ports of the Eastern Adriatic coast from Fiume down to the mouth of the Voyusa.'

(5) 'Zara, free town, with freedom to select its diplomatic representation. Guarantees for the relations of the citizens of Zara with the Dalmatian territory.'

(7) 'Italians of the cities of Fiume and Dalmatia to have the freedom of choosing Italian citizenship without leaving the territory.'

(8) 'Guarantees for the existing economic enterprises in Dalmatia.'

'January Compromise'—*Revised proposals of Clemenceau and Lloyd George, 14th January 1920.*

(3) Contiguity was not refused, but given only by a strip including a road along the coast. The whole St. Peter-Adelsberg railway from Fiume northwards to be within the Yugo-slav state. Some further rectification was given to Italy near Senosicche to protect the Trieste railway.

(5) Lussin, Pelagosa, and Lissa 'to be assigned to Italy'; all other islands to be under Yugo-slav sovereignty.

(6) 'All the islands of the Adriatic to be demilitarised.'

(3) Municipality of Zara 'to be an independent state under the guarantee of the League of Nations', with the right to choose its own diplomatic representation.

(7) Granted for Italians in Dalmatia.

(8) 'Existing economic enterprises in Dalmatia should have their security safeguarded by an international convention.'

Albania.

'Italy to retain Valona, as provided for in the Treaty of London, and, in addition, to have a mandate over Albania.'

The northern boundaries of Albania to be readjusted in favour of Yugo-slavia, and an autonomous province to be formed.¹

Argyrocastro and Koritza in the south to go to Greece.

The main features of this proposal are clear. The 'buffer-state' was to disappear; the city of Fiume was to be independent but confined to its own environs (*corpus separatum*).

¹ Cmd. 586, Parl. Paper, Misc. No. 2, 1920, p. 18; v. *infra*, pp. 343-4.

The much coveted contiguous access to Fiume was granted to Italy. Šušak was to go to Yugo-slavia and the St. Peter railway was to remain inside her western boundaries. The Yugo-slavs were to be reconciled to the loss of territory in Istria, etc., by an international guarantee of the communications of Fiume, by the cession of the whole of Dalmatia except Zara, and by a concession in North Albania which would enable them to build a railway from Prisrend to Scutari. Such was the proposal on which England, France, and Italy had at last agreed and which they were prepared to urge with their full power. Settlement seemed at last in sight, but the three Powers had forgotten two factors: Dr. Trumbić and President Wilson.

(b) *The reply of Dr. Trumbić, 20th and 28th January 1920.* On the 20th January Dr. Trumbić forwarded a Memorandum accepting the principle of the independence of the *corpus separatum* of Fiume, but demanding that the port and communications should be *sous la gestion* of Yugo-slavia. Otherwise he adhered strictly to the Wilson line, as the new proposals, ceding Albona and Senosicche, would give 460,000 (instead of over 400,000) Yugo-slavs to Italy.¹ He accepted the principle of the independence of Zara but placed its diplomatic representation under the League, for to give Fiume and Zara the right of choosing their diplomatic representatives 'would constitute a disguised annexation' (to Italy). He accepted the demilitarization of the Isles and offered to cede Lussin and Pelagosa to Italy, if they were also demilitarized. On other questions he was prepared for agreement, though he wished to make some stipulations as to the partition of the Austro-Hungarian Navy and commercial fleet. As regards Albania, he preferred it as 'a local autonomous Government' as defined in 1913 'without interference from any foreign Power'. In case this was not accepted he would stipulate for certain rectifications in favour of Yugo-slavia. In substance, therefore, he rejected the 'January Compromise'.

The Supreme Council met the same day and Clemenceau is stated to have recommended acceptance in strong terms. He drew attention to the fact that, while Croats and Slovenes

¹ v. Vol. V, statistics. The real figures of the 'Wilson line' are about 366,000, and as amended in the December Memorandum about 420,000, revised proposals of January about 484,000 (including 12,000 on the islands).

had fought against the Entente, Italy had fought for her. If the Yugo-slavs did not accept the proposals, not only would the Treaty of London be applied, but Italy would be empowered to carry its provisions into effect. He added that he spoke in a 'friendly' spirit and that the Yugo-slavs had his 'sympathy'. Mr. Lloyd George is reported to have concurred with these views.¹ This formidable address was almost the last official utterance of the great Frenchman who had presided over the Conference for a twelvemonth.

On the 28th January Dr. Trumbić replied to the effect that the Yugo-slav Government considered the communication of the 20th January 'as a friendly proposal, not as an injunction', and one not to be answered immediately. The proposals did not wholly conform 'to the principles proclaimed by the Peace Conference of the free disposal and independence of peoples, nor the wishes of populations, nor to what was geographically and economically expedient'. The Yugo-slav Government would accept 'arbitration or a plebiscite' and had been ready to do so for over a year. 'In default of an immediate and categorical acceptance, it (the Yugo-slav Government) did not understand that they (the Powers) desired to apply to it a Treaty unknown to it and concluded by third parties, who had never communicated its contents.' The proposals could not therefore be wholly accepted. The demand thus made for a communication of the text of the Treaty of London could not well be refused by Italy, England, and France, and necessarily produced a further delay. Meanwhile it had already become evident that Yugo-slavia would not stand alone in her resistance to the 'January Compromise'.

16. *President Wilson's intervention*—*The Memorandum of the 10th February 1920*. Mr. Frank Polk, the American representative on the Supreme Council, had left Paris shortly after signing the 9th December Memorandum. Mr. Wallace, the American Ambassador at Paris, was without full powers and therefore did not sit on the Supreme Council, though Mr. Polk had requested that 'the Dalmatian and other questions should be taken up through regular diplomatic channels'.² On

¹ Professor Šišić, adviser to the Yugo-slav Delegation, has published a work *Jadransko Pitanje*, Zagreb, 1919. This gives conversations of the Conference with Trumbić and Pašić on the 13th, 14th, and 20th January, which appear to be *verbatim* reports.

² Mr. Lansing to Mr. Wallace, Paris, 20th January 1920.

the 20th January, Mr. Wallace was instructed to make inquiries of M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George.

‘The United States is being put in the position of having the matter disposed of before the American point of view can be expressed, as apparently M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George have sought only the views of the Italian and Yugoslav Governments before ascertaining the views of the United States Government. Is it the intention of the British and French Governments in the future to dispose of the various questions pending in Europe and to communicate the results to the Government of the United States? There are features in connexion with the proposed Fiume settlement which both M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George must realize would not be acceptable to the President.’¹

(a) *Joint telegram of Clemenceau and Lloyd George, 22nd January 1920.* On the 22nd a joint telegram was sent in the names of M. Clemenceau² and Mr. Lloyd George. They disclaimed all idea of not consulting the United States and summarized the ‘January Compromise’ in the following terms :

‘The French and British Governments are glad to think that practically every important point of the joint memorandum of the 9th December, 1919, remains untouched, and has now been endorsed by the Prime Minister of Italy. Only two features undergo alteration, and both these alterations are to the positive advantage of Yugo-slavia :

‘1. The Free State of Fiume, which would have separated 200,000 Yugo-slavs from their Fatherland, disappears. Three-quarters of these people are at once and for ever united with Yugo-slavia. A source of perpetual intrigue and dispute is done away with. And if in return Yugo-slavia has to agree to the transfer of territory to Italy, including some 50,000 Yugo-slavs in addition to those already included under the Wilson proposal, the balance is clearly to the benefit of Yugo-slavia. Fiume becomes an independent State under the guarantee of the League of Nations, and the authority of the League of Nations over the port becomes absolute and immediate in the interests of all concerned.

‘2. As regards Albania, an attempt has been made to afford

¹ Mr. Lansing to Mr. Wallace, Paris, 20th January 1920.

² He was succeeded as French Prime Minister by M. Millerand on the 21st.

satisfaction to the necessary requirements of all parties concerned. The details of the administration of this country by Yugo-slavia, Italy and Greece have yet to be elaborated. But in working to this end, sight will not be lost of the feelings and future interests of the Albanian people, and every endeavour will be made to carry out the arrangements in full consultation with them.'

(b) *President Wilson's Memorandum of the 10th February 1920.* President Wilson replied on the 10th February in a memorandum of great importance. He intimated that the American Government was now to be consulted, but that it would not consent to the Treaty of London being used to enforce the submission of the Yugo-slavs.

'The President fully shares the view of the French and British Governments that the future of the world largely depends upon the right solution of this question, but he cannot believe that a solution containing provisions which have already received the well-merited condemnation of the French and British Governments can in any sense be regarded as right. Neither can he share the opinion of the French and British Governments that the proposals . . . (of the 14th January) leave untouched practically every important point of the joint memorandum of the French, British, and American Governments of the 9th December, 1919, and that "only two features undergo alterations, and both these alterations are to the positive advantage of Yugo-slavia". On the contrary, the proposal of the 9th December has been profoundly altered to the advantage of Italian objectives to the serious injury of the Yugo-slav people and to the peril of world peace. The view that such positive advantages have been conceded to Italy would appear to be borne out by the fact that the Italian Government rejected the proposal of the 9th December and accepted that of the 14th January.

'The memorandum of the 9th December rejected the device of connecting Fiume with Italy by a narrow strip of coast territory as quite unworkable in practice, and as involving extraordinary complexities as regards customs control, coast, guard services, and cognate matters in a territory of such unusual configuration. The French and British Governments, in association with the American Government, expressed the opinion that "the plan appears to run counter to every con-

sideration of geography, economics and territorial convenience". The American Government notes that this annexation of Yugo-slav territory by Italy is nevertheless agreed to by the memorandum of the 14th January. The memorandum of the 9th December rejected Italy's demand for the annexation of all of Istria, on the solid ground that neither strategic nor economic considerations could justify such annexation, and that there remained nothing in defence of the proposition, save Italy's desire for more territory admittedly inhabited by Yugo-slavs. The French and British Governments then expressed their cordial approval of the way in which the President has met every successive Italian demand for the absorption in Italy of territories inhabited by peoples not Italian, and not in favour of being absorbed, and joined in the opinion that "it is *neither* just nor expedient to annex as the spoils of war territories inhabited by an alien race". Yet this unjust and inexpedient annexation of all of Istria is provided for in the memorandum of the 14th January. The memorandum of the 9th December carefully excluded every form of Italian sovereignty over Fiume. The American Government cannot avoid the conclusion that the memorandum of the 14th January opens the way for Italian control of Fiume's foreign affairs, thus introducing a measure of Italian sovereignty over, and Italian intervention in, the only practicable port of a neighbouring people, and taken in conjunction with the extension of Italian territory to the gates of Fiume, paves the way for possible future annexation of the port by Italy in contradiction of compelling consideration of equity and right. The memorandum of the 9th December afforded proper protection to the vital railway connecting Fiume northward with the interior. The memorandum of the 14th January establishes Italy in dominating military positions close to the railway at a number of critical points.

'The memorandum of the 9th December maintained in large measure the unity of the Albanian State. That of the 14th January partitions the Albanian people against their vehement protests, among three different alien Powers.'

The President then intimated that he would not consent to the latter proposition.

'The matter would wear a very different aspect if there were any real divergence of opinion as to what constitutes

a just settlement of the Adriatic issue. Happily, no such divergence exists. The opinions of the French, British, and American Governments as to a just and equitable territorial arrangement at the head of the Adriatic Sea were strikingly harmonious. Italy's unjust demands had been condemned by the French and British Governments in terms no less severe than those employed by the American Government. Certainly the French and British Governments will yield nothing to their American associate as regards the earnestness with which they have sought to convince the Italian Government that fulfilment of its demands would be contrary to Italy's own best interests, opposed to the spirit of justice in international dealings, and fraught with danger to the peace of Europe. In particular, the French and British Governments have opposed Italy's demands for specific advantages which it is now proposed to yield to her by the memorandum of the 14th January, and have joined in informing the Italian Government that the concessions previously made "afford to Italy full satisfaction of her historic national aspirations based on the desire to unite the Italian race, give her the absolute strategic control of the Adriatic and offer her complete guarantees against whatever aggression she might fear in the future from her Yugo-slav neighbours". . . .

It is a time to speak with the utmost frankness. The Adriatic issue as it now presents itself raises the fundamental question as to whether the American Government can on any terms co-operate with its European associates in the great work of maintaining the peace of the world by removing the primary causes of war. This Government does not doubt its ability to reach amicable understandings with the Associated Governments as to what constitutes equity and justice in international dealings; for difference of opinion as to the best methods of applying just principles have never obscured the vital fact that the main several Governments have entertained the same fundamental conception of what these principles are. But if substantial agreement to principle, if just and reasonable, is not to determine international issues; if the country possessing the most endurance in pressing its demands rather than the country armed with a just cause is to gain the support of the Powers; if forcible seizure of coveted areas is to be permitted and condoned, and is to receive ultimate justification

by creating a situation so difficult that decision favourable to the aggressor is deemed a practical necessity ; if deliberately-incited ambition is, under the name of national sentiment, to be rewarded at the expense of the small and the weak ; if, in a word, the old order of things which brought so many evils on the world is still to prevail, then the time is not yet come when this Government can enter a concert of Powers, the very existence of which must depend upon a new spirit and a new order. The American people are willing to share in such high enterprise ; but many among them are fearful lest they become entangled in international policies and committed to international obligations foreign alike to their ideals and their traditions. To commit them to such a policy as that embodied in the latest Adriatic proposals and to obligate them to maintain injustice as against the claims of justice would be to provide the most solid ground for such fears. This Government can undertake no such grave responsibility.

‘ If it does not appear feasible to secure acceptance of the just and generous concessions offered by the British, French and American Governments to Italy in the joint memorandum of those Powers of the 9th December, 1919, which the President has already clearly stated to be the maximum concession that the Government of the United States can offer, the President desires to say that he must take under serious consideration the withdrawal of the treaty with Germany and the agreement between the United States and France of the 28th June, 1919, which are now before the Senate and permitting the terms of the European settlement to be independently established and enforced by the Associated Governments.’

(c) *Reply of Millerand and Lloyd George, 17th February 1920.* The February Memorandum of Wilson dissolved the ‘ January compromise ’ made by Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Nitti. It was received on the 14th and answered by a joint memorandum of M. Millerand and Mr. Lloyd George on the 17th. Their chief point was that the origin of the ‘ January compromise ’ was that they discovered, when dealing with the representatives of Italy and Yugo-slavia in Paris, that nobody desired the ‘ buffer-state ’ of Fiume. Yugo-slavia desired to do away with it and include ‘ as much as possible of its territory and population (200,000 Slavs) within its own borders ’. Thus, under the December Memorandum there would be about 420,000 Slavs

under Italy and 200,000 in the buffer-state. Under the compromise 90,000¹ more Slavs would pass to Italy but 150,000 would be added to Yugo-slavia. They disclaimed the idea that contiguity of Italian territory to Fiume 'paved the way for annexation'.

'As regards the railway, the proposal of the 20th January gives to the Yugo-slav State the control of the whole line from the point where it leaves the port of Fiume, which is under the control of the League of Nations. The railway is a commercial and not a strategic railway. Under President Wilson's proposals it is commanded by Italian guns. According to either plan nothing could be easier than for Italy to cut it in the event of war. They do not, therefore, see that there is substance in this criticism of a proposal whose real effect is to transfer the whole railway to Yugo-slavia instead of leaving it in the hands of the free state of Fiume, which no one desires.'

After some discussion of the Albanian question they announced that the failure of an agreed settlement must leave them no choice but to acknowledge the validity of the Treaty of London. They agreed with the President that conditions had changed.

'But throughout these negotiations they never concealed from him the fact that they regarded themselves as bound by the Treaty of London in the event of a voluntary agreement not being arrived at. The fact, therefore, that when they made their proposals of the 20th January they informed both the Italian and the Yugo-slav Governments that in the event of their not being accepted they would have no option but to allow the Treaty of London to come into force can have come as no surprise, and was, indeed, the obvious method of bringing this long controversy to a close. They would point out that this declaration is not, as the American Government would appear to think, an ultimatum to Yugo-slavia on behalf of Italy. Under the Treaty of London, Italy has had to abandon Fiume altogether and hand it over to Yugo-slavia. This part of the Treaty is as unacceptable to Italians as is the transfer of Dalmatia and the islands to Yugo-slavia.'

They concluded by a somewhat controversial discussion on

¹ It was pointed out that Wilson had agreed to 40,000 of these passing to Italy in the December Memorandum.

the general principles of the Peace, which has been summarized elsewhere.¹

(d) *Wilson's Memorandum, 25th February. Franco-British Reply, 26th February 1920.* The President replied on the 25th February to the effect that Yugo-slavia had not consented to the 'January compromise'. Consequently, direct negotiations between her and Italy were required. 'The President would of course make no objection to a settlement *mutually agreeable to Italy and Yugo-slavia regarding their common frontier in the Fiume region, provided that such an agreement is not made on the basis of compensation elsewhere at the expense of nationals of a third Power.*'² His willingness to accept such proposed joint agreement of Italy and Yugo-slavia is based on the fact that only their own nationals are involved. In consequence, the results of direct negotiation of the two interested Powers would fall within the scope of the principle of self-determination. Failing in this, both parties should be willing to accept a decision of the Governments of Great Britain, France and the United States.'

The French and British Premiers replied on the 26th February stating that the President's proposal,² which they quoted, 'would be the ideal way of settling the question at issue, and they are willing to do their utmost to reach a settlement by this road. In order to facilitate this process they are ready to withdraw the proposals made both on the 9th December and the 20th January, for they feel that, if the two parties principally concerned believe that the various Allied and Associated Powers are committed to supporting them in any particular solution, it will be more difficult to secure a voluntary agreement between them. The French and British Prime Ministers therefore join in a cordial invitation that President Wilson should take part with them in a formal proposal to the Italian and Yugo-slav Governments urging them to negotiate a mutual agreement on the basis of a withdrawal of all previous proposals.'

If, however, this attempt should prove unsuccessful, the French and British Prime Ministers agree that the United

¹ v. Chap. VII, pp. 433-4.

² The passage in italics was quoted in the Franco-British Reply. Note.—Some of the parts of these despatches dealing with Albania are omitted and dealt with on p. 344.

States, Great Britain and France should once more consider the question in common with a view to arriving at concrete proposals.'

They practically agreed to drop the question of partitioning Albania, but adhered to the view that the Treaty of London might have to be used as a lever to secure compliance if all other means failed.

'In conclusion, the French and British Prime Ministers venture to call the attention of President Wilson to the urgent importance of a speedy settlement of the Adriatic dispute—a dispute which is now gravely threatening the peace and delaying the reconstruction of South-Eastern Europe.'

(e) *President Wilson's letter of the 6th March 1921.* On the 6th March the President acknowledged this despatch but stated that he could not join in withdrawing the December Memorandum. If, however, both Yugo-slavia and Italy desired to withdraw from the 'buffer-state' idea 'and desired to limit the proposed free state to the *corpus separatum* of Fiume, placing the sovereignty in the League of Nations without either Italian or Yugo-slav control, 'then the President is prepared to accept this proposal and is willing, under such circumstances, to leave the determination of the common frontier to Italy and Yugo-slavia'. He intimated once more his refusal to accept the coercion of the Yugo-slavs by the application of the Treaty of London.

With this utterance was ended the long controversy between the great Powers over Fiume. President Wilson had failed to convert Orlando, Nitti to convert D'Annunzio, the three Powers together had failed to convert Italy, Tardieu and Clemenceau had failed to convert the Yugo-slavs. The President of the Conference and the President of the United States had failed to solve the problem, and the two principals were at last left to work out their own salvation, which they ultimately did without summoning the League of Nations to their aid.

E. DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ITALY AND YUGO-SLAVIA, TREATY OF RAPALLO.

17. *Pallanza and the prelude to Rapallo.* The result of the last serious controversy between the Great Powers in the Peace Treaty had been to produce a division between the

American and the Franco-British views. Conditions were more favourable than they had once been, for Nitti, unlike Sonnino, was a man who preferred negotiation to negation. But his political position was weak, and it was not improved by his failure to obtain the 'January compromise'. The San Remo Conference of the three Great Powers led to an attempt to arrive at direct agreement between Italy and Yugo-slavia at a conference between Nitti and Trumbić at Pallanza (May). It met just after imposing demonstrations had been held in all parts of Yugo-slavia in favour of Fiume remaining Yugo-slav. Negotiations were proceeding favourably when Nitti was recalled to Rome by a political crisis on the 11th May which ended in his downfall. The negotiations were broken off just as they had reached a favourable stage. They are reported to have been based on the following lines :

(a) A modification of the 'Wilson line' was to give more protection to Pola, by carrying the line to Ponta Fianona, instead of to the Arsa mouth (to this Wilson himself had already assented in principle). Two other rectifications in favour of Italy were to be made near Monte Maggiore and Senosicche. The St. Peter railway would, however, have remained Yugo-slav.

(b) *Fiume*. Nitti's claim of territorial contiguity between Italy and Fiume was to be abandoned. The city of Fiume was to be under Italian sovereignty. Sušak with the port of Baross and the Zagreb railway was to be Yugo-slav, the harbour of Fiume itself was to be controlled by the League of Nations. The Italian part of Fiume would be an island in a Yugo-slav sea, but protected by the League.

(c) Zara was to be autonomous under Yugo-slavia.

(d) The islands Lussin and Unie alone to be Italian, fate of Cherso to be decided by plebiscite.

These terms on the whole represented genuine concessions on both sides and are the best tribute to the moderate and conciliatory spirit of Nitti.¹ It is, of course, possible that the Italian Chamber would not have ratified such a Treaty.

Very serious social and political troubles now began to appear in Italy which were not even temporarily tided over until September. As in many other Italian political crises the chaos gradually subsided, and Giolitti appeared riding the

¹ v. Special Correspondent of *The Times*, 18th May 1920.

whirlwind. The situation was not without its irony. Nitti, who had just fallen, had been received on his arrival at Paris at the end of June 1919 with a Franco-British intimation that the Treaty of London was no longer binding upon them. Yet it was in his favour that these same two Powers had used the threat of the Treaty of London to enforce the 'January compromise'.¹ Now Giolitti was in power who had advised neutrality for Italy during the war and had declared that Italy had broken the Pact of London, and therefore that it had no binding force. It would seem therefore that, from all points of view, the Yugo-slav prospects had very greatly improved.

But this was not really so. Giolitti was at least a Realist, a man who saw facts as they were, a man who could be trusted not to take office unless he commanded a parliamentary majority, and trusted not to renew negotiations unless with a prospect of success. Moreover, D'Annunzio was inflicting great harm on Yugo-slavia by his interference with the traffic to Zagreb and Belgrade. All British commerce, for instance, had to go to Yugo-slavia via the Simplon or via Salonica. A serious affray between Yugo-slavs and Italians at Spalato had provoked riots at Trieste, and it was reasonably certain that this harbour would not be open to Yugo-slav goods for some months. Yugo-slavia was, in effect, blockaded at Fiume and at Trieste. At one period at the Conference it was suggested that Yugo-slavia could find an outlet at Bakar (Buccari). But at that place the railway station is a considerable height above the harbour and D'Annunzio's raiders had cut off the best route, so that a *détour* of 11 kilometres had to be undertaken. Practical experience very soon proved that no such outlet was possible. There were other economic considerations. The Yugo-slav budget showed a deficit, and the exchange got worse. Unless export and import could be undertaken on an extensive scale the financial and economic condition of the country would become serious and even critical.

In June Italian troops, who had already left Antivari, finally evacuated Cattaro. Thus all the Southern coast of Dalmatia and of Montenegro was at last free from Italian

¹ That at least was the version of Scialoja, Nitti's Foreign Minister in the Italian Senate, and he quoted Tittoni's reply, 7th July 1919, *The Times*, 16th and 17th July 1920.

occupation. In October the French handed over the administration of the harbour of Cattaro provisionally to the Yugo-slavs, but the Powers had stipulated (15th Sept.) that Allied warships should be permitted to enter the harbour of Cattaro, which should not be used as a military arsenal.¹ This was claimed by the Yugo-slav press as an important concession to Italy.

Two very important considerations now affected Yugo-slav feeling. On the 15th October the Klagenfurt plebiscite took place and its result was that, though an ethnic majority of Slovenes were in this area, the electoral majority voted for union with Austria. This was a sad blow. It was emphasized by the fact that Yugo-slav troops marched into the area and the three Powers (Great Britain, France, and Italy) peremptorily ordered them out and forced them to evacuate the place in forty-eight hours by delivering an ultimatum. This incident was followed by another which doubtless greatly discouraged the Yugo-slavs as they were proceeding to Rapallo. At the Presidential Election in the United States the Democrats, who had adopted the Wilsonian programme of the League and the policies therein implied, were hopelessly beaten. Thus fell their great champion President Wilson, and with him apparently all hopes of securing an arrangement on the basis of the 'Wilson line'.

M. Vesnić has summarized their feelings as follows: 'We realized the difficulty of our situation after the Carinthian plebiscite and the American election, and what counts much more, we felt our big Allies had left us to our own destiny and simultaneously put upon our shoulders the responsibility for the peace of Europe.' He then proceeded to refer to the exquisite courtesy with which the Italian negotiators had received him. Whether there were other reasons not expressed time alone will show. On the 8th November, M. Vesnić, Dr. Trumbić, and M. Stoyanović proceeded to Santa Margherita and were met by the Italian Delegates headed by Count Sforza. Differences of opinion were speedily reported and a rupture was threatened. It did not come. On the 10th November, to the amazement of the world, it was announced that 'the Adriatic question had been settled', and that Giolitti would arrive to sign the Treaty. On the 12th it was

¹ The French (i.e. Inter-Allied) evacuation of Cattaro on the terms indicated took place 4th March 1921, from which time it may be assumed to have become Yugo-slav territory.

signed by all the plenipotentiaries. The result was certainly not foreseen by everybody, but one thing is undoubted. Whatever judgment may be passed on the Treaty it cannot be maintained that either side was taken unprepared. No diplomatic question was ever more discussed, and every economic, racial and strategic difficulty must have been perfectly known to the distinguished diplomats on each side.

18. *Terms of the Rapallo Treaty.*¹ The main points of the Treaty are as follows :

(1) *Boundaries of Istria.* The Italian frontier line turns southward from Péc, where Italy, Yugo-slavia, and Austria meet, leaving Mount Blegoš and the Assling 'railway triangle' to Yugo-slavia. Farther to the south Italy obtains Idria and the town of Adelsberg, and the whole course of the St. Peter railway to Fiume, and the strategic point 1454, Monte Nevoso (Schneeberg). The town of Castua and a tongue of land running south of Monte Nevoso, and thence in a westerly direction, are, however, granted to Yugo-slavia apparently for ethnic reasons.

(2) *Free State of Fiume, Arts. 4 and 5.* 'Full liberty and independence' of the Free State of Fiume 'in perpetuity' is recognized by both parties. The *corpus separatum* of Fiume is, however, enlarged by a coastal strip stretching to the west and stopping just outside Mattuglie, which remains Italian.

(3) *The Istrian and Dalmatian Islands, Art. 3.* Of the Istrian isles Cherso and Lussin, with some small adjacent islets, fall to Italy. Arbe, Veglia, etc., go to Yugo-slavia. Of the Dalmatian islands Italy retains only Lagosta and Pelagosa with adjacent islets.

(4) *Zara, Art. 2.* The city of Zara and a perimeter of about 7 kilometres round the town are 'recognized as forming part of the Kingdom of Italy'. A special convention is to 'regulate the reciprocal intercourse between the territory assigned to Italy and the rest of the territory hitherto forming part of the same communes, district, and province belonging to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government, including therein the just division of provincial and communal property, and of the archives relative thereto'.

(5) *Protection of Italians of Dalmatia, etc.* (a) Yugo-slavia

¹ For Text v. Vol. V, App. III, § xi.

promises to respect economic concessions, granted by the Government or public bodies, to which the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government succeeds, to Italian companies or citizens, and held by the latter in virtue of legal title deeds up to the 12th November 1920. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government binds itself to keep all the pledges given by former Governments.

(b) Italians, who up to the 3rd November 1918 'belonged to former Austro-Hungarian territory, which in virtue of the Treaties of Peace with Austria and with Hungary, and of the present Treaty is recognized as forming part of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, will have the right of opting for Italian citizenship within a year from the entry into force of the present Treaty'. They are exempted from the obligation of transferring their domicile outside the territory of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom. 'They will preserve the free use of their own language and the free practice of their own religion, with all the attributes connected with such freedom.'

(c) Degrees and University diplomas, etc., obtained by Serb-Croat-Slovene citizens in Universities, etc., of Italy to be recognized by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government as valid in its territory, and as conferring rights equal to those derived from degrees, etc., in the higher Serb-Croat-Slovene Universities. 'The validity of the higher studies completed by Serb-Croat-Slovene subjects in Italy will form the subject of a further agreement.'

(d) *Art. 8.* The two Governments to establish a convention 'with the object of intensifying the intimate reciprocal development of the cultural relations between the two countries'.

(e) *Economic Conference, Art. 6.* A Conference of technical and competent authorities of the two countries is to be convoked within two months of the coming into force of the Treaty, to 'place before the two Governments precise proposals on all the plans for establishing the most cordial economic and financial relations between the two countries'.

(f) *Arbitration and Interpretation, Arts. 5 and 9.* In case of dispute over territorial boundaries, 'the arbitration of the President of the Swiss Republic shall be requested, and from this arbitration there shall be no appeal' (Art. 5). The Treaty is in both languages—Italian and Serbo-Croat. 'Should there be any divergence between the two, the text to be followed

will be that in Italian as the language known to all the plenipotentiaries.'

(g) *Convention subsequent to Treaty.* It was stated officially that a Convention had been signed by the two States with the intention of taking action, if there was any attempt to restore the Habsburgs to the throne or thrones of Austria and Hungary.¹ But no details were made public. The subjects of Montenegro and Albania were not mentioned in the Treaty. This is carrying out the conditions suggested by President Wilson.

19. *Comments on the Treaty.* (1) The Istrian frontier is on the whole very favourable to Italy, and gives her in all about 467,000 Yugo-slavs. Yugo-slavia obtains Mt. Blegoš and therefore some protection to Laibach and the Tarvis-Assling railway triangle.² But Italy gains much more in this area: in addition to Yugo-slav subjects, the very rich quick-silver mines of Idria, the St. Peter junction, and the railway to Fiume, thus giving her a continuous railway route between Trieste and Mattuglie right up to Fiume. Moreover, she obtains the very important strategic point of Monte Nevoso, which enables her to command the road to Laibach, the Slovene capital. The railway from Fiume to within a short distance of Laibach is also in Italian hands.

(2) The area of the Free State of Fiume is extended so as to make it contiguous with Italy. This is a modification of Nitti's proposal in January.

(3) The history of the cession of the Istrian and Dalmatian islands is interesting. On the 9th January 1920 M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George had seen 'serious objections to the removal of the island (Cherso) from the Free State' of Fiume as 'the preponderant part of the population (of Cherso) is Slav', and had agreed to cede Lagosta 'for strategic reasons'. On the 14th their revised proposals maintained their view but agreed to cede Lussin, which has a strong Italian minority. They had stated Lagosta to be 'necessary' to Italy on the 9th for 'strategic reasons', but on the 14th, as all islands were to be demilitarized, they had substituted Lissa. So whereas Clemenceau and Lloyd George would have ceded only Lussin,

¹ v. Chap. IX, pp. 492-4.

² This is not much use to Yugo-slavia, but enables her to interrupt traffic between Austria and Italy. A good study of the Treaty and its effects is by A. H. E. Taylor in the *Balkan Review*, December 1920, pp. 330-5.

Lissa, and Pelagosa, the Yugo-slavs themselves ceded Cherso, Lussin, Lagosta, and Pelagosa. The islands of the Adriatic were to be demilitarized according to the January compromise, but this provision does not appear in the Treaty of Rapallo. The Yugo-slavs obtained, of course, the port of Sebenico, but Italian, like other Allied, warships have already been allowed the right of entry into the harbour of Cattaro, which is not to be a military arsenal. Dalmatia was abandoned (except Zara) by Italy in the 'January compromise' just as at Rapallo.

(4) The economic status of Zara does not seem to be clear, but she is now politically Italian, whereas in the January compromise she was to be independent under the League.

(5) The rights obtained by the Italians of Dalmatia are very extensive and greater than any others granted under similar cases in any other Treaty.

(6) Economic co-operation depends on mutual agreement, but without international intervention or aid.

(7) There is no provision for arbitration except over the boundaries. The provision arranging for the Italian text to prevail in case of divergence gives, for practically the first time, a high diplomatic importance to that language, and much will depend upon the actual meaning of the words. From the Yugo-slav point of view, it would have been safer to have adopted for the authoritative text a neutral language, such as French, in which the diplomatic meanings of words are known and standardized.

20. *Ratification of the Treaty and Expulsion of D'Annunzio from Fiume.* It remained to ratify the Treaty and to deal with D'Annunzio. In Yugo-slavia ratification offered no difficulties. The National Assembly and the Skupshtina had no legal right to be consulted nor had the Constituent Assembly when elected. The Treaty was speedily ratified by the Yugo-slav Cabinet, though Korošec, the Slovene Minister, refused to sign it. On the 22nd November the Regent of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State signified his assent. In the Italian Chamber the Treaty ran a more chequered course, but was ratified on the 27th November by 253 votes to 14. In the Senate it was opposed by Ziliotto, the Mayor of Zara, who stated that D'Annunzio's opinion had more weight than that of 40 million Italians, and also by the naval strategist Admiral Thaon di Revel, while Sonnino was conspicuous by his absence. It

ultimately passed the Senate and received the royal assent on the 20th December, ratifications being exchanged on the 2nd February 1921.

D'Annunzio, who had become even more autocratic as Dictator of Fiume, refused to accept the Treaty. He seized the islands of Arbe and Veglia, and endeavoured to incite the soldiers and sailors to mutiny. Two small destroyers deserted to him and some troops also rallied to his cause. He declared war on Italy on the 1st December. But his heroics had been spun out too long and neither the population of Fiume nor the Italian Higher Command were disposed to have further patience with him. On the 24th December, General Caviglia, after fruitless parleys, advanced to the attack. D'Annunzio's 'Arditi' resisted and with success, though the losses were small. There was a truce on Christmas Day, but resistance was clearly hopeless. D'Annunzio had been slightly wounded; he had no reserves, the town had already been shelled, and General Caviglia had announced his intention of bombarding the town and destroying it by sections unless a surrender was arranged. D'Annunzio at last realized that the people no longer supported him. He had frequently threatened to 'throw his bleeding body between Fiume and Italy'. Now he exclaimed petulantly that 'Italy was not worth fighting for' (and apparently also not worth fighting against) and instructed the Municipality to come to terms (29th December 1920). The surrender was arranged, and the Italian troops entered the town on the 18th January 1921 after a settlement had been arranged with the authorities (1st January). D'Annunzio issued what was said to be his thousandth manifesto in which he said, 'I leave to Fiume my dead, my sorrow, and my victory.' It was a pity that an adventure not without gleams of idealism and courage had become at first extravagant and exuberant, and at last merely tedious and absurd. A hero who is not wanted in the city he comes to save is no longer a hero at all.

21. *International Aspects of the Treaty.* While Giolitti must receive credit for the undoubted firmness he showed in mastering D'Annunzio, and Vesnić for his courage in facing popular clamour in Yugo-slavia, both would appear to have neglected one aspect of the Treaty. The consent of the Great Powers had indeed been implied if direct negotiations succeeded,

but this did not mean that they could be wholly neglected. The negotiators evidently thought so, for all territories, recognized as Italian under the Treaty of Rapallo, were incorporated in Italy on the 5th January 1921. There would appear to be two aspects to the question: (a) How far is the Treaty of London modified or abrogated? (b) How far is the consent of the Great Powers necessary to the validity of the Rapallo Treaty?

(a) *Modification of Treaty of London.*¹ With the exception of Articles 4 and 5, which have already either been modified by the Austrian Treaty or the Treaty of Rapallo, it would appear that all the Articles have been superseded by subsequent arrangements to which Italy has been a party, or have become obsolete.² The only exceptions to this rule appear to be Articles 12 and 13, which remain until territorial compensations granted in Africa and elsewhere are embodied in a definite agreement.

(b) *Necessity of Consent of Great Powers.* President Wilson's suggestion that the settlement should be made on its merits, without compensation at the expense of a third party like Albania, was strictly observed. Otherwise there is no reference in the Treaty to any international guarantees, and still less to the League of Nations. The position does not seem to be very clear, because Article 7 of the Treaty of Rapallo appears almost to consider the Treaty of Rapallo as equally able, like the Treaties with Austria and with Hungary, to assign territory to one Power or another. If this assumption is made, it is incorrect. There can be no real doubt that the city of Fiume and the other Austro-Hungarian territory involved, belongs legally to the Principal Allied Powers unless and until they consent to assign it to a definite State. Their consent may be implied but is still necessary to the Treaty of Rapallo, before it is really recognized as coming into force. Moreover, even so the Powers have a right to intervene in virtue of the two Articles guaranteeing free access to the Adriatic to Austria and to Hungary respectively.³ Austria and Hungary must both have such access to the sea at Fiume. Conse-

¹ v. Text, Vol. V, App. III, and cf. this chapter, Part II.

² Even Article 7 falls under this head, for, as Italy will no longer obtain Dalmatia and certain islands, the arrangements dealing with Albania fall to the ground.

³ Austria 311, Hungary 294. c. also n. 1, p. 337.

quently, if any condition arose endangering the freedom of international communications at Fiume, the Great Powers would have a right to bring pressure upon the two States who signed the Treaty of Rapallo.¹ It is only another instance of how the war and the peace have produced conditions which necessitate international co-operation and guarantees, however much nations may try to avoid one or the other. It is therefore improbable, whether they desire it or not, that Yugo-slavia and Italy will escape altogether from that international control and from that supervision of the League of Nations which they so carefully excluded at Rapallo.

¹ On the 14th February 1921 the British Government wrote both to the Yugo-slav and the Italian Governments, that they 'recognize, without reserve, the stipulations contained in this Treaty (Rapallo) relative to the allocation of such of the territories of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as had not yet been allocated under the treaties of peace referred to' (Austria and Hungary). The French Government is understood also to have assented, so that the territories in question are now allocated. v. Misc. no. 12 (1921), Cmd. 1288.

CHAPTER V

THE TREATY OF LONDON

PART II

ALBANIA


1. *Emergence of Albania as a State, 29th July 1913.* The result of the Balkan War of 1912 was that as early as December of that year the Great Powers agreed, in principle, as to the independence of Albania. Sir Edward (now Lord) Grey announced the conclusions of the Great Powers on the 7th April 1913 :¹ 'The agreement between the Powers respecting the frontiers of Albania was reached after a long and laborious diplomatic effort. It was decided that the littoral and Scutari should be Albanian, while Ipek, Prizrend, Dibra and (after much negotiation) Djakova should be excluded from Albania. This arrangement leaves a large tract of territory to be divided between Serbia and Montenegro as the fruits of victory.' This announcement referred only to the north and north-eastern borders. An article was inserted in the Treaty of London (30th May 1913), by which both the Turkish Empire and the Balkan League left to Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia, and Great Britain 'the care of regulating the delimitation of the boundaries of Albania and all other questions concerning Albania'.² In pursuance of this article, an international commission proceeded to Albania and delimited the north and north-eastern boundaries, but never reported fully. It appears that the frontiers had already been adequately indicated and that their mission was largely of a technical character. For reasons that are not altogether clear it appears that the area south of Gusinje³

¹ Cp. *Albania*, No. 17, Hist. Section, Foreign Office, London, 1920, p. 99.

² Art. 8 of Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey signed at London, 30th May 1918. Text is in *History of Eastern Question*, No. 15, Hist. Section, Foreign Office Handbook, pp. 132-7.

³ Probably because a survey was not made and the line of the watershed was not exactly known.

ALBANIA



and two small areas immediately west of the two important towns of Prizrend and Dibra (both awarded to Serbia) were not actually delimited. The chief difficulties of the arrangement were that about half a million Albanians, including certain predominantly Albanian towns, such as Dibra, Prizrend, Djakova, and Ipek, were enclosed within Montenegrin or Serbian frontiers.

The settlement of the southern and south-eastern frontier was a more lengthy matter, and it was not till the 12th August 1913 that it was announced that agreement had been reached. An international commission proceeded to the south and had reported on the 19th December. Their work was carefully done, but the award was not favourable to extreme Greek claims. Greece received much of Epirus and the important town of Janina, but Argyro-Castro and the important road via Santi Quaranta, Ersek, and Koritza remained to Albania.

2. *Arrangements for the Government of Albania.* The independence of Albania appears to date from its recognition by the Council of Ambassadors on the 29th July 1913. Sir Edward (now Lord) Grey, on the 12th August, indicated the following features of the new government :

- (1) A foreign prince chosen by the Great Powers.
- (2) An international commission of control.
- (3) A gendarmerie supplied by a neutral Power (Holland).

The last two features barely materialized,¹ but a German Prince, William of Wied, was found to act as 'Mbret' or ruler and provided with an international loan of £3,000,000. Essad Pasha and a deputation offered him the crown on the 21st February 1914. On the 7th March he landed at Durazzo and made Essad a general. On the 28th March he made him Minister of War, and in May arrested him. In June Essad was removed to Italy and his partisans besieged the 'Mbret' in Durazzo. Prince William, after a vain appeal to the Powers, quitted Durazzo on the 4th September 1914 and took service as an officer in the German Army. His power had never extended beyond the town in which he had first landed. On the 18th February 1918 Mr. Balfour declared that 'the arrangements come to in 1913, to which Albania was not a party, have ceased to have

¹ £400,000 of the loan was actually spent. Some good work was done by the Dutch Gendarmerie, but the International Commission did little. v. Chekrezi, *Albania Past and Present*, New York, 1919, pp. 90, 129, 138.

binding force, as all the signatory Powers are now engaged in war. 'As regards the future . . . His Majesty's Government would be glad to see the principle of nationality applied as far as possible to this as to the other difficult questions which will have to be settled by the Peace Conference.' This utterance, however, might be construed so as to mean merely that the frontiers could be rearranged.

3. *Position as altered by the Treaty of London 1915.* Albania had always been an important interest to both Italy and Austria-Hungary. To the former it was chiefly important because the magnificent harbour of Valona is but sixty miles from the Italian coast, and the possessor of that harbour can use it as a stopper wherewith to close the Adriatic bottle. In the first weeks of the War, Italy, though still a neutral, occupied the island of Sasseno, and finally on the 25th November 1914 Valona itself, with armed forces, though she informed Austria-Hungary that it was her policy to prevent any Power from controlling Albania during the War. After (or rather just before) her rupture with Austria-Hungary Italy signed the Treaty of London with Russia, Great Britain, and France (26th April 1915). Articles 6 and 7 dealt with Albania in the following fashion :

ARTICLE 6. 'Italy shall receive full sovereignty over Valona, the island of Sasseno and surrounding territory of sufficient extent to assure defence of these points (from the Voyusa to the north and east, approximately to the northern boundary of the district of Chimara on the south).'

ARTICLE 7. 'Should Italy obtain the Trentino and Istria in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, together with Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands within the limits specified in Article 5, and the Bay of Valona (Article 6), and if the central portion of Albania is reserved for the establishment of a small autonomous neutralized State, Italy shall not oppose the division of Northern and Southern Albania between Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece, should France, Great Britain, and Russia so desire. The coast from the southern boundary of the Italian territory of Valona (see Article 6) up to Cape Stylos shall be neutralized.

'Italy shall be charged with the representation of the State of Albania in its relations with foreign Powers.

'Italy agrees, moreover, to leave sufficient territory in any event to the east of Albania to ensure the existence of a frontier line between Greece and Serbia to the west of Lake Ochrida.'

It is not clear from these articles that the independence of the Albania of 1913 was intended to be terminated, but at any

rate it was to be limited to a small area. In effect, part of it might be partitioned and part might be under the control of Italy. The 'small autonomous neutralized State' would apparently be under Italian direction, as Italy was to be charged with the diplomatic representation of Albania. Valona in any case was to remain Italian. In 1914-15 conditions were very confused. Finally, the Austro-Hungarians occupied north and central Albania, but Italy continued to hold Valona with a strong garrison. On the 3rd June 1917, Italy proclaimed the independence of all Albania under Italian protection. This proclamation was subsequently explained in the sense that the Italian proclamation spoke not of a 'protectorate' but of a 'protection' of Albania.¹

Meanwhile, the French, who had occupied the Ersek-Koritza road, replied to the Italian proclamation by proclaiming the Republic of Koritza, which apparently was to be independent of 'Independent Albania'. After three months the independent Republic was abolished, but the Koritza area continued under French control.

4. *Inter-Allied Military Occupation of Albania.* Events stood thus at the close of the War. Towards the end of 1918 the Serb troops occupied Scutari, but eventually abandoned it to an inter-Allied force commanded by a French General. It seems clear that the actual Scutari area was therefore regarded as international and separated from the rest of Albania. The French continued to hold the Koritza area till May 1920, when it was surrendered to the Albanians. Early in 1919 Serb troops advanced beyond their 1913 frontier into Albania and occupied a line along the whole north frontier comprising the basin of the Drin from the west of Dibra to a point south of Gusinje. In March 1920 the inter-Allied forces retired from Scutari, and the French control over it ceased. The Serb troops then seized the opportunity to occupy the heights of Taraboš, which lie within the Albanian frontier of 1913, and dominate the city of Scutari. An Italian garrison remained in the town. Since Italy has returned her Albanian Mandate, the juridical position would now appear to be that both Yugo-slav and Italian forces, in so far as they occupy Albania as defined in 1913, are doing so in the name of the Allied and Associated

¹ v. Tittoni's Note of 7th July 1919, quoted by *The Times*, 16th July 1919.

Powers as a whole, until order can be restored and the frontiers of 1913 confirmed or re-drawn.

5. *Albanian Claims at the Peace Conference.* Like almost every other race or people, Albania had her claims represented at the Conference,¹ and, as has already been described, a Territorial Commission on Greco-Albanian affairs was appointed. The account of the labours of this Commission in respect to Albania has been given from an authoritative American source.² It does not, however, appear that the north and north-eastern frontiers of Albania were taken into consideration. The actual question dealt with, therefore, was the adequacy or otherwise of the southern frontier as defined in 1913. Though considerable numbers of Albanians inhabited the areas west of Janina, discussion seems in fact not to have turned on whether the Albanian frontier was to extend southwards but whether the Greek area was to extend northwards. Two districts awarded to Albania in 1913 came under discussion.

(a) *The Argyro-Castro District.* Argyro-Castro itself was a pro-Albanian town, but the surroundings were largely pro-Greek. During the years since 1913 serious disturbances took place in this area and the Greek inhabitants certainly made a strong resistance to Albanian attempts to crush them. During the years 1914-16 Greek troops occupied most of the area and protected them. Subsequently, the area came under Allied control and the question was therefore re-opened at the Peace Conference.

(b) *The Koritza District.* The Koritza-Ersek area was claimed by the Greeks for a somewhat different reason. The road between these two towns is the only one connecting Macedonian Greece with Epirus. The Pindus Mountains absolutely cut off Thessaly from Epirus and, unless this road is in the hands of Greece or of a neutral power, the only connexion between Janina and Salonica, or between Janina and Larissa, must be by sea, as the Pindus range is crossed only by

¹ v. Vol. I, p. 257, note, and see this volume, map, p. 338.

² *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*, Haskins and Lord, pp. 278-81. For a statement of Albanian claims v. Memo. on Albanian Claims at Peace Conference, May 1919, by Mehmed Bey Konitza, *Council of International Conciliation*, No. 138; and for the Greek view, 'Northern Epirus and the Principle of Nationality,' *ibid.*, No. 141, by N. J. Cassavetes. v. also statement of C. T. Erickson, C. A. Chekrezi, C. A. Dako, *Hearings Senate Committee Foreign Relations*, Part 18, 66th Congress, Washington, 1919, pp. 931-9, 961-71.

goat tracks. On the grounds of supply and communication, therefore, the possession of the Koritza road was of the highest importance to Greece. The question of nationality is, however, a particularly difficult one. No one doubts that Mussulman Albanians are anti-Greek, but it is often doubtful how far Orthodox Albanians are really Nationalist Albanians. The test of language affords no clue. Many inhabitants of this area are bilingual, and the fact that nearly all the schools in this area are Greek does not necessarily mean that persons who know Greek are Grecophil. On the whole, the balance of evidence suggests the view that the majority of the Argyro-Castro area might favour the Greeks and those of the Koritza area the Albanians.

The Paris Conference seems to have been unable to agree on the matter. According to our previous authority (Haskins and Lord, p. 280), 'While the British and French advocated transferring all of Northern Epirus to Greece,' the Italians stood out for leaving it to Albania, and the Americans advocated a compromise solution, which would have ceded the southern, Argyro-Castro district to Greece, while leaving to Albania the northern district of Koritza, which some people have called the intellectual centre of Albanian nationalism'.

6. *Italy seeks but returns the Mandate. December 1919-28 June 1920.* In December 1919 and January 1920 the question of Albania was raised once more in a manner that has already been partially indicated. As part of the arrangements for settling the question of Fiume, it was proposed that Italy should receive Valona in full sovereignty and have the Mandate over all Albania.¹ On the 14th January it was proposed that an autonomous province should be constituted in the north under the control of Yugo-slavia, with the object of enabling her to build and work the railway from Prizrend to Scutari and San Giovanni di Medua, while Greece was to receive a frontier which practically gave her both the Argyro-Castro and Koritza area. Italy showed some objection to the frontier thus to be acquired by Greece. It does not seem, however, worth while to examine these proposals in detail because the vigorous intervention of President Wilson brought them to

¹ v. Vol. V, Appendix III. The revised proposals of Clemenceau and Lloyd George state 'the southern boundary of Albania to be the line proposed by the French and British Delegations on the Greek Affairs Commission, leaving Argyro-Castro and Koritza to Greece'.

naught. His point of view may be indicated by a quotation from his Memorandum of the 10th February 1920 :

'The memorandum of the 9th December maintained in large measure the unity of the Albanian State. That of the 14th January partitions the Albanian people against their vehement protests, among three different alien Powers.'¹

and he intimated that he would not consent to it.

On the 6th March he re-stated his opinion :

'Albanian questions should not be included in the proposed joint discussion of Italy and Yugo-slavia, and the President must re-affirm that he cannot possibly approve any plan which assigns to Yugo-slavia in the northern districts of Albania territorial compensation for what she is deprived of elsewhere.'

The negotiations of Pallanza and Rapallo with reference to Fiume do not seem to have included any agreements with respect to Albania. Meanwhile the situation at Koritza had been seriously altered by the actual progress of events. The French, who had administered the Koritza area with great ability, retired from it in May 1920 but it was immediately occupied by Albanian troops, and after some obscure skirmishing and still more obscure negotiation with the Greeks the whole of the southern frontier of Albania as defined in 1913 remained in the hands of the Albanians themselves. In the part of Albania occupied by the Italians, the Albanians showed likewise no intention of submitting, and the Italian troops encountered great difficulties from armed bands and suffered greatly from malaria. In February the Albanians formed their

¹ The chief differences appear to be the following :

Joint Franco-British-American Memorandum, 9th December 1919.

Suggested Greek frontier to include Argyro-Castro but not Koritza.

(2) North and east frontiers of Albania as in 1918. Drin valley railway to be built by Yugo-slavia, but the Albanian state retained right of negotiating 'regional rectifications' with Yugo-slavia. The Boyana river navigation to be under League of Nations.

Revised Proposals. Clemenceau and Lloyd George, 14th January 1920.

(1) Koritza and Argyro-Castro to go to Greece.

(2) Readjustment of north and east frontiers. Part of north Albania to be 'an autonomous province' under Yugo-slavia. The map indicating this area has not been published—but Šišić, *Jadransko Pitanje*, p. 88, quotes Clemenceau as telling Trumbić on 18th January that it included the Drin valley, Scutari, and S. Giovanni di Medua.

Valona and Hinterland, in each case, to go in full sovereignty to Italy, which had the Mandate for Albania.

own Government, first at Ljusna and then at Tirana. On the 28th June 1920 Giolitti spoke of the independence of Albania and foreshadowed returning the Mandate. The question of Valona remained. After some rather obscure fighting an agreement was ultimately signed between Italy and the Tirana Government on the 2nd August.¹ This provided for the independence of Albania as defined in 1913 and for the complete evacuation of all Albania by the Italian forces. The Italians retained only the island of Sasseno dominating the Bay of Valona and maintained a garrison at Scutari, but this last apparently as an international force. Otherwise, they withdrew their forces altogether and Giolitti formally returned the Mandate for Albania which Italy had received. The new Government, which represented the three religions and most of the representative tribes of Albania, showed considerable energy. It improved the roads, instituted telephones, and did something to improve the financial system. It had now recovered for Albania the whole of the 1913 boundaries except in the north and north-eastern districts. There, as related, the Serbs had occupied the basin of the Drin from the south of Gusinje to the shores of Lake Ochrida, holding strategic positions beyond the 1913 line. The Albanians were ill-advised enough to attack the Serbs at about the only point where the latter had strictly maintained the frontier of 1913, that is, just north of the Lake of Scutari. This attack was begun in July 1920, doubtless by the local levies and without the consent of the Tirana Government. It was defeated, and the Serbs advanced, occupied, and held a line some 5 to 10 kilometres beyond the 1913 boundary, which gave them better possibilities for defence, in case of a future attack. In the Dibra area severe fighting also took place. The Serbs were driven back to the 1913 frontier, but ultimately restored their line and took up their old military positions beyond the Drin well in advance of their legal frontier.

7. *Difficulties of the Northern and Eastern Frontiers.* The situation had thus cleared to a considerable extent except in the area where Serbs and Albanians were in contact. The history of this area since the first Treaty of London, 30th May

¹ This agreement has not been published and it is not clear whether it is a Treaty between Italy and a *de facto* Albanian government, or merely a species of armistice. Italy never formally received the Mandate.

1913, had shown decisively that the present frontier is impossible. It has three grave defects. As at present drawn the four important towns of Ochrida, Dibra, Prizrend, and Podgorica are all exposed to attack. It is also probable that the Albanian attacks on them would actually have been more successful had the Serbs strictly adhered to the line of 1913. In September 1913 the Albanians actually captured Ochrida and Struga, and both at that time and in September 1920 fighting took place beneath the very walls of Dibra. The most vulnerable place is obviously Prizrend, which is assailable from heights on one side and from a valley on the other. The railway is comparatively close to this town, and there are considerable numbers of Albanians in the Kossovo Plain who might be stirred into unrest by Albanian attacks on the Serbs. It seems clear that the frontier cannot remain as it stands, but its future settlement might be along one of several lines. (1) The Yugo-slav frontier could be advanced ; (2) the frontier of Albania could be drawn in a manner more in accordance with her ethnic claims ; (3) strategic rectifications with a view to interposing natural barriers between the two states could be made on a basis of mutual compensation and exchange. The situation is not unlike that on the North-west frontier of India. It seems probable that the interposition of natural frontiers is the only ultimate way of preventing sudden raids by small frontier tribes whom the Government of Albania cannot reasonably be expected to control and to whose incursions the Yugo-slav Government cannot reasonably be expected to submit. On the other hand, the large numbers of Albanians who were incorporated in the kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro in 1913 give rise to a problem obviously difficult of solution. Up to date, however, no decision has ever been made to revise pre-war frontiers except in the case of Albania.

8. *Admission of Albania to the League by the Assembly, 17th December 1920.* The Government of Tirana had laboured under great difficulties not only from want of money and from the presence of many refugees from the disturbed northern areas, but still more from want of recognition. By appointing a High Commissioner Italy had recognized the new Government at any rate as a *de facto* Government, but the other Powers had given no sign. In December, however, the question of recognition came up before the League of Nations Assembly,

and it is important to point out that by Article 1 of the Covenant admission to the League depends on an agreement of two-thirds of the Assembly and does not require unanimity. In the case of Albania, however, the decision appears ultimately to have been unanimous. It has been stated that her admission was adversely reported on by the Commission considering it. Lord Robert Cecil, as representative of South Africa, and Mr. Rowell representing Canada, strongly advocated this admission when it came before the Assembly. Mr. Fisher, representing Great Britain, at length withdrew his opposition, and the question was finally decided in favour of Albania on the 17th December. The decision implies that the existing Government of Albania is a real government with a real organization and a real function. It satisfies the conditions of having self-government, and, according to Lord Robert Cecil, the Assembly 'is convinced that there is no reason for impugning the good faith of Albania or her desire and power to fulfil her international obligations'. This decision not only gives great moral support to Albania, but in case of future attack by any power it gives her the right of appeal to the League and such protection as is afforded by Article 10 of the Covenant. A number of problems remain to be settled, such as the evacuation of Scutari by the Italians, the regulation of the traffic of the Boyana river, the evacuation of the Isle of Sasseno, and the revision of certain parts of the northern and eastern frontiers.¹ But these difficulties, of course, do not affect the question of the recognition of Albania as a national state. Her recognition will, however, not be complete until the decision of the League Assembly has been confirmed by the members of the League individually. For the first time in her history, Albania will then have acquired the right to independence and self-government entirely unhindered by the interference of interested powers.

¹ It is clear that her frontiers must be authoritatively defined because Article 10 cannot guarantee the 'territorial integrity' of a state, without knowing what its boundaries are. Similarly the Minorities Treaty, which Albania will have ultimately to sign, cannot be complete until it is known within what boundaries these minorities must lie.

It is not clear that the agreement of 1913 is not still in force.

CHAPTER VI

THE PLEBISCITES

PART I

THE CZECHO-SLOVAK PLEBISCITE AREAS

A. THE TESCHEN QUESTION

1. *History and Geography.* The Silesian province of which the Teschen district forms the south-east corner was occupied by Slav tribes as early as the fifth century of our era, and formed during the early Middle Ages a sparsely populated march land between groups of Czech and Polish tribes which successively acknowledged the suzerainty of the Polish or Bohemian kings. In the tenth century the Teschen district was included in the Bohemian kingdom and in the diocese of Prague, founded in 873, but at the end of the same century it came under Polish rule and was included in the diocese of Breslau, in which it still remains. It was reconquered by the Czechs for a few decades in the eleventh century, but again passed to Poland in 1054. The town of Teschen is mentioned for the first time in 1155 as a seat of a Polish castellan. From 1163 on the authority of the Polish king as Dux Maximus of Silesia declined and the local principalities, of which Teschen was one, after 1282 became virtually independent. After the Tartar incursions in the first half of the thirteenth century successive waves of German immigrants advanced eastwards into the Silesian duchies and settled in large numbers in the principality of Teschen, especially in the towns. From 1291 onwards the Bohemian kings gradually established their authority over the whole Silesian province. In 1316 Oswiecim (Auschwitz) and Zator were separated from Teschen, and under Duke Kasimir I the principality assumed its present form. In 1327 the Duke concluded a treaty with the Bohemian king John of Luxemburg, recognizing him as his feudal overlord, and in 1335 Poland finally relinquished her claim to Silesia in favour of Bohemia. From then till 1742, except

for a few years at the end of the fifteenth century, the Teschen district was regarded as a fief of the Bohemian Crown.

The ancient Ducal house died out in 1653 and the fief escheated to the Habsburg Emperor in his capacity as King of Bohemia. In 1742 Maria Theresa ceded to Frederic II of Prussia 'all Silesia, except Teschen and the district beyond the river Oppa and the High Mountains'. Maria Theresa had the cession in question ratified by the Estates of Bohemia, thus recognizing the rights of the Bohemian Crown over the Silesian lands. The remaining fragment of Silesia as finally delimited by the boundary commissions appointed by Frederic II consisted of the ancient circles of Troppau (Opava) and Teschen (Czech Tešín, Polish Cieszyn), which are divided from one another by the Moravian district of Mistek. It was henceforth regarded as an Austrian province and under Joseph II was united for administrative purposes with Moravia, though the Provincial Estates (*Landesstände*) remained distinct.

In 1858 the Emperor Francis Joseph, as King of Bohemia, granted the fief of Teschen to the Archduke Albert.¹ In 1860 the Duchy of 'Upper and Lower Silesia' was finally separated for administrative purposes from Moravia. Upper Silesia or Teschen was administratively under Troppau (Opava), and for judicial purposes under Brünn (Brno).

The Duchy of Teschen, which is divided into the four districts of Frydek, Fryštát, Teschen, and Bielitz, has an area of 2,282 square kilometres, but its mineral wealth, especially its coke and gas coal and its position as a nodal point in the road and railway system of Central Europe, give it an importance out of all proportion to its actual size. Its natural boundaries are clearly defined to the west by the Ostravice, an affluent of the Oder, to the north by the natural depression followed by the Warsaw-Vienna railway, to the east by spurs of the Beskids and by the Biala, a tributary of the Vistula, and to the south by the wooded slopes of the western Beskids which form the watershed between the Danubian system and the valleys of the Oder and Vistula. The western part of the Duchy forms a corridor between the East European plain and the basin of Vienna and is at the junction of several arterial

¹ In his Rescript of September 1870, Francis Joseph acknowledged the indivisibility of the lands of the Bohemian Crown.

lines of communication which since prehistoric times have served as routes for trade, for invasion, and for the migration of peoples. These are :

- (a) the road and railway to Vienna and Prague by the upper valley of the Oder and March. The line to Prague diverges at Prerau ;
- (b) the road and railway to Breslau and Berlin ;
- (c) the railway to Warsaw and Petrograd via Czerstochowa ;
- (d) the railway to Cracow, Lemberg, and Kiev ;
- (e) the very important line from Oderberg through the Jablunka Pass to Silles, Kaschau, Budapest, and the Balkan lands.

Eastern Silesia is thus of great importance as regards the railway traffic of the whole of Central Europe because the two great main double lines connecting the north and south of Europe and also the south and west intersect at Oderberg (Bohumin).

2. *Language and Ethnology.* Under Bohemian suzerainty in the later Middle Ages the official language was, as in Bohemia itself, first Latin, then German. Czech became the official language of the Ducal Chancery in 1434, and remained the judicial language of the country till the period of active Germanization under Joseph II. The Hussite tradition was strong among the Slav peasants, and the Silesian Protestants, who were less harshly treated by the Habsburg Emperors in the seventeenth century than their co-religionists in Bohemia and Moravia, produced devotional works in Czech such as those of Tránovský (1581-1637) which were in general use in their schools and churches down to 1848, though after about 1750 the official language was German, and the towns were externally germanized. Czech hymnals were also in use in the Catholic churches down to about 1870. The native Silesians, or Slonzaks, in the eastern part of the Duchy, speak a transition dialect between Czech and Polish, and often describe themselves as 'Moravians'. After 1848 a Polish paper was founded at Teschen, and a few local Poles vigorously supported by their kinsfolk in Western Galicia carried on active propaganda among this section of the population, chiefly through the agency of polonophil priests and schoolmasters whom the Czechs allege to have been tacitly encouraged by the Austrian authorities.

After 1870 there was a large influx of Polish workmen from Galicia into the Karvin mining district. It is admitted by Polish writers that there was no Polish literary activity in Teschen before the second half of the nineteenth century. The Austrian census for 1900 shows a population of 360,662, of whom 218,869 spoke Polish, 85,553 Czech, and 56,240 German. The census returns of 1910, which probably tended to favour the German element, show a total population of 426,370 of whom 233,850 (54·85 per cent.) spoke Polish, 115,604 (27·11 per cent.) Czech, 76,916 (18·04 per cent.) German. The 1910 census showed that the Polish speakers numbered 77·63 per cent. of the population in Biala, 76·81 per cent. in Teschen, and 63·52 per cent. in Fryštát, while in Frydek the Czech speakers formed 78·16 per cent. The Polish speakers included the numerous recent immigrants from Galicia in the mining districts, numbered at 50,000 to 80,000, and about 56,000 native Silesians (Slonzaks, *Slazacy*), many of whom belonged to the Silesian People's Party which had been organized in 1907 to oppose the polonizing efforts of the Galician Poles. Some light is thrown on Polish immigration from Galicia by the Austrian census of 1910, which shows that there were 101,138 persons in the Teschen district who did not possess the rights of citizenship (*Heimatsrecht*) in the Duchy itself.¹ To sum up, the Polish speakers are in a large majority in the central and eastern parts of the Duchy; in the north-eastern part they are rather less numerous than the Czech and German-speaking population; in the western part (Frydek) they are not numerous. The Germans are mostly settled in the towns, such as Bielitz and Teschen, and form the middle class in the urban and industrial regions. German capital is largely invested in the mines, factories, and great landed properties.

The province formed a natural unit and under Austrian rule there was broad tolerance between Poles, Slonzaks, Czechs, and Germans, and between Catholics, Protestants (93,500), and Jews (11,000). Racial friction was not acute, though after 1890 some Czech nationalists, such as the poet Bezruč, complained bitterly of Polish encroachments in the Fryštát region. There was a strong tradition of provincial particularism, and the sentiment of unity and of common interest was widespread

¹ 51,279 of these immigrants came from Galicia and Bukovina.

and general except among the immigrant element in the mining district. The general standard of civilization was western in character and approximated more to that of Upper Prussian Silesia and Moravia than to that of Galicia.

3. *Mines and Industries.* The Duchy, which was one of the most highly industrialized and densely populated areas in the former Austrian Empire, owes its economic importance to the fact that it forms part of the vast Silesian coal-field of 6,920 square kilometres, of which 7·3 per cent. is included in eastern Silesia. The coal-field is bowl-shaped, and one portion of the rim comes close to the surface at Karvin, where excellent coal containing 65 per cent. gas is obtained, which is extensively used in the industries of Bohemia and Moravia. The Karvin coal-field is being developed from west to east, round Ostrau, Orlova, and Karvin. No pits have yet been opened to the east of the river Olša, and that portion of the Duchy with its Polish-speaking population is still chiefly agricultural, though there are iron-works at Ustron and Golleschau, and large textile mills at Bielitz, which with Biala on the Galician bank of the river of the same name forms a German-speaking enclave. The relative importance of the Teschen portion of the great Silesian coal-field is best seen from the following statistics :

Total Output of Coal and Coke in 1913.

	Coal.	Coke.
	Tons.	Tons.
Bohemia	27,106,532	10,424
Moravia	2,498,515	1,429,794
Teschen	7,594,865	1,146,580
Russian Poland and Galicia	8,740,000	—
Prussian Silesia	48,801,056	2,201,829

The existing reserves of coal in their proportion to the basin as a whole are as follows : Moravia and Teschen 8·6 per cent., Kingdom of Poland and Galicia 37·4 per cent., Prussian Silesia 54 per cent. The mines employ about 35,000 miners, of whom approximately one half are Polish and the other half Czech. The proximity of these mines, which produce much better gas coal and coke than is obtainable in Bohemia and Moravia, has led to the development of industries of great importance in the Duchy itself and the adjoining portion of Moravia round Mährisch-Ostrau. For instance, the great iron-works at

Trzynietz near Teschen and at Witkowitz near Mährisch-Ostrau are dependent on the Karvin coal, as are also, in a less degree, the large chemical works, oil refineries, and other industries at Oderberg and Fryštat, and the textile factories at Frydek and Bielitz. The eastern portion of the Duchy is mainly agricultural, and supplies the mining and industrial districts to the west with farm produce. There are also important cloth factories at Bielitz and a flourishing timber industry.

4. *The Czech claims.* In their formal statement to the Peace Conference the Czechs based their claims on the following historic, economic, and political grounds :

(i) *Historical.* Since 1335 the district had from the standpoint of feudal law formed an integral part of the lands of the Crown of St. Wenceslas.

(ii) *Ethnological.* According to the census of 1910 the Polish-speaking population formed 54·85 per cent. of the population. Apart from the fact that the language of ordinary intercourse (*Umgangssprache*) did not absolutely determine nationality, the Polish speakers included the native Silesians (Slonzaks) and the numerous Polish miners from Galicia, who numbered more than 50,000. These immigrants were not a stable element in the population, and tended to move eastwards as the western coal-mines were worked out.

(iii) *Economic.* (a) The Czecho-Slovak State could not cede the Fryštat district which formed part of the mining and industrial district of Mährisch-Ostrau (Moravska Ostrava), with which it was inextricably interlinked economically owing to the dependence of the great iron-works and chemical industries, such as those at Witkowitz and Moravska Ostrava, on the Karvin coal and coke. The pit coal from Silesia was also indispensable to the industries of Bohemia and Moravia, and to a lesser extent of Slovakia.

(b) The Oderberg-Jablunka-Sillein line was of vital importance to the Czecho-Slovak State from the political, economic, and military standpoint, as it was the arterial line connecting Slovakia with Bohemia-Moravia. The line over the Vlára Pass in Moravia was of secondary importance on account of its steep gradients and sharp curves, and the line from Břeclava (Lundenburg) to Bratislava (Pressburg) was too far to the south to be of much economic use. On the other hand, the

Jablunka–Oderberg line was only of very secondary importance to Poland.

(iv) *Political.* (a) The Czechs contended that the Poles did not really require the Karvin mines, nor the Oderberg–Jablunka railway. A large portion of the Karvin coal-field extended into Polish territory and only required to be properly developed.

(b) The disputed territory was only about the size of a French *arrondissement*, and it was doubtful whether the majority of the Polish-speaking inhabitants really desired to be incorporated in Poland. If they remained in Czecho-Slovakia that State would guarantee all their liberties and privileges.

(c) In reply to the Polish contention that these economic difficulties could easily be surmounted by special treaties regulating the export of the Karvin coal and the use of the Oderberg–Jablunka railway, the Czechs insisted that a State in their geographical position must be in complete possession of mines and lines of communication which were of vital importance to its economic existence. They cited the case of Antwerp, cut off in war-time from free access to the sea owing to the Dutch control of the lower Scheldt. The Czechs therefore, while admitting that the Poles according to the principle of nationality had a valid claim to the districts of Teschen and Fryštát, submitted that, in view of the arguments adduced above, it would be merely mechanical to apply the principle of nationality in this instance.

The Czechs appear from the first to have been willing to cede Bielitz to Poland, and at later stages in the negotiations they intimated their willingness to acquiesce in a line of demarcation which secured them the possession of the Karvin coal-field and the Oderberg–Jablunka railway.

5. *Polish Claims.* (i) The Poles, while admitting that the district of Frydek properly belonged to Czecho-Slovakia, claimed the remaining districts of Bielitz, Teschen, and Fryštát on account of the Polish national sentiment of the majority of the population which M. Roman Dmowski described as being ‘ sentimentally and culturally, if not ethnographically, Polish ’.

(ii) The Poles maintained that the economic considerations adduced by the Czechs did not justify ownership. M. Dmowski pointed out that the railway over the Jablunka Pass had been

constructed as the main line between Berlin and Budapest. In addition to the existing line over the Vlára Pass two additional lines could easily be constructed to connect Moravia directly with Slovakia. M. Paderewski said that Poland would be prepared to pay half the cost of constructing these two lines, in case the line from Oderberg to Jablunka were ceded to Poland.

(iii) The Poles pointed out that any economic difficulties could easily be surmounted by means of Conventions, providing for a regular supply of coal and coke for Czecho-Slovakia from the Karvin mines and for the free passage of Czecho-Slovak trains to and from Slovakia over the Jablunka Pass.

It will be seen that in the main the Polish case rested on ethnological and linguistic considerations, whereas the Czech claims were based on economic and historical arguments.

During the last few years of Austrian rule the Polish members in the Diet (Landtag) of Austrian Silesia supported the historic Czech claims to the province. In 1916, however, when the Central Powers were making preparations to reconstitute the Polish state, some Chauvinistic German writers suggested that Biala, Oswiecim, and Zator should be detached from Galicia and incorporated in Silesia. The Polish population of these districts raised a vigorous protest, and early in 1917 their Central Committee presented a memorandum to the Polish Club in the Reichsrat at Vienna and to the Austrian Minister for Galicia, demanding that the Duchy of Teschen should be annexed to Galicia.

The future of the Teschen district was discussed by Professor Masaryk and M. Paderewski at Washington in May-June 1918, when it was agreed that the matter should be settled by friendly negotiation between the Czech and Polish Governments in the event of the defeat of the Central Empires. On page 53 of his work, *The New Europe*, published in October 1918, President Masaryk says that 'with goodwill on both sides it is possible to find a suitable frontier in Austrian Silesia'. When Austria collapsed at the end of October 1918, two local Silesian organizations, the Polish National Council and the Czech National Local Committee for Silesia, provisionally assumed power in the name of their respective States. Great confusion ensued, but after a few days the two bodies concluded an agree-

ment at Ostrau on the 5th November 1918, establishing a provisional frontier line on an ethnographical basis, by which Frydek and the Czech communes of the district of Fryštát were within the Czech zone, while the districts of Bielitz and Teschen, and the Polish communes of Fryštát fell to the Poles. A central body composed of 7 Czechs, 7 Poles, and 5 Germans was to organize and control food supplies for the whole Duchy. Racial minorities in either zone were to be protected, and nothing was to be done by either side to prejudice the final disposition of the territory or to effect its permanent incorporation in either State. The coal districts were placed under the mining administration of Mährisch-Ostrau, but the Polish National Council were to have the right of nominating a confidential agent to represent them. This frontier line gave twenty-six pits to the Czechs and ten to the Poles. The Prague Government merely tolerated the situation thus created and reserved their right to modify any arrangement concluded by the local National Committee for Silesia, which had never been formally recognized by them. The execution of such a relatively complicated agreement was difficult in any case, and both sides appear to have violated its spirit especially in the Fryštát district, where the situation was rendered still more strained by the presence of a number of advanced social revolutionaries who fomented anti-Czech feeling and general discontent among the miners.

6. *The crisis of January 1919.* Great indignation was aroused among the Czechs when the Polish authorities on the 10th December 1918 announced that the election of deputies to the Warsaw Diet from the occupied portion of the Teschen area would take place on the 26th January, and a week later mobilized troops along the provisional frontier. The Prague Government, professing to be greatly alarmed at the proceedings and still more by the alleged spread of Bolshevism in the mining districts in the Polish zone, sent a special courier to Warsaw with a memorandum requesting the withdrawal of the Polish troops. He was however arrested at Cracow, and did not reach Warsaw till the 26th January. On the 22nd January the Czech military authorities prepared to advance, and four officers of the Great Powers, who were with the Czech troops, went on the 23rd January to Teschen and demanded the complete evacuation of Eastern Silesia by

Polish troops on two hours' notice. The Czech troops then advanced and occupied Oderberg (Bohumin) after a slight skirmish. On the 5th February an armistice was concluded, defining the Czech and Polish zones. The Poles held the Vistula with a bridgehead beyond Skotschau.

7. *The Conference appoints a Commission ; its recommendations.* The Czech advance produced a very unfavourable impression on the Peace Conference at Paris,¹ which on the 3rd February, after having heard the statements of the Polish and Czech representatives, decided to refer the matter to the Commission, already appointed to proceed to Poland, of which the President was M. Noulens, late French ambassador at Petrograd. Some days later the Conference accepted the recommendations of this Commission, which were as follows :

(a) The mining districts and the section of the Oderberg-Jablunka line north of Teschen was to be held by the Czechs, while the southern portion of the line from Teschen to Jablunka was to be held by Polish troops.

(b) The local administration was to be carried on in accordance with the agreement of the 5th November 1918.

(c) An Inter-Allied Commission of control subordinate to M. Noulens' Commission was to be sent to Teschen to see that these decisions were carried out, and to collect data and statistics on which the Peace Conference could base their final award.

The Inter-Allied Commission arrived at Teschen on the 12th February,² and at first as a temporary measure allowed the Czech troops to retain the positions they had taken up in January, but M. Noulens' Commission, which had arrived in Warsaw on the 12th February, ordered the subordinate Commission at Teschen to enforce without delay the decisions of the Peace Conference and sent two of its members, Generals Niessel and Romei, to Teschen, by whose orders a military Convention was drawn up on the 25th February, fixing limits beyond which

¹ Cf. Mr. Lloyd George in House of Commons, 16th April 1919 : 'How many members have heard of Teschen ? I do not mind saying that I had never heard of it, but Teschen very nearly produced an angry conflict between two Allied States, and we had to interrupt the proceedings to try and settle the affairs at Teschen.'

² The first or Inter-Allied Commission was authorized by the Conference on the 31st January 1919 and remained at Teschen from the 12th February 1919 till January 1920, when it was superseded by the International or Plebiscite Commission.

the Czech and Polish troops might not pass. The new positions were taken up on the 25th February. The Commission appear to have been much hampered in their work owing to the fact that they could only make suggestions to the Czech and Polish Governments.

The Inter-Allied Commission sent in their main report to the Peace Conference at the end of March 1919, submitting some additional recommendations towards the end of April.

There appeared to be three possible courses :

(d) To constitute the duchy as a neutral state. This would have met the wishes of a large number of the inhabitants, especially the native Silesians or Slonzaks and the Germans, but the practical difficulties would be very great, as the territory was so small.

(e) To divide the territory on ethnographical lines, which would follow roughly the temporary frontier of the 5th November 1918, though the Czechs might be given the Jablunka Pass with such territory as was required to enable them to construct a connecting line from Mährisch-Ostrau to Jablunka by way of Frydek, so as to have direct railway communication with Slovakia over the Jablunka Pass through their own territory. The Commission, however, drew attention to the difficulties of delimiting a satisfactory frontier through the densely populated mining and industrial district of Karvin-Mährisch-Ostrau without cutting mining concessions in two and separating workmen from their places of work and their homes and marketing places.

(f) To follow the natural hydrographical lines of division according to the basins of the Olša and Vistula. For instance the eastern districts of Schwartzwasser, Bielitz, and Skotschau might be assigned to Poland.

The Peace Conference, having regard to the inherent difficulties of arriving at a satisfactory solution, advised the Governments of the two Republics to endeavour to settle the question amicably between themselves.

8. *A Plebiscite decided on, 27th September 1919 ; administration of Teschen area.* Negotiations for this purpose took place at Cracow from the 23rd July to the 30th July 1919. The Polish representatives demanded a plebiscite, and as the Czechs would not agree to this the negotiations broke down. Meanwhile the heads of the Delegations of the principal Allied

Powers at Paris, after consulting the Czecho-Slovak and the Polish delegates, decided at the end of July that, if the respective Governments were unable very shortly to reach an agreement, the matter must be decided by the Supreme Council. The whole question was very carefully considered by the Supreme Council in September, after hearing oral statements from the heads of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Delegations. The Council being unable to accept any of the suggested alternative lines of demarcation decided on the 27th September to hold plebiscites for the whole Duchy of Teschen,¹ and in the disputed areas of the Slovak counties of Zips and Orava.

The Teschen plebiscite area was to be placed under the control of an International Commission vested with full powers, on whose arrival the two Republics were to withdraw their troops.

The following were the voting conditions :

' The right to vote shall be given to all persons, without distinction of sex, who :

- (a) Have completed their twentieth year on the 1st January 1919 ;
- (b) Have had their domicile or indigénat (' Heimatsrecht ') in the plebiscite area since a date prior to the 1st August 1914.

Persons occupying a public position or having, as officials, acquired indigénat, shall not have the right to vote.

Persons convicted of political offences before the 3rd November 1918, shall be enabled to exercise their right of voting.

Every person will vote in the commune in which he is domiciled or in which he has indigénat.

The result of the vote will be determined by communes according to the majority of the votes cast in each commune.'

It will be seen that, in contrast with the Klagenfurt plebiscite, the result of the vote was to be determined by communes and not by the total majority in the whole area, a very important difference (*v. p.* 381, n. 1).

The Plebiscite Commission, which arrived at Teschen on the 30th January 1920, found the plebiscite area divided into two portions by the line of demarcation of the 3rd February 1919.

The line itself presented a formidable barrier of military posts and custom stations and the closest scrutiny of persons

¹ Note, however, that the Minorities Treaty between the Principal Allied Powers and Czecho-Slovakia, signed on the 10th September 1919, refers in its preamble to ' part of Silesia ' as included in the territories of the Czecho-Slovak State. Western Silesia (Troppau) is certainly intended, but it might be taken to imply more.

and goods was combined on both sides with a strict censorship. The first act of the Commission was to replace the Czech and Polish guards by French and Italian troops, and to set back the customs line to the respective frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. The parts of the area to east and west of the demarcation line were each placed under a Prefect nominated by the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments respectively. These officials were under the direct order of the Commission. Certain communes of the district of Fryštát, including the Karvin coal-mines, were withdrawn from the competence of the western Prefect and placed under a sub-commission of four members, one delegated by each section of the Commission. This division into Prefectures was arranged after careful consultation with the members of the outgoing Inter-Allied Commission, which had been at Teschen since the 12th February 1919. The Commission also took over from the Czecho-Slovak authorities the duty of distributing the output of coal in the Ostrau-Karvin region. The Czechs had systematically utilized the period from February 1919 onwards to consolidate their prestige in the region between the two lines of November 1918 and February 1919 by means of judicious propaganda and victualling.

Racial friction soon became acute in the Karvin region owing to the agitation carried on by some of the Polish miners and the counter-measures organized by the Czech plebiscite Commission at Mährisch-Ostrau (Moravska-Ostrava). There was also unrest in the iron-works at Trzynietz, some miles to the south of Teschen, where the Polish workmen ejected all the Czech employees.

A Conciliation Committee, consisting of one representative of the miners, one of the Czech plebiscite Committee, and one of the political parties on either side, was formed at the suggestion of the Commission to settle strikes and disturbances in the mining regions. Both sides were in a state of tension and excitement as a result of the war, of the Czech invasion of January 1919, and the long period of suspense before the plebiscite. The Press of both countries appears to have deliberately circulated grossly exaggerated rumours calculated to increase the general unrest.

On the 18th May 1920 a serious riot occurred in the town of Teschen, and on the 21st May about 11,000 Polish miners

struck work in the Karvin district and remained on strike for several weeks. The tension and unrest became very serious, and at the end of May a demand was made in the Warsaw Parliament for the suspension of diplomatic relations with Czecho-Slovakia.

9. *Question referred to Ambassadors' Council, 10th July 1920.* The Ambassadors' Council at Paris, having received urgent representations from the Inter-Allied Commission regarding these alarming developments, inquired of both States whether the question could not be settled by arbitration. M. Beneš, the Czecho-Slovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, discussed matters with M. Patek, the Polish Foreign Minister, and they agreed to obtain the opinion of the Committees for Foreign Affairs of their respective Parliaments. The Committees for Foreign Affairs of the Czecho-Slovak Senate and Chamber of Deputies considered the whole question at the end of June and rejected the proposal for arbitration expressing themselves in favour of a plebiscite. On the other hand, the Polish Committee for Foreign Affairs were opposed to a plebiscite. Meanwhile the Czecho-Slovak Chamber of Deputies had received a deputation of Slonzaks and Germans from Teschen demanding that the National Assembly at Prague should insist on the carrying out of the plebiscite. After further negotiations between the two Governments MM. Beneš and Grabski, the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Delegates to the Spa Conference, submitted a declaration, dated the 10th July, to the Supreme Council, consenting in the name of their respective Governments to the suspension of the plebiscites in Teschen, Zips, and Orava, and to the taking by the Allied Powers, after hearing the two parties, of the necessary measures for a definite settlement of the dispute.

On the following day the Supreme Council sent similar notes to the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Delegates enclosing copies of a resolution passed by the Council on the 11th July in regard to the frontiers between the two Republics in the former Duchy of Teschen and in the counties of Zips and Orava. This resolution points out that, in view of the objections raised by both parties, it appeared impracticable to proceed either to a plebiscite in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council of the 27th September 1919, or to arbitration as had been recently proposed. Any further prolongation of

the dispute would injuriously affect the interests of Europe and the general peace.

In these circumstances, the representatives of the British, French, Italian, and Japanese Governments assembled at Spa had decided that the Delegates of the Allied Powers in the Ambassadors' Conference at Paris should forthwith be authorized, after hearing the two parties, to elaborate as soon as possible a settlement in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council.

10. *Decision of Ambassadors' Conference, 28th July 1920.* The instructions sent by the Supreme Council to the Delegates of the four Allied Powers in the Ambassadors' Conference were as follows :

(i) The Duchy of Teschen was to be divided between the two Republics by a line running from north-west to south-east, starting east of the village of Prstna and drawn so as to leave to Czecho-Slovakia the town of Fryštát, then running south in the direction of Teschen along the river Olša and from there south-east so as to leave to Czecho-Slovakia the whole of the railway running north and south, but to include in Poland the town of Teschen.

(ii) The regions of Zips and Orava were to be divided so as to leave to Poland the north-east part of Orava and the north-western portion of Zips, according to lines approximately traced on maps annexed to these instructions.

(iii) The Ambassadors' Conference was to take such measures in consultation with the representatives of the two Republics as would ensure the satisfactory settlement of all economic questions, including that of the distribution of coal and of transport between the two countries.

After a series of meetings the Ambassadors' Conference, consisting of the representatives of the four Powers named above and of the United States of America,¹ drew up a Declara-

¹ The American Government, while not disapproving of the proposed line of demarcation, considered that it should not be imposed upon both parties in the rapid way contemplated. On learning, however, that the interested parties were prepared to accept the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors, the Washington Government instructed their Ambassador at Paris to acquiesce.

On the 27th January 1921, Beneš, the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister, in asking the Chamber to ratify the Treaty, spoke as follows : ' With reference to the problem of the territory of Teschen, although it does not satisfy it, the Czecho-Slovak Government considers our difference with the Poles definitely settled and desires to pursue a policy of systematic *rapprochement*. '

tion delimiting the frontiers of Teschen and of Zips and Orava, which was signed by Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, while Poland and Czecho-Slovakia signed their acceptance of the award on the 28th July 1920.¹ The Agreement was ratified by the Czecho-Slovak Chamber on the 28th January 1921.

The partition of the little duchy can only be regarded as an unfortunate necessity, as it had since the beginning of the fourteenth century formed an administrative and economic whole, and possessed a strong local tradition based on the sentiment of unity and common interests. As, however, it was impossible to constitute it a neutral state or to assign the whole territory to either Republic, the line of division actually adopted was probably the most equitable in the circumstances and best calculated to produce the minimum of economic dislocation. Based on the river Olša, it assigns to Czecho-Slovakia the whole of the Karvin mining area and the Oderberg-Jablunka Railway, which passes through a modern suburb of Teschen on the western bank of the river.

Poland, on the other hand, obtains the ancient town of Teschen, which is first mentioned as a Polish castellany in the twelfth century, and since 1848 has been the centre of Polish literary and political activities in the duchy. She also acquires the valuable agricultural region to the east of the Olša, containing the German enclave of Bielitz with its textile factories which are connected economically with those in the German town of Biala in Galicia. The Karvin coal deposits extend east of the Olša to Dieditz and Western Galicia, so that it is probable that the Polish portion of the duchy, which already possesses important works and industries at Teschen, Ustron, Bielitz, Skotschau, and Dieditz, will become more and more industrialized when new coal pits are opened east of the Olša.

¹ The Declaration contains provisions safeguarding the rights of individuals and corporations in the territories in question and apportioning the shares of the financial obligations of Austria and Hungary to be assumed respectively by Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. It also provides that Czecho-Slovakia shall deliver yearly to Poland in return for naphtha a quantity of coal from the Karvin mines equal to that delivered in 1913.

B. THE QUESTION OF ZIPS AND ORAVA

1. *History.* The Poles claimed the north-west part of the county of Zips (Polish, Spisz, Czech, Spiš, Magyar, Szepes) on historic and ethnological grounds, and the north-eastern part of the county of Orava (Magyar Arva) for ethnological reasons.

In 1412 the Emperor Sigismund, as King of Hungary, pawned 13 of the 24 German towns of the Hungarian county of Zips to Poland. This portion of the district was never redeemed by the Hungarian Crown and remained Polish till 1769, when Maria Theresa, encouraged by a law of the Hungarian Parliament passed in 1756, occupied the district which was formally ceded to Austria at the First Partition of Poland in 1772. The Poles have always laid special stress on the fact that the occupation of Zips in 1769 marked the beginning of the First Partition.

2. *Ethnology.* The northern portions of the counties of Trenčín Orava, and Zips are inhabited by Slovak peasants, Gorals (highlanders), who speak a dialect which is a transition from later Slovak and Polish, just as farther east in the neighbourhood of Eperies (Prešov) Slovak dialects are spoken which approximate to Ruthenian. About thirty years ago the eminent Slavist, Dr. Polivka of the Czech University of Prague, called attention to the fact that a part of the population in several villages in Orava near the Galician frontier spoke dialects showing certain Polish influences. This was due partly to economic influences. For instance, owing to the bad roads Cracow was more accessible from some villages in northern Orava than Dolní-Kubin, the county town. Moreover, the peasants of northern Orava and Zips had benefited by the rapid development of Zakopane, the well-known Polish health resort in the Tatva. Many of them attended markets at Nowy Targ in Poland or went on pilgrimage to the famous Polish shrine at Czenstochowa. Strong Polish influences, however, appear to have been confined to the villages near the frontier.

The existence of a Polish element in these portions in the counties of Orava and Zips was not officially acknowledged in the Magyar census returns, which never refer to Poles by name except in foot-notes, but group the Polish element under the category of 'others'. It will, nevertheless, be observed from a comparison of the returns for the county of Orava

for 1900 and 1910 that the number of 'others' had increased in the decade from 888 to 16,120.

Population in 1900.

1,494 Magyars.
2,127 Germans.
80,487 Slovaks.
888 others.

Population in 1910.

2,000 Magyars.
1,528 Germans.
59,096 Slovaks.
16,120 others.

It is evident that the Magyar officials, for reasons best known to themselves, had discovered the existence of a considerable non-Slovak element in the Trstena district of Orava for the first time in the census of 1910.

The statistics for the county of Zips are as follows :

In 1900 : 10,843 Magyars.
42,885 Germans.
99,557 Slovaks.
14,333 Ruthenes.
4,117 others.

In 1910 : 18,658 Magyars.
38,434 Germans.
97,077 Slovaks.
12,327 Ruthenes.
5,629 others.

3. *The Polish Case.* In the *Petite Encyclopédie Polonaise*, published at Lausanne in October 1916 under the editorship of M. Erasme Piltz, it is claimed that there are 200,000 Poles¹ in the northern portions of Zips, Orava, and Trencin, while in M. Piltz's larger *Encyclopaedia*, published at Fribourg in 1916, it is asserted that the highlanders of Orava and Trencin form an intermediate type between the Slovaks and the Poles of Teschen. The Poles emphasized their historic claim to Zips and maintained that the Magyar census returns had included large numbers of Polish Gorals under the heading of Slovaks.

4. *Czech Case.* The Czechs maintained that the Gorals, or highlanders of the Carpathian ridge adjoining the Galician frontier, were not ethnically Polish, and had not strong Polish sympathies, though in the two districts specially claimed by the Poles they had economic connexions with Poland owing to the relative accessibility of Zakopane and Novy Targ. This was largely due to deliberate policy on the part of the late Magyar authorities, who aimed at keeping the Slovaks isolated and discouraging them in every possible way. Nevertheless,

¹ In a pamphlet issued in 1919 the Polish Committee at Warsaw for the Defence of Zips, Orava, and Podhalia made the singular claim that there were 50,000 Poles in Zips and 50,000 in Orava.

the Slovak Gorals of northern Zips and Orava were not polonophil and their present isolation could be obviated by the construction of proper roads and the use of motor-buses, etc.

5. *The Plebiscites abandoned, 11th July 1920.* The Czecho-Slovak authorities had occupied the whole of the two counties in November 1918, but the Galician Poles carried on active propaganda among the Gorals along the frontier, and on the 10th January 1919 the Warsaw Government set up an Administration Commission at Cracow for 'Galicia, Teschen, Orava, and Zips'.

The complications raised by the Teschen Question had an inevitable repercussion on the problem of Zips and Orava, and the Peace Conference, finding that the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments could not settle the matter between themselves, decided on the 27th September 1919 that plebiscites should be taken in the disputed zones of the two areas. A Plebiscite Commission was sent to Zips and Orava early in 1920. On the 11th July 1920 the Supreme Council at Spa, acting on a request from the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments, decided to abandon the plebiscite and fixed the frontiers in the two areas, leaving the details to be worked out by the Conference of Ambassadors at Paris.¹

It will be seen from the map that the new lines of demarcation widen considerably the Zakopane salient. It seems tolerably certain that some of the frontier villages in the two districts have more natural economic connexions with Galicia than with Slovakia, and presumably the sense of nationality is not very strongly developed in these remote mountain regions. It is doubtful, however, whether their cession to Poland can be justified on purely ethnological grounds.

C. LEOBSCHÜTZ (HLUBICE)

This small piece of territory in Silesia involves part of the administrative district of Leobschütz and borders on the Moravian frontier and Troppau. It includes a population of about 34,113 Germans, 6,121 Czechs, 1,183 Poles, and its fate is connected with the plebiscite in Upper Silesia. 'Germany hereby agrees to renounce in favour of the Czecho-Slovak State all rights and titles over the part of the Kreis of Leobschütz

¹ v. *supra*, p. 362.

comprised within the following boundaries in case after the determination of the frontier between Germany and Poland the said part of that Kreis should become isolated from Germany.’¹ The area includes some important railway connexions. If the result of the plebiscite in Upper Silesia is in favour of Poland this area is ceded by Germany to Czechoslovakia.

¹ Art. 83 of German Treaty. v. Vol. III, p. 155, for further description of boundary in question.

CHAPTER VI

THE PLEBISCITES

PART II

THE KLAGENFURT BASIN

A. THE KLAGENFURT QUESTION AT THE CONFERENCE

1. *Introductory. Settlement of the new frontiers of Styria and the 'Assling triangle'.* The fate of the three old Austrian provinces of Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria formed one of the most disputed problems of the Conference, and involved the interests of three Powers. Italy claimed, and eventually obtained, part of Carniola; the major part of Carniola and the debated districts of Styria passed to Yugo-slavia without any popular vote, and a plebiscite ultimately gave to Austria the Klagenfurt area in Carinthia. The three problems cannot, in fact, be separated from one another, though circumstances forced Klagenfurt to the front and made it one of the most important minor disputes at the Conference. It is a curious fact that the population of all these areas in dispute was predominantly Slovene in race, though (and the fact is important) not always predominantly Yugo-slav in national aspiration.

2. *Railway Problems. (a) The 'Assling triangle'.* The real unity of the problems was due to the railway systems which bound them together and therefore acutely concerned the three neighbouring states of Italy, Austria, and Yugo-slavia. For transportation reasons the following towns were extremely important—Villach, Assling, and Marburg, as being all on or near great railway routes. The Italians had obtained by the Treaty of London and subsequent arrangements control of the Trieste-Udine-Villach line. This was not, however, so important as the great Tauern-Bahn line to the Tyrol and South Germany via Trieste-Assling—the Rosenbach Tunnel and Villach. Though Italy had not claimed it in the Treaty of London, the piece of land bounded by Assling on the west and by point 1,370 on

the east, known as the 'Assling triangle', caused serious difficulties. The point was that, if Austria obtained the Klagenfurt area and Yugo-slavia the 'Tarvis triangle', the direct railway connexion between Italy and Austria would be broken and Italian and Austrian goods would be subjected to the customs examination and tolls of a third power. This was contrary to all the principles of transportation, which are to make railway lines entirely within one nation's territory if possible, and if not to confine them to the territory of two nations. The intervention of a third party over a small part of a through line is necessarily annoying and productive of friction. Italy had not claimed the 'Assling triangle' under the Treaty of London and was certain, therefore, not to obtain it. The piece of territory might indeed have been given to Austria, but to do this would have been to bring an enemy over the Karavanken within measurable distance of the sea. Moreover, the population affected was wholly Yugo-slav. Hence this solution found no favour. Ultimately the Peace Treaty with Austria put this area at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers, and by the Treaty of Rapallo (12th November 1920) Italy agreed to Yugo-slavia obtaining it.

(b) *St. Peter-Laibach-Marburg railway.* The great Austrian Südbahn railway ran from Trieste to St. Peter (with junction to Fiume) and thence to Laibach, Marburg and Vienna. By the Treaty of Rapallo Italy obtained the Trieste-St. Peter (junction to Fiume) stretch of railway to ten miles north of Adelsberg; Yugo-slavia obtained the railway from this point to a point beyond the important German town and railway junction of Marburg. A third nation thus again controlled part of a through route. Here again a railway line which, on transportation principles, should have been shared by only two nations, was trisected by three. It must not be thought, however, that the solutions were made as easily and as simply as the description implies. But there was no fighting in these areas; the 'Assling triangle' and Marburg were occupied by Slovene levies immediately after the Armistice, at which time Italian troops also occupied that part of the Trieste-St. Peter railway which they eventually incorporated in Italy. There was therefore no serious difficulty in keeping order in any of these areas, and it was only in the Klagenfurt Basin that actual fighting continued and forced the problem of the disposal of that area into undesirable prominence.

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3. *Styria and the Klagenfurt Question.* In dealing with the Armistices it has already been mentioned ¹ that no provision was made in the Armistice of the 3rd November for an occupation line to be held by Allied troops in Carinthia and Styria. In Styria there was some fighting, but eventually Yugo-slavs and Austrians accepted a line delimited by command of General Franchet d'Esperey. This corresponded roughly to the ethnic line and to the permanent frontier as settled at the Conference. No such solution was arrived at in the case of Carinthia.

The Klagenfurt area is bounded on the south by the Karavanken mountains and forms the basin of the Drave. The inhabitants, who number about 150,000, are predominantly Slovene in race, but the town of Klagenfurt itself, which is the most important in Carinthia, contains 28,958 inhabitants, of whom 25,582 are German (Census of 1910). To the north of the Basin runs the important Villach-Feldkirch-St. Veit railway line to Vienna. The towns of Villach and of Assling are adjacent to, but not actually part, of the Klagenfurt area. The town of Klagenfurt is important as a centre for agricultural supplies, also the basin contains a lead-mine at Bleiburg and a rifle-factory at Ferlach.² One important fact should be noted. An American Mission under Colonel Miles had visited this area in January 1919 in the hope of restoring peace and had taken great trouble to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants as to their future status. It was stated in the press by Slavs who had accompanied the Mission (and the statement was not in substance denied) that Colonel Miles had reported that, though the majority of the inhabitants of the basin were Slovene in race, there would not be a majority in favour of union with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. The newspaper discussion on this report increased the bitterness. All the elements of a burning question were there already; the unrest produced by an undecided demarcation line and racial hatreds fanned to flame by a state of actual and continuous warfare.

4. *The 'Four' intervene, 31st May 1919.* In the Klagenfurt area the fortunes of war continually fluctuated and Austrians and Yugo-slavs contended with one another as chance or

¹ v. Chap. II, Part I.

² The latter was important for the Yugo-slavs if they got it but of no value to the Austrians, as Art. 182 of the Austrian Treaty lays down that all munitions, etc., shall be produced in a single factory.

opportunity dictated. Neither of them at first paid the slightest attention to the Conference and there was indeed no reason why they should, for no one knew what was the line which they were justified in holding. The Yugo-slavs naturally contended that they were justified in adopting as their temporary line the actual ethnic frontier, the Austrians that the true line was that which had existed at the moment the Armistice was signed. There was no way of settling the difficulty until this sporadic fighting became of sufficient importance to produce the intervention of the Conference. At the end of April the situation became really serious and the Yugo-slavs, who had previously been chiefly south of the Karavanken, began to cross them and threaten the Klagenfurt Basin. After several reverses the Yugo-slav irregulars were strengthened by some Serb troops and this fact introduced a new and important feature. The prowess of the Serb troops was such as to change the situation completely. By the third week of May two-thirds of the Basin was over-run and the important town of Klagenfurt itself captured with immense quantities of Austrian war material. This fact brought the Conference on the scene, for the Austrian war material belonged to the Allies and the intervention of Serb troops meant that the Government at Belgrade was now supporting the irregular Slovene levies. On the 31st May the 'Four' despatched a telegram to both Austrian and Yugo-slav Governments ordering both sides to cease hostilities and to evacuate the Basin with their armed forces. On the 2nd June negotiations for a suspension of hostilities began between the two parties and on the 6th an Armistice was signed, but on the 8th it was disavowed by the Austrians. On the 13th Italian troops occupied the Villach-Feldkirch-St. Veit railway just north of the Basin in virtue of a clause in the Armistice permitting them to safeguard the routes to Vienna. This action naturally produced some effect on the combatants. The Yugo-slavs fell back from the northern side of the Basin, but retained the town of Klagenfurt and about two-thirds of the whole Basin.

5. *Decision to hold a Plebiscite, 23rd June 1919.* Towards the end of June a solution was arrived at, which was communicated to both belligerents and embodied in the draft Treaty delivered to Austria on the 20th July and in the Treaty as signed on the 10th September. It was decided to divide the Basin into two zones, A and B, for the purpose

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of holding a plebiscite to decide their ultimate fate. Zone A, the southern and largest part, was predominantly Slovene in race, and contained about 78,000 inhabitants; Zone B, which included the town of Klagenfurt itself, was predominantly German, and contained about 54,000 souls.

Before giving the details and results of this plebiscite it may be well to quote the arguments by which Austria opposed and the Powers justified the general territorial settlement as to Styria and Carinthia. This will serve to explain why a plebiscite was granted in the one case and refused in the other.

6. *Correspondence of Austria with the Powers on the Boundaries of Carinthia and Styria*

(a) *The Austrian Position.* The Austrian Delegation stated that they welcomed the news that a plebiscite had been granted to determine the future character of the Klagenfurt basin. 'So much the greater was the consternation of the people of Central Styria, where circumstances are exactly analogous to those in Carinthia, that the Peace Conference has opposed a formal refusal to the fervent desire of this oppressed people to recover its liberty.' Just as the Klagenfurt basin formed one unity so did the basin of Marburg (Maribor). In both cases 'economic life would be disorganized' by an arbitrarily traced frontier'. The railway triangle of Bruck-Villach-Marburg was essential to Austrian economic life. Marburg especially depended on connexion with Graz and Vienna, and the basin of the Mur was in a similar position. The railway line from Mureck to Radkersburg was, in any case, essential to Austria and the basin of the Mur should not be divided. Petitions to that effect had been signed in all the communes affected. The hydraulic energy of the Drave was also a source of wealth for all Styria. Accordingly, a plebiscite for all disputed districts in Central Styria was demanded. Certain suggestions were then laid down for a plebiscite.

(b) *The Powers' Position. Reply of the 2nd September 1919.* 'The policy of assimilation pursued by the imperial and royal administration in respect to the Slovene race, has been one of the

¹ For purposes of plebiscite the Klagenfurt basin was divided into two zones, the Yugo-slavs having the administration of zone A until the plebiscite was taken. The Austrian Delegation seem here to assume that the plebiscite would go against them, which it did not do.

chief reasons preventing the formation of its moral unity under the old monarchy. Bent beneath the pressure of officials foreign to their race, deprived of schools teaching their language, discouraged by the immigration of state officials and workers, the Slovenes have yet preserved their national aspirations intact. The Allied and Associated Powers have recognized the right of these Slav populations to share the destinies of a Slav State.'

This principle has different applications in (i) Styria, (ii) Carinthia.

(i) *Styria*. 'The Marburg basin in its geographic, ethnic and economic unity should be attached to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom.' It communicates easily with the south and the Drave valley. 'They (the Allied and Associated Powers) recognize that certain towns, notably Marburg, are German in character. But they state that the Slovene element clearly dominates in the rural population, where the action of the authorities only succeeds with difficulty in creating factitious majorities.'

The Powers . . . 'have yet taken into account the Austrian protest regarding the town of Radkersburg, whose geographic and economic conditions seem to give it an orientation in the direction of Austria rather than of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State'.

'They are convinced that their solution, thus amended, answers at once to the sentiment and interests of the majority of the population.'

(ii) *Carinthia*. The Powers 'admit the geographic unity of the Klagenfurt basin. They find a very definite ethnic line of demarcation, but state that the economic orientation of this region appears to be towards the frontier. They have wished to give the population every opportunity to confront their national aspirations with their economic interests, and decide whether they wish or not to maintain their regional unity.' For plebiscite purposes they have arranged two zones divided by an ethnic line. The Austrian protest about the waterworks of Klagenfurt being cut off from the town was admitted. A new article (310) was inserted to secure this water supply.

B. THE HOLDING OF THE PLEBISCITE

7. *Arrangements under the Treaty*

Article 50 of the Austrian Treaty signed on the 10th September 1919 laid it down that the Klagenfurt Area should be placed under the control of a Commission entrusted with the duty of preparing a plebiscite in that Area and assuring the impartial administration thereof. The Treaty also stipulated that in the first zone (A), which was to be administered in accordance with the general legislation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and by its officials, the plebiscite was to be held within three months from the coming into force of the Treaty, on a day to be fixed by the Commission, and that, if the vote in that zone was in favour of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, a plebiscite was to be held in the second zone within three weeks of the proclamation of the result of the plebiscite in the first zone, on a date to be fixed by the Commission. If, however, the vote in the first zone resulted in favour of Austria, no plebiscite was to be held in the second zone, which was to be administered in accordance with the general regulations of the Austrian legislation and by Austrian officials, and the whole of the plebiscite area was to remain definitively under Austrian sovereignty.

8. *Organization: (a) The Plebiscite Commission*

The Treaty of St. Germain was finally ratified on the 16th July 1920, and in accordance with the terms of the Treaty the Commission immediately proceeded to Klagenfurt, where it established its headquarters and was formally constituted at a meeting held on Wednesday, 21st July 1920, under the Presidency of the British Commissioner and at which the French and Italian Commissioners were present, together with the Austrian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegates, as laid down in the Treaty.¹ The Commission was charged 'with the duty of arranging for the vote, of taking such measures as it might deem necessary to ensure its freedom, fairness, and secrecy;' and steps were immediately taken by the Commission to set in

¹ The Commission was composed as follows: President Lieut.-Col. S. C. Peck, D.S.O. (British Empire), Dr. Cvijić who was succeeded by Jovan Jovanović (Serb-Croat-Slovene (S.C.S.) State), Count Charles de Chambrun (France), Prince Livio Borghese (Italy), Capt. A. Peter-Pirkham (Austria).

motion the proposals put forward for the organization of the plebiscite area. The underlying idea of the scheme adopted was that the detailed organization of the plebiscite should as far as possible be carried out by the inhabitants themselves under the supervision of the Commission, and the following machinery was accordingly set up :

- (a) An Inter-Allied Secretariat.
- (b) An Advisory Administrative Council.
- (c) District Councils.
- (d) Commune Councils.

The Inter-Allied Secretariat consisted of a Secretary-General (British) and three Secretaries, one British, one French, and one Italian, and to it were assigned the duties of compiling the minutes of the meetings of the Commission and conducting the business of the Inter-Allied Section.

The Advisory Administrative Council consisted of three members, one British (Chairman), one French, and one Italian, to whom were entrusted the duties of supervising and reporting to the Commission on the administration and government of the two zones of the area, and in particular of ensuring that no public official or employee used his position or office to influence the voting in any way whatsoever.

(b) Organization of the plebiscite area, voting qualifications

The plebiscite area was for the purposes of the Commission divided into six districts in each of which were placed District Councils consisting of District Commissioners (Inter-Allied military officers), one nominated by each of the British, French, and Italian Commissioners. These District Councils acted as corporate bodies, the Chairmen (representing in equal proportion the three nationalities) signing and forwarding their reports to the Commission on behalf of their colleagues. They were made responsible to the Plebiscite Commission for all the details of organization of the plebiscite within the confines of their districts. They were the channel by which the orders of the Plebiscite Commission were conveyed to the Commune Councils (see below) and were responsible for seeing that these orders were carried out. They were also charged with the supervision of the administration of their districts.

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The Commune Councils, of which in zone A of the plebiscite area there were in all fifty-one, consisted of six representatives, three being nominated by the Austrian Delegate on the Commission and three by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegate. These Councils were made responsible to the District Councils whose duty it was to keep in close touch with and supervise the work of the Commune Councils, to compile the register of voters in each district, and to preside at the polling centres on the day of the vote. The Chairmen and Secretaries of each Commune Council, who represented in each case the Austrian and Serb-Croat-Slovene parties or *vice versa* in equal proportions, were appointed by the District Councils, who were instructed that wherever possible members of Commune Councils should be local men belonging to the commune in which they served, and in most cases local men were obtained.

In addition to the above organization there was set up an Inter-Allied Tribunal consisting of one British (Chairman), one French, and one Italian Representative and two Assessors in a consultative capacity nominated by the Austrian and S.C.S. Delegates respectively. The duties of this Tribunal were to try offences against the authority of the Commission such as disobedience of their instructions and proclamations, wilful hindrance of officials carrying out duties in connexion with the plebiscite, impersonation at the polling booths, deliberate falsification of ballot papers, etc. A Boundary Committee composed of five officers, nominated by each member of the Commission respectively, was also set up in order to determine in detail on the spot the geographical boundaries of the area.

As soon as the District Councils had established the Commune Councils and put them in motion, the Commission issued detailed regulations designed to govern the preparation of the registers and the carrying out of the vote in all its stages. These regulations, which were printed in the German and Slovene languages, set forth in full the conditions governing the right to vote, the method of compiling the registers, the rules governing appeals and objections, the procedure on the day of voting, the form and use of the ballot papers, and finally the method to be employed in counting the votes. By the terms of the Treaty of St. Germain the right of voting in the plebiscite was enjoyed by every person of either sex :

- (i) Who on or before the 1st January 1919 had attained the age of 20 years, and
- (ii) Who had on the 1st January 1919 his or her habitual residence in the zone subjected to the plebiscite, and
- (iii) Who either (a) was born in the said zone or (b) though not born in the said zone had his or her habitual residence or enjoyed rights of citizenship (*pertinenza*) in the said zone from a date anterior to the 1st January 1912.

In order therefore to qualify for a vote every one had to satisfy the first two conditions, and one or other of the alternatives under the third condition. If a person satisfied the conditions in respect of age and of place of birth, it was necessary that he or she should also have had his or her habitual residence in the zone of plebiscite on the 1st January 1919. If a person qualified in respect of age but not of place of birth, then he or she must also have had his or her habitual residence or have enjoyed *pertinenza* in the zone of plebiscite on the 1st January 1919 and for a period of not less than seven years preceding that date; i.e. from a date anterior to the 1st January 1912. The word zone in sub-headings (b) and (c) of Clause 50 of the Treaty of St. Germain was interpreted by the Commission in its wide sense as meaning the whole zone of plebiscite. Also a person was said to have 'habitual residence' who on or before the 1st January 1919 had settled in the plebiscite area with the obvious intention or with intent appearing from circumstances, to take there his permanent residence. 'Habitual residence' for the purposes of the Commission's rules was not considered as being interrupted by absence if the circumstances showed the intent to retain the residence, nor owing to the liability to render military service or as a consequence of the war.¹

9. *Administrative acts of the Plebiscite Commission.* In addition to the actual organization of the vote the Commission carried out several administrative acts under the powers conferred on them. The chief of these was the removal of the Austrian and S.C.S. Police and Forest Guards from the Line of Demarcation between zones A and B, transit across which thus became unrestricted to persons and goods coming from both zones, and the issue of cards of identity to all residents in the Klagenfurt area. In accordance with the terms of the Treaty

¹ Imprisoned persons, but not certified lunatics, were allowed to vote. The former were very few in number.

the local troops in the area were replaced by a Police Force recruited on the spot and controlled by Inter-Allied officers appointed by the Commission.

10. *The Voting.* The voting took place on the 10th October 1920, passed off without incident, and the smooth working of the voting arrangements was greatly due to the harmonious collaboration of the Austrian and S.C.S. Representatives on the Commune Councils in carrying out the regulations of the Commission. Polling centres were established in every Commune of each District in zone A and in some cases there were two or more polling centres in one Commune, i. e. in Communes having more than 588 voters as each complete register contained 588 names and there was approximately a polling centre to each register. The total number of polling centres in the zone was 80, and at each of these polling centres the polling commenced at seven a.m. and finished at six p.m. 58 Inter-Allied Officers were lent by the Inter-Allied Commission of Control in Vienna and this reinforcement enabled one officer to be placed in charge of each polling centre, and allowed others to be stationed on all the important entrances to the zone of plebiscite to keep out persons who had not the right to vote. Practically all of these voters had registered their votes by midday.

On entering the polling centre of their Commune each voter was, after presenting his voting ticket and having his name and number as given on the ticket verified with the corresponding entry in the voting list, handed by the chairman of the Commune Council an envelope together with a green ballot paper bearing the name 'Austria' and a white ballot paper bearing the name 'Yugo-slavia' printed legibly thereon. He then proceeded into a small booth, of which there were several in each polling centre. There he tore into two pieces the ballot paper of the State for which he did not want to vote, and inserted both the torn and untorn ballot papers in the envelope, which was then closed and handed to the Chairman. He immediately placed it unopened in the ballot box in full view of all present. This method of voting, which was rendered necessary owing to the presence of a number of illiterates on the voting lists, completely assured secrecy and gave great confidence to the people, who fully realized that the conditions under which they voted ensured absolute secrecy. This was a large factor in the maintenance of peace and order, which was also contributed to

by the prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors on the day of the poll and previous days.

At the close of the poll the ballot boxes were sealed by the Commune Councils and together with the accompanying protocols were handed over to the District Council concerned. They conducted the scrutiny in the presence of the Austrian and S.C.S. Liaison Officers who had for the last six weeks or so of the plebiscite been attached, together with a German and a Slovene interpreter, to each district. Owing to the large percentage of voters the scrutiny in each district took a considerable time and it was not until the evening of Wednesday the 13th October that the Inter-Allied Advisory Council, which had been charged by the Commission with checking and compiling the figures submitted by the District Councils, presented to the Commission the final result. This was announced by the President at a meeting of the Commission held that same night.

11. *Result of Plebiscite.* The result of the plebiscite was that 22,025 votes were given to the Republic of Austria, and 15,279 to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, leaving a majority in favour of the Austrian Republic of 6,746 votes.

A remarkable factor of the plebiscite was the enormous percentage of the registered voters who throughout the whole zone recorded their votes. The total number of persons qualified to vote in zone A was 39,291, and the total number of votes cast (including invalid votes, of which there were altogether 332) was 37,636, making a percentage of 95.78 voters who went to the poll.

In view of the fact that the voting in zone A was in favour of Austria no plebiscite was, in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty of St. Germain, to be held in zone B of the area, and the whole of the area was therefore to remain definitively under Austrian Sovereignty.

12. *Conclusion of the work of the Plebiscite Commission.* Under the Treaty, however, the labours of the Commission were not concluded until the administration of the whole of the Klagenfurt Area by the Republic of Austria had been assured. Steps were accordingly taken immediately by the Commission to make the necessary provisions for the safeguarding as far as possible of the minority and for the handing over of the machinery of Government, such as civil and police administration, together with all the archives, public buildings, schools, and railway

buildings and stock, to officials of the Austrian Government. The work of the Commission in this direction was considerably delayed by the action of the S.C.S. Government in occupying zone A with their troops on the 14th October, i.e. four days after the plebiscite. The Commission immediately protested against this action and decided to take into their own hands the administration of zone A. The attitude of the Commission was supported by the Conference of Ambassadors, who presented a strong ultimatum to the S.C.S. Government demanding the withdrawal of the troops in 48 hours (20th Oct.). They were consequently withdrawn after an occupation of the zone lasting about a week. The withdrawal of the troops enabled the Commission to proceed with the work of handing over which had thus been interrupted, but it was not until the 18th November that the Commission felt that the work had been thoroughly completed and that they were in a position to entrust the whole zone to the care of the Republic of Austria. On that day the Commission published a final proclamation to the inhabitants of the area, informing them that their mission had terminated and that 'henceforth the administration of both zones of the plebiscite area devolved in full measure upon the lawfully constituted authorities of the Austrian Republic', and emphasizing the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain respecting the protection of minorities. On that day also the final meeting of the Commission was held at which the President, the French and Italian Commissioners, and the Austrian and S.C.S. Delegates signed a document delivering over from that day the administration of the whole Klagenfurt Area to the Government of the Republic of Austria.

13. *General Conclusion.* The result of the plebiscite caused some natural heart-burnings among the Slovenes, but there was general agreement on one point. The elections were conducted with absolute fairness and the number of recorded votes was so many and the majority so adequate, that the result was taken as final. Whatever conclusions may be held it cannot be denied that the vote represented faithfully the opinions of the inhabitants at the time of voting. The reasons for this are more difficult to explain. One thing alone is certain, the conclusion of Colonel Miles in his report was abundantly justified. The Yugo-slavs wanted an earlier date than 1912 for residence, contending that this would have considerably affected

the result. It is anyhow unquestionably true that in 1914 there were only two Slovene schools in the whole area so that administrative and educational tradition must have worked in favour of Germanization.¹ It is probable, however, that other causes were even more important, such as the economic situation of the Klagenfurt Basin and the question of military service. It is not, however, clear if the voters really voted for an undivided Carinthia or for reunion with Austria as a whole. If zone A had fallen to the S.C.S. State its peasant inhabitants felt that their only market and economic outlet would be cut off, in view of the fact that zone B (with the market centre of Klagenfurt) was extremely unlikely also to fall to that State. Perhaps, as a secondary consideration, they felt that they would be compelled to serve in the S.C.S. Army, whereas they knew that under the Republic of Austria such an obligation would not be required of them. It is perhaps impossible to probe the motives of the peasant and the decision must be left to time for approval. There is no doubt, however, that this plebiscite is remarkable, as being the only one up to now conducted successfully without the aid of Inter-Allied military forces. The moral authority of the Commission was sufficient to carry through the plebiscite with unparalleled smoothness, and for this result great credit is due to the President and the other members of the Commission.

¹ It should be recognized, however, that the voting by total numerical majority, and not by majority in each commune, favoured Yugo-slavia (cp. p. 359).

CHAPTER VI

THE PLEBISCITES

PART III

GERMAN WEST HUNGARY¹

1. *Introductory: General Arguments.* The problem of German West Hungary was, in some ways, unique. For it involved a territorial exchange at the expense of one enemy power and in favour of another. The first sketch of the new frontiers, as given on the 2nd June 1919, did not indicate that a portion of Hungary (German West Hungary) was to be transferred to Austria. This was not absolutely necessary at this stage, but it seems probable that two circumstances caused the question to be raised. These were the preparation of the Austrian Treaty itself and the events taking place in Hungary. The Austrian Delegation urged on the Allied Powers the danger from the economic ruin with which Austria was threatened and provided a reasonable means for averting that peril. Evidence was brought to show that German West Hungary was the 'kitchen garden of Vienna', that the Austrian capital had suffered from the lack of vegetables and the West Hungarian peasants from the loss of their markets. Béla Kun's régime in Hungary enforced the argument from another point of view, for the Peace Conference realized the danger incurred by Austria in relation to Hungary. The important town of Wiener-Neustadt was within a few kilometres of the existing Hungarian frontier, from which four easy roads led to Vienna. To push that frontier back for any average breadth twenty to thirty kilometres would afford protection to the Austrian capital and keep Bolshevism at a reasonable distance in both present and future. The economic and military arguments for the transfer of territory were therefore undoubtedly strong,

¹ The title 'West Hungary' is normally used, but 'German West Hungary' is technically more correct. See also Chap. II, Part II, and Vol. V for statistics.

and, if the ethnic arguments were no less so, the case seemed to be concluded.

In this, as in other, cases the ethnic facts do not seem to have been contested by either side. The district in question extends from the Danube to the Upper Valley of the River Raba and includes parts of the three Hungarian counties (*comitato*) of Vas, Sopron, and Moson. It is largely mountainous and contains about 330,000 souls. Of these 235,000 are Germans, 50,000 Croats and Wends, 25,000 Magyars, 20,000 Jews and small nationalities; i. e. 71 per cent. German and 29 per cent. all other nationalities whatsoever (Census 1910). There was no reason to suppose that the Croats or the Wends were more pro-Magyar than the Germans, so the Magyars seem to have no strong case on the grounds of race.

2. *The Hungarian Position.* (a) *Economic Arguments.* It is convenient to take the Hungarian statement of the case first, though their views were only fully given in their General Reply of the 12th February 1920 to the Allies, and in an official or semi-official pamphlet issued about the same time.¹ The question was hardly dealt with from the military point of view, but there were some interesting admissions on the economic side in the Appendix to the General Reply. They did not deny that the district in question contributed considerably to the vegetable supply of Vienna.² They admitted also that 'the milk supply of these countries does really, for the most part, come from these counties'. They stated, however, that this actual supply came from the more definitely Magyar districts, and that, in any case, this supply would now be diminished. The surplus of milk available for export had been due to capitalistic dairy-farming, which had now come to an end owing to the extensive agrarian reforms instituted in Hungary. They denied that any great part of the meat supply of Vienna came from German West Hungary. They stated, however, that the annexation of these districts by Vienna would adversely affect the industrial part of the population who depended on

¹ General Reply. Appendix XV with relevant annexes. v. also *East European Problems*, No. 6, '*West Hungary*', by Dr. Gustav Thirring, Director of Budapest Municipal Statistical Office, London, New York, and Budapest, 1920.

² They took the opportunity to suggest here that the new frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-slavia would interfere considerably with the vegetable supply of Budapest.

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Budapest. As, however, the industrials formed only 23 per cent. of the population affected, the argument could hardly be a powerful one.

(b) *Ethnic and Historical Arguments.* Dr. Thirring's pamphlet published a map and some detailed statistics, intended to show that 'in some places of the territory allocated to Austria the non-German inhabitants constitute considerable minorities, even majorities in several cases.¹ Thus the secession (*sic*) of this territory were (*sic*) in direct contradiction to the nationality principle on which Austria, supported by the Entente's decision, bases her claims. It is quite obvious that the annexation of such mixed language territories, which would subject great bulks of Hungarians and Croats to Austrian rule, were (*sic*) to give rise to nationality conditions quite unknown in present Hungary.' The figures already given show that West Hungary was a mixed population but overwhelmingly non-Magyar in race, and therefore the arguments just quoted have little basis in fact, especially as practically the whole population was admitted, even by the Magyars, to be 'German-speaking'. There was a good deal more substance in the more purely historical argument advanced by Dr. Thirring. He contended that the Germans of West Hungary had been there since the time of Charlemagne and 'differ from the Austrian Germans in descent, language, and manners, have never united with them in common cause and never desired to do so'. The Germans of West Hungary had in fact frequently fought as Hungarian frontier-guards against the Austrians and, though occasionally under Austrian control in the past, had always been administratively under the Kingdom of Hungary. He argued also that, in these areas, Magyars, Germans, and Croats had all lived together in contentment and 'in perfect harmony' side by side. 'These nationalities have never had any cause for discontentment (*sic*) and they have never betrayed any such sentiment; in all the liberty wars they have fought side by side with the Magyars for the Magyar fatherland, and their love and fidelity was as natural to them as to the most original Magyar.'

3. *Allied Decision to cede West Hungary to Austria without a Plebiscite, 20th July 1919.* Dr. Thirring's argument laid stress

¹ This seems rather misleading. In only one district is there a non-German majority—the ceded portion of the Kőszeg district, and in that district the Germans number 49 per cent.

on facts which were unduly neglected at the Peace Conference. No trouble was spared to ascertain, and it is improbable that the Conference in any way misunderstood, the facts relating to nationality, economics, hydraulics, or statistics in this case or in other similar ones. But the ascertaining of the true wishes of the people concerned was a much more difficult matter. If a German or a man of German speech, or a Croat or a man of Croat speech, was always anti-Magyar, the question was one of ascertainable fact. But it was much harder to obtain evidence as to whether the German, Slav, and Magyar of West Hungary did form a cultural and historic identity with the Magyars.¹ The actual wishes of the population were also exceedingly difficult to ascertain. Béla Kun's revolution rendered examination on the spot impracticable between March and the end of July 1919. His revolution also had the effect of confusing the minds and opinions of the inhabitants. Under these circumstances, a plebiscite would have been, in any case, impossible for many months. It was, of course, demanded by the Hungarian Delegation but it would have necessitated the presence of Entente troops in considerable numbers. In July it had not been found possible to send an army to expel Béla Kun from Budapest, and it was clearly impracticable at that date to promise to hold a plebiscite in an area still occupied by him. Accordingly, the Principal Allied Powers, in communicating their revised draft of Peace terms to Austria on the 20th July 1919, informed her that Western Hungary would be ceded to her without a plebiscite. It will be seen that this decision in fact preceded the statement of their case by the Hungarian Delegation, and was necessitated by the peculiar circumstances of Béla Kun's revolution and of the Austrian distress.²

4. *The Austrian Position, and the Position of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.* The actual motives of the decision of the 20th July 1919 with reference to West Hungary were

¹ The only firsthand evidence from examination on the spot after 3rd November 1918 came from the American Commission of Inquiry directed by Professor A. C. Coolidge from Vienna. See Vol. I, p. 289.

² No specific provisions as to the fate of West Hungary appear in either Austrian or Hungarian Treaties except that the frontier line between the two countries is defined to secure the cession of West Hungary to Austria. See Vol. V, Art. 27, Part II (Austria); Art. 27, Part II (Hungary). The powers of suggestion granted to the Boundary Commissions (see *infra*, pp. 422-3, and Art. 29 in both Treaties) might conceivably be important, as the non-German districts of West Hungary lie nearest to the new Hungarian frontier.

set out at some length in the correspondence between the Supreme Council and the Austrian Delegation and may be summarized as follows :

(a) *The Austrian Position, as stated in their Observations of the 6th August 1919.* The Austrian Delegation 'has to recognize with a sincere acknowledgment the decision taken by the Conference with respect to the German regions of Western Hungary. In extending the frontiers of the Young Austrian Republic to these districts, the Peace Conference has effectively contributed to make life possible for German Austria and thus to realize the principle of free self-determination (*droit des peuples de disposer librement de leur sort*). German Austria, however, desires scrupulously to put into execution the said principle, which has in addition been adopted as the basis of her national organization.' They desired, therefore, to have a plebiscite under the direction of one of the Allied Powers to ascertain explicitly the wishes of the inhabitants. 'Only this wish formally declared by the people itself could serve, in right and in fact, as a basis for the incorporation of Western Hungary in German Austrian territory.' They protested, however, against the separation of the Wieselburg district into two parts, 'of which that to the East is traversed by the Pressburg-Cserna railway and was not to form part of Austria'. This part was necessary from the point of view of the food supply of Austria, as this district supplied milk to hospitals and babies. A plebiscite was proposed for this area. Arrangements could be made to safeguard the railway for the Czecho-Slovaks.

(b) *Position of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers ; Reply of 2nd September 1919.* The Powers have 'thought it right to reattach to Austria the districts of Western Hungary which are inhabited by a German *bloc* and of which the agricultural products form an important element in the food supply of Vienna'.

'The boundary established and communicated to the Austrian Delegation on the 20th July is very close to the ethnographic frontier, notably in the region of St. Gothard.' In the case, however, of the environs of Pressburg (Bratislava) the Powers have been preoccupied with guaranteeing access to the sea to the Czecho-Slovak state. In consequence, they have desired that Pressburg¹, the great market of Moravia, should have its communications with the Adriatic assured along

¹ Bratislava.

Hungarian as well as along Austrian territory. They have therefore left the railway Cserna-Szentjanos-Hegyeshalem in Hungarian territory and considered it impossible to cut it by allowing the Austrian revindication of the district of Wieselburg.

Inside the frontier thus fixed, the ethnic character and national character of the populations too clearly show their reattachment to Austria for the Allied and Associated Powers to think it necessary to recur to a plebiscite or, in any case, to share in the organization and supervision of such a consultation if Austria were to proceed with it.

5. *Developments subsequent to the 20th July 1919.* The Allies had refused point-blank to negotiate or assist in a plebiscite, though Austria had strongly pressed for it. They sent inter-Allied officers into the territory in dispute, but they did not disturb the Hungarians in their actual occupation of the territory during the whole of the year 1920, when the question of the signature and ratification of the Hungarian Treaty was under discussion. At the beginning of 1920 the Hungarian Government addressed a note to the Austrian Government proposing that a plebiscite should be held to determine the fate of West Hungary in accordance with the previously expressed Austrian pledge on the subject, and offering certain commercial advantages as an inducement to Austria to consent. The matter came before the National Assembly of Austria and was fully discussed on the 19th February 1920. The Chancellor summed up the discussion by declining to discuss the question of legality as that had already been settled by the Peace Treaty and was not the concern of Hungary. The district of West Hungary would receive the status of an Austrian province (when occupied by Austria). It would receive a provincial legislature, which would be elected on a properly democratic basis. This would decide as to the possibility of a plebiscite, and arrange for its carrying out if it was decided to hold one. The Austrian Government's official Reply was presented to the Hungarian Minister at Vienna and published in the press on the 20th February 1920. It stated that German West Hungary 'already belongs *de iure* to Austria,¹ and consequently Austria cannot enter into negotiations regarding this country, nor renounce a part of its people for temporary economic concessions of questionable value. The Austrian Government, however, is ready to

¹ This is not quite correct. *v. note, p. 388.*

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negotiate with Hungary and all other neighbouring States on the question of Free Trade.'

The Austrian Government was, no doubt, within its rights in refusing to permit Hungarian interference in the question of a plebiscite. But its enthusiasm for that form of decision seemed to have waned from the date of the Reply of the 6th August 1919 to the Powers. The Austrian Government apparently was no longer 'scrupulously to put into execution the said principle' (of self-determination) 'which has in addition been adopted as the basis of her national organization'. On the contrary, it was to be left to the provincial assembly not only to decide upon but to execute the plebiscite, an undertaking which would obviously be difficult for such a body. It appears, therefore, that there has been a devolution of responsibility for the plebiscite. The Allied Powers threw it on Austria, and Austria has thrown it not on the people but on the legislature of West Hungary. If any plebiscite is ever to be taken it is reasonably certain that it will be unreasonably delayed. A communication of the Council of Ambassadors at Paris of the 23rd December 1920 (announced in the press of the 3rd January 1921) intimated to both governments that the Hungarians must evacuate the districts of West Hungary on the coming into force of the Treaty. The organization of a provincial government by Austria would take some time, and a plebiscite could hardly be held much before the end of 1921.¹ One conclusion seems certain. In view of the delay and difficulties a strong demand for a plebiscite would not be made unless there was a strong desire to return to the rule of the Hungarian Government. The motives of the peasant are likely to be mixed and incoherent—fear of a Red Terror from Vienna and of a White Terror from Budapest, fear of a lost market if he severs from Austria and of lost political customs if he severs from Hungary. Such difficulties make it doubtful whether the plebiscite will ever be held, and render it certain that prophecy as to its result will be impossible.

¹ The legal position would appear to be that the Treaty of St. Germain (with Austria) came into force on the 16th July 1920, and under Article 27 the territories in question were attributed to Austria without the intervention of Hungary, which was not a signatory. By the Treaty of Trianon (with Hungary), not yet in force, the Allies, without the intervention of Austria (which was not a signatory), decided to take these territories from Hungary (Articles 27 and 71). It is therefore the duty of Hungary to cede these territories, on the coming into force of her Treaty, to the Allied and Associated Powers, who will then hand them to Austria.

CHAPTER VII

THE MAKING OF THE TREATIES WITH AUSTRIA, BULGARIA, AND HUNGARY, AND THE PRIN- CIPLES UNDERLYING THEM ¹

I. THE AUSTRIAN TREATY

1. *Introductory.* The negotiations centring round the Austrian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian Treaties possess a certain unity, for in the main the treaties are similar in design and scope. The German Treaty was a bad model to imitate, as the drafters of the Austrian Treaty soon found, but when once the broad lines of the Austrian Treaty had been fixed, many of its clauses could be, and were, transferred wholesale to the Treaties with Hungary and with Bulgaria. Consequently, the negotiations connected with each possess an underlying unity of conception, and one may be seen to grow out of the other. The contrast of all with the German Treaty is striking. There the territorial clauses were capable of interpretation on the basis of the 'Fourteen Points'. In the Austrian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian Treaties the territorial arrangements are difficult to reconcile with any definite principle. On the other hand, in both the German and the other Treaties the Military, Naval, Air, the Economic, Financial and Reparation clauses are worked out on similar principles. But the Ports and Waterways Clauses in the German Treaty are wholly distinct from those in the others. Except for their territorial clauses the Austrian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian Treaties greatly resemble one another, and in so far as they do this, they differ from the German. The reason is a simple one. The war, or the rise of the new nations, had rendered these countries for the moment harmless. Their demobilization and disarmament were certain, and even Béla Kun's revolution in Budapest did not alter the main out-

¹ The full treatment of territorial clauses is given elsewhere in this volume, the Reparation, Economic and Financial clauses of these Treaties are specially considered in Vol. V, Chap. II, while International communications have already been discussed in Vol. II, Chap. I, Part V.

lines of the Allied policy. These three States were not to be feared in the condition to which the war had reduced them, and they were not hated by at least three of the Great Powers. The statesmen and the experts had a freer opportunity than they had as regards Germany, and were untrammelled by popular prejudice in England, France, and America. Had it not been for the obligations incurred by the Treaty of London with Italy, the Supreme Council would have had an unequalled chance of settling the numerous and complex questions entirely on the merits of each particular case.

2. *Decisions affecting the Austrian Treaty taken by the Supreme Council before the 2nd June 1919.* (a) *The Decisions as to the German Tyrol and Czecho-Slovakia, May, June.* In one sense, and from a territorial point of view the most important sense, the Austrian Treaty had already been settled before the Austrian Delegation arrived, and discussion of details had therefore become futile. The creation of the new States of Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-slavia, and the liberation of Italians who were Austrian subjects, had definitely settled at least that few Czechs, Yugo-slavs, or Italians would remain beneath the Austrian flag.¹ But the implications were wider than this, for under the Treaty of London Italy claimed a frontier as far as the Brenner, which included over 200,000 Germans. France and England considered themselves bound by this Treaty, though President Wilson had refused to recognize it. But before the Treaty was actually presented, to be exact on the 29th May, it was reported that President Wilson had given way on this point, and the Draft Treaty of the 2nd June showed that this report was true. It was obvious that no modification could be obtained here, for President Wilson would not have yielded if he thought it possible to induce the Allies to make concessions. As regards Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-slavia it had already been rumoured on the 10th May that the boundaries of these new States had been settled, and the Draft Treaty of the 2nd June showed that the historic frontiers of Bohemia and Moravia, with Slovakia, which included over three million

¹ The Poles and Czecho-Slovaks were recognized by being admitted to the Plenary Session of the Conference, 18th January 1919. On the question of recognition of Yugo-slavs there seems no doubt that the mere exchange of their credentials in connexion with the German Treaty was equivalent to recognition. This took place on 1st May, from which date this State existed though its boundaries were undefined.

Germans, were to be the frontiers of the new Slav State. As regards Yugo-slavia, the frontier was more uncertain, and some subsequent alterations in fact took place. But it was also known in this case that Austrian boundaries would not advance farther to the south than the Karavanken mountains, and the river Mur. Hence the essential fact was known that Austria was to be a small land-locked State of somewhat over six million inhabitants, and was to have nearly four million compatriots severed from her and placed under alien rule. Such grave decisions could hardly have been announced unless the Supreme Council was prepared to stand by them.

(b) *Decision as to the union of Austria to Germany, April.* A last, and in view of the future of Austria, an even more momentous decision had been reached. Austria was not to be permitted to join herself to Germany. According to M. Tardieu,¹ this decision was taken largely in deference to French views. Among the 'garanties essentielles jusqu'alors vainement réclamées' from the other Allied and Associated Powers,² which were obtained by M. Clemenceau in the second fortnight of April, he mentions that of the prohibition to Austria to unite herself to Germany. It was necessary to make this decision thus early because the German Treaty was approved in Plenary Session on the 6th May and presented on the 7th, and Article 80 of the German Treaty, as signed on the 28th June, ran as follows :

'Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the independence of Austria, within the frontiers which may be fixed in a Treaty between that State and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers ; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.'³

The question can apparently be raised in the Assembly of the League, but the Council has the right of decision. The motives for this decision have been usually considered to be the desire to safeguard the independence of Czecho-Slovakia in her early days, and the belief that a plebiscite in Austria would at that time have been influenced by desire for food and by other

¹ *L'Illustration*, 29th May, 1920, p. 325.

² The Italian Delegation was absent from Paris between the 24th April and 4th May.

³ For such purposes the Council must be unanimous. Therefore a single power, e.g. France or Italy, can forbid Austria joining Germany. v. Vol. I. p. 347, and *infra*, p. 477.

temporary considerations. The subsequent history of this Article 80 of the German Treaty, which ultimately was adopted in a slightly different form as Article 88 of the Austrian,¹ is detailed elsewhere, for it concerns Germany rather than Austria. In fact the most remarkable thing is the correctness of the Austrian attitude in the matter, in view of the attempt of the Germans to secure a revision of it. Their defeat at the hands of the Supreme Council is related elsewhere.²

To sum up then—on three points, probably the most disputable in the whole Austrian Treaty, the Supreme Council had already made up their minds before the Austrian Delegation had an opportunity of seeing the Draft Treaty, and all were presented at the Plenary Session of the Allies on the 29th May. On none of these points was any alteration obtained in the final treaty, so that the inclusion of German Tyrol south of the Brenner in Italy, of German Bohemia in Czecho-Slovakia, and the veto on the inclusion of German Austria in Germany, were the three irrevocable facts which confronted the Austrian Delegation of the 2nd June.

3. *Arrival of the Austrian Delegation ; the Klagenfurt crisis.* On the 2nd May 1919, the Government of the Austrian Republic was informed by a note from the French Mission that the Allied and Associated Powers had invited them to present themselves at St. Germain-en-Laye on the 12th May to examine the Conditions of Peace.³ On the 14th the Austrian Delegation arrived and took up their residence in the old palace once inhabited by James II of England. On the 19th their full powers were presented, and on the 22nd they were accepted, but with a very important qualification, which showed in what direction the

¹ ARTICLE 88. 'The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and until her admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another Power.'

This was not inserted until the final Draft of 10th September was delivered to the Austrians.

Mr. Bonar Law, in reply to Mr. Asquith in the British House of Commons (14th April 1920), explained 'participation in the affairs of another Power' as 'that is to say any agreement with any other party which compromises her independence. That is certainly what is intended.'

² Vol. I, p. 347 ; Vol. II, pp. 18-14 ; Vol. III, p. 154.

³ Hungary had also been invited but, as the Government had fallen, no answer was received.

peace proposals were leading. They presented their credentials in the name of 'German Austria'; but they received them back from the Allied and Associated Powers in the name of 'Austria'. The meaning of this change was presently to appear; it was that 'Austria' had not the right or the power to speak in the name of all the Germans of the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy. This verification of credentials had another important result, for it was on this date of the 22nd May that the new Government of Austria received a *de facto* recognition.

Hardly had this question of credentials been settled than one of those singular breaches of the peace arose which so often threatened the whole Conference. This was one of the most important, and exercised both 'the Five' and 'the Four' at a critical moment. On the 22nd and again on the 26th the Austrians complained that the Yugo-slavs had crossed the temporary demarcation line in Carinthia and were attacking them. On the 31st 'the Four' addressed a telegram to the heads of both the Yugo-slav and Austrian Governments, demanding an evacuation of the Klagenfurt basin by both sides, and the cession to the Allied and Associated Powers by 'Austria' of the control of that basin for six months. This step proved to be not the end, but the beginning of difficulties at Klagenfurt, which will be described elsewhere. It at least shows that the 'Four' lent prompt attention to the material difficulties experienced by the New Austria, and illustrates how the need of executive intervention complicated diplomatic arrangements.

4. *The Draft Treaty of the 2nd June.* On the 24th May the Austrian Delegation sent a rather pathetic note to the Supreme Council, complaining of the 'incertitude', and asking for immediate communication of the terms. Clemenceau replied on the 27th informing them that the terms would be communicated on the 30th, except that the clauses dealing with the future military establishment of Austria and with reparation would be reserved. On the 29th the communication of the terms was adjourned to the 2nd June, and on the 30th Chancellor Renner, in acknowledging this notification, asked for a personal interview to discuss the questions involved.¹ Clemenceau

¹ Cf. President Wilson to F. P. Walsh, 11th June, 1919. 'Of course, you should understand that no small nation of any kind has yet appeared before the Committee of Four, and there is an agreement among the Committee

replied on the 31st that, according to the rules imposed by the Conference for the conduct of negotiations, the exchange of views must be exclusively in writing, but that communications would be strictly confidential. The Draft Treaty was finally presented on the 2nd June. It was very defective in form, the Political Clauses (Part III) dealing with Italy and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State were reserved though the general outlines of all frontiers were given, and consequently of the territorial changes that were to take place. The military clauses, the reparation, and the financial clauses were also reserved. In some ways perhaps these reservations were an advantage, for they enabled the Austrians to concentrate at once on a relatively small number of points.

5. *The Austrian Protests.* The Austrian line was to accept the Wilsonian principles logically and whole-heartedly, to demand no sovereignty over any one in the area of Austria-Hungary who was not ethnically a German, and to demand allegiance from every one who was. On the 10th June they protested against the separation from Austria of 4 out of 10 million Austrian-Germans in Czecho-Slovakia and Tyrol, stating that what remained of German Austria could not live, and that the city of Vienna comprised 2 out of the 6 millions who could not exist without the possibilities of export. They protested particularly against the right of sequestering and liquidating the property of Austrian nationals which was to be given to the inhabitants of States newly formed out of the débris of Austria-Hungary, while compensation had to be made by the new Austria alone. They stated that Austria was no longer a great Power but a newly-born State, and that her annihilation might create a centre of social ferment and unrest, and that this disaster would involve their neighbours as well as themselves. The Austrian Government could not be responsible for the consequences of such terms of peace as these. They ended by asking for a commission of inquiry into their resources which should be controlled by the Allied and Associated Powers. In this brief survey they touched on some of the most vital points of the Treaty. A slight note of defiance was seen because, disregarding Clemenceau's suggestion that all communications

of Four that none can come unless unanimous consent is given by the whole Committee.' *Hearings, Committee Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 66th Congress, No. 106, p. 835.*

should be confidential, the Austrian answer of the 10th June was communicated to the Press and the public.¹ From this time forward a rain of notes and a storm of economic, geographic, statistical, legal, and historical dissertations deluged the Supreme Council. So enormous was their mass that it proved impossible to answer them in detail. In their Final Reply of the 2nd September, the Allies wisely stated that they had examined with care the whole mass of literature, though they added unkindly (and incorrectly) that they had found no new arguments in it.

6. *The Contest over the Preamble.* In point of fact the Austrian Delegation first raised on the 16th June a new and important question. The contention that the Austrian Republic was not the heir of the old Austria (i.e. the Cisleithan part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy) was fundamental, and it is of the greatest importance to understand its precise implications. They amount to this: the Austrian Republic was a State *de novo* and new-born. It first saw the light on the 12th November 1918, nearly ten days after the Armistice. Therefore it had never been at war with the Allies. It did not refuse to share the burden of the war expenses, but maintained that it could not be solely responsible for those of the old 'Austria', or of the whole Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.² Its share was to be determined in this way. Not only was the Kingdom of Hungary to bear its share proportionate to wealth and population; but the old 'Austria' was to be

¹ Subsequently they found it convenient occasionally to resume confidential communications.

² The whole vexed question of the position of Austria-Hungary is here raised. It is impossible fully to discuss it here, but it would appear that 'Austria' and 'Hungary' were separate States for internal purposes, united by a third element 'The Common Monarchy' or Austria-Hungary which was responsible for international relations. In strict law there was no 'Hungary', for the Hungarian word 'Magyarország' means the 'land of the Magyars' (v. Wickham Steed, *Hapsburg Monarchy* (4th edition, 1919), p. 29. note). In the same way the Austrian Delegation pointed out that the official title 'Austria' applied only to the sovereign house, 'domus Austriae', and that the Cisleithan part of the Common Monarchy had been officially entitled from 1867 to 1914 'The Kingdoms and countries represented in the Reichsrat'. Though neither term is therefore legally correct the expressions 'Austria' and 'Hungary' are convenient to describe the two halves of the Monarchy. The Austrian Delegation went on to say that there was legally no 'Austrian' army, only an 'Imperial and Royal' army of various nationalities, German, Magyar, Czech, Yugo-slav, etc. So far the Austrian Delegation were on sound ground, but there seems no legal warrant for their further assumption that old Austria was not really a single State.

considered as a series of different nationalities, German, Czech, Slovene, Poles, etc., each of which assumed a proportionate share of war responsibilities and war burdens. The contention was that the old 'Austria' had not really been a single State at all but a conglomeration of different nationalities.¹ It was pointed out that, since the universal suffrage law of 1907, the Germans had always been in a minority in the Austrian Reichsrat; and coalitions had had to be formed with one or other of the Slav nationalities. If this principle had been accepted, the Austrian Republic would have escaped more lightly from the burden of the war than any other of the nationalities, for as they pointed out, 'German Austria is the least important of all the new States'. In a letter of the 2nd July they developed this contention still further, stating that the war had been one of the dynasty, of the general staff, and of the militarists, of Magyars against Serbs, of Poles against Russians, of Croats and Slovenes against Italians, and of Catholic Croats against Orthodox Serbs. In fact, the only people in the old Austria-Hungary who had not agreed to the war were the German Austrians. Both 'as belligerent and as successor' German Austria was 'absolutely in the same position as its neighbours (Czechs, Poles, etc.), who had equally issued from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy'.

7. (a) *The Austrian Amendments to the Preamble.* The Austrian Amendments to the Preamble were finally formulated as follows: ²

Preamble in Draft Treaty 2nd June.

Austrian Counter-proposition, 10th July.

The Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers etc. 'on the one part and Austria on the other'.

'German Austria'

'Whereas the Allied and Associated Powers are equally desirous that the war in which certain among them were successively involved, directly or *indirectly, against Austria, and which* originated in the declaration of war against Serbia on July 28, 1914 by the former Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government . . . (which) has now ceased to exist and has been replaced in Austria by a republican government, . . . Whereas the Principal

'indirectly against German Austria and which, considering that the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has to-day ceased to exist and that in Austria its territories have been partitioned between the following states, i. e. Ger-

¹ See p. 395, note 2.

² Italics not in original.

*Preamble in Draft Treaty 2nd June.
Continued.*

Allied and Associated Powers have already recognized that the Czecho-Slovak State, in which are incorporated certain portions of the said monarchy, is a free independent and allied state and Whereas the said Powers have also recognized the union of certain portions of the said Monarchy with the territory of the Kingdom of Serbia as a free independent and allied state, under the name of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State ' etc.¹

' From the coming into force of the present Treaty *the state of war will terminate. Austria is recognized as a new and independent state under the name of the "Republic of Austria"*. From that moment, and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, official relations will exist between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Republic of Austria.'

Austrian Counter-proposition, 10th July. Contd.

man Austria, Italy, Poland, Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Czecho-Slovakia and the Ukraine,' Whereas, etc.

delete 'state of war will terminate'. The sentence should then run: 'From the coming into force of the present treaty German Austria, comprising those parts of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited by Germans, is recognized—as well as the other states arisen from the territories of this old Monarchy—as a new independent state: it will bear the name of the "Republic of German Austria"'. From that moment, etc.

These proposed amendments, though often good in law, were sometimes bad in sense. New Austria could not sign peace with the Allies and refuse to shoulder the burdens of the

¹ Note that Poland is not mentioned here as a 'free independent and allied state'. Art. 1, part iii, section vii, Political clauses of Austrian Draft Treaty of 2nd June ran, 'The High Contracting Parties hereby recognize and accept the frontiers of Poland, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and the Czecho-Slovak State as these frontiers are at present determined in the Annex hereto, or as they may be ultimately determined by the Allied and Associated Powers in treaties with the states concerned.' The argument seems to be that the Austrian Republic was concerned only with her new frontiers and not with any districts outside them, which were in future for the Allied and Associated Powers to dispose of and were no concern of Austria. By Art. 91 of the 10th September Austria expressly renounced 'all rights and title over the territories which previously belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy . . . situated outside the new frontiers of Austria'. (This was Art. 3, part iii, section vii, of 2nd June.) Poland is mentioned, however, in Arts. 195 and 208, and is one of the 'successor-states' in virtue of Galicia.

old Monarchy. For Germans and Hungarians in that Monarchy had been really enemies, while their Slav and Latin populations had been only technically enemies. These facts had to be fitted into diplomatic language. It was possible to recognize Czecho-Slovakia as an Allied State without a formal conclusion of peace; it was possible, as the Allies soon found, to recognize the new Austrian Republic, but it was impossible to exempt it from signing a formal Treaty of Peace. There does not therefore seem much justification for the Austrian Republic's protest against treating 'one state as a vanquished belligerent and the others as conquerors'. Moreover, if strict law was to be followed, it was absurd to contend that 'Austria' had not been one state before the war.

(b) *The Powers' Decisions.* None the less the Allied and Associated Powers, in drafting their original Preamble, had entered upon dangerous waters. They had made an error in the Preamble, for the Allies never went to war with 'Austria', but only with Austria-Hungary—or the Monarchy as a whole. But the difficulties of identifying Old Austria with the new Republic were still greater. If this was so the Austrian Republic could claim to speak for, say, the German population of Czecho-Slovakia, or for any Germans likely to be included within Yugo-slavia. A more serious danger lay behind this, for the Emperor Charles had never abdicated. He might therefore return as ruler of Austria, if New Austria was identical with Old Austria. He obviously could not return to a State created *de novo* without an amendment in the constitution whose basis and principle were republican. Hence the *de novo* policy was the only one which offered complete security to the Allies, but there were great difficulties in adopting it. Further complications lay in the international obligations of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In the draft of the 2nd June (Political clauses, § V, Art. 1, Belgium¹) 'Austria' was made to consent to the abrogation of the Belgian Treaties of the 19th April 1839 'so far as she is concerned'. How far was she concerned or was she concerned at all? There were other difficulties; in Art. 32 of the Economic clauses, Part X of the 2nd June Draft, 'Austria,' i. e. the Republic, was made responsible for damage or injury to Allied property 'in Austrian territory as it existed on July 28, 1914'. Both the clauses

¹ Art. 73 of 20th July; Art. 83 of 10th September.

above named appeared to support the view that 'Austria' was not a new State but the heir to the Old Monarchy. Some risk necessarily lay in this conception, but it had to be faced.

8. *Solution adopted in the Preamble to the Treaty of the 10th September 1919.* The solution eventually adopted was not consistently followed in the Draft of the 2nd June, or even in that of the 20th July, but it was clearly set forth in the Preamble signed on the 10th September.¹

'These Powers constituting, with the Principal Powers mentioned above, the Allied and Associated Powers,
of the one part ;
And AUSTRIA,
of the other part ;

Whereas on the request of the former Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government an Armistice was granted to Austria-Hungary on November 3, 1918, by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in order that a Treaty of Peace might be concluded, and

Whereas the Allied and Associated Powers are equally desirous that the war in which certain among them were successively involved, directly or indirectly, against Austria-Hungary, and which originated in the declaration of war against Serbia on July 28, 1914, by the former Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, and in the hostilities conducted by Germany in alliance with Austria-Hungary, should be replaced by a firm, just, and durable Peace, and

Whereas the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has now ceased to exist, and has been replaced in Austria by a republican government, and

Whereas the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have already recognized that the Czecho-Slovak State, in which are incorporated certain portions of the said Monarchy, is a free, independent and allied State, and

Whereas the said Powers have also recognized the union of certain portions of the said Monarchy with the territory of the Kingdom of Serbia as a free, independent and allied State, under the name of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and

Whereas it is necessary, while restoring peace, to regulate the situation which has arisen from the dissolution of the said Monarchy and the formation of the said States, and to establish the government of these countries on a firm foundation of justice and equity ; . . .

From the coming into force of the present Treaty the state of war will terminate.

¹ Italics not in original. It is convenient, though chronologically premature, to give the final wording of the Preamble here, because the conception embodying it was really adopted in the body of the Treaty as drafted on the 20th July. The alterations thus inserted in the Treaty were due largely to the 'Co-ordinating Committee', which had four meetings on the 19th and 20th August 1919, and several later ones. The personnel were M. Jules Cambon (France), Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley (Great Britain), Mr. Woolsey (U.S.A.), Count Vannutelli-Rey (Italy), M. Idachi (Japan).

From that moment, and subject to the provisions of the present Treaty, official relations will exist between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Republic of Austria.'

In the Preamble, as it appeared on the 10th September, the Allies abandoned the view that the Austrian Republic was a new State whose existence had yet to be recognized.¹ It was an old State, shorn of certain outlying provinces and endowed with a new government. *De facto* recognition of the new government presumably dated from the time when the Republic's credentials were accepted at the Peace Conference, i. e. from the 22nd May; *de iure* recognition dated from the signature of Peace (10th September).

The war of preambles was no more a dispute about minutiae than were the old religious controversies of the first four centuries. It dealt with apparently minute details in which error involved far-reaching results. No political community has ever presented more complex legal problems than Austria-Hungary, and even its death agonies caused infinite difficulties to lawyers and diplomats. To cut the Gordian knot and to call Austria a wholly new State made it difficult to establish her previous responsibility and obligations. The solution was to maintain the identity of the old State with the New Austria. The Powers replied (2nd September): 'Austria is one of the successor states of Austria-Hungary . . . Austria herself does not shrink from this heritage when it is a question of preserving the diplomatic and consular buildings in Siam (etc.) (Art. 111 of 10th September) . . . or reserving to herself the possibility of obtaining part of the indemnity fixed in the final Protocol signed at Peking 7 September 1901 (Art. 113 of 10th September). The Powers consider that Austria is bound by the treaties and contractual obligations of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. They have to demand of it its formal renunciation of rights, titles, and privileges belonging to that state', e. g. *re* Morocco (96), Egypt (103), China (113).² In the

¹ The Preamble of 10th September omits the words: 'Austria is recognized as a new and independent state under the name of the Republic of Austria', which were in the Drafts both of 2nd June and 20th July. This, however, does not appear to affect the question of recognition but only shows that a 'new' state was not recognized.

² *cp.* also Arts. 83, 84, 85 of 10th September, relating to guarantees of abrogation by 'Austria' of former Treaties or arrangements made by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy for Belgium, Luxemburg, and Schleswig, and substantially the same as in the original draft. In Art. 203 of 10th September

covering letter of the 2nd September the Powers stated that they considered that the responsibility for the war did not fall wholly on the dynasty. 'It is impossible to admit the defence of the Austrian Delegation that the Austrian people does not share the responsibility of the Government which provoked the war and that it should escape the duty of reparation to the full towards those upon whom, in conjunction with the Government it supported, it inflicted so grave an injury. The principles upon which the . . . Treaty is founded must remain. The people of Austria is, and will remain till the signature of the peace, an enemy people. Peace once signed Austria will become a state with which the Allied and Associated Powers can count upon being able to maintain friendly relations.'

The practical upshot of all this seems to be that Austrian-German and Hungarian peoples were charged with the guilt of the war and therefore with the war debt and the consequences of war. Thus, though Austria was recognized as one of the successor-states of the Habsburg Monarchy, she and Hungary incurred moral responsibility for its past sins and obligation. The exact nature of this responsibility was finally settled in the clauses of the Treaty. As regards the disposal of all Austro-Hungarian territory, it was clearly laid down that all rights over territory outside the new boundaries of Austria were surrendered by Austria and the disposal of these territories became a matter for settlement by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers only.¹

9. (a) *Concessions made by the Supreme Council before*

(Art. 199 of 20th July) it was laid down that the (new) Austrian Government 'shall be solely responsible for all the liabilities of the former Austrian Government incurred prior to July 28, 1914', etc.

In Art. 91 of 10th September (Art. 90 of 10th July) it was further provided that :

'Austria renounces so far as she is concerned in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights and title over the territories which previously belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and which, being situated outside the frontiers of Austria as described in Article 27, Part II (Frontiers of Austria), have not at present been assigned to any State.

'Austria undertakes to accept the settlement made by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in regard to these territories, particularly in so far as concerns the nationality of the inhabitants.'

These three passages sum up the new conception that was adopted, and, with some exceptions, eventually worked out throughout the Treaty.

¹ In practice Italians, Serbs, etc., occupied certain of these areas, but theoretically these belonged to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers until otherwise disposed of by them.

20th July. League of Nations, 4th July. The Draft Treaty of the 2nd June was confessedly incomplete, but several important modifications of it, as it stood, were foreshadowed by the Supreme Council at the beginning of July. On the 23rd June the Austrian Delegation demanded immediate admission to the League of Nations. Among other arguments they pointed out that, in case of dispute with say Czecho-Slovakia, the latter would send a delegate to the Council while the former could only send a written representation. They also stated that they required the protection of the League as, unlike Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-slavia, and Hungary, they had not had recourse to arms or prejudged the decisions of the Conference by creating accomplished facts. They stated, therefore, that they desired the protection of the League, and made certain suggestions by which it could be improved. The Powers replied on the 4th July, and took occasion to traverse some of the arguments of the Austrians. On the whole, however, the reply was favourable. They stated that 'It has never been their intention to exclude Austria for any long period from the League; on the contrary, they wish to reiterate that it is their hope and conviction that the League will at the earliest possible date include all nations that can be trusted to carry out the obligations accepted by members of the League. . . . As soon as they are assured that Austria possesses a responsible Government and that this Government has both the will and the power to fulfil its international obligations, they are prepared to support Austria's candidature for admission to the League.'¹ They concluded by promising to examine, and to submit to the Council of the League, the suggestions of Dr. Lammasch as to the establishment of an International Court of Justice, and as to a General International Convention for promoting equality of trade.

(b) *Allied Concessions on liquidation of Austrian property, 8th July.* A further communication from the Supreme Council of the 8th July dealt with a point of fundamental importance. The liquidation of Austrian property in the States issuing from the Old Dualist Monarchy, or in the States ceded out of the territories (*états cessionnaires de territoires*) of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. They considered that the Austrian

¹ Austria was actually admitted as a Member of the League in December 1920. No promise, etc., of admission had, however, been embodied in the Treaty, and this concession was not a change in the Treaty as such.

protest against the permission accorded in the Draft Treaty of the 2nd June to the new States to liquidate the property of Austrian nationals resident in their territory was not without value, and the article had accordingly been suppressed, and another substituted (Art. 261 of 20th July, ultimately Art. 267 of 10th September) and protecting Austrian nationals against liquidation in the sense of the wish expressed by their Delegation.¹

(c) *Allied Concessions as to Non-Reciprocity of commercial intercourse, 8th July.* Another important concession was made with reference to the Austrian protest about the non-reciprocity of the Articles 1-4 of Part X, Economic Clauses of the 2nd June. These were ultimately inserted unaltered as Arts. 217-20 of the 10th September Treaty,² but with some very important additions in Arts. 221 and 232. It was contended that the Austrian Delegation had misunderstood the effect of these provisions which were now qualified by Arts. 221-222 (10th September), and which permitted special customs relations between Austria, Hungary, and Czecho-Slovakia, which did not extend to other Powers. Reciprocity was, however, definitely refused for a fixed period, but that period was under certain circumstances reduced from five to three years by a provision which eventually reappeared as the first paragraph of Art. 232 of the 10th September :

'The obligations imposed on Austria by Chapter I above shall cease to have effect five years from the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, unless otherwise provided in the text, or unless the Council of the League of Nations shall, at least twelve months before the expiration of that period, decide that these obligations shall be maintained for a further period with or without amendment.'

To this was now added the qualifying phrase :³

'Nevertheless it is agreed that unless the League of Nations decides otherwise an Allied or Associated Power shall not after the expiration of three years from the coming into force of the present Treaty be entitled to require the fulfilment by Austria of the provisions of Articles 217, 218, 219 or 220 unless that Power accords correlative treatment to Austria.'

In other words, the New States could not claim the fulfilment of these stipulations after three years without granting reciprocal treatment.

¹ v. also Vol. V, Chap. I, Part I.

² Arts. 218-16 of 20th July.

³ This appears as Art. 232 of 10th September, except that the numbers of the other Articles referred to as 217-20 are numbers 218-16 in the draft Treaty of 20th July.

Three important concessions—in their way as important as the three irrevocable decisions—had already been made before the completed Treaty was delivered to the Austrians. The general meaning of these concessions was clear, and the importance of them was very great. Partly for the sake of universality, partly from mere imitation, the original Draft of the Austrian Treaty had been assimilated to the German. As examination and written discussion proceeded, it was found more and more difficult to work on this model, and in parts of the Treaty still open to discussion it was speedily abandoned. It would certainly have been simpler to remodel the Austrian Treaty, like the Austrian State, *de novo* from the beginning. But the Treaty makers were fast in the toils of consistency, and struggled in vain to escape from them. Each section did its work practically anew, but the plain guiding principle which should have formed the basis of the Treaty was never wholly adopted and there was resultant loss and confusion. That principle should have been to make the Austrian Treaty as unlike the German as possible, for it dealt with different problems, with the childhood or old age, not with the vigorous manhood, of States, with the reconstruction of whole communities, not with the lopping of provinces, with the disarmament of a State essentially helpless, not with that of one which was a potential menace to civilization; with indemnities to be placed on a State of six millions, not of seventy. As soon as these facts became clear, great alterations and great concessions were made. In particular, the hard position of Austria was recognized, and the New States were compelled to grant her considerable concessions. But the Austrian Treaty was never thoroughly and completely rewritten, and the shadow of the German falls darkly over many of its pages.

10. *Presentation of the Draft Treaty of the 20th July.* On the 20th July the Supreme Council transmitted to the Austrians a revised draft of the Treaty together with an intimation that their Delegation had ten days in which to formulate a reply. The new Draft consisted of 371 clauses and was a much more complete affair than that of the 2nd June. It contained, however, serious errors and omissions. The 'Preamble' remained unaltered and inaccurate, and some of the other anomalies remained in the Financial and Economic Clauses. A considerable territorial concession was announced, namely,

the proposed cession to Austria of German West Hungary, which was important on economic as well as on ethnic grounds.¹ The Reparation Clauses resembled the German in body but not in spirit, while the Military Clauses were definitely drafted on a basis different both in substance and form, in order to avoid comparison. The chief importance of the Draft Treaty of the 20th July is that it provided the text for the formal Observations of the Austrians and the final Allied Reply.

11. *The Discussion upon the Territorial Clauses.* (a) *The Austrian Protest, 6th August 1919.* The Austrians presented their Observations on the 6th August. Many of these were no longer applicable, for example the principle of early admission into the League of Nations had already been conceded, as well as the non-sequestration of Austrian private property in the New States. On the Political Clauses there was naturally much discussion, which will be found fully analysed elsewhere.² The Austrians protested against three million Germans being handed over to Czecho-Slovakia, over 200,000 to Italy, and many thousands to Yugo-slavia, as being contrary to all the principles of self-determination.

(b) *The Powers' Reply, 2nd September 1919.* The Allied and Associated Powers, in their Reply of the 2nd September, did not attempt to deny the ethnic facts but emphasized other considerations. Few concessions were made, but the German town of Radkersburg was returned to Austria. The Powers declined to permit the holding of plebiscites in other areas. A plebiscite had, however, already been granted in the Klagenfurt basin, and also in the case of Teschen,³ but it was refused in all other cases, even in German West Hungary, where the Austrians themselves demanded it. Czecho-Slovakia acquired three million Germans in virtue of historic rights; Italy over 200,000 because of treaty obligations and strategic claims. Some light is thrown on the general principles of the Treaty by the subsequent correspondence between some of the Principals. That ethnographic reasons cannot be the only ones to be taken into account is clearly shown by the inclusion of 3,000,000 Germans in Czecho-Slovakia, and the proposals

¹ v. also *supra*, pp. 383-4.

² For the frontier with Italy, v. pp. 280-9; with Czecho-Slovakia, v. pp. 267-70; with Hungary, v. pp. 382-8; with Yugo-slavia, v. pp. 210-11, 368-81.

³ The Galician part of Poland, though not figuring much in the Austrian Treaty, was part of Austria while the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy existed.

so actively supported by the United States Delegation for the inclusion within Poland of great Ruthenian majorities exceeding 3,500,000 in number hostile to Polish rule.¹ Though the British Representatives saw serious objections to this arrangement, the British Government have not thought themselves justified in reconsidering on that account their membership of the League of Nations.' (Mem. British and French Prime Ministers to President Wilson, 17th February 1920.)

To this the President replied on the 25th February 1920 :

'The President notes that the memorandum of the 17th February refers to the difficulty of reconciling ethnographic with other considerations in making territorial adjustments, and cites the inclusion of 3,000,000 Germans in Czecho-Slovakia and more than 3,000,000 Ruthenes in Poland as examples of necessary modifications of ethnographic frontiers. He feels compelled to observe that this is a line of reasoning which the Italian representatives have advanced during the course of negotiations, but which the British and French have hitherto found themselves unable to accept. There were cases where, for sufficient geographical and economic reasons, slight deflections of the ethnographical frontier were sanctioned by the Conference, and the American Government believes that, if Italy would consent to apply the same principles in Istria and Dalmatia, the Adriatic question would not exist.'

Orlando, in a published *communiqué* of the 24th April 1919, approved the statement that Italy had received the 'barrier of the Alps, which are her natural defences'. He also stated that 'among the various national reorganizations which the Peace Conference has already brought about or may bring about in the future, none of the reorganized people will count within its new frontiers a number of people of another race proportionately less than that which would be assigned to Italy. Why, therefore, is it especially the Italian aspirations that are to be suspected of imperialistic cupidity?'²

Of Yugo-slavia alone can it be said with certainty that the Austrian cessions, either of populations or territory, involved only 'slight deflections of the ethnographical frontier'. The question as to whether 'geographical and economic reasons' for the various decisions were 'sufficient' will long exercise historians. It seems necessary, however, to point out that, without some substantial proportion of Germans, the state of

¹ The Galician part of Poland, though not figuring much in the Austrian Treaty, was part of Austria while the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy existed.

² v. Vol. V, App. III, for texts of these documents.

Czecho-Slovakia could not have been formed. The number of Ruthenes, assigned for example to Czecho-Slovakia, raises further difficulties, but the Ruthenes seem to have been practically considered as almost falling in the same category as populations to be governed under mandates. The geographical and economic factors are examined elsewhere, but the ultimate judgment upon the Austrian (and indeed also upon the Hungarian) Treaty will probably be determined by the extent to which the erection of the new States justified interference with ethnic conditions. In certain cases natural boundaries or economic advantages had to be given in order to give to the new States the possibility of continued existence. But much of the Austrian territory was highly industrialized and the transfer or partition of areas of this type presented the Conference with new and unprecedented problems for solution.

12. *The Nationality and Minorities Clauses.* On the subject of the Nationality Clauses the Austrian Delegation protested vigorously, and pointed out serious inconsistencies. Thus under Article 37 an Austrian national, born in such territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as are transferred to Italy, and entitled to citizenship before the 24th May 1915 under the local administrative laws, acquired Italian nationality *ipso facto* and lost his Austrian nationality. On the other hand, under Article 57, if born in Trieste but 'habitually resident' in the territories assigned to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, he would lose Austrian nationality but *ipso facto* acquire Serb-Croat-Slovene nationality. Further, (acc. Art. 38) while an Italian¹ who was an Austrian national, could opt for Italy, an Austrian, in the newly acquired Italian territory, had not similar privileges. These and some other anomalies were probably due to an overworked Drafting Commission rather than to the Supreme Council.

In reply the Powers acknowledged most of these inconsistencies and redrafted the Nationality clauses, which they placed in a separate section in the Treaty of the 10th September (Part III, Sec. vi, Arts. 70-82; and also Sec. vii-viii, Arts. 84-94). These dealt with practically all the difficulties and ambiguities of which complaint had been made. The Austrians made no objection to the clauses for the protection of racial minorities. They claimed that the 'laws in force in the German Austrian

¹ Or Czecho-Slovak, or Yugo-slav or Ruman, as the case might be.

Republic are the most democratic in the world', but that, in so far as they did not already do so, new laws would be made to cover the clauses mentioned. The articles dealing with the protection of racial minorities by the League, as appearing in the first draft of the Austrian Treaty, were provisional, and ultimately had to be harmonized with the Polish Treaty (v. Vol. V, Chap. II). These were redrafted accordingly and appear as Articles 62 and 69 of the Treaty of the 10th September.¹

One important alteration in favour of Austria took place. In the original of Article 69 (Art. 87 of 20th July) the 'consent of the Council of the League of Nations was required for any modifications thereof'. But, unless 'otherwise expressly provided', the decisions of the Council must be *unanimous* (Art. 5 of Covenant in all Treaties). The revised article made this consent dependent only on the assent of 'a majority of the Council', and not upon a unanimous assent. At the same time the Allies took the opportunity to add an article (No. 88) which thus makes the independence of Austria inalienable, except with the *unanimous* consent of the Council. This was inserted in the Austrian Treaty because the Germans, as

¹ ART. 62: 'Austria undertakes that the stipulations contained in this Section shall be recognized as fundamental laws, and that no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.'

ART. 69: 'Austria agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing Articles of this Section, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The Allied and Associated Powers represented on the Council severally agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.'

'Austria agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.'

'Austria further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these Articles between the Austrian Government and any one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Austrian Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.'

related elsewhere,¹ had inserted in their new Constitution, signed on the 31st July 1919, an article providing for the admission of representatives from Austria to the Reichstag of Germany when that country should join the German Empire.²

13. *Military, Naval and Air Clauses, Sanctions and Penalties.* As regards the Military, Naval and Air Clauses, the Austrians argued that the abolition of compulsory military service would prevent Austria from raising any military forces at all and was opposed to democratic principles. A number of detailed exemptions from conditions were requested, chiefly with the view of slowing down the process of disbanding officers, demobilizing men, dismantling fortresses and munition factories.

As regards the Naval Clauses, they drew attention to the absurdity of any land-locked State being expected to deliver up any material, and they made an effort to secure concessions in the Air Clauses, for the commercial purpose of manufacturing and exporting aeroplanes during the six months after the Treaty had come into force. All these suggestions were declined, with one small exception,³ with the remark that the Powers 'could not forget that Austria had been the Ally of Germany'. Sanctions and penalties had formed the subject of a voluminous correspondence already. The Austrian arguments were now rejected with the final tart observation: 'To claim that the laws of the Austrian Republic are opposed to the bringing of Austrian nationals before a foreign tribunal is an argument which the Allied and Associated Powers cannot admit; in international law it belongs to the Powers, who are parties to a Treaty, to put into force the laws necessary for the application of that Treaty.' It may be noted here that no attempt had been made to accuse the Austrian Emperor of 'supreme moral offences', or to bring him before a tribunal.

¹ Italics not in original. Vol. I, p. 347.

² Strong objection was taken by the Austrian Delegation to the provisions of Part IV, Austrian interests outside Europe, Arts. 95-117. These rendered property of Austrian nationals in Morocco, Egypt, Siam, and China, liable to be dealt with according to sections iii and iv of Part X, Economic Clauses, i.e. to liquidation. The Powers in reply refused to grant any modification or to grant them equal treatment in Morocco, Egypt, Siam, and China, as this would put Austria, before she entered the League, in a position as favourable as a member of the League. (v. Vol. V, Chap. I, Part IV.)

³ Para. 4 of Chapter I, Military Clauses of the Armistice of 3rd November 1918, having become inoperative was omitted from Art. 157, which stipulates for the remaining in force of paras. 2 and 3 of Chapter I, Military Clauses, paras. 2, 3, 6 of Chapter I of Annexed Protocol (Military Clauses), v. this volume, Appendix I.

(14) *Reparation and Finance.* The Austrian Delegation protested against being made responsible as author of the war for the loss and damage inflicted by it. This argument and the Allied answer to it have already been dealt with in the discussion on the Preamble. Apart from this the chief argument was that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had been an economic as well as a political unit, and this was urged as a reason for a demand for the repeal of many of the more onerous clauses. A number of detailed protests followed as to the amount of river-craft, cattle, wood and iron to be surrendered. They protested in a manner not without interest against the surrender of objects of art, records, etc. They refused to admit 'the principle . . . that all objects, important from the point of view of art, archaeology, science or history, can be claimed by the country whose spirit and culture have created them', pointing out that such a principle would result in limiting such collections to purely national works. They also stated that Italy had already carried off some works of art to which the Treaty gave them no claim. 'If one wished to scatter to the winds works of art and science peace would begin with an act of destruction equal to the devastations of war.' It was a last plea for the Old Vienna as a centre of culture and a gracious citadel of art. The Allied Reply refused to alter the principle of Reparation. As regards the cession of river-craft, the article was altered (300) in favour of Austria. They declined to reduce the number of Austrian milch cows to be surrendered to various members of the Alliance on the ground of the scarcity of milk prevalent among them as well as among the Austrians.¹ As regards the question of objects of art, the Reparation Commission was given some discretion, and the Italian Government promised to restore any objects of art improperly taken by them after the Armistice of the 3rd November. The Financial Clauses provoked lengthy arguments on both sides as to Austrian financial responsibility of a type already familiar to students of the Preamble.

(15) *Ports, Waterways and Railways; Labour.* The discussion as to Debts, Property, etc., is dealt with elsewhere in this volume, but the question of International Communications demands some notice.² These provisions were so bound up with the German Treaty that they had to be dealt with in a previous

¹ v. also Vol. V, Chap. I, Part I, p. 7. They have not yet (March 1921) been surrendered.

² v. Vol. V, Chap. II, Part IV.

volume.¹ But they are of considerable interest because the Powers made far-reaching concessions to Austria in consequence of her representations. These had already been conceded from the point of view of general principle (v. § 9 (a), (b), and (c)). Some specific alterations in detail were now made, of which Article 304 enabled Austrian representatives to be present at the Conference for drawing up the permanent statute of the Danube.²

As regards Part XIII, Labour, the Austrian Delegation, like the German and Bulgarian, made this an occasion for vigorous propaganda and for suggesting detailed legislation in favour of Labour. The Powers replied shortly to the effect that there seemed to be no difference in principle but that detailed suggestions must await discussion before the League of Nations.

(16) *Signature of the Austrian Treaty of St. Germain, 10th September 1919; Exchange of Ratifications, 16th July 1920.* No resistance to the Final Reply had ever been contemplated by Austria or expected by the Supreme Council, and on the 10th September the Treaty was duly signed at St. Germain. Treaty ratifications, which were much delayed, were not exchanged until the 16th July 1920, from which time the Treaty came into force and the state of war ceased.

II. THE BULGARIAN TREATY

1. *Introductory.* There are few features of special interest attaching to the preliminaries preceding the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty. One curious circumstance is that, as the League of Nations formed part of this as of every other treaty, a number of nations, of which the chief was the United States, signed the Treaty though they had not been at war with Bulgaria. While the territorial clauses undoubtedly entailed severe losses on Bulgaria, the Reparation clauses were the most fair and practicable in any Treaty. The Bulgarian Delegation, when they arrived at the end of July, seem to have been surprised that no one offered to shake hands with them. In fact, the Bulgarian atrocities in occupied territory,³ and the manner in

¹ v. Vol. II, p. 95, et seq.

² v. also Vol. II, p. 102.

³ Terrible instances of this were given in the report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on enforcement of penalties. Apart from actual atrocities on men, women, and children they included the deliberate destruction, not only of rare manuscripts, but of common printed books, and attempts to denationalize the Serb inhabitants of occupied areas. The Report tabulated 32 different kinds of offences committed by the authorities

which she intervened in the war, had removed much of that warm sympathy which had been felt not only in England but elsewhere for her. The friends of Bulgaria in the Allied countries were, and always have been, very numerous and worked ardently in her favour, but they did not succeed in producing any very serious modifications in the Treaty. Perhaps one reason of this was that the Great Powers had spared Bulgaria an occupation of her territory by the soldiers of Greece, Rumania, or Serbia, whose helpless inhabitants she had so deeply wronged. Bulgaria was practically the only enemy power whose territory had not been occupied, invaded or devastated to any appreciable extent, and this circumstance led to some misapprehension on her side as to the reality of her defeat.

2. *Preliminary Communications, 2nd September 1919.* On the 2nd September Todoroff communicated with the Supreme Council to the effect that his Delegation had been at the Castle of Madrid for five weeks without receiving the terms. He proceeded to anticipate them by some preliminary observations on the supposed terms which he had derived from the Press. He denied the assumption that Bulgaria was the one 'guilty, imperialistic and aggressive' nation in the Balkans. He said that she was now helpless and assailed by enemies on all sides, and in the same position as Poland had been in the eighteenth century. He asserted that she had lost 400,000 of her soldiers during the wars from 1912 onwards. He protested vigorously against the proposed cessions to Serbia of the Bulgarian towns

or forces of the Central Empires and their Allies against the Laws and Customs of War and the Laws of Humanity. Of these three were monopolized by the Bulgars. These were, No. 4, *deliberate starvation of civilians*; No. 8, *internment of civilians under inhuman conditions*; No. 14, *confiscation of property*. Two other categories were shared by Bulgars and Turks only; these were, No. 2, *putting hostages to death*; No. 6, *abduction of girls and women for the purposes of enforced prostitution*. Two others were shared by Bulgars and Germans only; these were, No. 9, *forced labour of civilians*; No. 10, *usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation*. Excluding offences at sea, of which Bulgars could not well be guilty, the Report mentioned specific instances of 122 German offences, 76 Bulgarian, 38 Austrian, and 15 Turkish ones. Even this is misleading, as the Bulgarian offences were the most numerous in such cases as No. 3, *torture of civilians*, which gives 9 Bulgarian instances, 6 German, 1 Austrian, 1 Turkish, or No. 5, *Rape*, which gives 4 Bulgarian, 3 German, 1 Austrian, and 1 Turkish. The instances given are described as 'typical'. Also Bulgaria had waged war for less than three, and other enemy Powers for more than four, complete years. (*v. Hearings, Committee of Foreign Relations, U.S.A. Senate, 66th Congress, No. 106. Washington, 1919. Annex 1 to Report of Commission, pp. 835-59.*)

of Tsaribrod and Strumica and of Western Thrace to Greece. He demanded plebiscites for Thrace and Macedonia, on the basis of self-determination.

3. *The Bulgarian Observations on the Draft Treaty, 24th October 1919.* On the 7th October the Bulgarian Delegation asked for and received an extension of ten days in which to reply to the Draft Treaty (19th September). On the 24th October the Bulgarian formal Reply was received. The chief point which they stressed was that Bulgaria had had a change of heart and was regenerated and democratic, like France after her Revolution. On this, as well as on other grounds, she protested against her exclusion from the League of Nations. She made no objection in principle to the Minorities clauses, of which most were already in her constitution, but she wanted the other Balkan Powers as well as herself to sign the same treaty guaranteeing such rights. In her territorial claims she merely repeated the arguments already used in Todoroff's letter of the 2nd September. As regards the Military clauses she demanded a limited compulsory service, pointing out the difficulties of recruiting peasants for a voluntary long-service army. She demanded that the army and total numbers of armed men should be raised from 33,000 to 40,000.

As regards the Naval clauses, she demanded a limited torpedo flotilla for the Black Sea and armed motor-boats for the Danube. In the Sanctions and Penalties she objected to representatives of Serbia, Rumania, and Greece being on the mixed tribunals for trying war-criminals, on the principle apparently that these nations retained that Balkan savagery which the Bulgars had now abrogated. She also objected, on the principle of *non bis in idem*, to the Allies re-trying those war-criminals whom Bulgaria had already punished.¹

As regards Reparation, she put in lengthy pleas against the total amount of liability imposed and suggested some detailed changes. In the Ports and Waterways Section she pleaded for reciprocity and suggested an addition to Art. 234.

¹ v. Arts. 118-20. The Bulgarians expressed some apprehension as to the clauses relating to Prisoners of War. Before the ratification (9th August, 1920) the Yugo-slav Government repatriated 10,000 Bulgarian prisoners. The remaining 2,000 were retained by the Yugo-slavs (according to an official declaration of 20th October 1920) because Bulgaria had not handed over war-prisoners to be tried under Art. 119, but were repatriated before the end of the year. Greece and Rumania have now waived their rights to try war-criminals.

This provided that, if Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, or Yugoslavia improved a 'part of the river system which forms a frontier, these States shall enjoy on the opposite bank, and also on the part of the bed which is outside their territory, all necessary facilities for the survey, execution, and maintenance of such works'. Bulgaria wished to be entitled to similar benefits and privileges. (This request was ultimately refused on the ground that analogous treatment had been applied to Germany and Austria.¹) Of the Labour clauses Bulgaria heartily approved, but went even farther than the Allies and suggested some improvements.

4. *The Powers' Reply (3rd November)*. On the 3rd November the Allied and Associated Powers delivered their formal Reply. In their covering letter they refused to admit the plea that the Bulgarian people had not desired the war, or the suggestion that other neighbouring Balkan countries were responsible for it. 'The Allied and Associated Powers do not wish to follow Bulgaria in this discussion. The eloquence of the facts is enough for them.' . . . They 'cannot lose sight of the fact that, in ranging herself beside the Central Empires and in remaining until the moment at which their defeat seemed achieved, Bulgaria has broken the chief link between Russia and her Allies, opened to Germany the road to the East and thus rendered inevitable the prolongation of the war. She is then responsible for the terrible evils which have resulted from this.' The Powers concluded, however, by disclaiming 'the idea of vengeance' and by giving the Bulgars ten days in which to sign.

In their formal Reply the detailed concessions were as follows: As regards the League of Nations, a speedy entry was promised if the future attitude of Bulgaria was satisfactory (and was actually accorded in December 1919). On the question of frontiers the Allies declined to admit that the question of that part of the Dobrudja, ceded to Rumania by the Peace of Bucharest in 1913, was open to discussion. They claimed that the frontiers of Bulgaria had only been fixed after considering 'every element of the problem' and that they saw no reason for reconsideration. They, however, gave no detailed reply or argument on any of these grounds—ethnic, geographic, or economic. They added, however, that they had been

¹ v. for further treatment Vol. II, p. 103.

particularly attentive towards safeguarding the economic interests of Bulgaria by guaranteeing her access to the Aegean.¹

No modifications were granted in the Minorities clauses or in the Military or Air clauses, but, in the Naval clauses, two paragraphs were added to Article 83 to enable Bulgaria to maintain a small flotilla, not armed with torpedoes, on the Danube. No concessions were granted as regards Penalties and Sanctions. In Reparations a small concession only was given.² In the Financial clauses a few passages were redrafted, the only important change being in Article 141, where the Reparation Commission was instructed to take 'into account only such portion of the debt contracted after August 1, 1914, as was not employed by Bulgaria in preparing the war of aggression'. The only other modification of any importance is to be found in Article 197, dealing with 'Special Provisions relating to transferred Territory'.³

5. *Signature of the Bulgarian Treaty of Neuilly, 27th November 1919. Exchange of Ratifications, 9th August 1920.* On the 13th November Sarafoff informed the Council that the Delegation 'would sign but yields to force', and Stambuliisky on the 22nd wrote that he 'would sign even a bad peace' and had 'no illusions'.

No further resistance was experienced, and on the 27th November 1919 the Treaty with Bulgaria was signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine. Ratifications were exchanged on the 9th August 1920, from which time the Treaty came into force and the state of war ceased.

III. THE HUNGARIAN TREATY

1. *Delay in summoning the Hungarian Delegation; Decision as to Frontiers of the 13th June 1919.* It was intended to begin the Peace negotiations with Hungary at the same time as with Austria. The outbreak of Béla Kun's revolution rendered this impracticable, and the negotiations with his and subsequent governments came to nothing, as is related elsewhere. But the Béla Kun régime had not only very important

¹ This was to be by the railway which Venizelos promised to build from Kavalla to the Struma Valley.

² It forms the seventh paragraph of Art. 121.

³ The second, third, and fourth paragraphs of Art. 197 were altered in a sense more favourable to Bulgaria.

results upon the country but more particularly in regard to the Peace Treaty. For on the 13th June 1919, as is related elsewhere, the Supreme Council made a formal communication to Béla Kun of the new frontiers accorded to Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania and ordered him to withdraw his force behind them. These frontiers were permanent and definite and meant the severance from Hungary of Pressburg (Bratislava), the Grosse Schütt, Slovakia, Transylvania and a good part of the Hungarian Plain. The permanent frontiers of Yugo-slavia do not appear to have been communicated, but Yugo-slavia had already been recognized and the principle of the dismemberment of the Kingdom of Hungary had been laid down. Consequently on one of the most important and vital questions, the separation of vast tracts of territory from Hungary without plebiscite, a decision had already been taken before the Hungarians were able to discuss the terms. And this decision was in fact irrevocable, for the Great Powers could not reverse it without breaking faith with their smaller Allies.

2. *The Hungarians summoned to the Conference; Count Apponyi's Speech on receiving the Treaty, 16th January 1920.* On the 26th November a Coalition Ministry or Cabinet of Concentration was formed under and recognized by the Supreme Council which formally invited the new Government to send delegates to Neuilly to receive the Peace terms on the 1st December. Some difficulties arose, but finally Count Apponyi—an ex-minister and brilliant orator of pronounced Clerical and Magyar views—was appointed head of the Delegation which proceeded to Neuilly. On the 16th January 1920, in receiving the Treaty he made a speech, which proved second only in celebrity to that of Brockdorff-Rantzau in receiving the German Treaty. His chief point was that Hungary was in a unique position, as she lost two-thirds of her land, including three and a half million Magyars, and two-thirds of her total population as existing before the war. He denounced the refusal to hear Hungary at the Conference and the prohibition of all discussion as entirely contrary to all Wilsonian ideas. He stressed the inferiority of the culture of the races now occupying former Hungarian territory, and demanded a plebiscite in all ceded areas. He denounced in very strong terms the outrages wrought by the Rumanians in occupied territory. Finally, he turned to the Italian representatives present, addressed them

in their own tongue, and reminded them that good feeling and a desire for liberty and constitutional government were common to both Hungarians and Italians. It is a curious fact that a Hungarian Foreign Secretary has since pointed with pride to this occasion, as the first for four hundred years on which Hungarian delegates argued their case alone and independently before the representatives of foreign states.

3. *The Hungarian Reply, 10th February; contest over the Preamble.* An answer was required by the 10th February, but by that time only the General Reply was ready, and the detail of the counter-propositions was presented at a slightly later date. This fact made little difference, as much of the ground had been covered by notes preceding the actual delivery of the peace terms. The final objection in the General Reply may, in point of fact, be taken just as it dealt with the Preamble. This ran as follows in the Draft Treaty of the 16th January 1920 :

‘Whereas the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has now ceased to exist, *and has been replaced in Hungary by a republican government.*’

The Delegation wished to cut out the whole of the latter part of the sentence,¹ and simply to note that the Monarchy had ceased to exist. They contended that the ‘Republic of Hungary’ was a designation ‘to say the least premature. It is true that—in consequence of well-known events—the functions of the royal power have been suspended, but this material fact cannot change the legal fact of the ancient constitution of the country, which can only be modified by the will of the nation, expressed in its national assembly, elected by universal suffrage. As this act has not yet taken place, we beg you to use, according to established usage, the name of “Hungary”, and we beg the substitution of this name for that of “Hungarian Republic” in all the sections of the Treaty of Peace and in all the official documents’. This was not, as the Hungarian Delegation stated, ‘a question of form,’ but of material substance. Under this Preamble the Monarchy had permission to revive and to creep back under the shadow of a phrase. The position of the Allied and Associated Powers had already been defined as regards the Habsburgs, and they had publicly stated they would not permit their return, and this statement was again published on the 2nd February.

¹ That here given in italics.

But they had no wish to prevent the Hungarians from adopting a monarchical form of government if they themselves wished it. Accordingly, the new Preamble made use of the word 'Hungary' *solus* and inserted the following amendment :

'Whereas the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has now ceased to exist, and has been replaced in Hungary by a national Hungarian Government.'

No serious question arose in this case, as in that of Austria, as to whether the new Hungary was a state *de novo*. However its form of government might be changed, the state itself remained unchanged, except that it now undertook control of those international relations formerly discharged by the now defunct Common Monarchy. Hungary remained an historic state though shorn of nearly two-thirds of her old population.

4. *The Hungarian Demand for a Plebiscite.* The General Reply contained one passage of wide and almost universal condemnation. 'We consider and believe we have proved that there are in the very basis of the Treaty, as it has been proposed to us, such serious errors of fact that they must make for its total rejection.' The chief objection stated was the radical remodelling of a 'territory which had for ten centuries been a political unity because nature predestined it to be one, and the numerical diminution—equivalent to annihilation—of a nation whose cohesion has been strengthened . . . by these ten centuries. And this is to be done in the name of the nationality principle, whereas the new states which would be erected on the ruins of the Hungarian state would be, from the radical point of view, just as complex as the latter, while every other principle of organic unity would be wanting.' The frontiers were arbitrarily drawn, separating industrial from agricultural districts and 'aggravating thereby the conditions of productive labour'. The 'characteristic feature would be the transfer of the inevitable national hegemony to races of an inferior grade of civilization . . . which neither the peoples subjected to it, nor the conscience of humanity could accept without revolt'. This was not the only consideration. 'The territorial dismemberment of Hungary would be achieved without taking the slightest account of the will of the peoples concerned; they would be transferred from one state to another as cattle is driven from stable to stable.' . . . 'Only a plebiscite can establish in an incontrovertible manner the

will of the peoples concerned.' They then proceeded to quote, with some effect, the Allied Reply to Austria which rejected the German claim to historic Bohemia. 'They (the Allied Powers) thought it best to preserve as far as possible the historic boundaries of the Czech provinces belonging to the Kingdom of Bohemia. They thought it convenient that the German-speaking people living close to the boundaries should remain associated with the Czech people, to be their co-workers in the evolution of that national unity, of which history has made them partners.' On this the Hungarian Delegation commented: 'The statement is perfect . . . these words . . . apply with equal force to the case of territories inhabited by non-Magyars but belonging to Hungary for ten centuries.'

Hungary was prepared to offer 'her non-Magyar citizens a wide cultural and even territorial autonomy' and had 'prepared a special solution for Transylvania'. She therefore submitted proposals for a plebiscite to be managed by neutral commissions and a neutral military or police force, by which she meant one which was not Czech, Rumanian, or Serb. 'Without a plebiscite the transfer of the territories detached from Hungary would have no fundament, neither juridical nor moral; because these territories not being represented at the national assembly, this assembly has no right to dispose of them. Supposing therefore that the national assembly signs, through its plenipotentiary, and ratifies a treaty transferring these territories to a neighbouring state, such treaty would not be binding on the people living there, who would always have the right to consider themselves as being subjected to a rule of illegal violence.' The plebiscite, in short, was 'the chief and fundamental demand'.

5. *The Three Vital Questions.* The second part of the General Reply contained a sketch of the 'vital questions'. Besides the return of war-prisoners, which was, of course, a transitory measure, there were three main points.

(a) 'The case of 1,800,000 Magyars, who, though living on territories connected in unbroken geographic contiguity with the great Magyar mainland, are still to be torn from it and submitted to an abhorred foreign force.'¹ These were

¹ v. Statistical Tables, Vol. V. About 3,095,000 Magyars *in toto* were taken from Hungary, but of these only 1,800,000 lived in 'unbroken geographical contiguity' with her.

270,000 in the north-west, 410,000 in the north-east, 650,000 in the east, and 359,000 in the south. The contention was that the towns on these borders were 'almost exclusively Magyar or Magyar and German seats of Magyar learning and ancient culture'. These were wantonly to be submitted to the double torture of denationalization and cultural downfall. A plea was put in for the half million Szeklers, and it was proposed to connect 'their territory with the Magyar mainland, through a corridor of mixed population—with 200,000 Magyars—which lies between them. The great Magyar town of Kolozsvár (Cluj), former metropolis of Transylvania (68,108 souls, of which 83.4 per cent. Magyar), with its university and ancient Magyar cultural institutions, would thereby be saved.'

'These are the most glaring defects, the most irritating enactments, of the peace treaty as presented to us, from the standpoint of the nationality question. The plebiscite would certainly do away with them, but they ought to be cured anyhow and under any circumstances.'

(b) 'Next we have to consider the economic disorganization of Hungary in consequence of her planned dissection. . . . Should parts of the Hungarian territory be severed from it, in whatever way, the least that ought to be done to prevent serious trouble, is to maintain the economic (*sic*) union of these severed parts with Hungary for several years. Even this would be a palliative only, since neither the rivers would flow, nor the valleys open in a direction opposite to the present one after that epoch of transition. But still the blow would be softened and time would be given to each section of the disconnected whole to prepare for the struggle against the nature of things, which would henceforth be their daily bread.' Suggestions were then offered by which the economic distress of the country could be alleviated, Hungary 'having suffered three devastations within a short period, through war, Bolshevism and—in a great part of the country—Rumanian occupation'.

(c) As regards the protection of minorities, more solid guarantees were demanded, though the Hungarian Delegation stated that all such difficulties would disappear 'if we are given an opportunity to decide the fate of our country by means of a plebiscite'.

6. *The Powers' Reply, 6th May 1920, and the Covering*

Letter. Before the Allies replied, they considered a joint memorandum from Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-slavia, and Rumania, which doubtless had considerable influence on their answer. The chief point of this Memorandum, as reported in the Press, was to call the attention of the Powers to the fact that the Hungarian frontiers were definitely delimited on the 13th June 1919, and that any alteration of these would be regarded as a betrayal.

In their covering letter, the Allied and Associated Powers declared that 'they have been animated by the sole desire to take decisions conformable to justice and to the superior interest which they protect (*aux intérêts supérieurs dont elles ont la garde*). If the result of that study does not accord in essential traits with the counter-propositions formulated by the Hungarian Delegation, that is because it seemed impossible to the Powers to adopt the point of view of this Delegation.

The guilt of the war was definitely laid upon them. 'The Hungarian Government seems to forget the grave responsibilities weighing upon the Magyar state. . . . In the Dual Monarchy Budapest exercised an influence often the most predominant. Had Budapest resolutely opposed it they would never have dared, at Vienna, to launch the ultimatum which provoked the war.'¹ In addition, the Powers could not forget Hungarian action before the war, especially as regards the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bearing in mind the fact that some of the men now entrusted with the defence of her interests had then (1908-9) been in office, and 'inspired her imperialistic policy', 'how could they (the Powers) believe that the new Hungary has decided to break all the ties attaching her to a recent past?' The reference to Count Apponyi was obvious.

The Powers then proceeded to say that they had not replied to every point of the Hungarian Observations, but that it must be clearly understood that 'absence of response in no way means adhesion to a thesis sustained by you'. In particular, there was no detailed answer dealing with the question of frontiers or the demands for a plebiscite, on which Hungarian memoranda had been numerous. No modifications had been

¹ But see *Austrian Red Book*, Part I, pp. 21-34. According to this Tisza opposed the war, though Berchtold, a Magyar, supported it in the fateful council of the Common Ministers on the 7th July 1914. The Hungarian Parliament afterwards supported the war

admitted by the Powers 'because they are convinced that any modification of frontiers fixed by them would involve worse evils than those denounced by the Hungarian Delegation'.

7. *Concessions as regards Delimitation of Frontiers.* 'It is not, in fact, correct that the new states built on the ruins of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy contain as large a population of heterogeneous elements as the old Hungarian Kingdom.' Nor was it true that they included as many races. Ethnographic conditions in Central Europe made it impossible for political and racial frontiers to correspond. 'Consequently, and the Allied and Associated Powers did not resign themselves to it without regret, certain nuclei of Magyar population found themselves under the sovereignty of another state.' This, however, did not mean that old territorial arrangements should remain. 'Even a thousand-year-old state is not built for permanence (*n'est pas fondé à subsister*) when its history is that of a long oppression by a minority avaricious for rule of the races enclosed within its frontiers. Historic right does not avail against the will of peoples, and of this there can be no doubt.'

'As regards the question of plebiscites the Allied Powers considered them needless, when they perceived with certainty that this consultation, if surrounded with complete guarantees of sincerity, would not give results substantially different from those at which they had arrived after a minute study of the ethnographic conditions and national aspirations. The wish of the peoples was expressed in October and November 1918 when the Dual Monarchy disappeared under the blows inflicted by the Powers, and when long-oppressed populations welcomed their Rumanian, Yugo-slav, and Czecho-Slovak brethren. The tardy concessions to national autonomy made by the Hungarian Government do not, in any way, change the essential historical truth that, during long years, the whole efforts of Magyar policy have tended to stifle the voice of oppressed populations.'

The Powers, 'however, admit that, at certain special points, the frontier traced by them cannot precisely correspond to the ethnic or economic needs, and that an inquiry on the spot will perhaps show the need of altering the limit foreseen in the Treaty in a particular place'. This, however, would not be done before Peace was signed, but the Commissions of

Delimitation (appointed fifteen days after the coming into force of the Treaty) could report on anything they considered 'not corresponding to ethnic or economic necessities' (*qui ne correspondrait pas aux exigences ethniques ou économiques*) and present their conclusions to the League of Nations. The League could then offer its good offices to arrange a rectification amicably. 'In giving this power to the Commissions of Delimitation, the Allied and Associated Powers consider they take as much account as is necessary of the Observations presented by the Hungarian Delegation and fully safeguard the interest of the frontier populations.'¹ The interests of the islets of Magyar population were fully protected by the Minorities Treaties signed by Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-slavia, and Rumania.

The Allied and Associated Governments concluded by saying that the powers conferred on the Commissions of Delimitation and the retouching of various articles of the Treaty marked the extreme limits of concession. The Conditions of Peace as remitted now were definite. As such the Hungarian Delegation must give a declaration that they were prepared to sign within ten days from receipt of the Powers' Reply.

(8) *The Hungarian Reply, 12th February 1920, and the Powers' Answer of 6th May, considered in detail.* The Allies made no direct reply, except in their covering letter to the Hungarian Observations on the League and on Frontiers (Parts I and II). The Hungarians used the Political Clauses, Part III, particularly Minorities (Arts. 54-60) and Nationality

¹ ART. 29: 'Boundary Commissions, whose composition is or will be fixed in the present Treaty, or in any other Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the, or any, interested States, will have to trace these frontiers on the ground.

'They shall have the power, not only of fixing those portions which are defined as "a line to be fixed on the ground" but also, where a request to that effect is made by one of the States concerned, and the Commission is satisfied that it is desirable to do so, of revising portions defined by administrative boundaries; this shall not, however, apply in the case of international frontiers existing in August 1914, where the task of the Commission will confine itself to the re-establishment of signposts and boundary-marks. They shall endeavour in both cases to follow as nearly as possible the descriptions given in the Treaties, taking into account as far as possible administrative boundaries and local economic interests.'

'The decisions of the Commissions will be taken by a majority, and shall be binding on the parties concerned.

'The expenses of the Boundary Commissions will be borne in equal shares by the two States concerned.'

Art. 29 of the Austrian, Bulgarian, and Turkish Treaties is similar in tendency. But the Powers' letter gives Hungary also a possibility of appeal to the 'good offices' of the League.

(Arts. 61-66), to air two of their special grievances. One was a long catalogue of the crimes committed by the Rumanians in their occupation of Budapest, and other parts of Hungary, a catalogue which, in substance if not in detail, could not be refuted. The other was an elaborate argument to the effect that 'culture is superior to numbers', backed by elaborate statistics to prove that the Magyars were the most educated race in Hungary, and that their laws of nationality—as established in Hungary—afforded ample protection to the subject races. Both these latter arguments were extremely sophistical, because everybody knew, and many Magyar statesmen had reluctantly confessed, that the Nationalities Law had never been carried out. Hence the Law, as such, instead of being efficacious, had been the very reverse, and was in itself the strongest justification for depriving the Magyars of their subject nationalities. The argument of a 'lower culture' was also open to flaws, for the smaller percentage of Yugo-slav or Rumanian literates was due to the fact that the Magyars had starved the elementary schools, and suppressed the secondary ones, of every non-Magyar people in Hungary. The Magyars had, by permitting the ignorance of other nationalities, deliberately sanctioned and promoted it, and they now appealed to that ignorance as justification for their continued domination. Such pretensions could not impose on the Powers, even if the claim to 'superior culture' was not absurd on every comprehensible theory of self-determination. The Powers advanced little argument, but the Hungarian Observations on Nationality and Minorities were not acceded to or even seriously discussed. With regard to certain modifications concerning Part IV, 'Hungarian Interests outside Europe', the Powers pointed out in reply that no modifications could be admitted, as these clauses were identical with those in the Austrian Treaty, which Italy had already ratified, and that in such respects Austrian and Hungarian interests had been identical before the war.

9. *Military, Naval, and Air Clauses and Sanctions.* As regards the Military, Naval, and Air Clauses the Hungarians made some singular demands. They desired to increase their military strength beyond the 35,000 effectives allowed them in Article 108. They desired to increase the number of forest guards to double that of 1913 (the number allowed in Article 107)¹

¹ Elsewhere they complained that their forest areas were decreased to

and the police to two and a half times that of 1913, to permit the exclusion of candidates for military academies from the total number of effectives, to alter the proportion of officers to be discharged every year, and to recognize universal and compulsory service. The inducement held out in each case was that the Hungarian Army could be used to suppress Bolshevism anywhere and everywhere, an inducement frequently repeated in various parts of the Reply and in various ways at subsequent dates. The Allies replied dryly that there was an evident contradiction between arguments for 'raising an army to 85,000 effectives and the impossibility alleged by Hungary of supporting the financial charges inherent in a voluntary army of 35,000 men'. Practically all modifications were refused but the Commission of Control was given a certain amount of discretion in matters of detail as regards military and naval matters. As regards Part VII, 'Penalties', the Hungarians complained that trial of war-criminals outside their own country was 'contrary to the general legal comprehension of the legalized world'. The Powers answered that 'Articles 157-160 cannot be suppressed, as the Hungarian Delegation demands, without imperilling the very idea of justice which serves as their foundation'.

10. *Reparation.* On Reparation the Hungarian Delegation demanded the suppression of paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of Annex I to Part VIII,¹ 'which defines the categories of damage for which compensation can be claimed from Hungary'. This was a crucial point, for it touched on the old and disputed question of pensions. The Reply of the Powers was interesting. 'It (the Hungarian Delegation) demands the suppression of these three paragraphs, of which the disposition, according to it, is contrary to the fundamental principles proclaimed by President Wilson.

'The terms of Annex I are identical with those which have been inserted in the Treaties of Versailles, of St. Germain, of Neuilly, and the Allied and Associated Powers cannot permit any modification in the actual text, as Hungary advances no special reason peculiar to herself.' Other provisions were

15 per cent. of the pre-war area, yet they desired forest guards for this limited area double the number of all forest guards in 1913!

¹ These are identical with those in Annex I to Part VIII of German Treaty. See Vol. III, pp. 218-19. Cf. also Vol. II, pp. 47, 75-7. Vol. V, Chap. I, Part I.

defended upon the same lines, though the question of legality and of conformity with the Wilsonian principles was carefully avoided by the Powers. On Part IX (Financial Clauses) a similar opinion was expressed by them. 'The Hungarian Delegation seems to forget that these burdens and these losses have been imposed by the aggression of Germany and her Allies ; and that the peace should be a peace of justice at the same time as it is a peace of regeneration. Consequently it is just that Hungary should give reparation (*répare*) according to the full measure of its resources. Its sufferings will result not from the conditions of the peace, but from the acts of those who have provoked and prolonged the war.' In order to be equitable also the Hungarian Government could not expect the States, arising from the débris of old Hungary, to pay the burden of the war-debt for which the old Hungarian Government was in fact responsible.

On the other hand, special provision for inquiry was made into the losses inflicted by Béla Kun and the Rumanian Occupation, for which the Reparation Commission could make allowance (Article 181).

11. *Economic Clauses. The Hungarian Demand for Free Trade.* As regards Part X (Economic Clauses), the provisions of Article 205 were explained as permitting Hungary to make preferential agreements with Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, in regard to which other Allied Powers claimed no reciprocal advantage. This met one Hungarian demand. The second was for the establishment, over a long period of years, of free exchange between Hungary and the transferred territories. The Powers pointed out that this would have the effect of erecting economic barriers between the transferred areas and the other parts of the States to which they belonged (e. g. between Croatia and Serbia). 'The Powers . . . cannot consider a proposition whose effect would be to neutralize, from the economic point of view, the liberation of the territories that they have snatched from the Hungarian yoke, and to prevent, from the same point of view, the fusion of these territories with the States which are restoring them.' They concluded with a suggestion that ancient commercial relations would re-establish themselves and that, if they did not, and if Hungary found her economic barriers incompatible with the régime of peace, the League of Nations could use its good offices to adjust matters.

A special addition was made to Article 207 with this object — 'to permit' special tariff arrangements with Czecho-Slovakia.

12. *Ports and Waterways.* The Hungarian Delegation had made a very strong point of their view that Hungary was an economic unit which could not be broken up without damage to all component parts. Nowhere did this conclusion apply with more force, so they contended, than in the case of hydraulic communications. As a result of these remonstrances the Allies inserted Article 293 of the revised Treaty of the 4th June, which established a permanent technical Hydraulic system, and a Commission 'composed of one representative of each of the States territorially concerned and a Chairman appointed by the Council of the League of Nations'. This was to maintain and improve the unity of the hydraulic régime. Its functions are more fully described elsewhere.¹ Another important article, the same both in Draft and Final Treaty, Number 294, gave 'free access to the Adriatic Sea . . . Hungary . . . with this object will enjoy freedom of transit over the territories and in the ports severed from the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy'. The rest of the Powers' reply consisted in explaining various misinterpretations of this Part XII, which the Hungarians were said to have made. For instance, the Allies were at pains to point out that they had not been guilty of 'absurdity' in Article 295, for it became operative only 'under similar conditions of transport'.

13. *Labour.* As regards Labour, the Hungarian Delegation alone of all the defeated nations expressed a wish to retard and not to advance the operation of the provisions laid down in this charter of international Labour. They stated that Hungary had a great excess of agricultural labour over industrial, and that, under such circumstances, it was difficult to have an eight-hour day or to equalize conditions and hours of labour. It was impossible, according to them, to enforce such conditions. The Powers replied shortly to the effect that the Labour section applied chiefly to industrial workers, but could and did apply in part to agricultural ones, and that no alterations could be made, as this would involve conflict with the German and Austrian Treaties.

14. *The Signature of the Hungarian Treaty of Trianon, 4th June 1920. Ratification by Hungarian Parliament, 13th*

¹ See Vol. II, pp. 103-4.

November 1920. The covering letter had given the Hungarians ten days in which to announce their intention of signing the Treaty. Apponyi, who had stated to the Supreme Council on the 16th January that the Treaty contained 'inacceptable conditions', resigned from the Delegation because the final Treaty contained no essential modifications. The two points on which he laid most stress were the refusal to modify the territorial frontiers or to hold plebiscites to decide the destinies of the ceded populations. M. Ivan de Praznovsky was named plenipotentiary in his stead, and on the 17th M. Semadan, as President of the Council, addressed a letter to the Supreme Council. He gave assurances that his envoys would sign the Treaty, but he laid special stress on two points in the promises of the Allies. The first was to entrust their Boundary Commissioners with a certain discretion, particularly as regards the Ruthenes, to whom autonomy was to be granted. The second was the holding out of the prospect of an early entry of Hungary into the League of Nations. On the 4th June the Treaty of Trianon was signed by two Hungarians, M. Gaston de Bénard, Minister of Labour, and M. Alfred Drasche-Lazar, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. At one stage Hungary, or at least Budapest, had been draped in black on account of the Treaty. The Hungarian Parliament, which had held an election in January 1920, consisted of politically inexperienced representatives, and was therefore an incalculable force. As the moment for ratification drew near, however, moderating influences were brought to bear. The Foreign Minister, Count Csáky, published a rather interesting article in the press, in which he claimed that Hungary had at last gained international status and must boldly face her difficulties. This impressive historic appeal was doubtless not without its weight. The conclusion of the 'Little Entente' on the 14th August 1920 showed that, at any rate, the adjacent Powers of Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-slavia, and perhaps Rumania had signed a defensive alliance to enforce the execution of the Treaty. The pressure of the Supreme Council also became evident, and on the 13th November the Hungarian Parliament ratified the Treaty, and on the 6th December had prepared their ratification for exchange.

IV. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE THREE TREATIES

1. *Self-determination and the Sanctity of Treaties.* The more detailed consideration of principles underlying the three Treaties has been already indicated in part, and is more fully discussed in the sections dealing with the various territorial adjustments and with the finance and economics of the Treaties. It is, however, apparent that there was a conflict of principles between the Allies, such as did not exist in the discussion of the German Treaty. The conflict in the German Treaty was between the self-determination of peoples and the military security of certain States. This was the basis of discussion on such points as the Rhine frontier, the Saar valley, and Upper Silesia. In all such cases some compromise was arrived at. In the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties the real conflict was between the self-determination of peoples and the sanctity of treaties. It was graphically pictured by President Wilson in the following words :

‘ When I gave utterance to those words (“ that all nations had a right to self-determination ”), I said them without the knowledge that nationalities existed, which are coming to us day after day. . . . You do not know and cannot appreciate the anxieties that I have experienced as the result of many millions of people having their hopes raised by what I have said. For instance, time after time I raise a question here in accordance with these principles and I am met with the statement that Great Britain or France or some of the other countries have entered into a solemn treaty obligation. I tell them, but it was not in accord with justice and humanity ; and then they tell me that the breaking of treaties is what has brought on the greater part of the wars that have been waged in the world.’ ¹

No other statesman has put the argument with such force and clearness, for it is obvious that the President is referring to the

¹ *Hearings, Committee of Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 66th Congress, No. 106, Washington, 1919, p. 838.* Wilson realized the difficulties of its application. Cf. C. T. Thompson, *Peace Conference Day by Day*, New York, 1920, p. 251. It is not always recognized how ‘ the principle of self-determination ’ is defined in Wilson’s speeches. v. Principle *Four* of Speech of 11th February 1918 (App., Vol. I, p. 439): ‘ That all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break up the peace of Europe, and consequently of the world.’ The limitations here implied on the application of the principle are considerable.

Treaty of London, signed by England, France, and Italy, which would have handed over some 700,000 Slavs to Italy, and which conflicted sharply with Point 9 of the 'Fourteen Points'. This runs as follows: 'A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.'

(a) *The Italian Position.* It seems to be evident that the Italian delegates at the Conference refused to admit the application of Point 9, at any rate after the 1st May 1919.

'In view of the frequently repeated argument that Italy's acceptance of Mr. Wilson's "Fourteen Points" as a basis for future peace invalidates the claims put forward by the Italian Delegation at Paris, I have thought it well to apply direct to the Italian Prime Minister for a definite statement on this point.

'Signor Orlando authorizes me to say that on two occasions during the discussions in Paris regarding the German request for an armistice and the application of the "Fourteen Points" he declared formally that he must make reservations as to Point 9, which has reference to the future frontiers of Italy. On both occasions it was replied that this was not the moment to discuss points not applicable to Germany and that Point 9 was therefore not in question.

'On the second occasion, Signor Orlando said that at the proper moment he would renew the exception he had already taken.'¹

The Italian position, therefore, seems to be quite clearly that the Treaty of London, being prior to Point 9 (of the 'Fourteen Points'), definitely anticipated it and rendered it ineffective. To a limited extent the British point of view coincided with this. Sir Edward Grey (Viscount Grey), who negotiated the Treaty of London, in speaking at the Institute of International Affairs on the 5th July 1920, insisted strongly on 'the sanctity of treaties', but at the same time declared that secret treaties were necessarily produced by war, and added, 'many things regarded as criminal are inevitable in time of war'. The assumption appears to be that such instruments bind their negotiators in ways that are undesirable, and prevent them from doing justice to ethnic claims. So far as national aspirations went, then, the Treaty of London, and the sanctity of treaties generally, in so far as they were concluded previously to the 'Fourteen Points', introduced a limiting factor. In the case of the Rumanian Secret Treaty, this did not arise, because Rumania had herself abrogated it by making peace with the enemy. Agreements with Russia about Constantinople

¹ *The Times'* special correspondent, Rome, 1st May 1919; published in *The Times*, 2nd May 1919. Cp. also pp. 278-80.

had also died a natural death. These were the only other secret treaties which seriously affected Austria, Hungary, or Bulgaria.

(b) *President Wilson's Position.* The attitude of President Wilson on this whole matter is of high interest. He has stated that 'the whole series of understandings (i. e. secret treaties) were disclosed to me for the first time' after he had arrived at Paris, when he saw them all.¹ He always refused to recognize the Treaty of London. Mr. Lansing has stated the American attitude as being to support those parts of the secret treaties which were 'reasonable and just', and to oppose those which were not. In practice, however, even President Wilson, though asserting that the wishes of the people were the prime consideration, admitted some modifications to the principle that people should not be transferred from sovereignty to sovereignty without being consulted. These modifications were necessitated by strategic security or 'by an earnest desire to meet Italian demands' as based on the Treaty of London.

'Italy claimed a frontier on the Brenner Pass, and the demand was granted in order to assure to Italy the greatest possible protection on her northern front, although it involved annexing to Italy a considerable region populated by alien inhabitants. Italy demanded further a strong geographic eastern frontier, and this likewise was granted in order to assure her abundant protection, although it involved incorporation within Italian boundaries of further territory populated by alien inhabitants. Italy demanded the redemption of her brothers under foreign sovereignty, and every effort was made to meet this wish even in certain cases where by so doing much greater numbers of foreign races were brought within Italian sovereignty. Italy demanded complete naval control of the Adriatic, and this was granted by according her the three keys of the Adriatic—Pola, Valona, and a central island base. When all this failed to satisfy Italian claims, there was added concession to concession at Sexten Valley, at Tarvis, at Albona, in the Lussin Islands, in the terms of the Fiume Free State and elsewhere. In our desire to deal generously, even more than generously, we yielded to Italy's demand for an Italian mandate over Albania, always hoping to meet from Italy's statesmen a generous response to our efforts at conciliation.'²

(c) *French and British Position.* It seems, however, that a species of agreement was arrived at between President

¹ Discussion between President Wilson and Senate Commission, 19th August 1919. See Vol. III, p. 71. This is borne out by C. T. Thompson, ap. 6th January 1919, *Peace Conference Day by Day*, pp. 76-9.

² Mr. Lansing to M. Tittoni, 12th November 1919, quoted in Franco-American-British Memorandum of 9th December 1919 (Cmd. 586, Parl. Pap. Misc., No. 2, 1920). v. Vol. V, App. III.

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Wilson's views and those of France and Great Britain in the 9th December 1919 Memorandum, when the three Powers addressed Italy as follows :

'To the considerations thus urged by Mr. Lansing (quoted above) the three representatives desire to add another argument. In doing so they trust the Italian Government will not credit them with any desire to give advice on questions of Italian high policy, on which the Italian Government will rightly claim to be the best judge. But an appeal to an historical argument may be permitted to the representatives of three countries to whom the liberation of Italian territories from foreign domination has been a matter of unwavering concern and sympathy through generations of noble and often terrible struggles. Modern Italy won the place in the hearts of all liberty-loving peoples, which she has never since lost, by the pure spirit of her patriotism which set before her people the generous aim of uniting under the Italian flag those extensive provinces formerly within the ancient Italian boundaries which were and have remained essentially Italian territories in virtue of their compact Italian population. The sympathies of the world have accompanied Italy's advance to the outer borders of *Italia irredenta* in pursuit of the sacred principle of the self-determination of the peoples. This principle is now invoked by other nations. Not invariably is it possible, owing to the complicated interaction of racial, geographical, economic, and strategical factors, to do complete justice to the ethnic principle. Small isolated communities surrounded and outnumbered by populations of different race cannot, in most cases, be attached to the territory of their own nation from which they are effectively separated, but the broad principle remains that it is neither just nor expedient to annex, as the spoils of war, territories inhabited by an alien race, anxious and able to maintain a separate national State.

'From this point of view the inclusion in Italy of purely Yugo-slav territories where neither security nor geographical nor economic considerations compel annexation, is not in itself a commendable policy. It would be bound to create within the Italian borders a compact body of irredentism exactly analogous in kind to that which justified the demand of *Italia irredenta* for union with the Italian State.'¹

Subsequently, however, when France and Great Britain advocated the 'January compromise' as regards Fiume, they came into conflict with the President. This was, however, on a different point. There appears to have been substantial agreement between the three Powers that ethnic and other considerations could and must modify, though they did not destroy, the obligations of a previous Treaty. Even Italy admitted this in principle, though differing much as to the degree of modification needed. When on the 6th January

¹ Franco-British-American Memorandum of 9th December 1919.

1920 she wrote a Note, 'Italy asked for the fulfilment of the Pact of London', she proceeded to make an offer which modified its operation considerably in practice.

2. *Wilsonian Principles not applicable to Pre-War Treaties.* Another point of great importance is that the President several times made clear that his principles applied only to the territory of the defeated Powers, and were not meant to 'inquire into ancient wrongs'.¹ This gave the Treaty of London a certain *locus standi*, but it was even more important as regards the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913. By that arrangement the Rumanians had acquired new territory in the Dobrudja which was predominantly Bulgar in race, and the Serbs had acquired Macedonia, where pro-Bulgar sentiments were strong. In 1915, under pressure from the Powers, Serbia had offered to cede Monastir and an adjoining strip of territory to Bulgaria. In 1919 Serbia and Rumania did not yield, or offer to yield, a single inch of the ground they had acquired in 1913. It will be seen, therefore, that the Wilsonian principles did not govern even the very recent past, however they might affect the present or the future.

3. *Conflict between Ethnic and Economic Principles; Plebiscites.* A further conflict arose between the French and British on the one side and President Wilson on the other. The nature of this is indicated by the following extract :

'The President notes that the memorandum of the 17th February refers to the difficulty of reconciling ethnographic with other considerations in making territorial adjustments, and cites the inclusion of 3,000,000 Germans in Czecho-Slovakia and more than 3,000,000 Ruthenes in Poland as examples of necessary modifications of ethnographic frontiers. He feels compelled to observe that this is a line of reasoning which the Italian representatives have advanced during the course of negotiations, but which the British and French have hitherto found themselves unable to accept. There were cases where, for sufficient geographical and economic reasons, slight deflections of the ethnographical frontier were sanctioned by the Conference, and the American Government believes that, if Italy would consent to apply the same principles in Istria and Dalmatia, the Adriatic question would not exist.'²

Here the difference is not between ethnic justice and the sanctity of treaties, but between conflicting claims of ethnography,

¹ *Hearings, Committee of Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 66th Congress, No. 106, Washington, 1919, p. 835.*

² President Wilson's Memorandum, 25th February 1920.

economics, and geography. As has already been demonstrated elsewhere, the 'Fourteen Points', etc., are themselves at variance on this point.¹ The claims of nationality, free communication, and economic necessity, must often conflict with one another, and did in these treaties, as at Marburg, at Fiume, and on parts of the new Magyar-Rumanian and Serbo-Bulgarian frontiers. It is this fact that partly accounts for the cession of more than three millions of Germans, and of the same number of Ruthenes and of Magyars respectively, to alien rulers without their choice being ascertained by plebiscite. An equally insoluble difficulty lay in the fact that the arrangement of plebiscites for over nine millions of persons would have necessitated the employment of Allied troops on an enormous scale, and was quite impracticable in the middle of 1919, when Béla Kun was abroad in the land. The only plebiscites, sanctioned by the Powers in the three treaties regulating Central Europe and the Balkans, were at Teschen and Klagenfurt, where the number of troops employed was insignificant. This practical fact dominated the situation, and is one which the historian of the future should not forget. If the German Treaty had not arranged for Allied troops to hold the plebiscites in Silesia, Schleswig, and East Prussia, the Hungarian one might have had them in the Alföld.

4. *Relations of the Principal Powers to the Smaller States in the three Treaties.* The three Treaties all contained clauses which aroused the wrath of the Smaller States, and provoked the resistance or discontent alike of Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugo-slavia. The most serious objection was that to the Minorities Treaties, which is fully described elsewhere. Here it is enough to say that the Smaller Powers regarded these provisions as an infringement of their national sovereignty, a point on which small States are naturally sensitive. Furthermore, Italy escaped any similar treaty obligation, though there were special reasons for this course.² A distinguished

¹ v. Vol. II, pp. 366-7, 381-4, 388-93. The President realized this himself at an early stage of the Conference. President Wilson 'said he acknowledged this [giving Danzig to Poland] was a violation of the principle of self-determination, but he pointed out that Germany and all concerned had agreed that Poland was to have an outlet to the sea, so that this was an issue between two conflicting principles'. March 19, 1919. C. T. Thompson, *Peace Conference Day by Day*, p. 251.

² *Supra*, Chap. V, Part I, § 3 b, and also Vol. V, Chap. II, Minorities Treaties.

Serbian authority described these clauses as 'a perpetual internal and external menace . . . created by certain groups accessible to influence by our enemies abroad'.¹ The same authority states that 'It is clearly stated (in the Treaty) that the big nations have big rights and the smaller nations have lesser rights'. . . . 'Through all the political clauses, like a red line, runs evidence of the difference in treatment accorded to the interests of Great and Small States.' The delimitation of frontiers was, according to him, on ethnological or historical grounds for the Smaller Powers, but on strategical for Italy. 'The Treaty was drawn up in English, French, and Italian, although by far the most interested parties concerned were Austria, Rumania, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.'² He proceeds to contend that Italy has priority over the Small Powers as regards reparation and in all economic matters. Italy had two clauses (Articles 37 and 45) for special protection of Italians in transferred territories, the Smaller Powers had only one such clause (Article 92) for their common 'benefit'.

It is certainly not easy to meet these contentions, and the list might even be lengthened. For instance, the settlement of the Danube appears to give the Great Powers an undue control over that river, though no single Great Power is now a riparian State. There are, however, certain other sides to the picture. In the first place, the Smaller Powers were in a sense the Powers 'with limited interests', and were necessarily compelled to conform more to a general scheme and principle than was the case with the Great Powers. Next they were certainly more irresponsible in their methods, and, as Mr. Lloyd George remarked in a memorable passage, Teschen was at one time nearly the cause of a conflict between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. Others have pointed to sharp differences between Yugo-slavia and Rumania, which were only settled by the intervention of the Great Powers, and to all appearance could only have been so settled. Moreover, in their attempt to liquidate all property of Austrian nationals and in their disapproval of the Reparation and Economic Clauses, the Smaller Powers showed little understanding of the appalling economic

¹ Jovan-Jovanović, 'Treaty with Austria', *Balkan Review*, November 1919, p. 250.

² *Ibid.*, 243, 249, 250.

situation of Austria, and still less understanding of how that chaos would react upon themselves.

It is further not always recognized that considerable concessions were made to the point of view of the Small Powers in certain respects. The attempt to promote universal Free Trade in Central Europe broke down largely because of the opposition of the Smaller Powers. In spite of the strong ethnic claims for rectification of frontiers in the Dobrudja and Macedonia, Rumania and Serbia made good their resistance, and in the Ruthenian question Poland eventually had her way. According to a well-informed authority a scheme was proposed reducing the Polish Army to 80,000, and those of Yugo-slavia, Rumania, and Czecho-Slovakia to 50,000 in each case. In view of energetic protests by these four Powers on the 5th June 1919 the Council of Four dropped the project.¹ Therefore, in spite of their expressed desire to reduce and limit armaments, the Great Powers allowed Poland, Rumania, Czecho-Slovakia, and Yugo-slavia to increase their armies, while British, American, French, and Italian armies were dwindling.

These were substantial concessions to the point of view of the Smaller Powers. It is probable that, if the Great Powers had altered their methods, had shown more tact and temper and consideration, and had consulted the Smaller Powers more freely, much of the resentment felt would have disappeared.² It has persisted, and its consequences are undoubtedly of a serious character. It has encouraged a particularist point of view, and tended to make the Smaller Powers rely on themselves and to defy the Great Powers when it is safe to do so. The 'Little Entente', for example, the defensive alliance of Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-slavia, and perhaps Rumania to execute the Hungarian Treaty, may have dangerous results if it increases the bad feeling between Hungary and these three Powers, and may nullify the proposals for economic co-operation between the severed units of Austria-Hungary. A still more

¹ C. T. Thompson, *Peace Conference Day by Day*, pp. 390-1, v. a criticism of this action by Mr. Asquith in House of Commons, 15th April 1920.

² When the list of commissions was read out at the second Plenary Session of the Peace Conference on the 25th January 1918, the 'Small Powers had a total membership of five members on all the commissions'. Nearly all protested and it is of considerable interest that 'even Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian prime minister, criticized the discrimination against the Small Powers'. C. T. Thompson, *Peace Conference Day by Day*, New York, 1920, p. 151. Cf. pp. 100, 102-4, 112-17, 133, 154-5, 179, 387.

dangerous tendency is the suspicion of the League of Nations and of the Council of the League which various Articles of the Treaties appear to have engendered in the Smaller Powers. To quote our authority again: 'When in the future our enemies consent to join the League . . . they will hasten, under one pretext or another, to accuse our Government before the League, elaborating this method of attack into a system both insupportable and dangerous.'¹ There is certainly substance in this contention. One difficulty has indeed been removed. In case of an appeal by a Small Power against a Great, during the Peace Conference (as e. g. of Yugo-slavia against Italy) there was an evident injustice, for the plaintiff stood at the Bar and the defendant sat on the Bench with the other Judges. In a similar case Canning, one of our greatest and wisest Foreign Ministers, wrote as follows: 'Nothing can exceed the soreness of other Powers, of the Netherlands in particular, at the association of Prussia in an alliance assuming the general direction of Europe, more especially since a question between Prussia and the Netherlands was decided at Verona against the latter, the Netherlands not being summoned to state their case, and Prussia sitting as a judge in a cause to which she was a party.'² Such a system, though it may find arguments in a temporary crisis, cannot persist if it is to be supported by the Smaller Powers. Art. 15 of the Covenant now provides that, in the case of such dispute between two members of the League, one being on the Council, the report of the Council will be considered unanimous without the opinion of that member of the Council who is a party to the dispute being necessary. In addition, any member of the Council 'may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same'. At the present time, four of the Smaller Powers are represented on the Council. It appears, therefore, that adequate guarantees are given for publicity and for the full discussion of causes in which a Great and Small Power are involved. In the future, therefore, it may be hoped that the Smaller Powers will recognize the true character of the League as its functions and working are revealed. To quote Canning again: 'No combination of Great Powers can justify the infliction of injury upon a smaller one.' It would seem that the

¹ Jovanović, *Balkan Review*, November 1919, p. 251.

² Temperley, *Life of Canning*, p. 216.

League is the strongest machinery ever invented to protect the Smaller Powers in such circumstances, for it provides the Smaller Powers with the engine of publicity and the fact of representation on the Tribunal.

5. *Case of Austria.* The final judgment on the three Treaties will be most affected by a consideration of the treatment meted out to Austria. This has been frequently criticized, and a typical example of such criticism is supplied in the following extract :

‘ But the provisions as regards Austria are even more severe. They have been described by such a thoughtful and sober-minded man as Lord Robert Cecil as “insane”. Austria, unlike Germany, is a bankrupt State, and upon her, upon this bankrupt State, the Treaty imposes an undefined liability—undefined, I mean, as regards its total amount. She is to hand over, in addition to large quantities of manufactured articles, some 19,000 head of cattle, horses, and sheep. Think of that. That is in a country where the condition of the population is such that we are making appeals in our churches and from our platforms day by day and week by week to the benevolence and generosity of the people of Great Britain, supplemented by a corresponding dole from the Government, in order that they may be saved from starvation. I do not think I need enlarge upon that.’ (Mr. Asquith at Paisley, 6th February 1920.)

The criticisms on reparation, property, and the like are dealt with more fully in another place,¹ where it will be seen that there is much to be said for many of these provisions, which are more terrible in appearance than reality. Yet, when all is said, an appalling tragedy remains—the spectacle of a land bankrupt and starving, enduring more suffering to-day even than the devastated areas in war-time. The real crux of the matter would appear to be the territorial one. When it was decided to break up Austria-Hungary, the decision was taken mainly on ethnological grounds. The difficulties encountered in such a ‘break-up’ were, however, mainly economic. It is quite true that a scheme to preserve intact the areas of Old Austria-Hungary as an economic unit by a system of compulsory free trade was advanced or advocated.² Such schemes would also have avoided the economic ‘break-up’ of Austria-Hungary while permitting her territorial readjustment. But they could only have been carried through at the expense and to the injury of such States as Serbia, Rumania, Poland, and

¹ v. Vol. V, Chap. I, *passim*. The cattle, etc., have not (March 1921) been delivered.

² e.g. by Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons, 14th April 1920.

Italy, all of which had endured the most appalling sufferings at the hands of the enemy. Nor is it clear that a system of compulsory free trade would have availed to save the New Austria. As is pointed out elsewhere, in the area which remains to her there is compulsory free trade, but the city of Vienna is blockaded by her provinces.¹ The real causes of tragedy are based on the fact that the war, if continued long enough, was certain to be fatal to the continuance of the Dual Monarchy and bound to result in the rise of new States, which would endanger its very existence. When the ultimatum against Serbia was launched the statesmen of the Ballplatz declared, and the reckless Viennese applauded the declaration, that every step and every consequence of this action had been foreseen. It is the sad fate of the people of Austria to pay for the recklessness of their rulers. The Austrian diplomat, who was shown at the Friedjung trial to have instigated the forgery of documents designed to discredit Croat statesmen, subsequently became Under-Secretary of State and helped to draft the ultimatum to Serbia. That a man demonstrably guilty of forgery was suffered by Austrian public opinion, not only to continue in office but to be promoted, shows the measure of their indifference to the behaviour of their rulers. In that light-hearted spirit lies the political misfortune of the Old Monarchy and the appalling fate which has befallen the new Republic. 'There is another world for the expiation of good and evil, but the wages of folly are payable here below.'²

6. *The Justice of the Austrian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian Treaties.* The appeal to 'justice' was constantly made not only by the Enemy but also by the Allied and Associated Powers in the discussions preceding the signature of the Treaties. This raises a serious question which serves to show the difference between these Treaties and the German. Two or three simple tests can be applied to the German Treaty in order to ascertain some rule by which its justice or injustice can be established. Does it conform, or not conform, to the Wilsonian principles or to the pre-Armistice Agreement? It is probable that some definite judgment can be reached on one or other of these points, at any rate as to whether or no the German Treaty is based on the pre-Armistice agreement.

¹ See Chap. IX, Part I, p. 482.

² Acton, *French Revolution*, 1910, p. 239.

This can reasonably be considered the test of whether it is 'just' or not. But in the other three Treaties both the question and the tests are wholly different. There was no pre-Armistice agreement recognized as legally binding on all the Allies. Wilson himself was indeed bound, but his principles, as such, are much vaguer in character, and more difficult of application to Austria, to Hungary, and to Bulgaria than to Germany. Moreover, they encountered obstacles in the way of secret treaties and of ethnic and economic complexities which did not exist in the case of the German Treaty. The truth of the last statement is very clearly shown by the fact that, while the Allies gave full replies to the German Delegation on every ethnic point raised, they practically refused to discuss them at all in the case of Hungary and Bulgaria, while in the case of the Germans included in Italy and in Czecho-Slovakia their answers were noticeably meagre. The test of the Wilsonian principles is therefore much more difficult to apply with certainty and precision to the three Treaties than to the German. For example, it is much easier to reconcile the territorial basis of the German than of the other three Treaties with the 'Fourteen Points' and other principles.

The principles of 'justice' were invoked on all sides, and if there was agreement as to their meaning, we should be in a much better position to judge the three Treaties. But as to the meaning of 'justice', neither international lawyers, nor the Great Allied nor the Minor, nor the Enemy Powers, were or are agreed. It has already been pointed out that justice is a vague term and that what seemed 'justice' to the Allies seemed 'injustice' to Germany.¹ In the three Treaties it would probably be possible to point to some principles which the Americans regarded as unjust, and to others which the British, the French, and the Italians regarded as unjust from their individual points of view.² It might, of course, be con-

¹ Vol. I, pp. 402-5; Vol. II, pp. 254, 260-4, 346 and n., 371-4, 405.

² e.g. according to President Wilson (10th February 1920) Italy's demands in respect to the Adriatic were 'opposed to the spirit of justice in international dealings'. He subsequently accepted many of these demands as formulated in the Treaty of Rapallo, presumably because the Yugo-slavs had consented to the Treaty. The same principle applies to the joint Franco-British-American Memorandum of 9th December 1919, which declared it 'neither just nor expedient to annex, as the spoils of war, territories inhabited by an alien race, anxious and able to maintain a separate national State'. It

tended that they sank these individual differences and were in agreement as to the 'general justice' of the Peace. But even if this be admitted, it would not dispose of the objections of the Minor Powers. Serbia, for example, contended that the Wilsonian principles applied only to the German and not to the other three Treaties. The argument is as follows: 'He' (M. Protitch, Delegate for Serbia) 'says that not having reached any agreement with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey, as to what the terms of peace with these countries shall be, we are free to endeavour to impose any terms as we decide to be just.'¹ But this argument, while getting rid of the Wilsonian principles, which the Principal Allied Powers never explicitly disavowed, does not show that the view of 'justice', as held by Great and Small Powers, is the same. The facts indicate the contrary. The representatives of Serbia, which had by then become the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, put up a strong resistance to the Minorities Treaties which they only signed at a deferred date and under protest. Except in one or two instances, those representatives had no share in making the three Treaties and took no part in the final decisions. The Austrian Treaty itself was criticized by a distinguished Yugo-slav representative as inflicting upon all the Small Powers 'a very considerable measure of injustice'.² The Polish Delegation would probably, and the Rumanian certainly, have endorsed this view. If, however, there was no agreement as to what was 'just' among the Allies, there was still less agreement among the Enemy Powers. Bulgaria, like Hungary, was a predominantly agricultural country, but to the one the

would appear that, in this case, 'justice' depends on the consent of the Yugo-slav Government to such annexation, though the Yugo-slavs actually annexed were not consulted.

¹ Presumably Protić is the Serbian Delegate. See Address on behalf of American Delegates before Reparation Commission by J. F. Dulles, 19th February 1919. Mr. Dulles proceeds: 'In a technical sense this may be correct. . . . I do maintain, however, that it was understood that the settlement with these countries was to be in the spirit of the terms specifically agreed to as to Germany and which were originally enunciated as the terms of a general peace.' See Baruch, *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty* (New York, 1920), p. 325.

² Jovan Jovanović, in 'Treaty with Austria', *Balkan Review*, November 1919. It is also well known that the smaller Powers formally protested against the Minorities Treaties (v. Chap. II, Part II) and C. T. Thompson *Peace Conference Day by Day*, New York, 1920, p. 387; v. also Vol. I, pp. 249, 257, which shows how they protested against being excluded from the chief decisions.

Labour Clauses of her Treaty were 'just', to the other 'unjust'. Austria formed herself, or desired to form herself, into a new State on Wilsonian principles based purely on ethnic unity; according to the Austrian doctrine it was 'just' to include in this area twelve million Germans, and 'unjust' to take any away. Hungary thought it 'just' that Czecho-Slovakia should annex three million Germans on historic grounds, and used that analogy to argue that it was just for Hungary to retain some eight or nine millions of non-Magyar nationalities upon historic grounds. Austria thought it 'just' to annex West Hungary as its population was predominantly German. Hungary thought it 'unjust' to take this district away from her. These indications are sufficient to show how widely interpretations of 'justice' differed.

7. *Summary.* In moving the ratification of the Austrian and Bulgarian Treaties on the 14th April 1920, Mr. Cecil Harmsworth said in the British House of Commons :

'Two main principles ran through these Treaties, first the just punishment of wrongdoing, incalculable in its moral and economic effects; secondly, the prevention, so far as it might be humanly possible, of a similar wrongdoing in future.'

These principles are equally applicable to the Treaty with Hungary as to that with Austria, and it must be left to posterity to pronounce finally upon them. One observation, however, may be hazarded, for one test of 'justice' possibly does exist and is defined by President Wilson. 'The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favourites and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned' (President Wilson, 27th September 1918). If the treatment of enemies differed from that of Allies, as regards adjustment of frontiers or in respect to nationality, or any other subject, it might be held that the 'justice' was not 'impartial'. It certainly would be difficult for the most robust controversialist to contend that the enemy never received less, or the friend more, than his due in the three Treaties of St. Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly. This test is, however, a rough one, for it does not define 'justice' but only finds out if treatment is 'impartial'. Moreover, it can be applied only in certain cases. In many clauses of the Treaty,

as e.g. Reparation or Enemy Property, no comparison between treatment of friends and of enemies is possible. Consequently we shall not be in a position to pronounce finally or even fully on the 'justice' of these three Treaties, until there is some international agreement or pronouncement on the subject. Probably petitions to the League of Nations will eventually force the Members of the League to arrive at some definite conclusions on these important questions. For it will be difficult to adopt interpretations or to accept or reject revisions of the Treaties or complaints with respect to their execution, without expressing opinions on the 'justice' or 'injustice' of the demands submitted. As these opinions will be generally agreed or unanimous ones they will help towards devising a standard of international justice.

CHAPTER VIII

THE NEW BULGARIA

1. *Introductory ; geographical importance of Bulgaria.* In the alliances devised by Germany and brought into being in 1914-15 for the realization of her ambitions, the inclusion of Bulgaria was procured for reasons of greater weight than the military importance of the Bulgarian army. This army, indeed, was nowise underrated ; it was recognized as affording a considerable and welcome addition to the armed might of the alliance ; but the chief value of Bulgaria as a German ally was found in the geographical position she occupied between Central Europe and Western Asia. Placed thus her active support became almost essential to the execution of German designs in the East, particularly during their earlier and more critical stages.

But this accident of geographical position carried with it influences of yet wider bearing than those directly affecting Germany. It gave Bulgaria, as the enemy of the Western Powers, an importance out of all proportion to her population, wealth, or combatant strength ; it affected to a correspondingly serious degree the direction and application of military effort by those Powers ; it may be said to have prolonged the war ; and at the Peace Conference it influenced the terms which the victorious Allies deemed it necessary to impose on the Bulgarian people.

It will be well at this stage to look a little more closely at the strategical position held by Bulgaria ; at the results to the Allied Powers of her alliance with Germany ; and at the consequent importance of forcing her out of the war.

Her central position in the Balkan peninsula gave Bulgaria control of the three lines of railway by which the Turkish Empire might be reached from Europe. Her western frontier came within ten miles of the only line between Europe and Greece which did not pass over Bulgarian soil. For some three hundred miles she possessed the right bank of the Danube. She held, in fact, a monopoly of the means of intercommunica-

tion between the various Balkan States. She could deny access to the Turkish Empire from Europe by land ; or, with Serbia out of the way, provide excellent railway facilities between the Central Powers and Constantinople. She could unite Turkey in Europe, Rumania, Serbia, and Greece by the shortest interior lines of communication ; on the other hand, she could, if she chose, make intercommunication impossible for Turkey and only possible for the other states by roads far outside the Bulgarian frontiers. When Bulgaria became the ally of Germany all these great strategical advantages passed to the side of the Central Powers. With Serbia crushed Germany had the clear road she desired to the sovereign position of Constantinople.

The holding of Constantinople and the Straits for Germany, a matter fraught with incalculable consequences for the Allies, was made possible only by the transport of arms, munitions, and men through Bulgaria. This breach of neutrality contributed to the failure of the Dardanelles campaign, and ensured the isolation of Rumania. It prevented the supply of war material to Russia except by the frozen harbours and inadequate railways of the north. It withheld from the people of the British Isles the immense quantities of foodstuffs which had accumulated in Black Sea ports—at a time, too, when foodstuffs were most required in Western Europe. The effect upon Russia of the Straits being closed against her was deep and far-reaching beyond estimation. It is certain, at least, that the tremendous disasters and casualties suffered by her armies from lack of weapons and munitions, and the economic paralysis due to the impossibility of exporting her products, contributed much to the making of the Revolution.

But yet wider opportunities against her enemies were conferred on Germany by the Bulgarian route to Constantinople. From that city the East lay open to her—Asia Minor, Trans-Caucasia, Syria, Egypt, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian coast-line of the Red Sea. German prevision had already linked up disconnected railways into a great route which, with two short breaks, extended from Constantinople to Arabia, and brought the Suez Canal within reach of hostile operations by land. The Turkish Army, trained and directed by German officers, and stiffened by German and Austrian contingents, was able to operate against the Canal and against Baghdad.

Wireless stations, and bases for German submarines, were to be established along the eastern coast-line of the Red Sea. From Constantinople, too, by the aid of the Turkish Caliph, Germany hoped to set the Mohammedan world ablaze against the Western Powers.

These, and other grave dangers arising from German control of the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan countries, compelled the Allies, after the failure at Gallipoli, to embark on the yet greater expedition to Salonica. Directed against Bulgaria and the German line of communication with the East, this counter movement menaced the whole German edifice in South-eastern Europe and Western Asia. It prevented Greece from being drawn into the Central Alliance, and immobilized large enemy forces ; but for long it was itself immobilized, and only succeeded in knocking Bulgaria out of the war when the final triumph of the Allies was no longer in doubt. For at least two years, nevertheless, the Salonica zone ranked as the third greatest theatre of war. The measure of this distracting and financially costly campaign, rendered necessary by the Bulgarian alliance with Germany, is that for the greater period of the war it had locked up some three-quarter million Allied troops, transported and kept supplied across seas infested with enemy submarines.

Such in brief were the remarkable and disproportionate services Bulgaria, by reason of geographical endowment, was able to render as the ally of the Central Powers. The permanent factor of her strategical position, the use she had made of it, and the influence this position might yet again exert, were matters which could not be ignored by the Allies when framing the Treaty of Peace.

With these facts cited as necessary background we may pass now to a broad survey of Bulgaria since the Armistice, more particularly of Bulgaria as affected by the Treaty of Neuilly.

2. *Bulgarian attitude after the Armistice.* The Armistice of the 29th September 1918 marked the end of the 'Personal Régime' of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria. Since his accession to the throne ambition and the love of power had impelled him more and more to autocratic methods of government, and he chose as his ministers servile politicians concerned to forward their own interests by a ready compliance with the Royal

will. Most sinister of all the powers he was able in this way to vest in himself was the right of contracting treaties without reference to the Sobranje. Under the outward form of a constitutional monarch with ministers responsible to the country the King had, in fact, acquired powers almost despotic. Nor had he found it difficult to establish himself in the position of supreme control. Native Bulgarian leaders were amateurs of political science, confessedly ignorant of statecraft and the confused and dangerous ways of international politics. The King, an Austrian Bourbon connected with the great Royal Houses of Europe, was reputed well versed in such matters, and fondly credited with an astute direction of Bulgarian affairs, although he was in truth an opportunist without the saving grace of insight. He had but to clothe his policy with the intensely nationalistic ideals of his people to obtain their whole-hearted support; or if that were too much to expect in all cases, as upon the question of entering the war against Russia, he was able, by promise of great territorial gains, to secure at least their doubting acceptance. As ruler he had, indeed, created a 'Ferdinand' medium, through which, unknowingly, the mass of the Bulgarian people saw matters of foreign policy, and were led to act accordingly, even though with misgivings. The truth and disillusionment came only by the hard experience of defeat in war. From the disaster in which the King and his ministers had plunged them the Bulgarian people, in 1918, fell back upon themselves, to find a way out, and to reconstruct their exhausted and disorganized state as best they might.¹

These early efforts, it may be said, were not all above suspicion. Hesitation and delay appeared in carrying out various conditions of the Armistice; actions did not always square with professions and promises; a desire for evasion and for the concealment of facts was sometimes evident. But the country should be judged not so much by details, as by the general course it followed when faced by the consequences of defeat.

The General Election on the 31st March 1920 gave to Bulgaria a Sobranje freely elected, representative of the people, and

¹ Ferdinand abdicated 4th October 1918, and his eldest son, after a short republican interval, was proclaimed as Boris III. The new Government under Todoroff began to rule from the 28th November 1918.

alive to the grave circumstances of the hour. From this body emerged a government unlike those which had held office during the 'Personal Régime' of the King. By far the largest party returned to the Sobranje was the Agrarian, representing the greater part of the freeholding peasantry, who form 75 per cent. of the Bulgarian population. An Agrarian Government, with M. Stambuliisky—a life-long opponent of the King—as Premier was the outcome. It was democratic, even socialistic, yet strongly opposed to Communism; without experience, but anxious to learn and ready to experiment; strong enough to pass into law any measure it adopted, and to follow any policy it deemed necessary in the public interest. Above all it professed to stand for a New Bulgaria, and a break with 'Ferdinand' traditions, for a desire that the country should live at peace with its neighbours, and for an honest intention to retrieve the past and secure the goodwill of the Western Powers. With these as the characteristics and aims of his Government M. Stambuliisky undertook the heavy tasks of accepting and carrying out the terms of an onerous Treaty of Peace, and of reconstructing a defeated and impoverished state.

3. *Bulgarian War-aims (1915-18)*. More must be said upon M. Stambuliisky and the remarkable measures initiated and adopted by his Government; but before doing so it is necessary to glance at Bulgarian war-aims, at the Bulgarian Memorandum to the Peace Conference, and at the terms and implications of the Treaty of Neuilly.

The alluring prospect of gaining at once both territory and revenge had brought Bulgaria to the German side in spite of war-weariness and doubts among her people. She supported the Central Powers, in fact, to escape from the Treaty of Bucharest, though that itself was the sequel of her own inordinate ambition. Her official aim in the war, therefore, the reward she expected from her great Allies, was territorial gain at the expense of her enemies, Serbia and Rumania; and these gains were to be the districts they had wrested from her two years before, with a good deal added now that the opportunity seemed hers.

From Serbia she expected not only Serbian Macedonia, but the Old Serbian district of Kossovo, including Prishtina. She desired also to extend her western frontier to include Pirot, and perhaps the whole of Serbia eastward of the Morava;

in this way she would obtain a north-western frontier abutting on Hungary.

From Rumania Bulgaria required the portion of the Dobrudja taken from her by the Treaty of Bucharest, with an extension northward beyond the original frontier. She also required indemnities. Subject to these aims being realized she was willing to accept in principle a reduction of armaments and compulsory arbitration. Such at least was the gist of the reply Bulgaria gave, on the 26th September 1917, to an enquiry by His Holiness the Pope.

It should be noted that Bulgarian politicians were, to some extent, divided on the question of war-aims. Majority Socialists required Macedonia, and the Dobrudja of 1912; in Serbia east of the Morava they sought only a comparatively narrow corridor to the Hungarian frontier; but they, too, demanded indemnities. Minority Socialists, on the other hand, were more idealistic. They supported national self-determination by plebiscite, and on this basis urged a Federation of all Balkan nationalities and rejected indemnities.

Socialist moderation, however, counted for little, for the parties were of no great importance. Had victory fallen to the Central Powers it is certain that Bulgarian annexations would have been limited only by the frontiers her Allies deemed it expedient to allow her.

4. *The Bulgarian Memorandum to the Peace Conference.* At the Peace Conference which decided the terms to be imposed on Bulgaria she was not invited to offer her views; nevertheless she submitted a long document, prepared by MM. Gueshoff and Tsokoff, two of her most experienced diplomatists, in which her case was presented. In general the Memorandum sought to traverse statements contained in Greek and Serbian memoranda already laid before the Conference; and it adduced arguments and cited historical facts in support of Bulgarian territorial aspirations. On the whole it was less a statement of claims than a plea, based on the Eleventh of the 'Fourteen Points',¹ for wide extensions of territory. Though not

¹ Point 11. 'Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated, occupied territories restored, Serbia accorded free access to the sea, and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.'

contending for the sweeping annexations formulated in the Bulgarian war-aims it yet urged that the Dobrudja and portions of Serbian Macedonia and the Serbian Morava were ethnically and historically Bulgarian and therefore should be united to Bulgaria; and that on the same grounds she could show sufficient title to both Eastern and Western Thrace, and so should receive the one and remain in possession of the other.

In no area cited in the Memorandum, except perhaps the Dobrudja, is the question of racial predominance clear-cut and free from arguable uncertainties. In the southern part of the Dobrudja, indeed, reliable ethnical facts certainly support Bulgaria; in a part of Macedonia and in Western Thrace they do so in less degree; but in Serbia east of the Morava and in Eastern Thrace they are undeniably against her. The question is further complicated by the distribution of races within the districts. The northern part of Western Thrace by itself is predominantly Turkish and Bulgarian; if the narrow seaboard strip be regarded, it is Greek by reason of its Greek coastal towns. On ethnical grounds, therefore, the Memorandum was loose and unconvincing. But the question of Bulgarian territorial expansion is inseparable from the conditioning events of the Second Balkan War and the War of 1914-18. The whole Memorandum, indeed, was made unreal and unworthy of its subject by the purpose it showed of conveniently ignoring or travestying the part played by Bulgaria in these wars. It implied, in fact, that Bulgaria, though the defeated enemy of the Allied Powers, had incurred no responsibilities, and was entitled to claim from them great extensions of territory at the expense of their Balkan Allies. In no vindictive spirit the Peace Conference was unable to accept these suggestions as a suitable basis for the Treaty of Peace.

5. *The Allied Reply* (2nd Nov. 1919). The reply of the Peace Conference can be briefly noticed here as its chief conclusions are summarized elsewhere.¹ It traversed most of the Bulgarian claims, and cited facts against them with cold and destructive logic. To the contention that Bulgarian public opinion was not unanimously favourable to the alliance with the Central Powers the Conference replied that Bulgarian support was given, none the less, to a Government which was satisfying its territorial designs by pursuing a policy of conquest; and that

¹ Chap. VII, Part II, pp. 414-15.

Bulgarian troops did not hesitate, without provocation, to attack the Serbian Army in the rear, thus paralysing the heroic efforts this army was making on another front against invaders who threatened the existence of Serbia. The Reply remarked further that when Bulgarian troops were led against Rumania they everywhere displayed by their attitude that they cherished a hatred against the occupied country. And that there, as in Serbia and Greece, Bulgaria waged a war of conquest and pillage; and that public opinion unanimously applauded the successes of her arms.

To the Bulgarian assertion that the people did not believe the war would bring them into conflict with the Powers of the Entente the Conference asked: How could the Bulgarian people suppose that the Serbian Army would be left without aid by its Allies, when the struggle in which it was engaged had its origin in the aggression of Austria-Hungary against Serbia? And if the least doubt had existed in this respect among Bulgarian troops, how was it explained that when these troops found themselves in contact with those of the Entente, their country had no desire to give up the struggle against the Powers which had chiefly contributed to Bulgarian independence? It was only when conquered in the field and obliged to lay down her arms that Bulgaria had demanded peace.

The Reply of the Allies next reminded Bulgaria that in adhering to the Central Powers to the moment of their downfall she had broken and kept broken the principal line of communication between Russia and her Allies, opened the way to the East for Germany, and thus inevitably prolonged the war.

The Great Powers asserted that no idea of vengeance inspired them when preparing the conditions of Peace, and that they simply sought to establish a peace which should be just, and therefore lasting and fruitful. They felt that the conditions were of a nature to ensure the pacific development of Bulgaria and to enable her to re-establish within a short time her normal economic life. They further recalled that to this end they had guaranteed to Bulgaria a free economic opening on the Aegean Sea. The Reply of the Allies was closed by the statement that if the Allied and Associated Powers did not answer all the questions raised by the Bulgarian Delegation it was because, after studying them, they had not deemed it possible to accede to the requests made.

6. *Venizelos and Bulgarian aims.* We have seen the great importance of Bulgaria's strategical position, and how it enabled her, though an insignificant power, to affect the course of a world-war. We have seen, too, the instinct her people have for dominance and territorial aggrandizement, the sacrifices they are prepared to make for these ends, and the readiness with which they follow a leader who shews the way by which such ends may be reached. Her people are known, further, to be sober, docile, laborious ; apt in military organization, and stout in arms ; but good haters who are in bitter rivalry with their Balkan neighbours. Add that they live mainly on the soil, tilling each his freehold land, and have a high birth-rate, and they appear as a people firmly rooted, certain to increase and likely to seek expansion ; a people capable of much good, capable also of much disturbance ; a race in which however exists the elemental stuff of greatness though overlaid by primitive defects. It remains now to show how the Peace Conference, without imposing vindictive or crushing terms, sought to penalize national lawlessness, to diminish Bulgaria's temptations and opportunities to aggression and revenge, and yet leave her free to find a full and prosperous national life. To do so it is first necessary to recall certain events, beginning with the Second Balkan War.

As the result of the Second Balkan War Bulgaria lost to Serbia and Greece the whole of that part of Macedonia, east of the Vardar, which had fallen to her share by the First Balkan War. The part she lost to Greece included the rich district of Kavalla. She lost, also, the Bulgarian Dobrudja to Rumania, and Eastern Thrace and Adrianople to Turkey ; but she retained Western Thrace.

In January 1915—that is, soon after the entry of the Turkish Empire into the war—M. Venizelos, the Greek Premier, addressed two remarkable memoranda to the King of the Hellenes. In the first of these he showed, when forwarding a communication on the subject handed to him by the British Minister at Athens under the instructions of Sir Edward Grey, that with Turkey on the side of the Central Powers a great opportunity had arisen for Greece. It was nothing less than for her to obtain, by acting with the Entente Powers, territorial expansion in Western Asia Minor upon a scale never hoped for by the most sanguine of Greek optimists. An extension that would create

a real *Magna Graecia* and include within its frontiers the greater part of those ancient and historical lands of Asia, Greek by immemorial tradition, and still the home of large numbers of the Greek race. To use this great opportunity he showed that it would be necessary to obtain the co-operation with Greece of Serbia, of Rumania, and, if possible, of Bulgaria; but that the latter would demand certain concessions on the part of the others. The concessions he suggested for Serbia and Greece were the return of Serbian Macedonia and the Kavalla district. In his second Memorandum he developed his proposal further, and with much force showed the advantages, not only to Greece but to the Entente as a whole, of making sacrifices which might bring Bulgaria into the war against the Central Powers. With this end in view he now definitely urged that Greece should agree to surrender the Kavalla region, painful though the sacrifice might be.

In a later Memorandum addressed to the Peace Conference in 1918 M. Venizelos showed how the proposal had fallen through. He showed that Bulgaria had been offered the Dobrudja, Turkish Thrace to the Sea of Marmora, Kavalla, and Serbian Macedonia up to the frontiers of Albania, but had rejected these concessions as inadequate, demanding, in addition, Serbia east of the Morava, and part of Albania in order to obtain a coast line on the Adriatic. She had thus aimed at establishing a Bulgarian State extending from the Black Sea to the Adriatic, and from Hungary to the Aegean and the Sea of Marmora; a Bulgaria that would dominate the other Balkan States to an extent jeopardizing their existence. She sought in fact to become, what her rivals had always accused her of trying to be, the 'Prussia of the Balkans'. Having twice sought to gain her ends by war and twice suffered defeat, precautions against her became unavoidable in the interests of peace. Such precautions the Treaty of Neuilly sought to establish.

7. *The re-drawing of the Bulgarian Frontiers.* (a) *Re-adjustments of population in the Balkans.* In a large degree the Conference attained the purpose of removing future menace from Bulgaria by indirect means, for the readjustments of frontiers in South-Eastern Europe on an ethnical basis radically changed the relative importance and strength of Bulgaria with regard to her rivals. Under various treaties each Christian neighbour had vastly increased in area and population, whereas by the

Treaty of Neuilly, Bulgaria was slightly diminished in both. The change in relative standing so produced is shown in round figures in the following table ; those for Greece in 1921 being, however, merely approximate, as no definite statistics are available for Eastern and Western Thrace, nor for the Greek Smyrna zone of the Treaty of Sèvres, all of which are included.

	1914		1921	
	<i>Sq. miles.</i>	<i>Population.</i>	<i>Sq. miles.</i>	<i>Population.</i>
Bulgaria	47,750	5,500,000	45,000	5,200,000
Rumania	58,454	7,700,000	118,221	16,101,000
Serbia (or				
Yugo-slavia)	38,900	4,600,000	101,250	13,685,000
Greece .	42,000	4,800,000	60,000	7,500,000

But beyond making this vital and far-reaching change, the Conference included in the Treaty of Neuilly certain direct precautions against future Bulgarian aggression and national desire for revenge ; and sought also to diminish the strategical importance of Bulgaria with regard to Constantinople and the Straits. These measures imposed military limitations upon the country, adjusted her Western frontiers to the strategical advantage of her neighbours, and withdrew from her Western Thrace and her seaboard on the Aegean Sea.

The military clauses of the Treaty are dealt with at length in another chapter and need only be outlined here.¹ They limit the military material Bulgaria may possess, and the manufacture of armaments, and prohibit semi-military organizations. They also fix the maximum strength of the army at 33,000 rifles and direct that the force shall be recruited on a voluntary, long-service basis, the men to serve for not less than twelve years. By this provision it was sought to prevent Bulgaria passing any large portion of her manhood through the army and thus creating a great reserve of trained men. But this clause appears to present great, if not insuperable difficulties with regard to voluntary service. The Bulgarian Government has endeavoured to enlist men, but has signally failed : no recruits have offered themselves, nor seem likely to offer. As a conscript soldier, for a comparatively short time with the colours, the Bulgarian peasant takes kindly to military service and goes through his training with zest ; but to leave his land and village for a long space of years and become a professional soldier does not appeal

¹ v. Chap. III, Part III, *passim*.

to him. It appears that if Bulgaria is to have an army at all some modification of this clause will be necessary.

(b) *Macedonia*. The refusal of the Allies to entertain Bulgarian claims in Macedonia need not be discussed here; to have granted these claims in any direction to a potentially dangerous but defeated enemy in the circumstances outlined was clearly out of the question (cp. also p. 433).

(c) *Serbo-Bulgarian frontier*. The Treaty, as has been said, also adjusted Bulgaria's Western frontier to the advantage of Serbia. The pre-war Western frontier of Bulgaria contained two bold salients, one of which approached the Belgrade-Salonica Railway within 12 miles, near the Serbian town of Vranje; the other came within 5 miles of the same railway near the Greco-Serbian frontier at Gradiste. From these salients the Bulgars were able during the opening stages of the war to make railway communications impossible between Serbia and Greece. The Treaty dealt with these two problems by assigning the Strumica salient to Serbia (with consent of Greece) and advancing the Serbian territory to about 15 miles east of Vranje. So far the Serbian claims and the Conference awards were in harmony. But north of these points the Serbian demands were only partially conceded. They claimed the Bulgarian town of Tsaribrod and the Dragoman Pass, south of Nish, and the Bulgarian town of Vidin on the Danube. As regards Tsaribrod the Serb claims were conceded, and the readjustment of territory thus made enables four out of the seven roads by which Nish is approached to be commanded by the Serbs, thus protecting that vital strategic railway centre. On the other hand the Conference refused to give the Dragomanci Pass to Serbia, which would have enabled the Serbs to threaten Sofia at will, but thrust the Serbian frontier back to strong defensive positions south of Tsaribrod.¹ These changes give considerable strategic advantages to Serbia in the way of defence, but give her no offensive advantage such as she had specifically claimed. This is a really genuine attempt to make peace by giving each side a strong frontier for defence and

¹ The demand for Vidin was refused, but some protection to the Timok valley railway was accorded by pushing the Bulgar frontier back an average of about two kilometres for a distance of about ten miles. This gives no strategic protection, but enables the Yugo-slavs to claim that the frontier has been violated if rifle-shots from the Bulgarian side reach the railway line. Cp. p. 184 n. and pp. 211-12.

a weak one for aggression. Tsaribrod, a Bulgarian town, passes to Serbia, Vidin remains to Bulgaria, and the total territory transferred and population affected is comparatively small.

(d) *Western Thrace*. The measure, however, which detached Western Thrace from Bulgaria and denied her territorial access to the Mediterranean, involved the most important change.¹ It gave rise to national consternation and grief in Bulgaria, and has been the chief cause of criticism of the Treaty in other countries. While this provision may seem to bear the stamp of harshness that might have been avoided, there were underlying reasons, connected with the Allies' wider policy for safeguarding Constantinople and the Straits and diminishing the strategical importance of Bulgaria, which made the transfer of Western Thrace necessary if the policy was to be effective. Nor was any violation of ethnical principles involved. The population of Western Thrace contains no Bulgarian majority, either relative or absolute; an absolute majority, indeed, is held only by Moslems as against Christians. The ethnical factor therefore could fairly be ignored and the future of the territory decided on grounds of higher policy.

The portion of Western Thrace detached from Bulgaria by the Treaty has a length of about 80 miles, and an average depth of nearly 30 miles. It is, indeed, the seaward slopes of the Rhodope Mountains which bound, on part of the southern side, the Balkan area occupied effectively by the Bulgarian race. The southern frontier now laid down for Bulgaria is, more or less, a natural one, along the water-parting of the Rhodope Mountains.

But through this narrow maritime region not predominantly Bulgarian in population lie the natural routes for trade between the Mediterranean and a great part of Bulgaria, with Kavalla, Porto Lagos, and Dedeagach as possible ports. Before the First Balkan War there had been no stronger Bulgarian aspiration than to obtain an Aegean coast-line, providing Bulgarian ports on the Mediterranean, turning the national front southward instead of to the closed Black Sea and the East, and removing the dependence of the country on the waterway of the Straits. The First Balkan War realized these aspirations in full; the Second Balkan War diminished them somewhat,

¹ In Eastern Thrace a slight readjustment of frontier in favour of Bulgaria was given her for ethnic reasons to the north-west of Adrianople.

for it cost Bulgaria Kavalla ; but Porto Lagos and Dedeagach remained, and projects were set on foot to make of the former a great port worthy of Bulgarian hopes. By detaching the whole Aegean littoral the Treaty of Neuilly thwarted all these sentimental and practical national ambitions under circumstances galling beyond measure to Bulgarian feeling. It ensured, in fact, a revival of the aspirations of 1911, but intensified now to the last degree.

It was in spite of these strong reasons for the continuance of Bulgaria in Western Thrace that the Conference reluctantly decided to detach the district ; not by way of penalty, but, as has been said, on what were held to be the over-ruling needs of high policy. Nor, it must be admitted, can the sufficiency of these reasons be impugned if we consider the unhappy position in which Bulgaria had placed herself with regard to her rivals when these great causes came before the Conference.

The Bulgarian people had demonstrated the need for precaution against their ambitions for Balkan hegemony, and their innate capacity for aggression and national revenge. The Peace Conference held, in consequence, that it was imperatively necessary to cover the supremely important position of Constantinople and the Straits against future ambitious movements from the North-west, and at the same time diminish the strategic importance of Bulgaria. The road from Central Europe was now strongly held by the important new State of Yugo-slavia ; it was necessary, however, to interpose a sufficient barrier between Bulgaria and Constantinople. The task of holding this barrier could not be undertaken by the Western Powers. But Greece appeared to be a possible warden, marked out for the duty by her geographical position, by the considerable Greek element in the population of Eastern Thrace, and by her political sympathies with her Western Allies. She could hardly, however, hope to hold Eastern Thrace permanently if it were separated from Greece itself by the broad wedge of Western Thrace, forming part of a compact, virile, and still ambitious Bulgaria. And there were further considerations to be borne in mind. At best the territory of the Greater Greece to be created would be scattered, loosely knit, and dependent on sea-communication, with nearly half of her population living in the Greek Islands and in the new territory proposed for her in Asia. With Bulgarian harbours on the Aegean it

was evident that in time of war large movements of Greek troops by water could be rendered difficult if not impossible by the operations of hostile submarines; that, in short, possession of the Aegean littoral would confer upon Bulgaria strategic advantages destructive of the large purposes the Conference had before it.

8. *Economic access of Bulgaria to the Aegean.* But though the fate of Western Thrace was thus settled against Bulgaria the practical economic opportunities dependent on outlet to the Mediterranean were not denied her. M. Venizelos has announced that in widest measure Greece was prepared to give Bulgaria access to the Aegean sea coast; ¹ that within a stated time she might decide at which port she would require special facilities, and that there she would receive rights under treaty enabling her to establish what in effect would be a free port for Bulgarian goods in free and uninterrupted communication with Bulgaria, although on Greek territory. This offer would secure to Bulgaria the same, or nearly the same, practical economic advantages that she would enjoy if the port were in every way her own; but it leaves unsatisfied the intangible, though powerful, demands of national sentiment. Economists, and those who hold the impulses of national consciousness lightly, may urge that by this arrangement Bulgaria would secure the substance, though losing the shadow. From the Bulgarian national point of view it is the shadow, and not so much the substance, to which the chief value is attached. It cannot be said that the Treaty prejudicially affects the material future of the Bulgarian people, or their opportunities for national development within territory indisputably occupied by the Bulgarian race. Without the Aegean littoral, without Macedonia, without Adrianople and Eastern Thrace, Bulgaria still holds the most advantageous position in the Balkan Peninsula; a wide and fertile area with access through her own ports to the Black Sea, and the prospect of equally easy commercial access through Greek ports to the Mediterranean. And it should be remembered that for the future the waterway of the Straits will always be open and without irritating restraint. For all practical purposes Inter-

¹ Dedeagach is unsuitable as a port and at a great distance from Sofia. Kavalla, which is a fine harbour, is the most suitable, and Venizelos offered to build a railway connecting that port with the Salonica-Constantinople railway which now runs to Sofia up the Struma valley, though with a break of gauge.

national Control of the Straits will render the Black Sea ports of Bulgaria as free for the world's shipping as ports upon the Aegean, and in point of fact, Varna is more suitable for a Bulgarian harbour than the shallow open roadstead of Dedeagach. In this matter only the question of national sentiment in its most subtle and tenacious form remains unappeased.

In essence the territorial clauses of the Treaty of Neuilly—the loss of Eastern and Western Thrace and Macedonia which they impose—mean that for the immediate future Bulgaria's national development must be confined to territory ethnically Bulgarian beyond question. That she cannot seek to make herself the dominant Balkan power by Bulgarizing large areas outside these definite ethnic boundaries, and that, in fact, though not treated vindictively by the Treaty, she has lost, at least on this occasion, the high stakes for which she played in 1915. It remains for her to make the best of the not unsatisfactory future at present in sight before her: the country gives evidence, indeed, of following this course of wisdom.

9. *The future policy of the new Bulgaria; Stambuliisky.* The prospect demands a little attention here, for the methods by which it is being pursued offer remarkable features. We have noticed the Agrarian Government formed under the leadership of M. Stambuliisky, and that it professed to represent a 'New Bulgaria' eschewing aggression and anxious to live at peace with its neighbours; a few words are necessary now upon M. Stambuliisky himself, as chief author of the unusual measures by which Bulgaria is seeking to work out her salvation. He comes of peasant stock, and was educated first in his village school, then at Sofia, and next at the University of Halle. His career since has been varied and adventurous as editor, politician, leader of a peasant political party, and of a peasant revolutionary army which rose against Ferdinand and was defeated only by the aid of German troops. He has always been in violent opposition to King Ferdinand and his policy; and after the Second Balkan War attracted widespread attention by his campaign against the authors of that crime. He stood out for Bulgarian neutrality in 1915, and for his reward was condemned to death, a sentence subsequently commuted to imprisonment for life. Released in 1918 he led the Bulgarian political movement in favour of peace; and with this as his recent record won the elections in 1920 which placed an Agrarian Government in power. Since then

he has been absorbed in the measures for reconstructing his country, and in visiting various European countries in order to lay his policy before their Governments and to enlist the good will of their peoples. At the age of 43 he occupies a position in Bulgaria which makes much possible for him in point both of age and opportunity.

Though Socialistic in essence the policy of the Agrarian Government is opposed to Communism; and supported by a land-owning peasantry it has not hesitated to suppress the 'Narrow Socialists', who profess Bolshevism of a kind, by measures of the most drastic and forcible character.

In brief the policy of the Agrarian Government aims at making Bulgaria a model state by Socialist methods—methods which shall, however, commend themselves to a nation of free-holders. To find in labour and industry the means of national reconstruction. To compel the people to work. To increase cultivation by utilizing the waste lands of the country. To develop its natural resources by every means possible, both by private enterprise and by State assistance. To provide roads, waterways, and railways to enable the increased products of such developments to be exported with facility. And by increased production to meet honourably the heavy financial burthens which Bulgaria has incurred in war, both on her own behalf, and as indemnity laid upon her by treaty.

The chief process by which this policy is to be effected is by Compulsory Labour, and Laws for the purpose are already in operation. They provide for universal industrial service in the place of universal military service, and both sexes are liable, men for 16 months, women for 8 months, both before the age of 20; nor may immunity of the fit be purchased. Most of the work will be manual labour—road-making, railroad building, irrigation, re-afforestation and mining—but technical and factory work also will be undertaken by those who are capable, particularly by women.

Another measure of socialistic nature is the redistribution of land, according to the working capacity of each peasant family. Under this scheme all suitable state lands, all land held in excess of needs, and all ill-cultivated land will be distributed among landless peasants, among labourers with certain qualifications, and among Bulgarian refugees from neighbouring countries.

It is too early, as yet, to say how these measures will work in practice ; how they will be borne even by a people as naturally industrious and used to labour as the Bulgarian population. So far they are said to have given results better than could have been expected even by the most sanguine. Perhaps, however, their chief value is that they show an honest intention on the part alike of Government and of people to face their difficulties boldly, and to find in their own labour and in the natural resources of their country rather than in foreign loans the means for discharging the onerous obligations under which they lie.

With this spirit pervading Bulgaria her economic prospects can never be indifferent. She has a fertile soil, from which her hardy and industrious cultivators are capable of extracting national wealth beyond what is necessary to meet, in due time, all her national liabilities.¹ That they will do so can hardly be doubted. The chief uncertain element in the future of Bulgaria lies in the political course her people may elect to follow. There is hope that they may be content to leave to future generations the settlement of those national aims in pursuit of which the present generation has almost wrecked the country.

We may hope that they will, and that in due time Bulgarians will recognize that their real and greatest future lies in a Confederation of Balkan States, in which their virile peoples, laying aside old rivalries, old hatreds, and old hopes of dominance, shall contribute their differing racial qualities to the formation of a single Balkan Power, great in area and wealth and population, and greater still in opportunity, in consciousness of unity, and in the versatile capacities and good will of diverse and gifted races.

¹ The whole question of Bulgarian Reparation and Finance is examined in full in Vol. V, Chap. I. On 27th March 1921 the Ambassadors' Council demanded the repeal of the Bulgarian Labour Law as tending to military conscription. Text is in March *Contemporary Review*.

CHAPTER IX

PART I

THE NEW AUSTRIA

1. *Introductory.* The ancient empire of the Habsburgs fell with a fall that for suddenness and for dramatic completeness has had few parallels in the history of the world. While still holding great stretches of conquered territory and almost before a foreign soldier had set foot on its soil, it crumbled into fragments. Each of the nationalities that had so long lived together within its borders now thought only of itself. To some the way was henceforth open to the realization of cherished ideals and ambitions; to others, lately dominant, it was a question of saving for themselves what they could from the ruins of former greatness.

In the early days of October 1918 the leading men of the German group in the Austrian Reichsrat began to discuss the necessity of common action in view of the rapidly progressing dissolution of the Empire. They soon agreed on the general principles of a future German-Austrian State. On the 16th October an imperial manifesto was issued inviting the different nationalities to organize themselves so as to form a federated realm. On the 21st October the two hundred and ten German-Austrian members of the Reichsrat were convoked. They proceeded to constitute themselves a provisional national parliament that should take over the government and administration of German Austria and should prepare for a future constitution. At a second meeting, on the 30th October, the principles of the organization of the new State were laid down. On the 11th November it was recognized by Emperor Charles, who declared the old government at an end, and thus the Empire of the Habsburgs ingloriously terminated its career of centuries.

The German-Austrian State was faced from the outset by pressing questions of the utmost difficulty. Not only had the machinery of administration to be kept running but the

feeding of Vienna had to be attended to at every cost, and hundreds of thousands of disbanded and disorganized soldiers, streaming back from the Italian Front, had to be looked after. Unless they were promptly mustered out, or at least deprived of their arms and sped on their way to their homes, which, in many cases were in regions no longer parts of Austria, there was danger of military anarchy, such as occurred in Russia. This delicate task, however, was successfully accomplished. No attempt was made to keep any one in the ranks and before long the new republic found itself without an army.

2. *The Provisional Government and the Elections (February 1919).* The Provisional Government was formed by a coalition of the three strongest parties—the Christian Socialists, representing the more conservative and clerical element, the so-called *Bürgerliche* (Citizen) groups, among whom the German National party took the lead, and the straight Socialists. All these seem to have thrown themselves honestly and earnestly into the task of doing what was possible under the circumstances. Temporarily, three Presidents and a Council of State of twenty members (and their substitutes) were chosen by the parliament. The three Presidents with a Chancellor and a Notary of the Council were to form the directing executive body. Besides this, a number of departments were created to do the work of the former ministries. A volunteer popular guard—the *Volkswehr*—was gradually organized.

In February the elections occurred for the Assembly. There had been serious apprehensions of disturbances on this occasion. Many people believed that the country districts would vote overwhelmingly in favour of the Christian Socialists, giving them a complete majority in the Government, to which the Socialists in Vienna would refuse to submit and that the result would be civil war. Fortunately the elections passed off quietly enough. The Socialists were contented, having not only triumphed in Vienna but won successes elsewhere. Most of the country districts fell to the Christian Socialists. The Citizen groups fared worst, in part owing to the divisions in their ranks, but as no party had an absolute majority, the system of coalition government was continued. When the Constituent Assembly met, M. Seitz, a Socialist, was chosen President of the Republic; Dr. Renner remained at his former post of State Chancellor.

3. *Foreign Policy of the Republic.* One of the fundamental difficulties that had to be met in the formation of the new State was the fact that no one knew what were to be its boundaries, and there was a wide range of possibilities. From the first, the German-Austrian Government, and public opinion with it, placed itself on strong logical ground. It took the position that it accepted completely and unreservedly the fundamental principles laid down by President Wilson—that is to say, the 'Fourteen Points' and the other declarations. By so doing, it gave up all claim to retain within its borders any territory inhabited by peoples not wishing to be under it. Henceforth the Czechs, the Slovenes, and the Italians of the Trentino were to be their own masters. What the German Austrians asked for was like freedom and justice for themselves in equal accordance with President Wilson's principles. In a law of the 22nd November 1918 they declared (Article 1): 'The Republic of German Austria exercises territorial jurisdiction over the unbroken territory of German settlement within the boundaries of the kingdoms and lands formerly represented in the Reichsrat', and then follows a list of what this comprises, even including detached fragments such as Brünn, Iglau, and Olmütz. In a supplementary declaration dated the same day, it was stated that the industrial region of North-east Moravia and East Silesia forming a single economic unit inhabited by a mixed population of Germans, Czechs, and Poles, was a proper object for international administration. On the other hand, a claim was put in for the German-speaking portion of West Hungary. German Austria thus defined would have some ten million inhabitants, for it would include the German parts of Bohemia and Moravia as well as most of old Habsburg Austria. It is true some of these territories were not contiguous with the rest of the State, but this would matter little, for they did border on Germany, with which German Austria hoped soon to be merged. There might be difficulties as to the exact frontiers in regions where the population was mixed, and detached groups of German-speaking population—especially in Bohemia and Carniola—would necessarily be sacrificed. On the other hand, it was claimed that some of the non-German-speaking peasantry, notably in Carinthia, would prefer, for economic reasons, to remain with their old neighbours. At any rate, in all cases of doubt, the

German Austrians offered to submit the question to a plebiscite, provided such a plebiscite were fairly taken under the supervision of Allied or other non-partisan officials.

Logically this position was difficult to assail. President Wilson had held out to mankind the hope of a better world based on certain international principles and conditions. The German Austrians had accepted these unreservedly and only asked that the same principles should be applied to them. It was with this understanding that they had submitted and abandoned further resistance. And there is no occasion for us to question their honesty in this connexion or the genuineness of their belief that their cause was good. It was so, in many respects, but in their reasoning they left too much out of account.

In the first place, they conveniently forgot that they had for generations supported and profited by quite opposite principles. As long as they were the masters they had had small thought of self-determination or plebiscites. Now that they had come to grief, the other nationalities, who had been dominated by them, who had suffered at their hands, and had had grievances and rival claims against them that dated back for centuries, were not likely to let bygones be bygones in this easy fashion. The Austrians were a defeated nation. Not only were they doomed in the nature of things to pay reparation, but it was not easy to resist the more moderate demands made for their territory by claimants who all belonged to the victorious side. In disputed questions before the high tribunal at Paris, these all had the right of being heard verbally while Austria could only put forward her case in writing. In addition Italy sat on the tribunal which judged her own claims.

4. *Future Political Status ; Union with Germany.* Even more important than the question of the frontiers of German-Austria, though not so immediate, was that of her future political status. Three possible solutions were obvious. The new State might either constitute itself permanently as an independent republic, bound by no special ties to any of its neighbours ; or it might become a part of some confederation ; or, finally, it might return to the common fold of its nationality and join the German Republic. Each of these courses had its partisans, but the disadvantages if not actual impossibilities

of the first, although it is the one that has prevailed thus far, were so manifest that it met with much less support than the other two.

Article II of the Fundamental Law of the 12th November 1918 declared that 'German Austria is a constituent portion of the German Republic', to which its exact relations were to be determined later. The rival plan, which soon won favour, was what was usually termed a Danubian Confederation that should include German Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, Yugoslavia, perhaps Rumania, and other Balkan States—possibly even Poland, and should thus be the successor on a larger scale of the Habsburg Empire with all of its advantages but without its faults.

This idea found ardent supporters in German Austria. To begin with, it was attractive to those who still held to the old imperial tradition. Many of them regretted the downfall of the house of Habsburg, and all of them shrank from the thought that Austria, with her centuries of political primacy, should now dwindle into a mere province of a socialistic republic dominated by the North German. The deep-rooted dislike of the Prussian, which still survives in South Germany, has been far stronger in Austria, with her memories of more than a century of rivalry and of three disastrous wars, the last of which ousted her from her old hegemony. During the great struggle that had just ended, the relations between the two empires had not been such as to promote good feeling. It is true that they had fought side by side, but German scorn of Austrian inefficiency and Austrian resentment at Prussian domineering, had had ample reason to increase on both sides. In the course of the fighting, Austria had more than once been actually saved by Germany. On the other hand, she had been patronized, directed, and frequently browbeaten by her from the beginning to the end. Must she now be absorbed by her? A union with South Germany alone might be attractive, but in new greater Germany, the beautiful and cultured Vienna, the ancient seat of the proudest empire in Europe, would be nothing but a provincial town under the ferule of Berlin. In a Danubian Confederation she would be the natural capital and headquarters, and would retain something, at least, of her former imperial position.

In the second place, many people, particularly among the

property-holding classes, feared the political and social influence of a union. Not only had Germany turned into a republic with a highly democratic constitution; she also contained a great, well-organized Socialist party. At one time the triumph of socialism there looked not unlikely and perhaps imminent. Austrian Conservatives accused the Socialists in their own country of wishing for a union chiefly in order to strengthen their position. Conversely, the strength of socialism in Germany frightened every one in Austria who was opposed to its doctrines. Such feelings varied with the changing course of events. When Munich was in the throes of revolution, the alarm of Austrian Conservatives was extreme. When the Government got the upper hand in Berlin, while it tottered in Vienna, union with Germany appeared less terrifying to them.

Religious feelings also entered into the question, although the Church, as such, took no positive stand. The members of a Danubian Confederation would mostly be Roman Catholic States, and all of them (except Greece, if she were included) would contain a large Catholic element. On the other hand, the absorption in a Protestant State like Germany meant to many Catholic Austrians a triumph for Protestantism and a loss of the proud position that their country had long held as one of the chief pillars of the Church.

The economic motive weighed with many. Austrian capitalists and manufacturers had an uneasy feeling that they were less well organized, less energetic, and less modern than their German rivals. This fear had operated in the past to prevent too close economic relations between the two empires. If now the protective duties were to disappear, and if Vienna were to become a mere local emporium cut off by political barriers from her former markets, as well as from her former sources of supply, could her industries maintain themselves against the formidable competition to which they would be subjected? If, in the past, with a whole empire to exploit, Austrian industries had found it difficult to hold their own against their German competitors, what chance would they have under the new dispensation? But, in a Danubian Confederation, though its members would be politically independent, Austrian capital and industry might still hope to retain their precious economic fields. In Bohemia, in Yugo-

slavia, and even in Hungary, Vienna owned and financed mines and manufactures—not in Germany. The Habsburg Empire had, in the course of centuries, acquired a real economic balance and unity. Its now disjointed parts would suffer most seriously if they were to begin a fratricidal struggle for existence. The whole tendency of modern capital and industry is towards large conglomerations, and the only way in which these new small States could hold their own in economic or political matters, as compared with the great world empires, was to form some sort of a confederation, however loose, which would enhance their position in the world.

To these various arguments the partisans of union with Germany had much to reply. They pointed out that, for a period of ten centuries, Austria had been an integral portion of Germany, and had for many generations furnished to the German nation its emperors. Only since the war of 1866, barely more than half a century ago, had Austria led the separate existence which, in the end, had tended to her undoing. Now that the Empire of the Habsburgs had gone irretrievably to pieces and the sundered nationalities—with the exception of the Czechs and the Magyars, who had no near kin—were turning in one direction or another according to their ethnic affinities (to Italy, to Serbia, to Rumania, to Poland), what was more natural and proper than that the Germans of Austria should rejoin their brothers in their old fatherland? The separation from it had been accidental and of short duration. The reunion would not mean a triumph of North Germany over South. On the contrary, it would be a reinforcement of the Southern element which might thereby well regain the preponderance it had exercised at an earlier age. In the same way, it would not mean a success for Protestantism, but rather the strengthening of the Catholic element in Germany. To be sure, certain people might suffer economically, but they were likely to in any case. All Europe—not to say the world—was going through a painful crisis which would last until it had readjusted itself to new conditions. Vienna, with her splendid position on the Danube, would be the second capital of the German State, a centre of enterprise and industry, and would draw under her influence the South German regions which had always had more affinity with her than with Berlin. A reunited Germany would be

large enough for both. Painful as the losses of Germany had been, and difficult as was the crisis she was now going through, she remained and would remain a great State. Only from her could the Austrians obtain the immediate support and the future security of which they were in such sore need.

The advantages of a Danube Confederation might be considerable in theory, but what was the chance of their realization? How was such a confederation to be formed? Was it to have a common parliament? Could any one imagine that the different Danubian States, after what had just occurred, would consent to be subject in any way to a single parliament that should make laws for them all? The idea was absurd. The best that could be attempted was a series of agreements—of compromises. But Austria knew something about such compromises. Since 1867 her relations with Hungary had rested upon a compromise—the famous *Ausgleich*—which had had to be renewed every ten years. From the start it had never worked well. There had been endless discussion, bargaining, hard feeling. Only the pressure of certain great unifying forces, like the crown and the military influence, had managed somehow or other, at the last moment, to bring about a solution, each time with greater difficulty. After the agreement was thus reached with infinite pains, both parties set to work at once to plan out how they could make a better bargain at the next renewal. And all this had happened at a time when Hungary and Austria had been supposedly—and to a considerable extent were in fact—on the most intimate terms with one another. How could any one in his senses imagine that now the whole heterogeneous group of Danubian States, with their recent strife and hatred, their new hopes and ambitions, their conflicting interests and selfish designs, could form a good working confederation in the midst of the wild confusion and fierce passions of the day?

5. *Decline of the Idea of a Danube Confederation.* As the months of 1919 went by these last arguments gained in force, and the partisans of a union with Germany increased in number, while those in favour of a Danube Confederation diminished. Many people who would have preferred a connexion of some sort with their former compatriots of another nationality gradually came to admit that it was out of the question. This was chiefly due to the realization that the other

States had no desire for it. Each of them was eager to solve its own problems. It was thinking only of its own expansion and was little interested in the carcass of the former empire, save for what could be got from it. Both the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugo-slavs had, in great measure, immediately cut off the territories they had occupied from connexion with Austria. The export of food was rigorously prohibited; that of coal, which was even more essential, was continually interrupted; indeed, at times, traffic almost ceased. This violent rupture of ties and the interference with trade produced grievous hardship, especially in Vienna, which depended on the outside world for existence. In the contested regions of Styria and Carinthia there were intermittent hostilities, accompanied, as was inevitable, by many tales of outrages. From Bohemia came reports of the brutality of the Czech soldiers and officials towards the German population. The new Czecho-Slovak State, full of energy and ambition and controlling, as it did, the coal supply on which Vienna depended, soon excited increasing apprehension and dislike. It kept up a powerful army; Austria had none. The Czechs had also possessed themselves of the Hungarian town of Pressburg (Bratislava) on the Danube, with the express intention of making it some day the chief port of the river trade. In addition, the great future land route from Constantinople to the North Sea should run through Prague and Pressburg (Bratislava), leaving Vienna to one side, which in the future was to be replaced by Prague as the central city of Europe. How could Austria enter into a confederation with a neighbour of this sort? Only in Hungary was there noticeable sentiment in favour of a Danube league, but the Hungarians, too, held on as tight as they could to their own food, and relations between them and the Austrians were none too good.

Thus, through the winter and the spring of 1919, the idea of a Danube Confederation faded and the movement for union with Germany grew stronger, although Germany—while sympathetic—took no active steps to encourage it. Indeed, she could hardly do so until she had ascertained the feelings of the Allies on the subject and had learned on what terms she herself must accept peace. It was no secret that this union was looked on askance by the victorious Powers. France was known to be emphatically opposed. Italy was thought to be

favourable, and at any rate was hostile to a Danube Confederation, which seemed to her too much like a new Austria-Hungary on a larger scale. The small new States, and especially Czecho-Slovakia, regarded any union between Austria and Germany as a menace to themselves. Under the circumstances, the Austrian Government might have attempted to profit by the situation and obtain better terms at the Peace Conference in return for a promise that it would remain independent. Instead, whether wisely or not, it let events take their course.¹

6. *Critical Condition of the new Austria.* From the first, the existence of the new republic of German Austria was not, and could not be, easy. The difficulties that faced it were appalling, and most of them did not tend to diminish with time. To begin with there was the danger of actual starvation. German Austria is a mountainous country incapable of producing any large quantity of food and is far from being able to satisfy the needs of Vienna alone, even if the peasants at that time had been willing to, which they were not. The rest of the old empire of Austria-Hungary was now practically closed to the unfortunate city which had once been its capital. Wherever a new State had come into existence a barrier of frontier lines had suddenly been erected, and on the other side of the barrier was a nation which was thinking of itself and of its own necessities, hoarding what it possessed and indisposed to let anything go to its neighbours, least of all food. Austria had little to offer in return except depreciated paper money. Yet her people had to be fed somehow or other. A minimum of supplies had to be obtained at whatever cost; a great system of distribution had to be instituted; and prices had to be regulated. The upper classes lived largely from food brought in by the *Schleichhandel*—that is to say, smuggled into the city—because the peasant who would not part with his possessions for the prices fixed by the Government, even though they were higher than what it sold them for, would sometimes, if sufficiently tempted, dispose of them to richer customers. This *Schleichhandel*—a considerable part of which came over the Hungarian frontier, in spite of the efforts of Hungarian authorities to stop it—was often winked at by the Austrian ones. It might be illegal, but after all it

¹ For decision on the question in the Treaty, v. pp. 391-2.

did bring in more provisions than would otherwise have come, and this was something to be thankful for, even if the lower classes and the *Volkswehr* highly disapproved of it as aiding only the rich. Meatless days were soon followed by meatless weeks, and at times the authorities could hardly see their way ahead for more than a few days. Conditions became a little better with the spring, when vegetables could be got from the neighbourhood and particularly when the food from America, provided by the Allied Food Administration under the charge of Mr. Hoover, began to arrive regularly and in considerable quantities. But the struggle against famine was never ending and still continues to-day.

The fuel situation was as critical as the food one. Manufactories in Vienna and Wiener Neustadt had come to a standstill. The heating of buildings in the coldest winter days was often the exception rather than the rule. The lighting of the streets was kept down to its lowest limits. Theatres and restaurants were forced to close at early hours, and people were allowed but one light in a room and only in one or two rooms at a time. But, with every restriction of the consumption of coal, the demand continually threatened to overtake the supply, and there were no reserves in store. The vital needs were those of a minimum of railway transportation, and of the manufacture of gas with which most of the cooking at Vienna is done. It was also most important in so large a city to keep the tramways running. All fuel had to be obtained from outside, and much the greater part of it either from Bohemia or from Silesia, passing through Czech territory. One could not be astonished if the Czechs did not always show good-will in regard to this. They needed their coal for their own industries, which they were anxious to bring again into activity, and they were hampered by the decreased production of their mines, owing to labour and other troubles. In Austrian Silesia the situation was complicated by the rival claims of Czechs and Poles for possession—claims which led to endless difficulties and even to hostilities. In German Silesia the situation was confused politically, and it was made worse by a succession of strikes. Under these circumstances, one almost wonders that the Austrians were able to get fuel at all; in truth, they could hardly have done so if it had not been for the powerful support of the Inter-Allied Commission.

The financial situation—bad all the world over—was nowhere worse than in Austria. During the war the national debt had grown to fantastic proportions and the quantity of paper money in circulation was immeasurable. Without a reform of the currency no economic stability could be reached. But, far from being able to reduce the amount of it in circulation, the Government had no resource for paying its bills except the continual printing of more kronen, as its expenses vastly exceeded its income, and most of them it could not cut down, but had to keep on increasing. The people of the capital had to be fed; the unemployed and many others had to be supported, and the wages of the Government employees in the post, telegraph, railways, and everywhere else had to be raised continually as the steady rise of prices made living conditions dearer every day. It was easy enough to say that such a policy must lead to ruin and that the people of German Austria could not live indefinitely at the cost of the State with the aid of the printing press, but for the Government to cease its largesses of all kinds meant immediate revolution, anarchy, and widespread starvation. All it could do was to try to be economical and to make such preparations as it might for a better future.

Under these conditions normal economic life was impossible. Apart from the fact that many of the men returned from the trenches in Austria, as well as elsewhere, had lost their habit of work and were not eager to toil again as of old, the closing of factories had thrown a great number of others out of employment. Cut off as Austria was from outside, without raw materials of her own for industry, or coal to keep the manufacturing going, it was impossible to make even a beginning of the former activity. In consequence, during the winter and spring of 1918-19 there were from ninety to one hundred and twenty thousand unemployed in Vienna alone, all of whom had to be supported. There were thousands more at Wiener Neustadt and elsewhere. The officers and officials of the old Government constituted a special class of unemployed. In the administration and in the army of the Habsburgs, the German Austrians had furnished more than their proportionate share. They were now to suffer for this, as thousands of officers and civil officials suddenly found themselves without occupation. They were often men of middle age with families, some

of them highly trained, but they had for years followed one career and were little fitted for any other, even if they had the opportunities, which was not the case. They were not acceptable in the new States, useful as they might sometimes be, for they represented the German, the ancient oppressor, now the foreigner, and as such all they could do was to drift back to German Austria, where there was no room for them. Some of them would have been glad to serve as soldiers, but they were naturally looked on with suspicion by the radical element, who regarded them as reactionaries and minions of the old régime. Their plight was piteous.

7. *Relations to Hungary.* Finally there remained, as there still remains, the ever-present danger of revolution. It was all very well to point out that no change in the form of government would bring more food or coal into the land. This was realized by the extreme radicals themselves and may be taken as the chief reason why they kept so quiet during many trying months. But when a situation gets desperate people want to do something—no matter what—and where there is famine there are sure to be rumours that the rich are hoarding secret stores of provisions, which they should be forced to disgorge. The situation across the border, only a few miles away from Vienna, made matters worse, for revolutionary agitation is contagious. As soon as the Bolsheviks got the upper hand in Hungary, emissaries appeared to spread their doctrine and to make people believe that, if Austria were to follow the example of her neighbour, she could be supplied with food. In Vienna there was also much talk of Russian Bolsheviks in the city and of the enormous sums of money they were supposed to have at their disposal. Later this was said of the Hungarian ones, and, in point of fact, when the headquarters of the Bolshevik Hungarian diplomatic agent were raided by Hungarian refugees—probably with the connivance of the Austrian police—more than a hundred million kronen in money and valuables were found. At one time there was even fear of a Hungarian invasion, an invasion which Austria would have found it difficult to oppose, as the *Volkswehr* could hardly be counted upon in such a contingency. On the contrary, some of them would probably have made common cause with it. The radical elements among them tended to predominate from the first—indeed, one particular division was popularly called the

'red guard', for it freely carried the red flag, and its members were known to hold principles akin to Bolshevism. In the early days of the revolution at Budapest a section of them actually joined the new Hungarian 'Red Army', but returned after some weeks, apparently not enthusiastic over their adventure. The *Volkswehr* were not an imposing force, either in equipment or in physique, and they presented a curious contrast to the Vienna police, who still maintained their smartness and efficiency under the direction of their old chief, whom the new Government eagerly retained. Somehow or other the weeks passed. The Government never seemed too sure of its existence for the morrow, but it continued to live. Order was maintained, or rather maintained itself. During the long dreary months of the winter and spring, many rumours were afloat of impending revolution and mob rule, abetted, if not actually brought about, by the *Volkswehr*, but, save for one or two demonstrations that led to bloodshed, there was little real disturbance. All classes submitted to their hard situation with admirable patience.

8. *Austria at the Conference.*¹ Meanwhile the Conference and its Committees at Paris were discussing, among other things, the terms of peace that were to be imposed upon Austria. The whole question is more fully discussed elsewhere, but a few indications of the manner in which the Austrians viewed it may be permitted here. It was in the nature of the situation that, even if the arbiters had been equally well disposed towards both parties, the one which was represented on the spot and could make its voice heard would have a great advantage. The other side could only offer its arguments through the medium of Allied Representatives who happened to be in their midst and who might or might not be well disposed towards them. And, apart from their difficulty in maintaining their claims, the Austrians, like the Germans before them and the Bulgarians after them, suffered from the inevitable disadvantage that, in every contested question, the Powers were naturally inclined to favour their friends rather than their recent enemies.

¹ For the general treatment of Austria at the Conference, v. Chapters III, IV, and VII *passim*. For the settlement of the frontier with Italy, v. pp. 373-87; with Czecho-Slovakia, pp. 267-77; with Yugo-slavia, pp. 372-3, and with Hungary, pp. 382-8.

The Conference strove to act according to justice, but it was a justice that had to take many elements into consideration. Although the claims of self-determination which we may assume as almost coinciding with those of nationality were to remain the basis of the decisions of the tribunal, it was only when those claims were unfavourable to German Austria that they were certain to be decisive. When they were on the side of the Austrians, other considerations came into account. Strategic requirements, economic necessities, historic rights, were all invoked when need be and often with success. Thus, in the case of the German-speaking districts of Botzen and Meran in the Southern Tyrol, the Italian claim, which was set forth on geographical and strategic grounds, was essentially 'imperialistic', and hardly more justifiable in itself than the former Austrian possession of the Trentino. It was acceded to by the other Powers as a matter of general policy or of previous agreement, though it was regarded by many people as a particularly flagrant case of the violation of the principle of self-determination. The German parts of Bohemia and Moravia, likewise inhabited by a population which had lived there for almost as long as the Czechs had in their portion of the country, and which were bitterly opposed to being incorporated into a Czech State, were nevertheless handed over to it in deference to the historical and geographical unity of Bohemia and as a reward for what the Czechs had done for the Allies in Siberia and elsewhere. The decision in this instance was in glaring contrast to the one in the south, where the fact that Styria and Carinthia had been parts of Austria for many centuries counted for nothing in the drawing of the boundary line between the Austrians and the Slovenes—a line which gave almost all the mixed districts to the Slovenes and provided in the case of the Klagenfurt basin for a couple of plebiscites conducted under circumstances that should strengthen the Slovene chances of success. This was accomplished by stipulating that the district in which they were more likely to win should vote first. If it should go in their favour, then the other, which was closely united to it by economic ties, might perhaps follow suit. This was the only case where the strong Austrian pleas for a plebiscite in all disputed regions met with even a semblance of attention. As there was no thought of listening to them, and it might have

been awkward to refuse under the principle of self-determination, they were simply ignored.

Under these circumstances, one need not be surprised if the Austrians have since regarded the 'Fourteen Points', and especially the principle of self-determination, as a mockery and a sham, which merely served to lure them to their ruin. In this they are not altogether just, for it also helped to protect them against certain extreme claims on the part of the Czechs and the Yugo-slavs, and it brought them, at least in theory, an actual accession of territory.

The German-speaking region of West Hungary during much of its history had been part of Austria, and was economically in closer connexion with Vienna, to which it served as a kitchen garden, than with Budapest. The Austrians asked that it be allotted to them, subject to a fair plebiscite. The Conference agreed to grant most of it and without any plebiscite. The Hungarians, however, have protested vigorously, and they will not yield if they can help themselves, knowing that Austria, by herself, is too weak to compel them. We have here an apple of discord between these two shrunken heirs of the old Dual Empire that may embitter relations between them in the future.

In the question of all others where one would have said that, if any regard were to be paid to the principle of self-determination, the wish of the Austrians could not be denied, they met with inflexible opposition. Before they were even given a chance to express their views it was made clear to them by the German treaty that the Allies did not intend to allow them to join their kin, at least for the present. This decision is open to grave criticism. If the world, under the League of Nations, is to be governed according to the principles of a new freedom, what could be a more crass violation of it than to forbid two portions of the same nationality from forming a union that is desired by both, especially when one of them bids fair to go to ruin without it? This the British and Americans realized, although not welcoming the union in itself. The Italians appear to have preferred it to a Danube Confederation. The strongest opposition came from the French, who, in view of their own terrific losses in wealth and man-power from the war, were aghast at the thought that Germany might emerge defeated, indeed, but with European territory and population

equal or superior to what she had possessed when the conflict began. Against such a Germany, undiminished in permanent strength and nourished by hopes of revenge, the French felt that they had inadequate protection. Small wonder, then, that they were and are strongly opposed to letting German Austria become part of the new German State.

There is another and weaker country to which such a prospect is more menacing still. Czecho-Slovakia includes within her borders three million Germans, most of whom are in unbroken territorial contact with their kinsmen in Germany and Austria. The more desperate the situation of German Austria becomes, the less may be the immediate attraction she will exercise on the Germans in Bohemia, but the greater the danger that this utterly bereft territory will not only turn of itself, but will be allowed to turn in the only direction that seems to promise refuge, namely, Germany. But a greater Germany thus formed will inevitably attract towards it the millions of Germans who, against their will, have just been put under Czech rule, and we may question whether any League of Nations will, in the long run, insist on keeping a large European population under a dominion which is hateful to it. The Government of Czecho-Slovakia is intelligent enough to grasp the immensity of such a peril and to realize that it is not for its interests to crush German Austria beyond a given point. It has therefore of late exhibited a tendency to seek for better relations. By a recent agreement, the Czechs have shown a willingness to connect themselves once more to a certain extent with the people with whom they have so long lived in a common empire, but with whom they have lived in such sharp antagonism. Czecho-Slovakia can help German Austria in many ways, especially by furnishing her with the coal of which she is in sore need. She can also refrain from pressing her too hard in matters of reparation and liquidation. Curiously enough, close relations with Czecho-Slovakia—which at the present time mean Czech ascendancy—are favoured by many Austrians, and not entirely for material reasons, though these are compelling enough. Intensely humiliating as it is to the older type of Austrians to be in a position of dependence on the Czechs whom they so long ruled, a close connexion with them means also a close connexion with the German population of Bohemia. If the two States

were to become as one, the combined German element—say nine and a half million—would be more numerous than the six and a half million Czechs, and about equal to the Czechs and Slovaks put together. Who can tell then what the future would be?

On the occasion of the appearance of the Austrian delegates before the Conference, it was noticeable that Dr. Renner persistently spoke of his country as 'German Austria'. The President of the Conference, M. Clemenceau, has invariably used the term 'Austria', and this is what was put in the Treaty.¹ The difference was not merely one of words but of a fundamental idea. According to the representatives of German Austria (so called), who argued the point with some skill, their State was only one of a number of fragments into which the old Habsburg Empire had broken up. They pointed out that the highest government officials, both at the outbreak of and during the war, came from all sections of the Empire, and they declared that German Austria was no more responsible for the acts of what was formerly Austria-Hungary than were any of the other fragments, such as Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, and Yugo-slavia, whose inhabitants had also taken part in the struggle and had been no more opposed to it than had been the men who now were at the helm in German Austria. All portions of the Habsburg Monarchy should, therefore, be treated equally. While German Austria was ready to bear her fair share of indemnities and other burdens, it would be highly unjust to saddle upon her responsibilities which no more belonged to her than they did to her neighbours. Like them, she was a new independent State which must share in the general suffering from the events that had preceded its existence, but which bore no individual guilt in the matter.

Needless to say, this theory was not at all to the taste of the other portions of the old Habsburg dominions, except Hungary, whose situation resembled that of Austria. The rest maintained that they had been enslaved nationalities, and that their guilty masters could not shed responsibilities in this easy way by merely changing their own name. This was the view adopted by the Allies. The small new Austria was declared to be and was treated as the successor of the old larger one and had to pay the penalty of its succession.

¹ v. also Chap. VII, pp. 396-9.

That penalty was grievous, though the Powers recognized that the new State could not possibly bear the whole huge burden incurred by the former empire, and they cut down the reparations, indemnities, and financial obligations imposed upon it to an extent that bitterly disappointed the hungry claimants for them. Even so, we may well doubt whether German Austria can ever carry out the terms that have been dictated to her.

When it came to the question of assets rather than liabilities, both sides tended to shift their position. For instance, to whom belonged the vast properties of the old Habsburg State, including not only fortresses and arsenals, military and railway material, but hospitals, museums, and public buildings of many sorts? Here, the Austrians tended to claim, as far as possible, everything that was situated on their territory, while the Czechs, the Yugo-slavs, etc., asserted that such things were common property to which each was entitled to a fair share. Naturally views varied as to what was a fair share. The principle of liquidation, which was accepted to a certain extent by the Austrians, was one difficult to apply in practice and capable of indefinite extension. It might be made to include every picture in the Vienna Galleries, every fossil in the museums, and a part possession in every government building and in all the confiscated property of the imperial family. Then there were reclamations for past depredations. The Czechs soon began to raise their voices in favour of obtaining back everything which they had lost after the battle of the White Hill in the year 1620 and earlier. The Italians demanded, and ended by helping themselves forcibly to, certain pictures in the Vienna Gallery, which they said were rightfully theirs, and they filed a much larger contingent claim for future use, if need be. Thus, one more of the few resources of the city, the thing most likely to bring strangers to it, has been seriously menaced.

9. *The future Economic Difficulties.* Let us consider the condition of Austria as she has emerged from war and revolution and from the peace of Saint-Germain-en-Laye. Whatever her faults, she has suffered for them and far more severely than has Germany. The disruption of her former empire is complete and irreparable. The people that built it up and governed it, ruling over nationalities that have furnished less than they to the civilization and progress of the world, now

control but a remnant of their former domain. In the rest of it they are now subjects of those they have always looked down upon. Of the ten million German-speaking people of former Austria, about one-third are to-day under foreign rule. The Republic of Austria, as delimited in Paris, consists of what is left of the Tyrol, of Salzkammergut, Upper and Lower Austria, of a part of Carinthia, most of Styria, and, in theory at least, of a part of West Hungary. Her shape is that of a saucepan with the Tyrol forming the long handle. Almost the whole of this territory is mountainous, with much beautiful scenery and extensive forests, but comparatively little fertile soil and slight mineral wealth. It is rich in undeveloped water power, but where is the money coming from for development in these days when there is such a cry for capital from all over the world? Austria will not be one of the first places to get it. Several of the provinces are scarcely capable of raising sufficient food for their own subsistence. All of them together are far from being able to feed the city of Vienna alone (not to speak of Innsbruck, Linz, Grätz, and other towns) with its population of over one and a half million people—that is to say, about a quarter of that of the Republic.

The future of Vienna certainly looks most discouraging from every point of view. A metropolis, the magnificent capital of a powerful empire, a city full of palaces and museums, famous for its University, its art, its music, the gaiety of its life, and the attractiveness of its manufactures, what is to set it going again? The brilliant court, the thousands of salaried officers and officials, the wealthy aristocracy from every part of the country, who have made it their winter home, will be there no more. The capitalists and the managers of large enterprises are many of them ruined; others are likely to emigrate to the new States where their property is situated. In spite of native taste and skill, the local industries will find it very hard to revive, for they will no longer have either their sources of supply or their markets in their own land, and the financial situation is ruinous. For three winters Vienna has been on the verge of starvation, and has had to depend on the charity of her recent enemies. What are her prospects for next year or the year after, or for years to come? How long can she keep on buying food or fuel with a currency worth but an infinitesimal fraction of its former value?

Another thing to be remembered is that, not only are the Austrian country districts incapable of supporting a city of such size, but they do not want to. On the contrary, especially at the present moment, their feelings run in the opposite direction. In a period of disaster, universal disillusionment, suffering, and despair, such as Austria is now passing through, all the selfishnesses—local as well as individual—come to the surface. To-day the control of the Austrian central Government over the provinces is but slight. Each of them is thinking of itself much more than it is of the whole State, and is only disposed to heed such orders from the Government as it chooses to. Least of all, does it care anything about the capital, as such. The dislike of the rural population for the octopus of the modern great city exists in all lands. In the former Austria, it was intensified by the nationalistic hatred of the Slavs towards a centralizing government they regarded as foreign, but, even in German Austria itself, it was and is strong. To the people of the provinces, many of them old-fashioned, conservative, and proud of their local traditions, Vienna is the home of the official, the capitalist, the Jew, and now of the Socialist. If these are suffering—well, it is largely their fault. In the universal dearth of food, each region has tried to keep what it has for itself. Not only export prohibitions, but rules keeping any outsider—even a Viennese who owns an estate in the country—from coming in, have been the order of the day. Cruel and selfish as such an attitude may seem, it is comprehensible. What have the Viennese to give in return for food? Merely fresh quantities of almost worthless paper money, of which the peasant already has more than he knows what to do with. Rather than sell his milk, or his chickens, or his vegetables for such a return, he prefers to add to his stock for the future or to consume them himself.

10. *Political Difficulties.* Politically, too, the provinces feel little attracted towards Vienna. They have been loyal in the past to the Habsburg Dynasty. The Tyrol in particular has been famous for this. But the Empire and the Dynasty are gone. Why should people have any sentimentality about a fragment that calls itself German Austria? The Tyrol to-day consists of little more than one long valley with an absurd stretch of frontiers. It is suffering, itself, from lack of food. What good can it get from further political connexion

with a bankrupt State and a starving capital? If it had been allowed to keep its districts of Botzen and Meran, it might have had substance enough left to support itself and perhaps keep in communion with Austria. Now, the obvious thing is for it to sever a tie which brings no advantage and to join the Fatherland to the north. It is clear that union with it may offer uncertainties, but it also offers hopes, while there seems no hope—nothing but memories—to foster a connexion with Austria. All this the Tyrolese have thought out and have openly discussed, and Austria herself makes no real opposition. The Conference at Paris, to be sure, has forbidden the step, but it cannot forbid Austria from going to pieces. In the Tyrol itself, the district of Vorarlberg is clamouring for a union with Switzerland. This also has been forbidden by the victorious Allied and Associated Powers, who wish to keep their creation intact. They know that if the Tyrol breaks away, the neighbouring province of Salzkammergut, where most of the conditions are similar, will follow suit, and where will the process stop, and what is to happen to Vienna then? But how long can such prohibitions continue under the present desperate circumstances? We may well question whether it will be possible for the League of Nations, or any one else, without an odious abuse of power, to prevent German-speaking Austria from uniting herself, sooner or later—either as a whole or as a series of detached parts—to the main body of the German nation, if there is no other salvation for her? The Powers who have taken part in the Conference of Paris may not be responsible for the existence of German Austria, but they are responsible for the conditions of existence that have been imposed upon her, and particularly for prohibiting her from following what would seem to be her natural destiny. Time alone can show whether such action has been wise and whether any permanent result has been obtained.

In the winter of 1920 two notable results were accomplished which meant much to Austria, the one in the material, the other in the moral, sense. By the plebiscite in Zone A at Klagenfurt in October, Austria definitely and permanently acquired control over the whole of the Klagenfurt basin, with its agricultural supplies and its 150,000 inhabitants. By the vote of the Assembly in December Austria was made a member of the League of Nations. Membership of the League means

recognition, it also implies protection against enemies, and may increase the possibility of reciprocal trade relations.

The world has just witnessed the downfall of a famous and mighty empire, a State which had lived through the vicissitudes of many centuries, which had withstood the attack of the Turk at the height of his power, and which had in the end emerged victorious from its conflicts with the great Napoleon. It has fallen into fragments, and from these fragments have arisen new national States eager to play their part in the future. Even the pitiful remnant, which the victors have labelled as the successor to the old Austria, must some day come to its own, whatever that may be. It too has a right to live its own life and to mould its destinies as best it can.

CHAPTER IX

PART II

THE NEW HUNGARY

1. *Introductory.* It is not possible to do more than indicate with a few strokes the state of the New Hungary, for her situation is still uncertain and the Treaty has not yet come into force. Of all the re-modelled enemy States, she has been the loudest in her outcries against the Treaty, and the most reluctant to accept her new destiny. The reason of this is to be sought in her history. As a cultural and political entity Hungary is older than Austria, and has a thousand years of history behind her. None the less, her policy has changed strikingly and for the worse in the last hundred years. Whereas in her early days Hungary had welcomed alien nationalities within her State, since 1867, or even since 1825, she has, whenever possible, subjected them all (and they comprised about half the population of the Hungarian Kingdom) to a ruthless policy of Magyarization, despite stubborn opposition from Slovak, Serb, and Ruman. Passions so fierce could not be aroused without dangerous consequences. The war inevitably separated these nationalities from the Magyar body-politic, and the operation was accompanied by humiliating incidents. Yet the right way to regard these matters is not to look on them as due to the passions of the moment but as caused by the memory of wrongs, harboured for many years. In the days when the Serbs entered Temesvár and the Ruman Budapest, the Magyars tasted something of the bitterness that others had felt for so long. The attitude engendered on each side by this history may be and is deplorable, but it is the capital fact of the present situation.

The Magyar policy has always been the same since 1867. An able, small, and fanatically Magyar oligarchy has dominated the parliament, the administration, and the State by sheer force of character and achievement. The prestige of a ruling

race, much political insight and parliamentary ability, backed by a coalition between Jewish capitalists and the large Magyar landowners,¹ had enabled the Magyars to impose their severe and denationalizing policy upon the subject races they humiliated and oppressed. Withal, none will deny to the Magyars much political capacity and some administrative efficiency, but a narrow racial policy had brought matters to a crisis. Even before the war the burden of the subject races was becoming intolerable. The Magyar State rested on the two pillars of a restricted franchise and a unified Kingdom. Either universal suffrage or a federalized State would have enabled the different nationalities to realize their aspirations and to overthrow Magyar hegemony. Both proposals were, therefore, anathema. The Magyars claimed to be a 'national State', but their idea of such a State was the oppression of three or four nationalities for the benefit of a fifth. To this conception the Wilsonian ideas of democratic rule and national self-determination were as dangerous as dynamite, and in this case, at any rate, words proved mightier than the sword.²

2. *The Collapse of the Old Régime.* Early in 1918 the profoundest student of Hungarian history and politics stated that the dangers to his country had ceased to be racial and had become social and economic.³ It was a true forecast of subsequent tendencies, for from the early months of 1918 onwards the old era of rigid racial ascendancy was passing away. The Pacifists, the Social Democrats, and the Radicals began to be strong in the towns and were constantly pointing to Count Károlyi, the aristocratic Radical, as the one hope of Hungary. In May 1917 Tisza, the strongest representative of the old régime, was dismissed from the Premiership by the young King Charles (Austrian Emperor). No Ministry that succeeded had any chance of prolonging its life, and many Magyars also now realized that Austria, as distinguished from Hungary, was writhing in the agonies of death. The final crisis arose from two events. On the 16th October 1918, Charles issued a proclamation for 'federalizing' Austria. Andrassy, the ablest of Hungary's 'Elder Statesmen', described this as

¹ It was estimated that about one-fifth of the soil of Hungary was, before the war, in the hand of 3,768 persons.

² A curious and characteristic Magyar analysis of the Wilsonian ideas is given by Andrassy, *Diplomatie und Weltkrieg*, Vienna, 1920, pp. 275-7.

³ Professor Henrik Marczali.

a 'bombshell',¹—for federalism, which might save Austria, must ruin Hungary. Another shock followed. President Wilson's famous reply of the 18th October made it clear that Hungary would lose her Yugo-slavs and that Austria was to be broken beyond hope of recovery.² Many Magyars thought at once of separation, of cutting themselves free from this living corpse. Even Andrassy admits that the idea was 'undeniably popular'.³ But the 'Elder Statesmen' could not quite go as far as this, though their proposed concessions show their disillusionment and despair. On the 24th October Andrassy proposed three demands as necessary: (1) universal suffrage; (2) a separate peace; (3) co-operation with the Social Democrats. Even the stubborn Tisza submitted. 'What a soul-shattering struggle', writes Andrassy, 'must this inflexible man have undergone before he agreed to this!' A feeble attempt was made by King Charles to put in the Archduke Joseph as a strong man and Count Hadik as a conciliatory Premier. But it failed in a week. Like the repentant Kaiser in Germany, who appointed a prince as his Chancellor, the young King of Hungary sought to appoint an Archduke as *homo regius*, in each case to conciliate the Socialists. When the Archduke failed, Charles fell back on a noble as the only hope of saving the situation (30th October).⁴ The day after Károlyi took office Tisza was assassinated.

3. *Károlyi, November 1918–March 1919.* As the 'Elder Statesmen' had already become relics of a vanished past, and the young King soon ceased to trouble him, Károlyi held the fate of Hungary in his hands. He differed from Max of Baden and 'Joseph Habsburg' in that his past career squared with his present position. Though a great landowner he had long advocated emancipating the peasant and breaking up big estates, though a great aristocrat he favoured universal suffrage, though a Magyar he now proposed self-determination for the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary. To-day the nobles regard him as a traitor and the masses as a dupe. In truth

¹ Andrassy, p. 278. The proclamation was accompanied by a reservation that federalization did not apply to Hungary, but this hardly affected the matter.

² v. Chap. I, Part III, §§ 27 and 30.

³ Andrassy, p. 292.

⁴ Even Tisza, though opposed to this step on the 7th October, had advised it at the last. v. Andrassy, p. 309. Cf. this volume, Chap. I, Part III, §§ 33 and 38.

he was neither, merely a man of generous ideas and very moderate abilities, incapable of directing events or controlling circumstances at a supreme crisis. He is important in history not for what he was but because, for one delirious moment, he embodied the ideas which were triumphant—popular government and democratic co-operation between races. But he embodied ideas alone and was slow and weak in all constructive or practical action.

His first steps destroyed his own power and led to his subsequent unpopularity. On the 1st November the Hungarian Government ordered the Hungarian troops on all fronts to lay down their arms. As a result, thousands of famished soldiers and discontented officers soon filled Budapest and the countryside. Discipline went, and Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils arose. On the 13th November Károlyi's agents negotiated the Hungarian Military Convention with the Allies which has been described elsewhere.¹ On the 16th November he proclaimed the Republic of Hungary. For the moment this had the merit of stabilizing conditions and producing a relative calm, and it left Károlyi to face the other three difficulties—the land-hunger of the peasants, the unrest of the urban masses in Budapest, and the discontent of the demobilized soldiers. In point of fact, he did little for any of these things, and he made only spasmodic attempts to re-organize an efficient force capable of keeping order in the capital or the provinces. The result might have been foreseen. Various incidents caused the Rumanians to advance their demarcation line,² and finally led, under circumstances described elsewhere, to the famous uprising of Béla Kun, the Communist Jew who came to regenerate the Hungarian world. Károlyi vanished at once from politics, as 'transient and embarrassed a phantom' as had ever tried to rule in a crisis.

4. *Béla Kun and the Soviet Régime, March–1st August 1919.* After weakness came violence. Béla Kun assumed power with two objects in view: first to retain an undivided Hungary,³ and second to impose on that undivided Hungary a Communistic régime. Kun was prepared to go all lengths in pro-

¹ Chap. III, Part II, § 1. (Text in App. I, pp. 509–11.)

² v. Vol. I, pp. 352–4, and this volume, Chap. II, Part I, § 4; Chap. III, Part II, § 2.

³ For the Smuts Mission, etc., v. Vol. I, p. 854, and for the Rumanian attack, Vol. I, pp. 352–7, and this volume, Chap. III, Part II, §§ 2 and 3.

moting the latter. Opponents or reactionaries were seldom executed but were imprisoned in large numbers; the press was gagged and all except Socialists were intimidated. Energetic steps were taken to destroy the capitalistic régime, and to erect a socialistic one. As such they were a complete failure. The endeavours to socialize wealth and to produce manufactures on a communal system resulted in the collection of all the pictures from private galleries in one public hall, and in the establishment of some model factories, which were shown to visitors for propagandist purposes. But, apart from this, the general result was to disorganize industrial life and to cause ruinous losses to all parties. The best testimony to the inadequacy of the system was the fact that the trade unions declared against Kun in May, while the peasants in the provinces, who seem to have conceived a great hatred of the Kun régime, stopped all supplies and practically blockaded the capital. After Kun's fall, Mr. Hoover found in Budapest a great dearth of food, of medicines, and of all kinds of stores. It is certain that Budapest suffered more from Kun than it had from the war.

Communism had its international side. Kun endeavoured to get into touch with Lenin, and first attacked Czecho-Slovakia, undoubtedly in order to break through and to join hands with Bolshevist Russia. As such he had some success, and his negotiations with the Supreme Council¹ gave him considerable reputation. There seems to be no doubt, despite many assertions to the contrary, that his movement had a national, as well as an international, side. There were a number of officers and soldiers who fought for him in the belief that he stood for an undivided and historic Hungary and because he defied the Powers. This fact accounts for some of the success of Kun's movement. On the other hand, a counter-revolutionary government had formed itself at Szegedin and attracted volunteers to its standard, under the protection of the Allies. These forces were armed and drilled in three battalions by Admiral Horthy, and were subsequently of some importance in restoring order in the capital after the fall of Béla Kun. That worthy was now desperate. Either a desire again to join hands with the Bolsheviks or the need of food caused him to launch a frantic attack on the Rumanians. This proved an

¹ v. Vol. I, pp. 353, 354.

utter failure, and the Rumanians in their counter-attack advanced, and were within fifty miles of Budapest on the 1st August. It is an ironical fact that the Supreme Council had previously stopped a Rumanian advance on the capital,¹ which Kun himself now rendered inevitable.

Kun did not wait for the arrival of the Rumanians but fled to Vienna on the 1st August. On the 2nd a new Government of Social Democrats under Peidl was constituted, which repudiated Bolshevism and announced its respect for private property. But it was not by these means that the reaction could be averted. The Red Terror had already passed, the White Terror was to come. The Reactionaries, embittered by poverty and humiliation, gathered their forces and formed a new party known as 'Christian Nationals'. In the *interim* Budapest was sacked by the Rumanians, who entered the capital in force on the 8th.

5. *The Rumanian Occupation, the anti-Habsburg Manifesto of the Supreme Council, 22nd August 1919.* Budapest suffered very much at the hands of the Rumanians, and an active, almost frantic, hatred of Rumania has since pervaded all Hungary's relations with her.² The Supreme Council on the 5th despatched four Inter-Allied generals to Budapest,³ and refused to accept responsibility for the Rumanian proceedings. Meanwhile, the Archduke 'Joseph Habsburg' and a number of ex-officers expelled the Social-Democratic Government by a *coup d'état* (6th August) and called on the Allies to recognize the *fait accompli*. The Archduke called himself 'Administrator' and appointed Friedrich as Premier. The Inter-Allied Mission is said to have shown him some favour, but after Mr. Hoover's visit to Budapest the Supreme Council took an important decision against him which they expressed incisively as follows :

'It [the Hungarian Government] has at its head a member of the Habsburg family which, through its policy and ambitions, is in great measure responsible for the calamities from which the world is suffering and will still suffer for a long time. A peace negotiated with a Government of this kind cannot be durable . . . and, in addition, the Allied and Associated Governments cannot accord the economic aid of which

¹ Andrassy, p. 848.

² For discussion of Rumania's action v. Vol. I, pp. 352-7, and this volume, Chap. IV, Part II, §§ 15-16.

³ General Gorton (Great Britain), General Bandholz (U.S.A.), General Graziani (France), General Mombelli (Italy), sent on the 5th August 1919.

Hungary is so much in need . . . There would be insurmountable difficulties if the elections were to take place under the control of a Habsburg . . . It is therefore in the interest of European peace that the Allied and Associated Governments are obliged to insist upon the present pretender to supreme power in the Hungarian State resigning, and in order that a Government, in which all parties are represented, may be elected, that the Hungarian people should be consulted.

The . . . Powers would be willing to negotiate with any Government which has the confidence of an Assembly elected in this manner.'¹ (Supreme Council, 22nd August 1919.)

6. *Sir George Clerk's Mission, November 1919.* 'Joseph Habsburg', as 'the pretender' called himself, received this decision on the 24th August. He made no resistance to it and retired once again into oblivion. A period of much confusion then ensued, but, finally, in the second week of November, Sir George Clerk was despatched as Emissary of the Supreme Council to negotiate with leaders of various Hungarian parties and to arrange for a representative government, which would hold popular elections and be sufficiently stable to conduct negotiations for peace. When Sir George Clerk arrived Friedrich still held power with a more or less reactionary Cabinet. Conferences between various parties took place, during which period Admiral Horthy, now commanding the Hungarian Army, arrived in Budapest on the 14th November. He pressed for a compromise government on the ground that it was necessary to meet the wishes of the Allies, and that without it he could no longer keep order. Sir George Clerk succeeded finally in forming a Ministry headed by Huszar, containing representatives of Christian Nationals, Small Farmers, and also two Social Democrats (26th November 1919). This Government was recognized as a provisional *de facto* one, and an invitation to Paris was then despatched by the Supreme Council.² It was pledged to fulfil four conditions: (1) speedy holding of elections; (2) preservation of order; (3) ordinary courts of justice without courts martial; (4) freedom of speech, of elections, etc.

7. *The Elections, January 1920.* The elections for an Assembly which were held in January 1920 resulted in the votes being pretty evenly divided between Christian Nationals and 'Small Farmers'. It is evident that many Socialists and

¹ Text in *The Times* of 25th August 1919.

² v. Chap. VII, Part III, Hungary, §§ 1 and 2.

Social Democrats abstained from voting. The first result of this action was that the National Assembly elected Admiral Horthy as Governor (1st March) by a large majority. Very serious disturbances began shortly after his admission to office, arrests by the Government of Jews and Socialists taking place in many cases, while mobs and ex-officers committed various excesses. These deplorable incidents have produced a controversy which is still to some degree unsettled.¹ It is, however, important to point out that, with the elections to the National Assembly and the appointment of Horthy as Governor, Hungary passed out of the state of tutelage to the Allied Powers in which she had previously been. The Allied Powers still retained the right of remonstrance or protest but had divested themselves of the power of active interference in the internal affairs of the New Hungary, unless her actions were such as to endanger the Peace Treaty. In her purely international conduct the New Hungary has acted in a technically correct manner in all respects except one, which will be mentioned later. Her army has been kept nearly within the prescribed limits, and she has signed and ratified the Treaty. The Hungarian press, however, has continued to denounce the Peace Treaty, and, so far as public opinion can be gathered from that source, it shows no signs of accepting the Treaty provisions as permanent.

8. *International Safeguards of the Treaty with Hungary.*
 (a) *Anti-Habsburg Declaration of Allied Great Powers, 2nd February 1920.* Under the circumstances, it becomes important to examine the obligations under which the Allied and Associated Powers lie with regard to Hungary. It seems clear that they have definitely pledged themselves to resist the return of a Habsburg to the Hungarian throne. This is necessary for two reasons. First, the return of a Habsburg might reasonably be held to threaten the existence of the 'successor-states' arising out of both Austrian and Hungarian territories. Next, as King of Hungary, Charles did not abdicate: he indeed expressly refused to do so.² Apponyi has recently said, 'The crowned King of Hungary lives, the throne has never been

¹ v. Hohler, Report of 21st February 1920 on alleged 'White Terror'; Parl. Paper, Misc. No. 9 (1920), Cmd. 673; and contrast Report of British Labour Commission of Inquiry, May 1920.

² Cf. Andrassy, p. 328. Apponyi's remark is quoted in *New Republic*, 26th January 1921, p. 250.

vacant.' Károlyi declared a Republic, but the arrangements made by 'Joseph Habsburg' to act as Administrator, and by Horthy to act as Governor, suggest that the throne is not held by them to be vacant and that, in their view, Charles had merely renounced the exercise of royal power till a more fitting season. The Peace Treaty does not itself forbid the revival or restoration of Monarchy. But the Allies have refused to permit a Habsburg to return to the throne. When this subject was under discussion in connexion with the Peace Treaty,¹ the Allied Powers reiterated their declaration of the 22nd August 1919. While disclaiming all interference with the internal affairs of Hungary, they stated that 'they cannot admit that the restoration of the Habsburg Dynasty can be considered merely as a matter interesting the Hungarian Nation, and hereby declare that such a restoration would be at variance with the whole basis of the Peace Settlement, and would be neither recognized nor tolerated by them'.² (Declaration by Great Britain, France, and Italy, 2nd February 1920.)

(b) *The 'Little Entente', 14th August 1920.* The two Powers of Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-slavia signed on the 14th August an agreement known as the 'Little Entente', which Rumania subsequently joined. Its articles have been published.³ It nowhere expressly states that the presence of a Habsburg on the throne of Hungary would be a *casus belli*, but it draws much tighter the bands between the three nations which surround Hungary and have deprived her of the largest part of her ancient kingdom. An anti-Habsburg Convention has also been signed between Italy and Yugo-slavia at the same time as the Treaty of Rapallo. On the 5th February 1921 at Rome Dr. Beneš, the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Secretary, stated that the resolve not to permit the return of the Habsburg was the basis and groundwork of the 'Little Entente'. Hungary had anticipated this through her new Foreign Minister Gratz (4th February), who had stated that the refusal to permit a Habsburg to return constituted an interference with the internal affairs of Hungary. On the 7th February 1921

¹ v. Chap. VII, Part III, Hungary, § 3, pp. 417-18.

² The United States concurred in the declaration of the 22nd August 1919, but apparently not in that of the 2nd February 1920.

³ v. text in this volume, App. III, p. 519. v. also an article on the 'Little Entente' by R. W. Seton-Watson in *New Europe*, 14th October 1920.

Mr. Hohler, British High Commissioner at Budapest, in a published interview expressly stated that the Powers' declaration against the Habsburgs (2nd February 1920) still held good. To this utterance Count Apponyi replied regretting that 'our goodwill had been so badly recompensed', while ex-Premier Friedrich said, 'It only remains to throw ourselves anew into the arms of Germany.' The conflict of view between Hungary and the Powers is evident.

(c) *The attempted coup d'état of ex-King Charles, 26th March-5th April 1921.* It must, however, be admitted that the Hungarian Government showed a very proper attitude in respect to the recent attempt of the ex-King Charles. Charles suddenly appeared from Switzerland and presented himself to Horthy at Budapest on Easter Sunday (27th March). The latter requested him to leave, and the ex-King departed to Steinamanger, a small town on the borders of West Hungary. Both Austrian and Hungarian Parliaments passed resolutions condemning the attempt; on the 1st April the Ambassadors' Council at Paris reaffirmed its previous anti-Habsburg declaration of the 2nd February 1920. The 'Little Entente' went further, made military preparations, and demanded the expulsion of Charles before the 7th April by an ultimatum. On the 5th April the ex-King bowed to the storm and recrossed the Hungarian frontier *en route* for Switzerland, thus averting a serious crisis.

9. *Prospects of the New Hungary.* The net result would appear to be that a forcible attempt by Hungary to restore the Habsburgs would be regarded as an attempt to disturb the boundaries, as at present laid down. This is likely to meet with definite and concerted resistance from several different nations, quite apart from the fact that the Hungarian Treaty is also defended by the general territorial guarantee of the League of Nations. No other country is surrounded by so close a network of treaty obligations and, failing a complete reversal of the existing state system, the future of Hungary must depend on the degree to which she accepts the conditions imposed upon her. She occupies at present a position midway between the New Austria and the New Bulgaria, being more able than the first and less willing than the second to carry out her Treaty obligations. The Hungarian case has been stated at infinite length by her apologists, who plead the misery of

her present circumstances.¹ But, in spite of the distress inflicted on her by the Béla Kun régime and the Rumanian occupation, it does not appear that her burdens are insupportable. She has indeed been reduced from a population of nearly twenty-one millions to seven and a half millions, of whom six and a quarter millions are Magyars. She has thus lost over three millions of her own race. The blow is a hard one, but not proportionately as hard as the measure meted out by the Rapallo Treaty to the Slovenes, whom we consider as friends. Perhaps even more serious than loss of territory is the feeling of resentment engendered by the partition of the historic kingdom among nationalities whom the Magyars had hitherto despised. In especial the Rumanian occupation of Budapest and of the country beyond the Theiss, and the treatment of Magyars in the new Rumanian territories, has awakened very bitter feeling. The facts are still, to some extent, in dispute, but the Rumanians have made no effective reply to the long catalogue of incidents, requisitions, etc., produced by the Hungarian Peace Delegation. One serious charge in particular has not been denied. The Rumanians have broken up the Hungarian University of Cluj (Kolozsvár) and dispersed the professors and educational staff, an action in flagrant contradiction to the securities to race and language afforded by the Minorities Treaty to which Rumania has subscribed. As regards economic damage no doubt the Rumanian occupation (following on Béla Kun's wild efforts) has caused much temporary distress. But in the more permanent sense the new Hungary does not seem unable to 'live of her own' provided her affairs are well managed.

The arable land left to her is very rich and, even though some of it has been damaged by neglect and much stock has also been surrendered, Hungary's agricultural wealth is to a large extent indestructible.² The river transportation

¹ v. e.g. Apponyi in *La Revue politique internationale*, January-March 1920. Cf. also Chap. VII, Part III, *passim*. A series of six pamphlets entitled 'East European Problems' gives the official case of Hungary, and the economic difficulties of the New Hungary have been illustrated in an atlas published by F. de Heinrich, the Hungarian Minister of Commerce.

² Hungary still retains 36 per cent. of her old population (Census of 1910) and, according to figures given in the 'Case of Hungary', *Balkan Review*, December 1920, pp. 354-67, she retains 43 per cent. of arable land, 85 per cent. of cattle, 44 per cent. of horses, 85 per cent. of railways, 15 per cent. of forests. She has no salt mines left, but retains the valuable coal-

conditions have been altered in her favour, and a Hungarian is now President of the Danube Commission, which has fixed its permanent seat at Budapest. Access to the sea has also been guaranteed. The real trouble from which Hungary is suffering is not military defeat, economic distress, or even political disturbance. The cause lies deep in her history. The Magyars have for long been a ruling race, capable, efficient, and proud. Until 1825 they were tolerant to other nationalities, until the war they were tolerant towards Jews. The war and the peace made the pre-war ruling classes hostile not only to other nationalities and to Jews, but also to Socialists. In fact, Socialists and Jews seem now to have replaced the nationalities as the victims of Magyar misrule. It is to be hoped that this inter-class bitterness is only temporary and that the social gulf may ultimately be bridged, for internal unrest of this kind, if it is to be prolonged, must ultimately destroy the State. It is also serious that the Government seems continually to suggest the necessity of increasing its army on the pretext of employing it in anti-Bolshevist Crusades. The increase of Hungarian military forces is at least as menacing to the 'Little Entente' as it is to the Bolsheviks, especially as the former lie nearer to Hungary. Moreover, the policy which demands an increase of armed force in Hungary is more dangerous than that armed force itself. The future of the New Hungary is therefore dark and clouded, for Hungary cannot really be saved except by herself. The most hopeful sign is the rise to power of the 'Small Farmers' party, a party representing small landowners, and therefore representing Hungary in her best and most historic aspects, as the paradise of sturdy yeomen. Their programme is definitely anti-Habsburg, and, with the growth of political experience, they may be able to form a balance between the two extremes represented by the Red and the White Terrors. The real difficulty seems to be that, while the revolutionaries showed no respect for the past, the reactionaries had and have no plan for the future. The advent of the yeoman-class to direct political power is a new event in Hungarian history, but it conforms to certain ingrained historic and national tendencies. The dangers are now from the side of reaction as Andrassy himself has seen and

mines of Pécs. Cf. opinion of Dr. Mezes, the American expert at the Conference; C. T. Thompson, *The Peace Conference Day by Day*, pp. 274-5.

written.¹ Until law and order are once more fully established, prophecy is dangerous and progress impossible. But two facts seem certain. The old conservative régime in Hungary was shattered in the war beyond hope of redemption. The nationality problems no longer exist in any serious form,² and the establishment of universal suffrage has produced an epoch-making change in the historic Hungarian polity. Hungary is to-day and for the first time really 'the Land of the Magyars', but it is, or at least it should be, the land of all the Magyars and not of the privileged few. Given an adequate opportunity this gifted political race ought not to fail to adjust itself to the provisions of the Peace Treaty and to the conditions of the modern world. But Hungary's ultimate reconciliation with the three enlarged national States upon her borders and with Austria does not really depend on herself or upon them, for injuries or wounds on all sides are too recent and too deep. The healing process must be left to the Great Powers, who alone are in a position to mediate between and to reconcile these conflicting aims and ambitions. It is, however, not the Great Powers but the League which is the guardian of the Minorities Treaties, on the upholding and execution of which the ultimate peace of Eastern Europe essentially depends.

¹ Andrássy, pp. 348-9. He has, however, himself now (Feb. 1921) joined the Christian Nationals.

² There are in the new Hungary approximately 6½ million Magyars, 480,000 Germans, 480,000 Jews, 180,000 Slovaks, 50,000 each of Yugo-slavs and Rumans, and 70,000 others. (v. Vol. V, Statistical Tables.)

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

TEXT OF AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN, BULGARIAN, AND TURKISH ARMISTICES¹

A

PROTOCOL OF THE ARMISTICE BETWEEN THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Signed November 3, 1918.

With Appendix.

A.—MILITARY CLAUSES.

I.—Immediate cessation of hostilities on land, by sea, and in the air.

II.—Complete demobilization of the Austro-Hungarian Army and immediate withdrawal of all units operating on the front from the North Sea to Switzerland.

There shall only be maintained in Austro-Hungarian territory, within the limits indicated below in Par. 8, as Austro-Hungarian military forces, a maximum of 20 Divisions reduced to their pre-war peace effective strength.

Half the total quantity of Divisional artillery, Army Corps artillery, as well as their respective equipment, beginning with all such material which is within the territories to be evacuated by the Austro-Hungarian Army,

A.—CLAUSES MILITAIRES.

I.—Cessation immédiate des hostilités sur terre, sur mer et dans l'air.

II.—Démobilisation totale de l'armée austro-hongroise et retrait immédiat de toutes les unités qui opèrent sur le front de la mer du Nord à la Suisse.

Il ne sera maintenu sur le territoire austro-hongrois, dans les limites ci-dessous indiquées au paragraphe 8, comme forces militaires austro-hongroises, qu'un maximum de 20 divisions réduites à l'effectif du pied de paix d'avant-guerre.

La moitié du matériel total d'artillerie divisionnaire, d'artillerie de corps d'armée, ainsi que l'équipement correspondant, en commençant par tout ce qui se trouve sur les territoires à évacuer par l'armée austro-hongroise,

¹ The English texts are those printed in White Paper Cmd 58. There are some discrepancies or mis-translations which are noted as they occur.

shall be concentrated within localities to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, for the purpose of being surrendered to them.

III.—Evacuation of all territory invaded by Austria-Hungary since the beginning of the war, and withdrawal of Austro-Hungarian forces, within a space of time to be laid down by the Generals Commanding-in-Chief of the Allied forces on the different fronts, beyond a line fixed as follows :

From Piz Umbrail as far as the North of the Stelvio, it will follow the crest of the Rhætian Alps as far as the sources of the Adige and of the Eisach, passing then by Mounts Reschen and Brenner and on the heights of the Oetz and the Ziller.

The line thence turns south, crossing Mount Toblach as far as present frontier of Carnic Alps. It follows this line as far as Mount Tarvis, thence to watershed of Julian Alps by Col de Predil, Mount Mangart, the Tricorno (Terglou) and watershed Podberdo, Podlaniscan and Idria. From this point the line turns south-east towards the Schneeberg, excluding the whole basin of the Save River and its tributaries ; from Schneeberg it descends the coast in such a way as to include Castua, Mattuglia and Volosca in evacuated territories.

It will follow the administrative limits of present province of Dalmatia, including to the north Lisarica and Tribania, and to the south territory limited by a line from the shore of Cape Planka to the summits of water-

devra être réuni entre des points à fixer par les Alliés et les États-Unis d'Amérique pour leur être livré.

III.—Évacuation de tout territoire envahi par l'Autriche-Hongrie depuis le début de la guerre et retrait des forces austro-hongroises dans un délai à déterminer par les Généraux Commandants en chef des forces alliées sur les différents fronts, au delà d'une ligne fixée comme suit :

Du Piz Umbrail jusqu'au nord du Stelvio, elle suivra la crête des Alpes Rhétiennes jusqu'aux sources de l'Adige et de l'Eisach, passant alors par les monts Reschen et Brenner et sur les hauteurs de l'Oetz et du Ziller.

La ligne ensuite se dirigera vers le sud, traversera le Mont Toblach et rejoindra la frontière actuelle des Alpes Carniques. Elle suivra cette frontière jusqu'au Mont Tarvis, et, après le Mont Tarvis, la ligne de partage des eaux des Alpes Juliennes par le Col Prédil, le Mont Mangart, le Tricorno (Terglou) et la ligne de partage des eaux des Cols de Podberdo, de Podlaniscan et d'Idria. A partir de ce point, la ligne suivra la direction du sud-est vers le Schneeberg, laissant en dehors d'elle tout le bassin de la Save et de ses tributaires ; du Schneeberg, la ligne descendra vers la côte, de manière à inclure Castua, Mattuglia et Volosca dans les territoires évacués.

Elle suivra également les limites administratives actuelles de la province de Dalmatie, en y comprenant, au nord, Lisarica et Tribania, et au sud jusqu'à une ligne partant sur la côte du Cap Planka et suivant vers l'est les

shed eastwards so as to include in evacuated area all the valleys and watercourses flowing towards Sebenico, such as Cicola, Kerka, Butisnica, and their tributaries. It will also include all the islands in the north and west of Dalmatia from Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Scherda, Maon, Pago and Puntadura islands, in the north, up to Meleda, in the south, embracing Sant' Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Tercola, Curzola, Cazza and Lagosta as well as neighbouring rocks and islets and Pelagosa, only excepting the islands of great and small Zirona, Bua, Solta and Brazza.

All territories thus evacuated will be occupied by Allied and American troops.

All military and railway equipment of all kinds (including coal) within these territories to be left *in situ*, and surrendered to the Allies and America according to special orders given by Commander-in-Chief of forces of Associated Powers on different fronts.

No new destruction, pillage or requisition by enemy troops in territories to be evacuated by them and occupied by Associated Powers.

IV.—Allied Armies shall have the right of free movement over all road and rail and waterways in Austro-Hungarian territory which shall be necessary.

Armies of Associated Powers shall occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary at such times

sommets des hauteurs formant la ligne de partage des eaux, de manière à comprendre dans les territoires évacués toutes les vallées et cours d'eau descendant vers Sebenico, comme la Cicola, la Kerka, la Butisnica et leurs affluents. Elle enfermera aussi toutes les îles situées au nord et à l'ouest de la Dalmatie depuis Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Scherda, Maon, Pago et Puntadura au nord, jusqu'à Meleda au sud, en y comprenant Sant' Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Tercola, Curzola, Cazza et Lagosta, ainsi que les rochers et îlots environnants, et Pelagosa, à l'exception seulement des îles Grande et Petite Zirona, Bua, Solta et Brazza.

Tous les territoires ainsi évacués seront occupés par les forces des Alliés et des États-Unis d'Amérique.

Maintien sur place de tout le matériel militaire et de chemin de fer ennemi qui se trouve sur les territoires à évacuer.

Livraison aux Alliés et aux États-Unis de tout ce matériel (approvisionnements de charbon et autres compris) suivant les instructions de détail données par les Généraux Commandants en chef les forces des Puissances associées sur les différents fronts.

Aucune destruction nouvelle, ni pillage, ni réquisition nouvelle par les troupes ennemies dans les territoires à évacuer par l'ennemi et à occuper par les forces des Puissances associées.

IV.—Possibilité pour les Armées des Puissances associées de se mouvoir librement par l'ensemble des routes, chemins de fer et voies fluviales des territoires austro-hongrois nécessaires.

Occupation par les Armées des Puissances associées de tous points stratégiques en Autriche-Hongrie

as they may deem necessary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order.

They shall have right of requisition on payment for troops of Associated Powers wherever they may be.

V.—Complete evacuation of all German troops within 15 days not only from Italian and Balkan fronts but from all Austro-Hungarian territory.

Internment of all German troops which have not left Austria-Hungary before that date.

VI.—Administration of evacuated territories of Austria-Hungary will provisionally be entrusted to local authorities under control of the Allied and associated armies of occupation.

VII.—Immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, of all prisoners of war and interned Allied subjects and of civilian populations evacuated from their homes on conditions to be laid down by Commanders-in-Chief of forces of Allied Powers on various fronts.

VIII.—Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by Austro-Hungarian personnel who will be left on the spot with medical material required.

B.—NAVAL CONDITIONS.

I.—Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to location and movements of all Austro-Hungarian ships.

Notification to be made to neutrals that free navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines

et à tous moments jugés nécessaires par ces Puissances pour rendre possible toutes opérations militaires ou pour maintenir l'ordre.

Droit de réquisition contre paiement pour les Armées des Puissances associées dans tous les territoires où elles se trouveront.

V.—Complète évacuation, dans un délai de 15 jours, de toutes troupes allemandes, non seulement des fronts d'Italie et des Balkans, mais de tous territoires austro-hongrois.

Internement de toutes troupes allemandes qui n'auraient pas quitté avant ce délai le territoire austro-hongrois.

VI.—Les territoires austro-hongrois évacués seront provisoirement administrés par les autorités locales sous le contrôle des troupes alliées ou associées d'occupation.

VII.—Rapatriement immédiat, sans réciprocité, de tous les prisonniers de guerre, sujets alliés internés et populations civiles évacuées, dans les conditions à fixer par les Généraux Commandants en chef les Armées des Puissances alliées sur les fronts.

VIII.—Les malades et blessés inévacuables seront soignés par du personnel austro-hongrois qui sera laissé sur place avec le matériel nécessaire.

B.—CLAUSES NAVALES.

I.—Cessation immédiate de toute hostilité sur mer et indications précises de l'emplacement et des mouvements de tous les bâtiments austro-hongrois.

Avis sera donné aux neutres de la liberté concédée à la navigation des marines de guerre et de commerce des Puissances alliées et

of the Allied and Associated Powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

II.—Surrender to the Allies and United States of America of 15 Austro-Hungarian submarines completed between years 1910 and 1918 and of all German submarines which are in or may hereafter enter Austro-Hungarian territorial waters. All other Austro-Hungarian submarines to be paid off and completely disarmed and to remain under supervision of the Allies.

III.—Surrender to the Allies and United States of America, with their complete armament and equipment, of 3 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 9 destroyers, 12 torpedo-boats, 1 mine-layer, 6 Danube monitors, to be designated by the Allies and United States of America.

All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in Austro-Hungarian naval bases to be designated by the Allies and United States of America, and are to be paid off, completely disarmed and placed under supervision of Allies and United States of America.

IV.—Free navigation to all warships and merchant ships of Allied and Associated Powers to be given in the Adriatic, in territorial waters and up the River Danube and its tributaries in Austro-Hungarian territory.

Allies and Associated Powers shall have right to sweep up all minefields and obstructions, and positions of these are to be indicated.

In order to ensure free naviga-

associées dans toutes les eaux territoriales, sans soulever des questions de neutralité.

II.—Livraison aux Alliés et aux États-Unis d'Amérique de 15 sous-marins austro-hongrois achevés de 1910 à 1918 et de tous les sous-marins allemands se trouvant ou pouvant pénétrer dans les eaux territoriales austro-hongroises. Désarmement complet et démobilisation de tous les autres sous-marins austro-hongrois, qui devront rester sous la surveillance des Alliés et des États-Unis d'Amérique.

III.—Livraison aux Alliés et aux États-Unis d'Amérique, avec leur armement et équipement complets, de 3 cuirassés, 3 croiseurs légers, 9 destroyers, 12 torpilleurs, 1 mouilleur de mines, 6 monitors du Danube, à désigner par les Alliés et les États-Unis d'Amérique.

Tous les autres bâtiments de guerre de surface (y compris ceux de rivière) devront être concentrés dans les bases navales austro-hongroises qui seront désignées par les Alliés et les États-Unis d'Amérique et devront être démobilisés et complètement désarmés et placés sous la surveillance des Alliés et des États-Unis d'Amérique.

IV.—Liberté de navigation de tous les bâtiments des marines de guerre et de commerce des Puissances alliées et associées dans l'Adriatique, y compris les eaux territoriales, et sur le Danube et ses affluents en territoire austro-hongrois.

Les Alliés et les Puissances associées auront le droit de draguer tous les champs de mines et de détruire les obstructions dont l'emplacement devra leur être indiqué.

Pour assurer la liberté de navi-

tion on the Danube, Allies and United States of America shall be empowered to occupy or to dismantle all fortifications or defence works.

V.—Existing blockade conditions set up by Allied and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged, and all Austro-Hungarian merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture with the exceptions which may be made by a Commission nominated by Allies and United States.

VI.—All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in Austro-Hungarian bases to be designated by Allies and United States of America.

VII.—Evacuation of all the Italian coast, and of all ports occupied by Austria-Hungary outside their national territory, and abandonment of all floating craft, naval materials, equipment and materials for inland navigation of all kinds.

VIII.—Occupation by Allies and United States of America of land and sea fortifications and islands which form defences, and of dockyards and arsenals at Pola.

IX.—All merchant vessels held by Austria-Hungary belonging to Allies and Associated Powers to be returned.

X.—No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender or restoration.

XI.—All naval and mercantile prisoners of war of Allied and Associated Powers in Austro-Hungarian hands to be returned without reciprocity.

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, duly authorized, signify

gation sur le Danube les Alliés et les États-Unis d'Amérique pourront occuper ou démanteler tous les ouvrages fortifiés et de défense.

V.—Maintien du blocus des Puissances alliées et associées dans les conditions actuelles, les navires austro-hongrois trouvés en mer restent sujets à capture, sauf les exceptions qui seront admises par une Commission qui sera désignée par les Alliés et les États-Unis d'Amérique.

VI.—Groupement et immobilisation dans les bases austro-hongroises désignées par les Alliés et les États-Unis d'Amérique de toutes les forces aériennes navales.

VII.—Évacuation de toute la côte italienne et de tous les ports occupés par l'Autriche-Hongrie en dehors de son territoire national et abandon de tout le matériel flottant, matériel naval, équipement et matériel pour voie navigable de tout ordre.

VIII.—Occupation par les Alliés et les États-Unis d'Amérique des fortifications de terre et de mer, et des îles constituant la défense de Pola, ainsi que des chantiers et de l'Arsenal.

IX.—Restitution de tous les navires de commerce des Puissances alliées et associées détenus par l'Autriche-Hongrie.

X.—Interdiction de toute destruction des navires ou de matériel avant évacuation, livraison ou restitution.

XI.—Restitution, sans réciprocité, de tous les prisonniers de guerre des marines de guerre et de commerce des Puissances alliées et associées au pouvoir des Austro-Hongrois.

Les plénipotentiaires soussignés, dûment autorisés, déclarent d'ap-

their approval of above conditions.

3rd November 1918.

Representatives of Italian Supreme Command.

Ten. Gen. PIETRO BADOGLIO.
Magg. Gen. SCIPIONE SCIPIONI.
Colonn. TULLIO MARCHETTI.
Colonn. PIETRO GAZZERA.
Colonn. PIETRO MARAVIGNA.
Colonn. ALBERTO PARIANI.
Cap. Vasc. FRANCESCO ACCINNI.

prouver les conditions susindiquées.

3 novembre 1918.

Les Représentants du Commandement Suprême de l'Armée austro-hongroise.

Signés :

VICTOR WEBER EDLER VON WEBENAU.
KARL SCHNELLER.
Y. VON LIECHTENSTEIN.
J. V. NYÉKHÉGYI.
ZWIERKOWSKI.
VICTOR, FREIHERR VON SEILLER.
KAMILLO RUGGIERA.

SUPPLEMENT TO PROTOCOL

Contains details and executive clauses of certain points of the Armistice between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria-Hungary.

I.—MILITARY CLAUSES.

1.—Hostilities on land, sea and air, will cease on all Austro-Hungarian fronts 24 hours after the signing of the Armistice, *i. e.*, at 3 o'clock on 4th November (Central European time).

From that hour the Italian and Allied troops will not advance beyond the line then reached.

The Austro-Hungarian troops and those of her allies must retire to a distance of at least 3 kilometres (as the crow flies) from the line reached by the Italian troops or by troops of Allied countries. Inhabitants of the 3 kilometre zone included between the two lines (above-mentioned) will be able to obtain necessary supplies from their own army or those of the Allies.

All Austro-Hungarian troops who may be at the rear of the fighting lines reached by the Italian troops, on the cessation of hostilities, must be regarded as prisoners of war.

2.—Regarding the clauses included in Articles II and III concerning artillery equipment, and war material to be either collected in places indicated or left in territories which are to be evacuated, the Italian plenipotentiaries representing all the Allied and Associated Powers, give to the said clauses the following interpretation which will be carried into execution :

- (a) Any material or part thereof which may be used for the purpose of war must be given up to the Allied and Associated Powers. The Austro-Hungarian Army and the German troops are only authorized to take personal arms and equipment belonging to troops evacuating the

territories mentioned in Article III, besides officers' chargers, the transport train, and horses specially allotted to each unit for transport of food supplies, kitchens, officers' luggage and medical material. This clause applies to the whole army and to all the services.

- (b) Concerning artillery—it has been arranged that the Austro-Hungarian Army and German troops shall abandon all artillery material and equipment in the territory to be evacuated.

The calculations necessary for obtaining a complete and exact total of the artillery divisions and army corps at the disposal of Austro-Hungary on the cessation of hostilities (half of which must be given up to the Associated Powers) will be made later, in order to arrange, if necessary, for the delivery of other Austro-Hungarian artillery material and for the possible eventual return of material to the Austria-Hungarian Army by the Allied and Associated Armies.

All artillery which does not actually form part of the divisional artillery and army corps must be given up, without exception. It will not, however, be necessary to calculate the amount.

- (c) On the Italian front the delivery of divisional and army corps artillery will be effected at the following places: Trento, Bolzano, Pieve di Cadore, Stazione per la Carnia, Tolmino, Gorizia and Trieste.

8.—Special Commissions will be selected by the Commanders-in-Chief of Allied and Associated Armies on the various Austro-Hungarian fronts, which will immediately proceed, accompanied by the necessary escorts, to the places they regard as the most suitable from which to control the execution of the provisions established above.

4.—It has been determined that the designations M. Toblach and M. Tarvis indicate the groups of mountains dominating the ridge of Mts. Toblach and the Valley of Tarvis.

5.—The retirement of Austro-Hungarian troops and those of her allies beyond the lines indicated in Article III of the Protocol of Armistice Conditions, will take place within 15 days of the cessation of hostilities, as far as the Italian front is concerned.

On the Italian front, Austro-Hungarian troops and those of her allies must have retired beyond the line: Tonale—Noce—Lavis—Avisio—Pordoi—Livinallongo—Falzarego—Pieve di Cadore—Colle Mauria—Alto Tagliamento—Fella—Raccolana—Selle Nevea—Isonzo by the fifth day, they must also have evacuated the Dalmatian territory indicated above.

Austro-Hungarian troops on land and sea, or those of her allies, not having evacuated the territories indicated within the period of 15 days will be regarded as prisoners of war.

6.—The payment of any requisitions made by the armies of the

Allied and Associated Armies on Austro-Hungarian territory will be carried out according to paragraph 1 of page 227 of 'Servizio in Guerra—Part II, Edizione 1915', actually in force in the Italian Army.

7.—As regards railways and the exercise of the rights confirmed [conferred ?] upon the Associated Powers by Article IV of the Armistice agreement between the Allied Powers and Austria-Hungary, it has been determined that the transport of troops, war material and supplies for Allied and Associated Powers on the Austro-Hungarian railway system, outside territory evacuated in accordance with the terms of the Armistice, and the direction and working of the railways shall be effected by the employees of the Austro-Hungarian railway administration, under the supervision of special Commissioners selected by the Allied Powers, and the Military Italian Headquarters which it will be considered necessary to establish, the Austro-Hungarian authorities will give priority to Allied military trains, and will guarantee their safety.

8.—On territory to be evacuated at the cessation of hostilities, all mines on roads or railway tracts, all minefields and other devices for interrupting communications by road or rail must be rendered inactive and harmless.

9.—Within a period of 8 days from the cessation of hostilities, prisoners and Italian subjects interned in Austria-Hungary must cease all work, except in the case of prisoners and interned who have been employed in agricultural pursuits previous to the day on which the Armistice was signed. In any case they must be ready to leave at once on request of the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Army.

10.—Austria-Hungary must provide for the protection, safety and supplies (expenses of these to be repaid) of the various Commissions selected by the Allied Governments to take over war material and to exercise general control, whether in the territory to be evacuated or in any other part of Austria-Hungary.

II.—NAVAL CLAUSES.

1.—The hour for the cessation of hostilities by sea will be the same as that of the cessation of hostilities by land and air.

Before that time the Austro-Hungarian Government must have furnished the Italian Government, and those of the Associated Powers, with the necessary information concerning the position and movements of the Austro-Hungarian ships, through the Wireless Station at Pola, which will transmit the information to Venice.

2.—The units referred to in Articles II and III, to be surrendered to the Associated Powers, must return to Venice between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. on 6th November; they will take a pilot on board 14 miles from the coast. An exception is made as regards the Danube monitors, which will be required to proceed to a port indicated by the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Associated Powers on the Balkan front, under such conditions as he may determine.

3.—The following ships will proceed to Venice :

<i>Teghethoff.</i>	<i>Saida.</i>
<i>Prinz Eugen.</i>	<i>Novara.</i>
<i>Ferdinand Max.</i>	<i>Helgoland.</i>

Nine destroyers of *Tatra* type (at least 800 tons) of most recent construction.

Twelve torpedo-boats (200-ton type).

Minelayer *Chamaleon*.

Fifteen submarines built between 1910 and 1918, and all German submarines which are, or may eventually be, in Austro-Hungarian waters.

Premeditated damage, or damage occurring on board the ships to be surrendered will be regarded by the Allied Governments as a grave infringement of the present Armistice terms.

The *Lago di Garda* flotilla will be surrendered to the Associated Powers in the Port of Riva.

All ships not to be surrendered to the Associated Powers will be concentrated in the ports of Buccari and Spalato within 48 hours of the cessation of hostilities.

4.—As regards the right of sweeping minefields and destroying barrages, the Austro-Hungarian Government guarantees to deliver the maps of minefields and barrages at Pola, Cattaro and Fiume to the Commander of the Port of Venice, and to the Admiral of the Fleet at Brindisi within 48 hours of the cessation of hostilities, and within 96 hours of the cessation of hostilities, maps of minefields and barrages in the Mediterranean and Italian lakes and rivers, with additional notification of such minefields or barrages laid by order of the German Government as are within their knowledge.

Within the same period of 96 hours a similar communication concerning the Danube and the Black Sea will be delivered to the Commander of the Associated Forces on the Balkan front.

5.—The restitution of merchant ships belonging to the Associated Powers will take place within 96 hours of the cessation of hostilities, in accordance with the indications determined by each Associated Power, which will be transmitted to the Austro-Hungarian Government. The Associated Powers reserve to themselves the constitution of the Commission referred to in Article V, and of informing the Austro-Hungarian Government of its functions, and of the place in which it will meet.

6.—The naval base referred to in Article VI is Spalato.

7.—The evacuation referred to in Article VII will be effected within the period fixed for the retirement of the troops beyond the Armistice lines. There must be no damage to fixed, mobile or floating material in the ports.

Evacuation may be effected *via* the Lagoon canals by means of Austro-Hungarian boats which may be brought in from outside.

8.—The occupation referred to in Article VIII will take place within 48 hours of the cessation of hostilities.

The Austro-Hungarian authorities must guarantee the safety of vessels transporting troops for the occupation of Pola and of islands

and other places as provided for in the terms of the Armistice for the Land Army.

The Austro-Hungarian Government will give directions that the ships belonging to Associated Powers proceeding to Pola should be met 14 miles out by pilots capable of showing them the safest way into port. All damage to the persons or property of the Associated Powers will be regarded as a grave infringement of the present Armistice terms.

The undersigned duly authorized Plenipotentiaries have signified their approval of the above conditions.

8rd November, 1918.

*Representatives of the Supreme
Command of the Austro-Hun-
garian Army.*

VICTOR WEBER EDLER VON
WEBENAU.
KARL SCHNELLER.
Y. VON LIECHTENSTEIN.
J. V. NYÉKHEGYI.
ZWIERKOWSKI.
VICTOR, FREIHERR VON SEILLER.
KAMILLO RUGGERA.

*Representatives of the Supreme
Command of the Italian Army.*

Ten. Gen. PIETRO BADOGLIO.
Magg. Gen. SCIPIONE SCIPIONI.
Colonn. TULLIO MARCHETTI.
Colonn. PIETRO GAZZERA.
Colonn. PIETRO MARAVIGNA.
Colonn. ALBERTO PARIANI.
Cap. Vasc. FRANCESCO ACCINNI.

B

TEXT OF MILITARY CONVENTION BETWEEN THE
ALLIES AND HUNGARY

Signed at Belgrade, 18th November, 1918.

MILITARY CONVENTION REGULATING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH
THE ARMISTICE, SIGNED BETWEEN THE ALLIES AND AUSTRIA-
HUNGARY, IS TO BE APPLIED IN HUNGARY.

1.—The Hungarian Government will withdraw all troops north of a line drawn through the upper valley of the Szamos, Bistritz, Maros-Vásárhely, the river Maros to its junction with the Theiss, Maria-Theresiopel, Baja, Fünfkirchen (these places not being occupied by Hungarian troops), course of the Drave, until it coincides with the frontier of Slavonia-Croatia.

The evacuation to be carried out in 8 days, the Allies to be entitled to occupy the evacuated territory on the conditions laid down by the General Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. Civil Administration will remain in the hands of the Government.

In actual fact only the police and gendarmerie will be retained in the evacuated zone, being indispensable to the maintenance of order, and also such men as are required to ensure the safety of the railways.

2.—Demobilization of Hungarian naval and military forces. An exception will be made in the case of six infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions, required for the maintenance of internal order and in the case of small sections of police mentioned in paragraph 1.

3.—The Allies to have the right of occupying all places and strategic points, which may be permanently fixed by the General Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

The Allied troops to be allowed to pass through, or to remain in any part of Hungary.

The Allies to have permanent right of use, for military purposes, of all rolling stock and shipping belonging to the State or to private individuals resident in Hungary, also of all draught animals.

4.—The rolling stock and railway staff usually employed in the occupied territory will remain (*see* paragraph 1), and a reserve of 2,000 wagons and 100 locomotives (normal gauge), and 600 wagons and 50 locomotives (narrow gauge), will also be handed over within the month to the General Commander-in-Chief. These will be for the use of the Allied troops, and to compensate for the deficiency of material from Serbia due to the war. Some portion of this material could be levied from Austria. The figures are approximate.

5.—The ships and crews, usually employed in the service of the occupied territory will remain, in addition to monitors will be surrendered to the Allies immediately at Belgrade[?]. The rest of the Danube flotilla will be assembled in one of the Danube ports, to be appointed later by the General Commander-in-Chief, and will be disarmed there. A levy of 10 passenger vessels, 10 tugs, and 60 lighters will be made on this flotilla as soon as possible for the use of the Allied troops, to compensate for the deficiency of material from Serbia, due to the war. The figures are approximate.

6.—Within 15 days a detachment of 3,000 men from the railway technical troops are to be placed at the disposal of the General Commander-in-Chief supplied with the material necessary to repair the Serbian railways. These figures are approximate.

7.—Within 15 days a detachment of sappers of the Telegraph branch are to be placed at the disposal of the General Commander-in-Chief provided with material necessary for establishing telegraphic and telephone communications with Serbia.

8.—Within one month, 25,000 horses are to be placed at the disposal of the General Commander-in-Chief, together with such transport material as he may deem necessary. These figures are approximate.

9.—Arms and war material to be deposited at places appointed by the General Commander-in-Chief. A portion of this material will be levied for the purpose of supplying units to be placed under the orders of the General Commander-in-Chief.

10.—Immediate liberation of all Allied prisoners of war and interned civilians, who will be collected at places convenient for their despatch by rail; they will there receive directions as to time and place of repatriation, according to the orders issued by the General Commander-in-Chief. Hungarian prisoners of war to be provisionally retained.

11.—A delay of 15 days is granted for the passage of German troops through Hungary and their quartering meanwhile, dating from the signing of the Armistice by General Diaz (4th November, 3 p.m.). Postal and telegraphic communication with Germany will

only be permitted under the military control of the Allies. The Hungarian Government undertakes to allow no military telegraphic communication with Germany.

12.—Hungary will facilitate the supplying of the Allied troops of occupation; requisitions will be allowed on condition that they are not arbitrary, and that they are paid for at current rates.

13.—The situation of all Austro-Hungarian mines in the Danube and the Black Sea must be communicated immediately to the General Commander-in-Chief. Further, the Hungarian Government undertakes to stop the passage of all floating mines sown in the Danube up stream from the Hungarian and Austrian frontier and to remove all those actually in Hungarian waters.

14.—The Hungarian postal service, telegraphs, telephones and railways will be placed under Allied control.

15.—An Allied representative will be attached to the Hungarian Ministry of Supplies in order to safeguard Allied interests.

16.—Hungary is under an obligation to cease all relations with Germany and stringently to forbid the passage of German troops to Roumania.

17.—The Allies shall not interfere with the internal administration of affairs in Hungary.

18.—Hostilities between Hungary and the Allies are at an end.

Two copies made 18th November, 1918, at 11.15 p.m. at Belgrade.

Signed for the Allies by the delegates of the General Commander-in-Chief.

VOIVODE MISHITCH.
GENERAL HENRYS.

Signed for Hungary by the delegate of the Hungarian Government.

BÉLA LINDER.

C

THE ARMISTICE CONVENTION WITH BULGARIA

Signed September 29, 1918.

I.—Immediate evacuation, in conformity with an arrangement to be concluded, of the territories still occupied in Greece and Serbia. There shall be removed from these territories neither cattle, grain, nor stores of any kind. No damage shall be done

I.—Évacuation immédiate conformément à un arrangement à intervenir des territoires encore occupés en Grèce et en Serbie. Il ne sera enlevé de ces territoires ni bétail, ni grain, ni approvisionnement quelconque. Aucun dégât ne sera fait au départ.

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on departure. The Bulgarian Administration shall continue to exercise its functions in the parts of Bulgaria at present occupied by the Allies.

II.—Immediate demobilization of all Bulgarian armies, save for the maintenance on a war footing of a group of all arms, comprising three divisions of sixteen battalions each and four regiments of cavalry, which shall be thus disposed: two divisions for the defence of the Eastern frontier of Bulgaria and of the Dobrudja, and the 148th Division for the protection of the railways.

III.—Deposit, at points to be indicated by the High Command of the Armies of the East, of the arms, ammunition, and military vehicles belonging to the demobilized units which shall thereafter be stored by the Bulgarian authorities, under the control of the Allies.

The horses likewise will be handed over to the Allies.

IV.—Restoration to Greece of the material of the IVth Greek Army Corps, which was taken from the Greek army at the time of the occupation of Eastern Macedonia, in so far as it has not been sent to Germany.

V.—The units of the Bulgarian troops at the present time west of the meridian of Uskub, and belonging to the XIth German Army, shall lay down their arms and shall be considered until further notice to be prisoners of war. The officers shall retain their arms.

VI.—Employment by the Allied armies of Bulgarian prisoners of war in the East until the conclusion of peace, without reciprocity as regards Allied prisoners of war. These latter shall be handed over without delay to

L'Administration bulgare continuera à fonctionner dans les parties de Bulgarie actuellement occupées par les Alliés.

II.—Démobilisation immédiate de toutes les armées bulgares, sauf en ce qui concerne le maintien en état de combattre d'un groupe de toutes armes comprenant trois divisions de seize bataillons chacune, quatre régiments de cavalerie qui seront affectés, deux divisions à la défense de la frontière est de la Bulgarie et de la Dobroudja, et la 148^e Division pour la garde des voies ferrées.

III.—Dépôt, en des points à désigner par le Haut Commandement des Armées d'Orient, des armes, des munitions, véhicules militaires appartenant aux éléments démobilisés, qui seront ensuite emmagasinés par les soins des autorités bulgares et sous le contrôle des Alliés.

Les chevaux seront également remis aux Alliés.

IV.—Remise à la Grèce du matériel du IV^e Corps d'Armée grec pris à l'armée grecque au moment de l'occupation de la Macédoine orientale, en tant qu'il n'a pas été envoyé en Allemagne.

V.—Les éléments de troupes bulgares actuellement à l'ouest du méridien d'Uskub et appartenant à la XI^e Armée allemande déposeront les armes et seront considérés jusqu'à nouvel ordre comme prisonniers de guerre; les officiers conserveront leurs armes.

VI.—Emploi jusqu'à la paix par les Armées alliées des prisonniers bulgares en Orient sans réciprocité en ce qui concerne les prisonniers de guerre alliés. Ceux-ci seront remis sans délai aux autorités alliées et les déportés civils seront

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the Allied authorities, and deported civilians shall be entirely free to return to their homes.

VII.—Germany and Austria-Hungary shall have a period of four weeks to withdraw their troops and military organizations. Within the same period the diplomatic and consular representatives of the Central Powers, as also their nationals, must leave the territory of the Kingdom. Orders for the cessation of hostilities shall be given by the signatories of the present convention.

(Signed)

General FRANCHET D'ESPEREY.
ANDRÉ LIAPCHEF.
E. T. LOUKOF.

General Headquarters,
September 29, 1918, 10.50 p.m.

complètement libres de rentrer dans leurs foyers.

VII.—L'Allemagne et l'Autriche-Hongrie auront un délai de quatre semaines pour retirer leurs troupes et leurs organes militaires. Dans le même délai, devront quitter le territoire du Royaume les représentants diplomatiques et consulaires des Puissances centrales, ainsi que leurs nationaux. Les ordres pour la cessation des hostilités seront donnés par les signataires de la présente convention.

(Signé)

Général FRANCHET D'ESPEREY.
ANDRÉ LIAPCHEF.
E. T. LOUKOF.

Général Quartier-général,
le 29 septembre 1918,
22 heures 50.

D

THE ARMISTICE CONVENTION WITH TURKEY¹

Signed October 30, 1918.

I.—Opening of Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and secure access to the Black Sea. Allied occupation of Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts.

II.—Positions of all minefields, torpedo-tubes, and other obstructions in Turkish waters to be indicated, and assistance given to sweep or remove them as may be required.

III.—All available information as to mines in the Black Sea to be communicated.

IV.—All Allied prisoners of war and Armenian interned persons and prisoners to be collected in Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to the Allies.

V.—Immediate demobilization of the Turkish army, except for such troops as are required for the surveillance of the frontiers and for the maintenance of internal order. (Number of effectives and their disposition to be determined later by the Allies after consultation with the Turkish Government.)

VI.—Surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters or in waters occupied by Turkey; these ships to be interned at such Turkish

¹ The original of this convention was signed in English.

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port or ports as may be directed, except such small vessels as are required for police or similar purposes in Turkish territorial waters.

VII.—The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies.

VIII.—Free use by the Allied ships of all ports and anchorages now in Turkish occupation and denial of their use to the enemy. Similar conditions to apply to Turkish mercantile shipping in Turkish waters for purposes of trade and the demobilization of the army.

IX.—Use of all ship-repair facilities at all Turkish ports and arsenals.

X.—Allied occupation of the Taurus tunnel system.

XI.—Immediate withdrawal of the Turkish troops from North-West Persia to behind the pre-war frontier has already been ordered and will be carried out. Part of Trans-Caucasia has already been ordered to be evacuated by Turkish troops; the remainder is to be evacuated if required by the Allies after they have studied the situation there.

XII.—Wireless telegraphy and cable stations to be controlled by the Allies, Turkish Government messages excepted.

XIII.—Prohibition to destroy any naval, military, or commercial material.

XIV.—Facilities to be given for the purchase of coal and oil fuel, and naval material from Turkish sources, after the requirements of the country have been met. None of the above material to be exported.

XV.—Allied Control Officers to be placed on all railways, including such portions of the Trans-Caucasian Railways as are now under Turkish control, which must be placed at the free and complete disposal of the Allied authorities, due consideration being given to the needs of the population. This clause to include Allied occupation of Batoum. Turkey will raise no objection to the occupation of Baku by the Allies.

XVI.—Surrender of all garrisons in Hedjaz, Assir, Yemen, Syria, and Mesopotamia to the nearest Allied Commander; and the withdrawal of troops from Cicilia, except those necessary to maintain order, as will be determined under Clause V.

XVII.—Surrender of all Turkish officers in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to the nearest Italian garrison. Turkey guarantees to stop supplies and communication with these officers if they do not obey the order to surrender.

XVIII.—Surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including Misurata, to the nearest Allied garrison.

XIX.—All Germans and Austrians, naval, military, and civilian, to be evacuated within one month from the Turkish dominions: those in remote districts to be evacuated as soon after as may be possible.

XX.—The compliance with such orders as may be conveyed for the disposal of the equipment, arms, and ammunition, including transport, of that portion of the Turkish Army which is demobilized under Clause V.

XXI.—An Allied representative to be attached to the Turkish Ministry of Supplies in order to safeguard Allied interests. This representative is to be furnished with all information necessary for this purpose.

XXII.—Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of the Allied Powers. The release of Turkish civilian prisoners over military age to be considered.

XXIII.—Obligation on the part of Turkey to cease all relations with the Central Powers.

XXIV.—In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets, the Allies reserve to themselves the right to occupy any part of them.

XXV.—Hostilities between the Allies and Turkey shall cease from noon, local time, on Thursday, 31st October, 1918.

Signed in duplicate on board His Britannic Majesty's Ship *Agamemnon*, at Port Mudros, Lemnos, the 30th October, 1918.

(Signed) ARTHUR CALTHORPE.
HUSSEIN RAOUF.
RECHAD HIKMET.
SAADULLAH.

APPENDIX II

A. THE AGREEMENT WITH RUMANIA

From a series of Russian diplomatic documents published in the 'Izvestiya' on 4th February, 1918, and summarized by the 'Manchester Guardian's' Petrograd correspondent (8th February).

On the same day [8th August, 1916] the text of an agreement between the Allies and Rumania is prepared, giving satisfaction to all Rumania's claims to the Banat, Transylvania up to the Theiss, and Bukovina up to the Pruth. M. Stürmer, in a memorandum to the Tsar, however, raises the objection that Rumania must not be regarded as on a footing with the Great Powers, and the latter must not be bound to continue the war until all Rumania's territorial claims are realized, since this would cause serious complications over the Constantinople straits. On 12th August the Tsar agrees to all the Rumanian terms. The secret treaty was signed on 17th August, the Salonika advance to take place on 20th August, and the entrance of Rumania on 28th August.

From a Note signed by General Polivanoff, dated 20th November, 1916, forming one of a series of diplomatic documents published by the 'Izvestiya' on 24th November, 1917.

. . . In August, 1916, there was signed a military-political agreement with Italy, giving her territorial extensions (in Bukovina, Banat, and Transylvania) which were obviously out of proportion with Rumania's share in the military operations.

B. THE SECRET TREATY WITH RUMANIA

POLITICAL AGREEMENT WITH RUMANIA, 17TH AUGUST 1916¹

Political Agreement.

Entre les soussignés :

1. Sir George Barclay, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande et des Dominions britanniques au delà des Mers, Empereur des Indes, près Sa Majesté le Roi de Roumanie ;

2. Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire du Président de la République française près Sa Majesté le Roi de Roumanie ;

3. Le Baron Fasciotti, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie près Sa Majesté le Roi de Roumanie ; et

4. M. Stanislas Poklevski-Koziell, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies près Sa Majesté le Roi de Roumanie ;

spécialement autorisés par leurs Gouvernements respectifs, d'une part ; et M. Jean J. C. Bratianu, Président du Conseil des Ministres du Royaume de Roumanie, au Gouvernement roumain, d'autre part, il a été convenu ce qui suit :

1^o La Grande-Bretagne, la France, l'Italie et la Russie garantissent l'intégrité territoriale du Royaume de Roumanie dans l'étendue de ses frontières actuelles.

2^o La Roumanie s'engage à déclarer la guerre et à attaquer l'Autriche-Hongrie dans les conditions stipulées par la Convention militaire ; la Roumanie s'engage également à cesser, dès la déclaration de la guerre, toutes relations économiques et échanges commerciaux avec tous les ennemis des Alliés.

3^o La Grande-Bretagne, la France, l'Italie et la Russie reconnaissent à la Roumanie le droit d'annexer les territoires de la Monarchie austro-hongroise stipulés et délimités à l'article 4.

4^o Les limites des territoires mentionnés à l'article précédent sont fixées comme suit :

La ligne de délimitation commencera sur le Pruth à un point de la frontière actuelle entre la Russie et la Roumanie près de Novoselitza et remontera ce fleuve jusqu'à la frontière de la Galicie au confluent du Pruth et du Cêremos. Ensuite elle suivra la frontière de la Galicie et de la Bukovine et celle de la Galicie et de la Hongrie jusqu'au point Stog coté 1655. De là elle suivra la ligne de séparation des eaux de la Tisza et du Viso, pour atteindre la Tisza au village de Trebusa en amont de l'endroit où elle s'unit au Viso. A partir de ce point elle descendra le thalweg de la Tisza jusqu'à 4 kilom. en aval de son confluent avec le Szamos, en laissant le village de Vasaros-Nameny à la Roumanie. Elle

¹ Text from *Le Temps*. A military Convention was also signed at the same time.

continuera ensuite dans la direction du sud-sud-ouest jusqu'à un point à 6 kilom. à l'est de la ville de Debreczen. De ce point elle atteindra le Crisch à 8 kilom. en aval de la réunion de ces deux affluents (le Crisch blanc et le Crisch rapide). Elle joindra ensuite la Tisza à la hauteur du village Algyö au nord de Szegedin, en passant à l'ouest des villages d'Oroszaza et de Bekessamson, à 8 kilom. duquel elle fera une petite courbe. A partir d'Algyö la ligne descendra le thalweg de la Tisza jusqu'à son confluent avec le Danube, et enfin suivra le thalweg du Danube jusqu'à la frontière actuelle de la Roumanie.

La Roumanie s'engage à ne pas élever de fortifications en face de Belgrade dans une zone à déterminer ultérieurement et à ne tenir dans cette zone que des forces nécessaires au service de police. Le Gouvernement Royal roumain s'engage à indemniser les Serbes de la région du Banat qui, abandonnant leurs propriétés, voudraient émigrer dans l'espace de deux ans à partir de la conclusion de la paix.

5° La Grande-Bretagne, la France, l'Italie et la Russie, d'une part, et la Roumanie, d'autre part, s'engagent à ne pas conclure de paix séparée ou la paix générale que conjointement et simultanément.

La Grande-Bretagne, la France, l'Italie et la Russie, s'engagent également à ce que, au traité de paix, les territoires de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, stipulés à l'article 4, soient annexés à la Couronne de Roumanie.

6° La Roumanie jouira des mêmes droits que ses Alliés pour ce qui a trait aux préliminaires aux négociations de la paix, ainsi qu'à la discussion des questions qui seront soumises aux décisions de la Conférence de la Paix.

7° Les Puissances contractantes s'engagent à garder secrète la présente convention jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix générale.

Fait en cinq exemplaires, à Bucarest, le 4/17 août 1916.

(L.S.) G. BARCLAY.

(L.S.) SAINT-AULAIRE.

(L.S.) FASCIOTTI.

(L.S.) S. POKLEVSKI-KOZIELL.

(L.S.) JON. J. C. BRATIANU.

C. TEXT OF NOTE FROM THE SUPREME COUNCIL TO THE RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT ¹

PARIS, December 3.

The Supreme Council has been obliged to examine anew the question of the relations between the Allies and Rumania which have been compromised by the difficulties brought forward for long months by the Rumanian Government in their reply to all demands of the Peace Conference relating to the observation of the general engagements which bind the Allies together. The point of departure of this situation was the refusal of Rumania to sign the Treaty with Austria and the

¹ *The Times*, 4th December 1919.

Treaty guaranteeing the rights of minorities implied in the first signature.

On the other hand, since the commencement of the month of August, that is to say, since the moment when the Rumanian troops occupied Budapest, the Supreme Council has not ceased to request the Rumanian Government to assume in Hungary an attitude compatible with the common principles of the Allies. With an untiring patience inspired by the respect which the Allies have for each other and the hope that the Rumanian Government would eventually recognize that they cannot evade the reciprocal engagements of the Allies, the Conference has endeavoured to maintain the bonds which unite the Allies to Rumania and to obtain the deference of that Government to the decisions of the Supreme Council. Pressing demands to this effect were addressed to the Government of Bukarest on August 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 23 and 25, September 5, October 12, and November 3 and 7.

In order to show the importance attached to obtaining the reply of Rumania, the Conference went to the length of sending a special envoy, Sir George Clerk, to Bukarest.

So many patient efforts have only resulted in a reply conciliatory indeed in words, but negative in facts, to the three questions put—the acceptance of the frontiers fixed by the Supreme Council, the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Austria and of the treaty of minorities, and the regularization of the situation in Hungary. The Rumanian Government has adjourned the first two questions and formulated a series of reserves which amounts to a refusal of the satisfaction demanded in the case of the third.

In presence of this attitude the Supreme Council decided to make a final appeal to the wisdom of the Rumanian Government and people, leaving to them the responsibility of the grave consequences which would result from a refusal or from an evasive reply. A term of eight days was fixed to receive the Rumanian reply. Taking note of the singular delay with which this telegram was transmitted to Bukarest, the Conference fixed, as the starting-point of the time allowed, the day on which the Council's telegram was in fact notified to the Rumanian Government, that is to say, Monday, November 24. This last delay expired at midday, December 2.

The Rumanian reply has not been such as the Supreme Council had the right to expect. Pleading the resignation of the Ministry and the recent assemblage of the new Parliament, the reply was limited to a request for a further delay in order that the new Government when constituted may undertake its responsibilities in agreement with the King and the Parliament. If the Supreme Council had adhered to their formal notifications they would, faced with the inconclusive reply from Bukarest, have broken off relations with Rumania, since that Power, in spite of the incessant requests, has agreed to nothing for many months.

Nevertheless, desirous of manifesting in an incontestable manner their moderation and their extreme regret at the prospect of Rumania separating herself from her Allies, the Supreme Council has decided to grant a further and last delay of six days to Rumania. This delay will date from Tuesday, December 2, and will expire on Monday, December 8.

The Council hopes that so kindly an attitude will be appreciated at its due value at Bukarest by the new Government, whose decision will definitely determine the political orientation of Rumania, and will express either the respect or disdain of that Power for the decisions of the Peace Conference.

APPENDIX III

THE 'LITTLE ENTENTE' TREATY

This treaty was signed at Belgrade on the 14th August 1920 between Serb-Croat-Slovene and Czecho-Slovak representatives. It was subsequently announced that Rumania had approved of this Treaty, and had (28 Ap. 1921) signed a similar engagement with Czecho-Slovakia, and with Yugo-slavia 7 June 1921.

'1. In case of an unprovoked attack on the part of Hungary against one of the contracting parties the other party pledges itself to come to the assistance of the party attacked, in accordance with the arrangements set out in Part 2 of the Convention.

2. The competent authorities of the two countries will decide together the necessary measures for the execution of this Convention.

3. Neither of the contracting parties may conclude an alliance with a third power without previously informing the other party.

4. The Convention shall be valid for two years, after which each contracting party shall be free to denounce the Convention, which will remain valid for a further six months as from the date of denunciation.

5. The Convention shall be presented to the League of Nations.

6. The Convention shall be ratified and the ratifications exchanged at Belgrade with the least possible delay.' ¹

¹ Ratifications exchanged September 22, 1920.

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